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Doeum.ent 729 9th May 1977 
AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty• Third Ordinary Session 
Paris, 20th-23rd June 1977 
I. Report of the Council 
Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council 
to the Assembly 
11. Political Questions 
1. Political activities of the Council - Reply 
to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of 
the Council 
2. Western Europe's policy towards Mediter-
ranean problems - the Western Mediter-
ranean 
3. Application of the final act of the CSCE 
Ill. Defence Questions 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty- Reply 
to the Twenty-Second Annua.l Report of 
the Council 
2. European security and Ea.st-West relations 
3. Anti-submarine warfare 
4. Strategic mobility 
5. A European armaments policy 
IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Scientific and technological co-operation in 
Europe - Reply to the Twenty-Second 
Annual Report of the Council 
2. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies -
new maritime sources of energy 
3. Review of advanced technology in Israel 
V. Budgetary and Administrative Questiou 
Dra.ft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for the 
fina.ncia.l year 1977 
VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
Motion for a Resolution on the designation 
of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers 
to the WEU Assembly 
VII. Relations with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
H) 
Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Mendelaon on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armament& 
Report tabled by Mr. Duvieuaart on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Lord Seladon on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Piket on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf 
of the Committee for Relations with- Parliament& 
Document 730 
Moraing 9.30 a.m. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty .. Third Ordinary Session 
Paris, 20th-23rd June 1977 
MONDAY, 20th JUNE 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
10.30 a.m. 
Meetings of the Political Groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
l.f.th June 1977 
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. 
6. Twenty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
7. Political activities of the Council - Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
8. Application of the Brussels Treaty- Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
9. Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe - Reply to the twenty-second annual report 
of the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees. 
Vote8 on the draft recommendations. 
TUESDAY, 2bt JUNE 
Moraing 9.30 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and of the Committee on 
Defence ~estions and Armaments. 
A European armaments policy : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
3 p.m. 
I. European security and East-West relations : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the 
WEU Assembly : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Piket on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion for a resolution. 
WEDNESDAY,Hnd JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
10 a.m. 
I. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1977: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft opinion. 
2. Anti-submarine warfare: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems- the Western Mediterranean: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Urwin on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
3.30 p.m. 
Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs of the United Kingdom. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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THURSDAY, 23rd JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
10 a.m. 
Application of the final act of the CSCE : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Safeguarding Europe's ener~ supplies - new maritime sources of energy : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Review of advanced technology in Israel : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. · 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. Relations with Parliaments: 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION 
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Document 731 11th March 1977 
Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1916 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Second Annual 
Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1976. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters: 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly ................................ .. 
11. Activities of the Council ....................................................... . 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency ...........................................•......... 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee ............................................ , , .. . 
V. Public Administration Committee .........................•...................... 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions ........................................ .. 
14 
15 
17 
23 
30 
32 
34 
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CHAPTER! 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
In his address to the Assembly in June 1976, 
the Chairman-in-Office reiterated that it WBB the 
Council's constant concern to maintain good· rela-
tions with the Assembly. 
A. Annual report of the Council to 
the Assembly 
The Council noted with satisfaction that the 
Assembly had appreciated their early transmis-
sion of the twenty-first annual report. 
This document had been drafted with the 
same care as in previous years. In the case of 
armaments control, certain further details 
requested by the Assei:nbly had been provided 
in accordance with the procedure applied by the 
Council since their reply to Written Question 123 
in 1971. 
The Council also answered the various points 
raised in Assembly Recommendations 284 and 
285 concerning the twenty-first annual report. 
B. Assembly recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put to the Council by 
members of the Assembly 
The Council gave careful consideration to 
the reports presented by Assembly Committees 
and followed with interest the subsequent debates 
in plenary sessions on a number of important 
questions concerning European security and 
integration. 
They gave close attention to the eighteen 
recommendations 1 which the Assembly adopted 
during the second part of the twenty-first 
ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-
second ordinary session. They gave the same 
close attention to the eight written questions 2 put 
by members of the Assembly during 1976. 
In accordance with the undertakings given, 
the Council made every effort to answer all these 
recommendations and questions promptly. 
The preparation of replies to some of these 
texts, which dealt with developing questions, did 
in fact take rather a long time because the 
Council wished to be in a position to report the 
1. Numbered 273 to 290. 
2. Numbered 165 to 172. 
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most recent developments to the Assembly. This 
applied in particular to problems primarily 
within the province of other organisations; the 
Council then waited until they had details of 
consultations between Western European govern-
ments in the organisations concerned, so that they 
could supply the information sought by the 
Assembly in furtherance of its work. 
In all caBeS, the Council, assisted by national 
administrations, the working group and the 
Secretariat-General, mad~ every effort to reply 
to the Assembly as fully and substantially as 
possible. They noted the Assembly's comments 
on certain replies. In this connection, they wish 
to recall that their replies reflect the common 
view of the seven member countries, in accord-
ance with the principle of unanimity which 
governs their work. It is only in the most excep-
tional circumstances that the Council may find 
it. necessary to indicate that members' positions 
differ as, for example, when those positions are 
a logical consequence of the differing relations 
which member States have with a particular out-
side organisation. 
C. Speeches by ministers of member govem-
ments to the Assembly 
The Council fully understand the Assembly's 
frequently expressed wish to be better informed 
of member governments' positions on the subjects 
with which it deals. 
In 1976, therefore, as in previous years, 
several ministers attended the Assembly's plenary 
sessions (see Annex). They stated or explained 
their government's views in their speeches which 
covered a wide range of topics. 
D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly 
bodies 
Two informal meetings were held in Brussels 
on 31st May 1976, after the ministerial session 
of the Council. In the course of a working lunch, 
arranged in accordance with the agreement 
reached in 1968 and presided over by Mr. Van 
Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Belgium, the members of the Council had discus-
sions with the Presidential Committee. Later, at 
a meeting held early in the afternoon under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Destremau, Secretary of 
DOOUMENT 731 
State for Foreign Mfairs of France, they had an 
exchange of views with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
As the Council reiterated in their reply to 
the request for a joint meeting made by the 
General Affairs Committee in autumn 1976, they 
consider that informal meetings provide an 
appropriate means of fulfilling the parliamen-
tarians' desire for information because member 
governments' positions on the questions raised 
can be more freely expressed. The Council wish 
to repeat that they favour contacts of this nature, 
and are prepared to make their full contribution 
to them. 
E. Speeches by members of the Assembly in 
national parliaments 
The Council, who attach great importance to 
relations between the Assembly and national 
parliaments, because they help to strengthen the 
spirit of European solidarity, were pleased to 
note the opportunities taken in 1976 by members 
of the Assembly to put questions or to speak in 
their parliaments on subjects of particular inte-
rest to WEU. 
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ANNEX 
Speeches by Ministers of member States 
made during the twenty-second ordinary 
session of the Assembly 
First part (14th-11th June 1916) 
Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council ; 
Mr. Max van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands; 
Mr. Jos Chabert, Minister for Communica-
tions of Belgium ; 
Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
Second part (29th November-2nd December 1916) 
Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council ; 
Mr. Gaston Thorn, Minister for Foreign 
Mfairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg ; 
Mr. Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany; 
Mr. A.E.P. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal 
Navy of the United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER Il 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
In 1976, the Council met at ministerial level 
in Brussels on 31st May under the chairmanship 
of the Belgian Minister for Foreign .Affairs, 
Mr. Renaat Van Elslande. 
In add1tion, the permanent representatives 
met fifteen times and the working group regu-
larly as in the past. 
On various occasions during the year under 
review, the Council re-stated to the .Assembly 
the importance which they attach to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols. Moreover, the 
determination of each of the WEU partners to 
fulfil the obligations entered int() was reaffirmed 
in the speeches made by several ministers of the 
member governments to the .Assembly. 
The Council continued to pay close attention 
to the implementation of the treaty and its pro-
tocols. The various related problems were regular 
items on their agenda. Thus, the different aspects 
and stages of implementation of the Paris .Agree-
ments appeared on the agenda for their meetings 
thirty-four times. 
However, as indicated in their reply to 
Recommendation 285, the Council are not the 
only international body empowered to deal with 
the questions covered by .Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The member States of 
WEU are also members of the European Com-
munity, the North .Atlantic Council and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, which also have authority to dis-
cuss some of these problems. The Council con-
tinued to take account of the work in hand in 
those organisations when arranging their own 
activities. 
The Council kept the .Assembly informed of 
their work relating to the activities of the 
Standing .Armaments Committee. Developments 
on this matter throughout the year under review 
are summarised in Part B of this Chapter. 
Finally, as .the Council stated in the reply 
to Recommendation 285, they noted with interest 
.Assembly Resolutions 55 and 59 and the report 
of the General .Affairs Committee to the Presi-
dential Committee, in March 1976, on European 
union and WEU. 
A. Political questions 
1. East- West relations 
On 31st May 1976, in Brussels, Ministers 
discussed East-West relations in depth. They 
dealt mainly with the development of bilateral 
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relations between the member countries of WEU 
and those of the East si.nce the previous minis-
terial meeting. 
Statements were presented on bilateral 
contacts made during the period under con-
sideration. 
.As in previous years, the German Delegation 
gave a detailed account of the latest develop-
ments in the various aspects of relations between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the member 
countries of the Warsaw Pact and made parti-
cult8Jl' reference to human problmns. 
The Ministers discussed the follow-up to the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe. 
They reaffirmed the necessity for western 
countries to continue to consult together regard-
ing their bilateral and multilateral relations with 
the countries of the East. 
In their reply to .Assembly Recommendation 
276, the Council recalled that the maintenance 
of continuing consultations between members of 
WEU on all matters raised by the implementa-
tion of the final act of the CSCE was assured 
by the regular meetings of a working group set 
up for this purpose within the framew()rk of the 
political co-operation of the Nine, as well as 
through the discussions on the subject under the 
aegis of the North .Atlantic Council. 
Sharing the .Assembly's concern on certain 
points, the Council stated that member countries 
would insist on the full implementation of all 
the provisions of the final act of the CSCE, in 
particular those relating to the free movement of 
persons, ideas and information. They also stated 
that the principles set forth in the declaration 
on principles guiding relations between partici-
pating States were all of primary significance 
and that each of them would be interpreted taking 
into account the others : they added that there 
existed no intention on the part of member States 
of WEU to adopt any position or accept any 
interpretation contrary to any of the principles 
listed in the declaration. 
The importance which the member countries 
of WEU and their partners in the .Atlantic 
.Alliance attach to the full implementation of the 
final act of Helsinki was reaffirmed in point 4 
of the communique published after the North 
.Atlantic Council's ministerial meeting on 9th and 
lOth December 1976. With regard to the third 
basket, the .Assembly will note that "Ministers 
recalled that the final act acknowledges that 
wider human contacts and dissemination of 
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information would contribute to the strengthening 
of peace" and "expressed the hope that the 
Warsaw Pact countries would take measures 
leading to significant progress in the pace of 
implementation of the final act in the months 
to come". 
In their reply to Recommendation 276 men-
tioned earlier, the Council reiterated their assur-
ance that they entirely shared the Assembly's 
view regarding strict compliance with and full 
application of the quadripartite agreement on 
Berlin. Point 7 of the communique quoted above 
has since confirmed the position of all member 
governments of the Atlantic Alliance on this 
subject. 
2. Other foreign policy questions 
During 1976, the member governments of 
WEU played an active part in consultations in 
various fora on matters of common interest to 
the western governments. 
Wishing to maintain the dialogue with the 
Assembly on all questions concerning the a.pplica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council 
gave close attention to the recommendations on 
foreign policy questiollB transmitted to them by 
the Assembly. 
In their reply to Recommendation 278 on 
developments in the Iberian Peninsula and the 
Atlantic Alliance, they recalled that it was the 
guiding principle of the western democracies in 
their foreign relations not to intervene i.n the 
affairs of other countries. They str.essed that they 
have at all times a.dhered to this principle and, 
whenever advisable, have incorporated it in the 
texts of agreements and declarations governing 
their international relations. At the same time, 
however, this attitude could not constitute an 
obstacle to any expressions of sympathy by the 
western democracies for trends of opinion now 
emerging in favour of a pluralist democracy in 
countries where it had not yet been fully estab-
lished. 
The Council welcomed developments which 
were taking place in Western European States 
previously under authoritarian regimes. They 
also referred to the emergency EEC aid agreed 
upon as early as October 1975 to help Portugal. 
In reply to the concern expressed by the 
Assembly in Recommendation 282 on the resolu-
tion adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in November l 975, the Council str~d 
that their members considered the equation of 
Zionism with racism unacceptable and recalled 
that they had all therefore voted against the 
resolution. In common with theh· partners of the 
European Community, the member countries of 
WEU would seek to ensure that the adoption of 
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this text did not jeopardise the legitimate strug-
gle against racism and racial discrimination, i.n 
conformity with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and of the 1965 Convention on 
the elimination of all forms of racial discrimina-
tion ; the Nine would hold close corumltations 
whenever reference was made to the resolution in 
connection with the work of the United Nations. 
Finally the Council reaffir~ed the great 
importance attached by member countries to the 
early achievement of a negotiated settlement in 
the Middle East. They fully agreed with the 
.Assembly that the development of economic, 
cultural and political co-operation between 
Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediter-
ranean countries could have a favourable influ-
ence on the course of events in the region. They 
drew attention to the efforts which the EEC 
was making, as part of an overall Mediterranean 
approach, to establish close economic relations 
with the countries concerned. They also noted 
the general political significance of the Euro-
Arab dialogue bringing together the EEC ':ic.l?un-
tries and the members of the Arab League. . .. ,,+ 
B. Defence questions 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter 
of the annual report, the questiollB deriving from 
implementation of the modified Brllll!els Treaty 
and its protocols continued, in 1976, to form the 
central part of the Council's work. 
The importance of these a.ctivities was 
emphasised by the French Secretary of State 
for Foreign Mfairs when presenting the twenty-
first annual report to the Assembly in June, in 
his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
On that occasion, Mr. Destremau, in reminding 
the parliamentarians that the modified Brussels 
Treaty was one of the keystones in the security 
of the signatory States, affirmed that the Council 
attached the same importance as heretofore to 
the application of the provisions of the treaty 
and its protocols on the levels of forees and 
armaments of the member States. 
. Moreover, the Council gave a clear answer 
to Recommendation 284 on the application of the 
Brussels Treaty, and have assured the Assembly 
on many occasions that the mutual defence com-
mitment enshrined in Article V of the treaty 
remains entirely \l'alid. 
With regard to European armaments co-
operation, the Council of Ministers, at their 
meeting on 31st May 1976, in Brussels, instructed 
the Standing Armaments Committee to submit 
a detailed outline programme for a study of the 
armaments industries in member countries (see 
B. 3 below and Chapter IV). 
1. Level of forces of member States 
With the assistance of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments, the Council have followed, 
during 1976, as in previous years, the procedures 
required of them by the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
(a) Forces under N A.TO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and naval 
forces which member States of WEU place under 
NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II 
of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for 
a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these 
levels to be increased above the limits specified 
in Articles I and II. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that the 
limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol 
No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive 
information every year, in accordance with 
Article IV of that Protoe.ol, concerning the levels 
of forces placed under NATO command by 
member States of WEU which take part in the 
integrated structure. This information, which is 
transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking 
officer designated by the Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe, is based on force inspections 
carried out by SACEUR. 
The above information, as at the end of 
1975, which was conveyed by this high-ranking 
officer at the appropriate time, was presented 
to the Council by his representative on 2nd 
March. Information indicating the status as at 
the end of 1976 was requested in December. 
Furthermore, the Council have taken the 
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their Resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO com-
mand are studied in the light of the annual 
review. 
Thus, for the year 1975, a meeting was held 
in Brussels on 16th January 1976 of the perma-
nent representatives (or their substitutes) to the 
North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The 
Council examined the rt:>port from this meeting 
on 11th February 1976 and noted that the level 
of forces of these member States, as set out in 
the NATO force plan, fell within the limits fixed 
in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The Council also took 
note at the same time of a declaration on French 
forces by the permanent representative of France. 
The same procedure has alread(y been set in train, 
for 1976, by the end of the year under review. 
(b) Forces under national command 
'fhe strength and armaments of forces of 
· member States on the mainland of Europe 
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remaining under national command - internal 
defence and police forces, forces for the defence 
of overseas territories, and common defence 
forces - are fixed in accordance with the pro-
cedure laid down in the agreement signed in 
Paris on 14th December 1957. implementing 
Article V of Protocol No. II of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
* 
** 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able to fulfil in 1976 their obligations under 
Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In accordance with the undertaking given 
in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 213, the United Kingdom Government 
declares that the total level of British forces on 
the continent of Europe at 30th November 1976 
amounted to 60,985 men plus the Second Tactical 
Air Force. 
The continued need for the presence of 
troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for 
units of the British Army of the Rhine to be 
redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 
30th November 1976, there were some 4,419 men 
from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been 
previously stated, these units could be speedily 
returned to their duty stations in an emergency 
affecting NATO. 
3. Mandate given to the Standing Armaments Com· 
mittee to prepare an outline programme for a study 
of the armaments industries in member countries 
In 1976, the Council, desiring to make a 
contribution to efforts to improve European 
armaments procurement and standardisation, 
instructed the Standing Armaments Committee 
to submit to them a detailed outline programme 
for a study of the armaments industries in 
member countries. This decision, taken by the 
Council meeting at ministerial level on 31st May 
in Brussels, was conveyed to the Presidential 
Committee and Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments of the Assembly that same day. 
Detailed study in the Council earlier in the 
year had led up to approval of a mandate for 
the Standing Armaments Committee, the text of 
which was subsequently transmitted to the 
Assembly and to NATO. The exchanges, which 
continued during the later part of the year, 
culminated on 9th February 1977 in the submis-
sion to the Council of the SAC's detailed draft 
outline programme. 
Throughout 1976, the Council, who have 
noted the Assembly's keen interest in its dialogue 
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with them, have provided the parliamentarians 
with the fullest possible information, both in 
replies to recommendations and written questions, 
and on the occasion of ministerial addresses at 
sessions, particularly by the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council. This they wi11 continue to do. 
4. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) The Assembly sessions of December 1975 and 
June 1976 presented the Council with a number 
of recommendations and questions on defence 
topics. 
Questions relating to European armaments 
standardisation and procurement figured pro-
minently in these texts. In answer to Recom-
mendation 281, the Council stressed the import-
ance of building and maintaining a sound and 
sophisticated armaments industry in Europe, and 
asserted that European armaments co-operation 
would provide impulses for further European 
unification. The Council declared that all 
member governments attoohed particular import-
ance to activities aimed at co-operation and 
standardisation in the armameDJts field since they 
lead to a strengthening of the defence potential 
and to rationalisation of procurement. They 
further declared their resolve to press on with 
this task, despite the difficulties involved. Other 
aspects of defence co-operation in this sector 
were dealt with in the replies to Recommendations 
273, 280 and 283. 
With regard to a European defence policy, 
the Council noted, in answer to Recommendation 
273, the need for careful study of the long-term 
prospects for achieving such a policy as a logical 
completion of European union. Replying to 
Recommendation 285, they stated that no realistic 
approach could be made to the question of a 
European defence policy until substantial pro-
gress had been made towards political union. Yet, 
on the other hand, developments of a common 
foreign policy of the Nine could not stop short 
of common security and defence issues. 
The governments of member States availed 
themselves of the opportunity afforded by 
Recommendation 273 to underline that defence 
problems are a major concern of the Council, and 
that the modified Brussels Treaty, which com-
mits the member States to come to each other's 
assistance in the event of aggression, forms a 
fundamental element in the security system of 
Europe. 
Furthermore, the members of the Council 
noted, in their reply to Recommendation 288, the 
relevance of the Mediterranean basin to their 
security responsibilities. 
(b) During 1976, the Council answered six 
written questions on defence matters. These dealt 
with implementation of the modified Brussels 
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Treaty, the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the independent European programme group, 
British forces on the mainland of Europe, French 
forces in Germany and aerial surveillance. 
5. Symposium on a European armaments policy 
The Council noted with interest details con-
cerning preparation of this symposium, organised 
by the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, which would be held on 3rd and 4th 
March 1977, in Paris. 
C. Scientific, technical and space questions 
The Council noted with interest Recom-
mendation 286 on scientific, technological and 
aerospace questions, sent to them by the Assembly 
in reply to the twenty-first annual report. In 
their reply of October 1976, they made the fol-
lowing comments concerning the prospects for a 
European policy in this field : 
"The Council share the view expressed in 
the recommendation that the promotion of 
technological co-operation in a European 
framework continues to be of great import-
ance. They note with satisfaction that pro-
gress towards a common medium- and long-
term policy has already been achieved in 
several sectors. With regard to space applica-
tions, the European Space Agency has been 
entrusted with the elaboration and imple-
mentation of a long-term European space 
programme. In the field of research, the 
European Communities continue to carry out 
medium-term programmes, with special 
emphasis on energy and environmental pro-
tection. The Council agree with the view 
that the effort to co-ordinate and harmonise 
national medium- and long-term programmes 
should be encouraged." 
The Council were also greatly interested by 
the very full reports prepared by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, on three subjects to the study of which 
the Assembly has made a major contribution over 
a number of years : European aviation, the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy, and co-operation 
between Europe and the United States. They 
gave careful consideration to Recommendations 
274, 275, 277 and 289 on these subjects, and 
replied to them in as much detail as possible. 
The Council also answered Recommendation 
279 on the International Institute for the Manage-
ment of Technology. 
1. European aviation 
The Council appreciated the quality of the 
report prepared by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace questions following 
the colloquy which it organised in Toulouse on 
2nd and 3rd February 1976. 
As they stated in their reply to Recom-
mendation 289 in November, the Council are 
concerned by the uncertainties which hang over 
the future of Europe's aeronautical industry and 
airlines, both as regards maintenance of their 
production, marketing and operating capacity 
and as regards research and advanced techniques. 
In their view, closer co-operation is needed 
between the national aeronautical industries. 
The introduction of a concerted European 
policy designed to safeguard these industries, and 
to limit competition and encourage co-operation 
between them is the subject of detailed bilateral 
and multilateral discussions between member 
countries of the Community and at Community 
level. In particular, the ideas put forward in the 
action programme for the European aeronautical 
industry, proposed by the Commission of the 
Communities on 1st October 1975, are being 
studied, together with the conclusions of the col-
loquy organised at Toulouse. 
In the Council's opinion, any such policy 
should aim not at creating a protected European 
market, but at ensuring the continued activity 
of this major sector of industry and, therefore, at 
expanding its international markets. 
The Council made a close study of the various 
suggestions contained in Recommendation 289 
and would like to draw attention to the following 
points from their reply : 
- The creation of a national aeronautical 
council in each of the member countries con-
cerned might help to initiate concerted action 
at national level by the various interests con-
cerned. At the same time sueh national councils 
might duplicate the work of other institutions 
and their establishment does not seem to be 
essential as a first step. 
From this standpoint, the idea of setting up 
a special European institution to promote the 
policy of concerted action has its merits. How-
ever, in the present state of the aeronautical 
industry in Europe, its problems are unlikely to 
be resolved by such an institution. Moreover, its 
establishment seems out of the question until 
major progress has been made towards European 
union. Consequently, it is too soon to consider 
setting up a European aeronautical council based 
on national councils. 
- The Council favour the harmonisation of 
national aeronautical policies. However, they 
believe that a pragmatic approach should be 
adopted in the matter. 
In present circumstances, therefore, they feel 
it would be unrealistic to consider formulating 
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a joirut European air transport policy or adopting 
a joint European position in negotiations with 
the rest of the world. 
- In the military field, the Council recog-
nise the need for member countries to determine 
their aircraft requirements and &tudy the question 
jointly. On the other hand, as the independent 
European programme group is already in exis-
tence, with tasks which include military aircraft 
problems, they feel that there is no need to 
promote the creation of a special study group in 
WEU. 
2. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
In their reply to Recommendation 277 on 
second-generation nuclear reactors, the Council 
recalled that the member countries of the Com-
munities are pursuing a common policy based 
on the treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community. They further observed that 
decisions taken by the OECD Council or the 
Steering Committee of the Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the OECD are carried out by member 
countries with due regard to their obligations 
under the Euratom Treaty. 
The Council also recalled that member 
governments have, for many years, been pro-
moting the development of the nuclear energy 
industry so as to meet the growing requirements 
not only of their own countries, but also of the 
rest of the world. They added that European 
firms are perfectly capable of meeting the 
requirements for nuclear power plants on the 
world market. 
3. Co-operation between the United States and 
Europe 
The Council agree with the Assembly on the 
need to seek an overall policy in the field of 
advanced technology, designed to guarantee 
Western Europe's place in the world, and to 
foster fruitful co-operation with the United 
States on an eqool footing. 
As was reca11ed in the reply to Recommend-
ation 275, European policies in this field are 
co-ordinated through several international organ-
isations such as the European Communities and 
the European Space Agency. European policies 
are already formulated through these organisa-
tions, which provide the opportunity for streng-
thening Europe's technological base and co-
ordinating with other States. The Council con-
sider that the work done in these various organ-
isations represents a not inconsiderable effort in 
the direction sought by the Assembly. 
As regards collaboration on space questions 
between Europe and the United States, the 
Council pointed out to the Assembly that the 
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Director-General of the European Space Agency 
was in constant touch with the competent United 
States authorities and, in particular, with NASA, 
for the purpo.se of implementing the Spacelab 
programme as at present laid down and ulti-
mately, of establishing permanent co-ope~ation 
based on the practical results of the :first common 
space experiments. 
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Contacts with other international organisations 
In the course of the year, the principal 
officers of the Secretariat-General, representing 
Western European Union, attended a number of 
meetings of other international organisations as 
observers when questions of concern to WEU 
were under discussion. As in previous years, the 
most frequent of these contacts were made with 
NATO and the Council of Europe. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required : 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic 
of Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1976, the Agency's activities continued 
very much along the same Lines and at the 
same rate as in previous years. 
Subject to the comments made under point 
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1976, the twenty-first year of con-
trol, was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General problems 
1. General operating methods 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers all activities concerned 
with processing, for the purposes defined above, 
any useful documentary material including, in 
particular, countries' replies to the Agency ques-
tionnaire, and the results of field control mea-
sures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information suppLied is correct and that liDder-
takings not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are observed. 
The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, phy-
sically, the accuracy of· all the information 
collected in implementation of Part Ill of Pro-
tocol No. IV. 
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Documentary and field control measures 
are complementary, and equally essential for the 
accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control meas-
ures separately, in the interests of both conve-
nience and clarity. However, it must not be 
forgotten that these measures together make up 
a single control function. 
The Agency's operating methods, the main 
lines of which are set out above, did not change 
during the year under review. 
Although the principles of the present 
methods, which have proved their worth, remain 
unchanged, their applications are under con-
stant examination with a view to improvement. 
The Agency draws great benefit from the 
continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing 
knowledge of the organisation of the forces of 
each member State, of the progress of armament 
production or procurement programmes, the 
Agency develops its control activity efficiently 
and logically, both in the fixing of levels ood 
quantities of armaments and in the choice and 
assessment of its control measures. 
2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised 
to exercise its mandate 
The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, remained 
unchanged in 1976. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's activ-
ities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in 
one member State, to what that State calls 
"strategic forces". 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these cate-
gories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quantitative 
controls are made in this field since none of the 
member States concerned has declared possess-
ing such armaments. 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member States with the levels fixed by 
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the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies 
by member States 
The questionnaire sent to member States for 
1976 was broadly the same as those of previous 
years. 
As in all previous years, follow-up action 
on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that 
some of the facts reported are checked physically 
by means of field control measures. In addition, 
all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, 
and compared with the other sources of inform-
ation available, including member countries' 
earlier replies to Agency or NATO question-
naires and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the 
member States regarding the non-production of 
certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from 
a study of documents which, in 1976 as in the 
past, was based, in particular, on the replies 
of the country concerned to the Agency's request 
for annual information. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2(a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of the 
United States and Canada concerning their 
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member States stationed 
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these 
countries have provided no aid to the forces 
concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
In 1976, the defence budgets published by 
member States and their replies to the Agency 
questionnaire on this subject were studied in 
the same way as in previous years. 
The national authorities also gave additional 
information, whenever necessary, l.n response to 
the Agency's requests. 
The scrutiny of budgets confirmed the 
findings of other studies carried out by the 
experts to determine quantities of armaments. 
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2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
States' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statisticaL reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO International 
Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for 
the annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol 
No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
25th November 1976, attended by Agency experts 
and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and 
concluded with a meeting in Paris on lOth 
December 1976, under the chairmanship of the 
Deputy Director of the Agency ; this meeting 
was attended by the representatives of the Direc-
tor of the International Military Staff of the 
NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Admin-
istration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency 
experts. There were no comments on the total 
quantities of armaments declared as held by the 
member States (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), 
and presented by the Agency for study by these 
authorities. 
In consequence, the total quantities of arma-
ments declared to the Agency by the member 
States for forces placed under NATO authority 
and stationed on the mainland of Europe can 
be considered as appropriate levels for the control 
year 1976 within the terms of Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command 
on the mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to the 
Agency by the member States as being required 
on 31st December 1976, for their forces main-
tained under national command on the mainland 
of Europe have been accepted or approved by 
the Council, who have taken note of these figures 
of maximum levels of armaments for these forces 
in 1976. The quantities notified to the Agency 
can thus be considered as appropriate levels of 
armaments for the current control year within 
the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methods of execution 
(a) As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings 
not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are being observed ; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1976 on the same basis as during previous years, 
as an essential part of the Agency's work, 
in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. 
IV. 
The Agency's basic assumption in this 
respect, which is supported by the observations 
of previous years, is that the undertakings and 
declarations of member countries are being 
honoured. Clearly, if any doubt existed on this 
point, control measures would have to be 
increased. In any case, the measures taken by the 
Agency must provide a sufficiently high pro-
bability of detecting any contravention. 
In the case of its primary task of non-
production controls, the Agency once again 
relied, in 1976, on a comparatively small number 
of field control measures. However, these mea-
sures must be viewed in the context of wide 
and continuing studies, relying upon a continuing 
pattern of inspections. Taken overall, these pro-
vide a solid basis for the Ageooy's confidence. 
For the second of its tasks, the basic inform-
ation on levels of stocks of the types of armament 
subject to control by the Agency is provided by 
member countries in their replies to the annual 
questionnaire. This information is cross-checked 
not only against earlier declarations, but also 
against other information received from a variety 
of sources, including the findings of previous 
field control measures. On the basis of these 
analyses, a provisional programme of field con-
trol measures is worked out, covering an appro-
priate sample of the various establishments and 
sources contributing to the overall levels of 
stOcks. 
This draft programme, involving units, 
depots and factories, varies in composition from 
year to year as equipment programmes and other 
defence policies take effect. Care is taken to 
maintain the correct balance, while ensuring 
that the Agency's resources are directed in the 
most effective manner. For example, inspections 
at factories are planned for what is considered 
to be the most informative stage of the produc-
tion cycle, and a reasonable balance is aimed at 
in the distribution of control activities between 
member countries. In addition, due weight is 
given to such special factors as policies for the 
concentration of stocks ·to reduce management 
costs or for their dispersal for reasons of vulner-
ability. The final programme is modified to take 
account of the latest information available. 
Accounting checks and physical inspections are 
then strictly applied by experienced teams of 
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experts. As a result of this thorough check of 
the figures selected for scrutiny, the accuracy 
of the remainder can be accepted with every 
confidence. 
Although the Agency's two tasks are sepa-
rate and specific, the field control measures 
involved are not considered and programmed in 
isolation. Thus, at a single factory, control of the 
quantities of arms being produced may be com-
bined with a non-production control of certain 
proscribed weapons. 
(b) Article VIII of Protocol No. IV is of 
considerable assistance to the Agency in carrying 
out its mission. It states that to avoid duplication 
of effort, control measures in respect of forces 
under NATO authority shall be undertaken by 
the appropriate NATO authorities. The percent-
age of forces to be inspected by the Agency 
therefore varies between member countries, and 
this must be taken into account in the prepar-
ation of its programme. Special considerations 
apply to the depots also covered by the same 
article. In peacetime, each country is wholly 
responsible for the logistic support of forces 
placed under NATO authority. It is therefore 
difficult to determine which of the material 
in depots is or will be assigned to forces under 
NATO authority and which is or will be assigned 
to forces under national command. The system 
of combined Agency /SHAPE inspections, intro-
duced in 1957, was again applied in 1976. 
(c) As the Convention for the due process of 
law 1 has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1976, as in previous years, 
to take the form of "agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been withheld. 
2. Type and extent of field control measures 
In 1976, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency was carried out in accordance with the 
well-tried procedure of previous years. 
The total number of control measures was 
seventy-one. It should be noted, in this con-
nection, that this pattern of control activities 
carried out by the Agency is entirely satisfac-
tory : it enables some 80 % of existing armaments 
to be checked in four years for the air force, 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member States of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the 
Brussels Treaty, a.s modified by the Protocols signed in 
Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th Decem-
ber 1957). 
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five years for the navy and six to seven years 
for army munitions. 
These measures fall broadly into the follow-
ing categories: 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command ; 
(c) control measures at production plants : 
( i) quantitative control measures : 
In 1976, these control measures 
were carried out at aircraft and 
aircraft engine plants, at plants 
manufacturing armoured equip-
ment, at plants manufacturing mis-
siles and ammunition, and at ship-
yards. 
( ii) non-production control measures : 
These control measures related to 
chemicals and submarines. 
3. ConcluafoftiJ 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to 
exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effect-
ively to carry out its task of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose from the very 
complex nature of the inspections were dealt 
with satisfactorily through good relations with 
the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control measures 
carried out in 1976, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council : 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
levels of stocks of armaments at depots, 
units under national command and pro-
duction plants confirmed the data 
obtained from documentary control meas-
ures; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armaments for land forca 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Land forces armaments modernisation 
schemes and reorganisation programmes are in 
hand in all member countries. 
With regard to armoured material, the 
derivatives of the Leopard and AMX-30 battle 
tanks are still being built, including, in par-
ticular, recovery vehicles, bridge layers and 
dozers. However, the main battle tank purchasing 
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programmes have now been completed in most 
countries. 
The programmes for other armoured vehicles 
(AMX-10, M-113 and derivatives) are continuing. 
On the other hand, the Marder armoured vehicle 
programme in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the ·tank destroyer programme in Belgium, 
were completed in 1976. Production of armoured 
reconnaissance vehicles is proceeding in the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany with the wheeled Luchs 
(8 X 8) type and, in Belgium, jointly with the 
United Kingdom, with the Scorpion, the Scimitar 
and their derivatives. 
As regards anti-aircraft equipment, two 
major programmes are in hand : the Guepard 
anti-aircraft tank (developed from the Leopard), 
equipped with a twin 35 mm. gun, has been 
in series production in the Federal Republic 
of Germany since summer 1976 and the Roland 
missile launcher is being jointly produeed by the 
Federal Republic of Germany and France. 
Most member countries of WEU are inter-
ested in this equipment and total production 
under these programmes will amount to about 
one thousand units. 
In the case of artillery, several member coun-
tries have purchased the Lance missile system 
from the United States to replace their first-
generation weapons systems. 
In addition, production of the Pluton missile 
launching is continuing in France. 
Lastly, Italy, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom signed a contract 
in September 1976, for the joint production of 
several hundred FH-70 155 mm. towed howitzers 
over the next few years. 
(b) Control activity in 1976 
Control measures were carried out at several 
depots, at several units under national command, 
and at plants manufacturing armaments for land 
forces. 
2. Guided miaile8 and other self-propelled miaaUea 
(a) Current production 
The following modern guided missiles men-
tioned in last year's annual report are in pro-
duction in member States : Milan and Swingfire 
anti-tank missiles ; Crotale, Masurca, Blowpipe, 
Rapier and Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles ; 
Martel AS-37 air-to-surface anti-radar missile, 
jointly produced by France and the United 
Kingdom ; Matra Magic R-550 air-to-air missile ; 
Exocet sea-to-sea missile ; Malafon ASM missile. 
In addition, the following guided missiles of 
the previous generation are still being produced : 
SS-11 surface-to-surface missile; Cobra anti-tank 
missile ; AS-12 and AS-30 air-to-surface mis-
siles. 
Production of Zuni air-to-ground rockets 
continued in Belgium. 
(b) Exports 
Guided missiles exported include Cobra, 
SS-11, Exocet MM-38, Crotale, Milan, Matra 
Magic R-550, AS-12 and the Zuni air-to-ground 
rocket. 
(c) Control activity in 1976 
Control· measures were carried out at a 
number of depots containing guided and other 
self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units 
under national command equipped with these 
weapons, and at one plant manufacturing guided 
missiles. 
3. Military aircraft 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Work continued on the two major program-
mes referred to in the previous annual report : 
joint production of the Jaguar A/E by France 
and the United Kingdom, and the Mirage F-1 
programme in France. In Italy, production of 
the F-104G was nearing completion by the end 
of 1976 ; the same applies to the additional 
number of G-91 Y aircraft, for which the original 
programme was completed in 1975. 
The German air force received the remainder 
of their Phantom F-4F aircraft ordered from the 
United States. 
Following the decision taken by Belgium 
and the Netherlands to adopt the F-16 aircraft 
to replace their F-104G, the first contracts for 
production of this aircraft were plaeed with 
the firms concerned. 
(b) Future prospects 
Two major aircraft construction programmes 
were mentioned in the previous annual report : 
the MRCA 75, built jointly by the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Italy, and the Alpha-Jet by France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Eight MRCA pro-
totypes of the nine planned have already flown. 
Industrial-scale production of the Alpha-Jet 
started in 1976. 
The United Kingdom programme of Hawk 
trainer aircraft is progressing. 
(c) Control activity in 1976 
Control measures were carried out at depots 
holding aircraft or aircraft engines, at air force 
units under national command, and at plants 
manufacturing aircraft or aircraft engines. 
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4. Wanrhip8 
(a) Current construction 
Work was continued in 1976 on the modern-
isation and new construction programmes men-
tioned in the two previous annual reports as 
being in progress in member countries on the 
mainland of Europe. 
(b) Control activity in 1976 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at naval shipyards. An agreed non-production 
control was carried out· at the same time at one 
of these plants ; it revealed nothing contrary 
to the undertakings given by the country con-
cerned. 
5. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to renew 
in 1976 the list of chemical weapons subject 
to control. 
The member countries agreed to this renewal. 
This was reported to the Council, who noted the 
fact. 
(b) _(jontrol activity in 1976 
In application of Article HI of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down the conditions to be 
met to enable the Council to fix the levels 
of chemical weapons that may be held on the 
mainland of Europe by those countries which 
have not given up the right to produce them, 
the Agency, as in previous years, asked the 
following questions in its questionnaire : "Has 
the production of chemical weapons on the main-
land territory of... (member State) passed the 
experimental stage and entered into the effective 
production st~e 7" 
In 1976, as in the past, the member States 
concerned replied in the negative. 
The case could arise of stocks of imported 
chemical weapons being held by a member State 
that had replied in the :negative to this question. 
In any such case, these weapons would have to be 
reported in the reply to the questionnaire. How-
ever, no member State reported the existence 
of any chemical weapons in its reply to this 
questionnaire. 
As in previous years, the Agency also 
addressed to the appropriate authorities of the 
State concerned a "request for annual inform-
ation to facilitate the non-production control of 
chemical weapons". The reply received to this 
request was, as in the past, of great assistance 
to the Agency in selecting chemical plants at 
which to carry out agreed control measures in 
1976. 
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The supplementary procedure designed to 
increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, 
which has been tried out since 1973, was again 
applied successfully in 1976. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indic-
ation of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex 11 to Protocol No. Ill. 
6. Biological weapons 
All member countries reported to the Agency 
their agreement to renew in 1976 the list of 
biological weapons subject to control. This was 
reported to the Council, who noted the fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 
of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises 
no control in the field of biological weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated 
in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any 
control in the atomic field. 
F. Technical information visits (TIVs) and 
other means of improving the proficiency of 
the experts 
1. In 1976, technical information visits again 
contributed significantly towards keeping the 
Agency's experts informed of latest developments. 
They covered the procurement programmes of all 
three services, aspects of nava1 and air force 
research and development, as well as logistic 
problems and chemical and biological subjects. 
TIV s were made as follows : 
- to naval, army and air shows organised 
mainly for sales purposes, such as : 
( i) the new British army equipment 
exhibition at Aldershot; 
( ii) the Farnborough and Hanover inter-
national Air Shows; 
( iii) the first Italian naval exhibition ; 
( iv) the fifth exhibition of naval equip-
ment at Le Bourget. 
- to establishments where programmes had 
been specialLy arranged for the Agency, 
such as: 
( i) in France, the aircraft test centres 
at Istres and Bretigny, and the 
technical trials establishment at 
Bourges; 
( ii) in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the air force control and 
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reporting centre at Visselhovede, 
and the naval test centre at Eckem-
forder; 
( iii) in the United Kingdom, the Central 
Inventory Control Point RAOC at 
Bicester, and the RAF Supply Con-
trol Centre at Hendon. 
In the fields of chemistry and microbiology, 
a number of technical information visits were 
organised by the national authorities to scien-
tific centres and industrial establishments. On 
these occasions, the Agency experts met highly 
qualified biologists, chemists and engineers who 
gave them information on the theoretical aspects 
and the latest technical developments of the 
specialities concemed ; they were also ab1e to 
examine some remarkable scientific equipment 
and a number of industrial plants equipped 
with very modem production facilities. 
Visits on chemical subjects were carried 
out in Belgium and France. In Belgium, Agency 
experts visited two chemical factories, one of 
which concentrated specifically on all forms of 
polystyrene, while the other produces a very 
wide range of chemicals. In France, a TIV was 
organised to a plant producing halogen com-
pounds. 
Technical information visits on biological 
subjects were carried out in Belgium, France 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. In Bel-
gium, the Agency experts obtained valuable 
information on various infectious diseases, includ-
ing smallpox and psittacosis and on the appro-
priate prophylactic measures. In France, the 
main emphasis was on the industrial production 
of vaccines and therapeutic sera, and on the cul-
ture of micro-organisms required for such pro-
duction. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, con-
versations were directed mainly to exotic diseases, 
insects and other anima1 vectors of pathogenic 
germs, and the possibility of epidemics of rabies 
and influenza. Demonstrations of the detection 
and identification of micro-organisms were also 
organised. 
2. The Documentation Office continued to 
collect and collate for the benefit of the experts, 
both specialised and other published documents 
on military subjects (research and development, 
introduction of new weapons, reorganisation of 
the armed forces, etc.), as well as on financial 
and economic subjects (budgetary decisions of 
member governments, general economic trends, 
the growth of certain specific sectors of the 
economy and of certain firms working on defence, 
imports and exports of armaments). 
C1ose contact was maintained between the 
office and the experts, who, by defining subjects 
of interest and providing unclassified data 
obtained during their inspections, contribute to 
the preparation of reference documents for their 
own UBe. 
G. Miscellaneous contacts 
1. Contacts with the national authorities 
As in the past, the Agency maintained its 
contacts with national authorities whenever the 
opportunity arose, as, for example, when diseuss-
ing improvements to control measures, organising 
technical information visits, conducting budget-
ary studies, etc. In addition to their main pur-
pose, these contacts frequently produce solu-
tions to certain topical problems and lead to 
improvements to Agency procedures. 
The Agency continues to regard them as 
being of particular value. 
2. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation 
Contacts were maintained with the appro-
priate NATO authorities in accordance with the 
provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty. 
Mention should be made, in particular, of 
the two meetings heLd to fix the level of arma-
ments of the forces under NATO command, 
already referred to in point C.2 (a) of this 
chapter. In addition, contacts made by experts 
when on duty trips to Bl'UBSels and Mons 
made possible unofficial exchanges of views on 
matters of common interest. 
B. General conclusions 
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the 
Council that, as a result of the control exercised 
in 1976, the figures obtained in accordance with 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV: 
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-for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the terms 
of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Pro-
tocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1976 and for 
each of the member States, the appropriate 
levels of armaments subject to control for those 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures at production plants, it did 
not detect for the categories of armaments 
which it controls: 
- either the manufacture in these establish-
ments on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of a category of 
armaments that the government of this 
member State has undertaken not to 
manufacture ; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks or armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1976, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open to it. 
In this, relations between the Agency and 
the national authorities and services of the mem-
ber States, and aLso with those of NATO and 
SHAPE, continued to play an important part. 
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CHAPTER.IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The SAC. held ordinary meetings on 4th 
March, 25th June, 24th September and 15th 
December 1976. Its main subjects of discussion 
were the up-dating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 
(technical trials programme : wheeled transport 
vehicles: 1970-1980), co-operation with FINA-
BEL, exchanges of information between WEU 
and NATO, and the supervision of the work of 
Working Group No. 8 on operational l'ilSearch 
and on the methods of evaluating military 
equipment. 
In addition to these ordinary sessions, the 
SAC met three times as an ad hoc group, 
to draft the detailed outline programme for a 
study of the European armaments industries 
in the member countries, in implementation of 
~h,e mandate adopted by minister8.at the Council 
meeting held in Brus8els on 31st May 1976 
(cf. Chapter II, B). 
1. Up-dating of WBU Agreement 4.FT .6 (technical 
trial8 programme : wheeled transport whicles : 
1910-1980) 
Having been approved in January 1975 
by the SAC, WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 is now 
being up-dated by a group of national experts, 
with the United Kingdom as pilot country. 
The annual review for 1975-76, drafted by the 
co-ordinator of the pilot country with the advice 
of the national experts of the member coun-
tries, was apprQved by the SAC at its meeting 
on 25th June 1976. The same procedure will be 
followed for the 1976-77 period. 
2. Relations with FINABEL 
The SAC took note of a summary of the 
FINABEL catalogue of joint armaments and 
equipment requirements prepared in 1975. In 
this summary, prepared by the SAC's Inter-
national Secretariat, only equipment susceptible 
of joint development is mentioned. 
After a preliminary discussion, the SAC 
agreed to study any · specific questions on this 
subject officially put to it by FINABEL. 
3. Outline programme for a study of the armaments 
industry in member countries 
The SAC has drafted an outline pro-
gramme ; it has been submitted by each member 
of the Committee to his national authoritieR 
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for approval and subsequent transmission to 
the Council 1 • 
In the meantime, the Head of ·the Inter-
national Secretariat gave a progress report to 
the Council in October. 
B. Activities of the work~ groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 
During 1976, Working Group No. 8 on 
operational research met twice, the first meeting 
being coupled with a symposium and the second 
with a visit to Belgium. 
The work of the group has followed the 
usual pattern, including the communication of 
new study subjects, declarations of interest, 
bilateral exchanges of reports and the consult-
ation of studies in the WEU library. 
When translation of the five-language glos-
sary of operational research terms was finished, 
decisions were taken regarding the form and 
publication of a one-volume dictionary. Com-
puterisation and publication are expected to 
follow in 1977 with the help of the interested 
countries, the International Secretariat and the 
French Armaments Documentation Centre (CE-
DOCAR) ; the CIRO (French Interarms Ope-
rational Research Centre) will co-ordinate this 
work. 
A symposium on the methodology used in 
the determination of ammunition stocks, held 
the day after the group's spring meeting, resulted 
in interesting discussions following the present-
ation of studies by the Netherlands, the Federal 
RepubLic of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
At the invitation of the Belgian authorities, 
the group attended a series of presentations by 
the GSRO Section in Brussels on their opera-
tional research studies ; they also visited the 
Belgo-Netherlands school of mine warfare at. 
Ostend. 
2. Methods of eoaluating military equipment 
In pursuance of the terms of reference 
given to it by the SAC, a group of experts 
on the evaluation of military equipment, work-
ing under the supervision of Working Group 
No. 8, undertook a critical, comparative study 
of a German report on the evaluation of a 
recovery vehicle. 
Delegations submitted comments on this 
report and detailed discussions took place at 
the first meeting of the group of experts. 
1. This document was transmitted to the Council on 
25th January 1977. 
At the group's second meeting, the French 
delegation presented a study on the application 
of another method to the selection of the Bundes-
wehr's recovery vehicles. It was agreed to discuss 
this at the next meeting of the group of experts, 
planned for the beginning of 1977. 
C. International Secretariat 
1. Contacts with member countries and,..the Council 
On the invitation of the Netherland~ 
Government, the Assistant Secretary-General 
paid a visit to the Netherlands in January and 
had talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Kooijmans, and with senior offi-
cials of the Ministry of Defence. During the 
year he also had talks or working meetings with 
senior officials of the Foreign and Defence 
Ministries of Belgium, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Italy. In addition, he WIIB 
invited to visit armaments factories in the Nether-
lands, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
ItaLy. 
The Assistant Secretary-General was also 
invited to the air fair at Hanover; finally, 
representatives of the International Secretariat 
attended the international air fair at Farn-
borough. 
On 28th April, the Assistant Secretary-
General presented his customary annual oral 
report to the Council on the activities of the 
SAC, its working groups and its International 
Secretariat. 
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2. WEU Assembly 
The Assistant Secretary-General reported 
to the SAC on the discussions on armaments 
questions which had taken place during both 
parts of the twenty-second ordinary session of 
the Assembly. As in previous years, extracts from 
speeches, reports, discussions and recommend-
ations relating to armaments questions were 
collected into a single document, distributed 
to members of the SAC. 
In addition, the International Secretariat 
was represented at the colloquy on European 
aeronautical policy organised by the WEU 
Assembly, which was held at Toulouse on 2nd 
and 3rd February 1976. 
3. Contacts with NATO 
The International SecretAriat of the SAC 
was represented by observers at the two meetings 
of the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors, held at the NATO Headquarters, 
Brussels, in April and October. 
As in the past, a representative of the 
International Secretariat attended the two meet-
ings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group. 
4. Liaiaon with FINABEL 
Three liaison meetings were he1d with the 
FINABEL Secretariat during the period under 
review. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
The Public Administration Committee held 
its two annual meetings in Luxembourg from 
5th to 7th May and in Bath from 20th to 22nd 
October. 
As usual, the Committee devoted a con-
siderable part of these meetings to exchanges 
of information on new developments in the 
public administration of the member countries 
over the preceding six months. During the year 
under review, the choice of some of the subjects 
dealt with was naturally governed by the eco-
nomic and financial problems which are con-
fronting the various member countries and are 
affecting the administrative machinery of the 
State. In some cases, reductions in the strength 
of the civil service are taking place or are 
planned ; in others, a partial solution to the 
unemployment problem is being sought by the 
creation of posts in the ailininistration ; civil 
service structures and sa1ary levels are being 
genera1ly reviewed. The Committee also noted 
the effects of spending cuts on initial and 
further training programmes. 
With regard to conditions of employment 
for civil servants, exchanges of information 
related mainly to the elimination of discrimin-
ation and to lowering of the retirement age 
for certain categories of senior civil servants. 
Finally, the Committee noted changes in 
the pattern of administration resulting from 
changes of government or forming part of longer-
term developments : reduction of the number 
of local authorities and problems of local author-
ity organisation, questions of decentralisation 
and devolution of powers. 
During the year, the Committee concluded 
the studies on systems of adjusting payment in 
pubLic administration and on the organisation 
and methods of informing the public about the 
administration. These two studies were referred 
to in greater detail in the twenty-first annual 
report. The Committee now intends to exchange 
information on the scope and limits of the con-
cept of confidentiality in the civil services of 
member countries. 
B. Multilateral course for government 
officials 
In 1976, it was the turn of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to host the course organ-
ised each year for officials from the seven national 
administrations. This course, which was the 
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twenty-fifth of the kind held under the auspices 
of the Public Administration Committee, took 
place in Boppard from 6th to 17th September. 
It brought together eighteen young senior-
category civil servants, with the aim of enabling 
them to study methods and problems of work 
in international groups, and to acquire a wider 
knowledge of the main characteristic features 
of the administrations of the member countries. 
These are indeed two basic elements which make 
it possible to broaden the horizon of a young 
civil servant and prepare him better for the 
international negotiations in which he may be 
required to take part in the course of his career. 
The programme for the course, based on the 
recognition that many problems can no longer 
be solved exclusively within the national frame-
work, called upon participants to study at 
what stage and under what conditions interna-
tional impLications should be taken into account. 
The subject selected to focus discussions on a 
concrete example, was : "The international aspect 
of the water pollution problem". The majority 
of participants were "generalists", not specialists 
on the subject, and the technicaL data necessary 
were provided by specially invited experts. Three 
working groups were formed to deal with the 
various problems raised by water pollution in 
relation to use, types of pollution, and technical 
and legal means of combating and preventing 
pollution. This method of working, in small 
groups of six persons where three or four natio-
nal,ities were represented, was considered partic-
ularly valuable. 
As at courses in previous years, each 
national delegation presented a statement on the 
characteristic features of their administration, 
which was followed by discussion. This exercise 
was also judged to be useful by the participants, 
who even recommended that 1n future, more time 
should be devoted to this aspect of the pro-
gramme. 
This last comment touches on a point to 
which the Public Administration Committee has 
paid some attention during its recent meetings, 
namely, the duration of courses for civil servants. 
Originally planned and organised to last three 
weeks, they were subsequently shortened to two 
weeks. The increasing difficulty of finding suit-
able participants who could be away from their 
office for two weeks, and the financial burden 
imposed on the host country, led the Committee 
to wonder whether courses should not be limited 
to one week. To judge from the views of both the 
organisers and the participants, experience of 
the 1976 course suggests that two weeks (the 
weekend between the two WaB most successfuLly 
employed for an information trip to Berlin) 
represent a minimum, at any rate, for courses of 
this type. 
C. Study visits 
As already stated in previous 81Il1lual reports, 
the general economic situation and the concern 
of governments to effect economies in most sec-
tors are not conducive to the development of 
activities such as study visits, however useful 
they may be for the officials who unde~~e 
them. For this reason, the programme of VlSlts 
arl'8illged under the auspices of the Committee 
continued roughly aB usual, but without any 
increase. 
These visits enable an official to spend a 
week or two in the administration of one of 
the other member countries, studying the ques-
tion on which he is himself an expert. Naturally, 
they cover a wide variety of subjects, ru:' . is 
shoWill by the following examples of study VlSlts 
carried out or in preparation during the year 
under consideration : the suspended sentence -
its current use and effectiveness; the adminis-
tration of value added tax, in particular, in 
sole proprietorships 81lld sma11 businesses ; admin-
istration and organisation of primary health 
care ; institutional structure and funetioning of 
the public sector oil industry ; methods used 
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to assess performance level and advancement 
potential of civilian administrative and specialist 
staff, etc. 
D. Secondment of national officials to 
international organisations 
The Public Administration Committee con-
cluded the study caJ1ed for by the Council 
on the impLementation in member countries of 
the principles recommended by the Council for 
the secondment of national officials to inter-
national organisations. The Council were thus 
able, during 1976, to study the documentation 
coLlected and to decide what further measures 
should be adopted regarding the study of this 
question. 
Replies to the questionnaire submitted .to 
the member countries contained gaps in some 
caBes, and the Council requested those delegations 
which had been unable to collect some pall't of 
the information (particularly in the statistical 
field) to take the necessary steps to make the 
required information available in future. 
Secondly, the Council agreed that a further 
survey should be undertaken to review the situa-
tion after an interval of five years. 
The Council will not fail to keep the Assem-
b1y informed of all further deve1opments. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
Summaries of the main budgets for 1976 
and 1977 are shown in the Appendix to this 
report. 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
The practice was continued of bringing 
together periodically the administrative officials 
of the Secretariat-Genera1, the Armaments Con-
trol Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the Office of the Clerk to ensure uniform 
application of administrative policies and to 
study questions of common interest. 
It is evident that the necessity and frequency 
of these meetings will increase with the intro-
duction of the pension scheme which raises 
extremely intricate probLems of calculation and 
application. 
C. WEU provident fund 
The policy which had been adopted in 
197 4, and continued in 1975, of investing the 
fund in currencies on a short-term basis was 
maintained. In so doing, the advisory panel 
confirmed their opinion that, in view of the 
sharp fluctuations in currency parities, this 
policy provided the most effective safeguard 
against capital losses. The advisory panel con-
sidered that such a policy was in the best interests 
of the staff concerned and also of member govern-
ments to which a substantial proportion of the 
fund would ultimately revert as a result of 
members of the staff opting for the pension 
scheme. 
D. Introduction of new British social security 
scheme 
. The question of WEU's participation and, 
1f so, to what extent, in the British social security 
scheme, to which reference was made in the 
twenty-first annual report, had not been resolved 
at the end of 1976. Negotiations with Her 
Majesty's Government are continuing. 
Until an agreement is reached and as a 
holding measure, the contributions of both the 
organisation and staff members to the scheme 
~on!inue to be set aside and held by the organ-
IsatiOn. 
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E. Activities within the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
1. Committee of Seeretariea-General 
The gravity of certain problems facing the 
co-ordinated organisations made it necessary for 
the Secretaries-General of the five organisations 
to meet together on four occasions during 1976. 
The practice of holding meetings between the 
Secretaries-General themselves had been disconti-
~ued since ~968, but they felt ,that the difficulty 
m overcommg a number of problems of vital 
interest to their staffs - particularly over the 
introduction of the pension scheme and of an 
agreed procedure for the adjustment of salaries 
- required their personal intervention. 
Under their direction, the Standing Com-
mittee of Secretaries-General and the Committee 
of Heads of Administration met on numerous 
occasions to prepare proposals for submission to 
the Co-ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts. In addition, the Standing Com-
mittee of Secretaries-GeneraL held a number of 
joint meetings with the Standing Committee of 
Staff Associations. 
2. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts, which met seventeen times 
in 1976, issued nine reports, Nos. 127-135, in the 
course of the year. 
Those which affected WEU were the fol-
lowing: 
127th report : The pension scheme rules for 
the co-ordinated organisations. These were 
approved by the WEU Council on 23rd November 
1976 with effect from 1st July 1974. 
129th report : Procedure for adjusting the 
~m,:une~tion ~f staff of the co-ordinated organ-
ISations mcluding a recommendation for an ad 
hoc cost-of-living advance to staff to cover the 
period 1st July 1975 to 31st December 1975. The 
WEU Council approved the report but amended 
the recommendation for an advance so that B 
and C grades should receive 100% of the cost-of-
living increase (13 % in the United Kingdom · 
5.7% in France) and A and L grades 80 %: 
130th report : Request by the European 
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts 
for membership of the co-ordination system. 
Approved by the WEU Council. 
131st report: Annual review of daily rates 
of subsistence for staff travelling on duty in 
member countries from 1st May 1976. Approved 
by the WEU Council. 
132nd report : Adjustment of pensions. 
Approved by the WEU Council. 
133rd report : Procedure for adjusting the 
remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organ-
isations 1• 
134th report : Implementing provisions 
regarding tax arrangements for the pension 
scheme 1• 
135th report : Cost-of-living advance with 
effect from 1st July 1976 1 • 
In addition to completing their recommenda-
tions concerning the pension scheme the Co-
ordinating Committee's main activities centred 
round the elabora;tion of a procedure for adjust-
ing staff remunerations. In adopting the 123rd 
report, Councils had agreed to the Committee's 
recommendation to discontinue the adjustment 
procedures which had been practised up to 
30th June 1975. However, in attempting to work 
out a new formula satisfactory •to both govern-
ments and Secretaries-General, the Committee 
encountered considerable difficulties. A proposal 
by the Secretaries-General that the salary ad-
justment procedure should for a two-year period 
be based on the same principles as those appLied 
by the EEC was not accepted by the Committee 
although, in finally submitting its 133rd report 
to Councils, it explained the reasons for its ina-
bility to adopt the Secretaries-General's pro-
posa]s. 
Owing to the delay incurred in finding 
an agreed adjustment procedure, the Secretaries-
General proposed that, as an interim measure, 
an a.dvance should be granted to staffs to meet 
cost-of-living increases between 1st January and 
30th June 1976. While ready to accord 100% 
of the cost-of-living increase to B and C grades 
the Committee oouid only agree that A and L 
grade staff should be granted 60 % of the 
1. The 133rd, 134th and 135th reports were approved 
by the Council in January and February 1977. 
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increase during that period on an ad hoc basis 
and conditional upon the Councils' prior approval 
of the 133rd report. 
The elaboration of practical provisions for 
implmnentin.g the tax ar.rangements to be applied 
to the pension scheme also gave rise to problems 
owing to the highly complex and widely dif-
fering taxation systems applied in the twenty-six 
member countries of the co-ordinated organis-
ations. 
As stated in paragraph 2 of the Council's 
reply to Assembly Recommendation 287, the Co-
ordinating Committee is currently discussing the 
question of joint management of the pension 
scheme within the context of each organisation's 
estimated staff requirements to operate the 
scheme. Developments have not yet reached the 
state to give detailed consideration to the Assem-
bly's idea for the creation of a legally endowed 
body to be responsible for the management and 
payment of pensions. 
The Co-ordinating Committee decided, in the 
course of 1976, to set up a working group to 
review the system of allowances, in ·particular 
the expatriation ahlowance. The working group 
had not completed its studies by the end of 1976. 
A new departure, during 1976, was the 
admission of a delegation from the Standing 
Committee of Staff Associations to meetings of 
the Co-ordinating Committee whenever the inter-
ests of staff were directly affected. Delegates 
are afforded the opportunity to express their 
views. 
F. WEU Staff Association 
The WEU Staff Association has, through 
the Chairman of the Permanent Council, called 
the attention of member governments to the deep 
concern of staff over the delays in approving 
the pensions system and in introducing a pro-
cedure for the adjustment of salaries. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of WEU main budget for 1916 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 591,510 5,239,270 11,549,010 16,788,280 
Travel ........................... 15,245 72,700 297,400 370,100 
Other operating costs ............. 70,995 349,200 423,120 772,320 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 1,915 13,000 20,800 33,800 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 679,665 5,674,170 12,290,330 17,964,500 
WEU tax ........................ 192,635 1,771,220 3,925,820 5,697,040 
Other receipts .................... 3,750 21,200 34,960 56,160 
TOTAL INOOMB .................... 196,385 1,792,420 3,960,780 5,753,200 
NET TOTAL ....................... 483,280 3,881,750 8,329,550 12,211,300 
National contributions called for under the WEV main budget for 1916 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOT..U. ............................ 600 
• A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. &a. 
47,522.53 1,200,777.84 
96,656.00 2,442,260.00 
96,656.00 2,442,260.00 
96,656.00 2,442,260.00 
1,610.94 40,704.32 
47,522.53 1,200,777.84 
96,656.00 2,442,260.00 
483,280.00 12,211,300.00 
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Summary of WEU main budget for 19'11 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ....•....... 709,165 5,814,370 12,677,220 18,491,590 
Travel ........................... 19,645 86,000 335,300 421,300 
Other operating costs ............. 80,865 370,500 449,800 820,300 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 3,395 10,500 19,400 29,900 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
ToTAL Exl>BNniTUBB •••••••••••.•• 813,070 6,281,370 13,481,720 19,763,090 
WEU tax ........................ 237,430 2,006,850 4,337,700 6,344,550 
Other receipts .................... 5,800 31,200 54,960 86,160 
TOTAL lNOOME •••••••••••••••••••• 243,230 2,038,050 4,392,660 6,430,710 
NBT TOTAL ......•......•......... 569,840 4,243,320 9,089,060 13,332,380 
National contributions caU.d for under the WEU main budget for 1971 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
ToTAL .....•...................... 600 
• A Seoreta.riat·General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. frs. 
56,034.27 1,311,017.37 
113,968.00 2,666,476.00 
113,968.00 2,666,476.00 
113,968.00 2,666,476.00 
1,899.46 44,441.26 
56,034.27 1,311,017.37 
ll3,968.00 2,666,476.00 
569,840.00 13,332,380.00 
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Opinion of Sir Frederic Bennett on the application of the final act of the CSCE 
1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to I with 1 
abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. oon Bothmer (Chair-
man) ; Sir John Bodgera, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Abens, Amrehn, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : McNamara), 
Sir Frederic BenneU, MM. Brugnon (Alternate : Fomi), 
Cermolacee, Faulds (Alternate: Lewia), Gessner (Alternate: 
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Schwencke), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Gonella (.Alter, 
nate: Pecoraro), Grangier (Alternate: Blt~Ure), von Huael, 
Leynm, Mende, MmfiO<lCi, Nualer, de NiM, Peijnenburg, 
P~, Portheine (Alternate: Voogd), Segre, Urtoift. 
Van Hoeylandt. 
N. B. The names of those laWng part m the t10te are 
printed m italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the final act of the CSCE 
The .Assembly, 
Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held 
in Helsinki opened the way for a process which is intended to lead towards international peace, 
freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human rights ; 
Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be slow but that a start has 
been made; 
Considering that in each field jointly-planned developments must be acceptable to all; 
Considering that the maintenance of the alliances is essential for the preservation of balance 
and peace in Europe ; 
Considering that the achievement of a further step towards detente at the Belgrade meeting 
is essential for the pursuit of the process started in Helsinki ; 
Considering that such a stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly deter-
mined to achieve positive results, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. Continue to examine the preparation and conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with the 
other intergovernmental consultative bodies ; 
2. As a priority, endeavour to promote the process of detente with a view to improving under-
standing and co-operation between European States ; 
3. Respect in all events and promote respect for the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of every State defined in Helsinki ; 
4. Carefully prepare the measures necessary for adapting the defence policies and strategies of 
member countries to the new situation ; 
5. Ensure that member countries apply all the principles laid down in Helsinki and ask the 
Eastern European countries to pursue a similar policy. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur) 
I 
1. The heat of the ongoing debate preliminary 
to the follow-up conference at Belgrade between 
the countries signatories to the final act of the 
Helsinki conference, and the very fluidity of the 
situation, render difficult, in the Rapporteur's 
view, the presentation at the present juncture of 
any preliminary draft report capable of provid-
ing with a sufficient degree of approximation a 
snapshot of the situation that will arise when 
the WEU Assembly is called upon next June 
to pronounce a substantive opinion. In the words 
of Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, we are in fact "in a period of 
transition and uncertainty". There are many 
variable factors on the international scene. 
Among the more important, mention should be 
made of the international running-in of the new 
Carter Administration and developments in the 
SALT II negotiations. Other factors play an 
important role such as the strife in Africa, 
the continuing Middle East crisis and the ques-
tion of civil rights. The first meeting between 
the two great powers in Moscow, immediately 
after the American elections, was a failure. How-
ever, both parties hastened to underline that this 
was just a mishap not to be interpreted as a 
change of policy and discreet contacts were 
immediately established in order better to pre-
pare the talks to be held by Mr. Vance and 
Mr. Gromyko in Geneva in May. 
"I do not think", said Mr. Waldheim, "that 
this incident can bring detente to a halt ... 
Both the Americans and the Russians ~ 
still just as interested in continuing the 
policy of detente." 
2. It is clear that the state of American-Soviet 
relations has and will have far-reaching reper-
cussions on the state of international relations 
and consequently on the preparation and work 
of the Belgrade conference. Hence the present 
uncertainty. It is impossible to foresee the length 
of this "period of transition and uncertainty". 
Rather than go back over the controversies of 
that period and the points of view which have 
been and still are decisive, your Rapporteur 
feels he should try to bring out the basic ten-
dencies and then highlight the other recurring 
variables which must not be overlooked or under-
estimated. The main constant is still the convic-
tion that there is no rational alternative to the 
policy of detente and peaceful coexistence, al-
though there may be adjustments and differ-
ences in approach compared with other years. 
Thus it can be seen that there have been pauses 
and difficult periods, but it is not realistic 
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today to expect this universal awareness of a 
common destiny which in so many respects has 
been a feature of recent years to be seriously 
challenged or undermined. Admittedly, each time 
relations between the two superpowers enter a 
difficult stage, the first negative consequence 
is the breach in the barriers which had been 
raised against the Manichean habit, character-
istic of the cold-war period, of considering intcr-
nat;onal questions not on a rational basis but 
primarily in ideological terms and, in extreme 
cases, from a purely propaganda point of view. 
A hint of such a phenomenon, fortunately not 
yet general, has also been ascertained in recent 
weeks. To believe certain newspapers in both East 
and West, we seem to have gone back to the 
fifties. But an immediate denial has been repor-
ted - after the failure of the Moscow talks -
in statements by the leaders of both countries 
who are convinced that, while it is difficult 
to build up confidence, it is easy to restore 
mistrust, with the evident negative consequences 
which this implies. To quote a correct method-
ological viewpoint given recently (March 1977) 
in a Soviet review, New Times: 
"The question of confidence is most delicate. 
Decades of hostility and opposition have 
created stereotypes in East and West which 
judge each other primarily through the 
prism of mistrust. At the beginning, detente 
was in a sort of vicious circle: mistrust stood 
in the way of constructive talks and the 
absence of results prevented mistrust being 
overcome. The circle has been broken thanks 
to political lucidity and, perhaps, the polit-
ical courage of those who were able to resist 
the inertial force of the cold war and 
progress towards detente." 
3. It is now a matter of preventing a return 
to the vicious circle and avoiding a repetition of 
the state of affairs in which mistrust would 
stand in the way of constructive negotiations 
and the absence of results would not ahlow mis-
trust to be overcome. In a "period of transition 
and uncertainty" in international relations, and 
as the Belgrade conference draws near, this 
appears to be the central issue. It obviously 
includes an objective analysis of what Helsinki 
has produced to date, and as realistic an assess-
ment as possible of the process which started 
with the CSCE. 
II 
4. It is a concrete fact, in the current inter-
national situation, especially in Europe, that 
we find ourselves, in this preparatory phase of 
the Belgrade conference, at one of those critical 
moments (exaggerated as it may be in the pre-
sent state of affairs to speak of an actual 
crisis) which recurred on several occasions dur-
ing the years and the months which preceded the 
conclusion of the final act in Helsinki during the 
summer of 1975 and, time and again, called into 
question, more in form than in substance, the 
process of detente which has, for almost the past 
ten years now, been at work throughout our 
continent. For, let it be asseverated right at the 
outset of this report, what is at issue is not some 
casual occurrence but a long-term process, with 
all the typical complexities and contradictions 
which this sometimes implies, including even its 
moments of standstill and backsliding. A process 
which, for all that, seems fated to set its mark 
on the whole of Europe's political, economic and 
social development. While this undoubtedly 
throws up very knotty problems of the relation-
ship between this evolutionary process and that 
of other world regions and other continents, it 
should nevertheless be clear to everyone, even to 
those who now have the profoundest doubts 
about the progress of detente, that the only 
alternative hypothesis would carry with it dra-
matic consequences for the future of the Euro-
pean continent. 
5. Over and above the polemics that have 
marked the past weeks, the belief that this is 
the case still continues to emerge sufficiently 
clearly from the pronouncements of the prin-
cipal statesmen responsible for international 
affairs. 
"I think that detente does exist today", 
said the new United States Secretary of 
State, 1\Ir. Vance, at a press conference 
on 4th March, "and I believe and hope 
that it will continue to exist". 
6. With particular reference to American-
Russian relations, he went on to say : 
"I note a continuing, deep and abiding 
interest in the Soviet Union and among 
Soviet leaders for pursuing with us the 
questions relating to arms control, parti-
cularly in the nuclear area, and in a variety 
of other matters." 
7. On the prospects for detente in United 
States-Soviet Union relations, he addt>d: 
2. 
"I think it is in the interest of both of 
our nations to search for common ground, 
and to lessen the tensions which divide the 
nations. In this process, I think it is necess-
ary to try and work out a clear under-
standing of what the meaning of detente 
is as between the two nations. In a sense, 
it is the setting down or arriving at a set 
of ground rules which permit competition 
side-by-side with the resolution of outstand-
ing questions. And it is not, again, a simple 
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task. It is one that has to be worked out 
by discussion and by action ; and I hope 
that as we get into closer dialogue on a 
face-to-face basis, we may develop a clearer 
understanding amongst us of what will be 
acceptable conduct on both sides." 
8. In this manner 1\Ir. V ance seemed to be 
replying to some of the assurances and pledges 
given, in his latest public speech (Tula, 18th 
January), by Leonid Brezhnev: 
"Statements to the effect that the Soviet 
Union is going further than necessary for its 
defence and aiming at arms supremacy so 
as to be able to 'get in the first strike', 
are absurd and absolutely groundless. Our 
policy is not aimed at arms supremacy but 
at reduction of armaments, attenuation of 
warlike confrontation." 
9. Among other things he said that "detente 
is a specific trust, and the ability to take account 
of one another's legitimate interests". 
10. Indeed, the ability to take account of one 
another's legitimate interests is the central and 
trickiest crux of a balanced relationship that is 
undoubtedly never assured once and for all, but 
has to be constantly reaffirmed through a 
dialectic, an antagonism that has certainly never 
vanished from the international scene. 
11. In this connection, the United States 
President's Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, recently remarked 
that: 
"The ideological as well as political conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union will go on for a long time but we 
should strive to moderate it gradually. To 
achieve that moderation both co-operation 
as well as vigilance will be necessary. 
Consequently, the maintenance of a strong 
American military deterrent is a necessary 
precondition for a stable and increasingly 
comprehensive as well as reciprocal detente 
- a detente which will remain both com-
petitive as well as co-operative." 
12. Indeed, it is now plain that we have once 
more arrived at a difficult point in time for 
achieving such a balance of relations, not least 
by reason of the fact that the United States and 
its Democrat Administration have announced 
that concern for civil and human rights through-
out the world "will be threaded through our 
foreign policy" (V ance). The Secretary of State 
was asked: "Do you have a rule in your mind 
at what point does legitimate concern with 
human rights in other countries become un-
warranted interference in the internal affairs 
of another country, either adversary or ally Y", 
and his reply was: "There is no precise black-
and-white rule that I can set down. It is a much 
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more complicated process than that. It is a 
balancing process." The point of equilibrium has 
still to be reached, and most likely never will 
be once and for all, which is precisely one of the 
reasons for the uncertainty that currently looms 
over the international outlook. Yet the proceed-
ings in Geneva of the United Nations Commission 
for Human Rights indicate and confirm how 
seriously the diplomacy of the various countries 
is engaged in this search for an equilibrium. 
Ill 
13. It is necessary here - because it forms part 
of the ongoing debate between governments and 
· political forces on what the follow-up conference 
in Belgrade should be about- to refer back to 
the final act of Helsinki and what may be termed 
its philosophy. In this context, it is practically 
impossible to review all the elements of the 
tlebate (and of the controversies) which in recent 
months have mainly been concerned with the 
importance accorded to the campaign for civil 
rights in American foreign policy and also the 
Bast's reactions to actions and signs which have 
been interpreted as pure and simple interference 
in internal affairs. Consequently, there is a wall 
of misunderstanding and mistrust and a growing 
and bitter confrontation of ideologies and 
internal propaganda around the correct inter-
pretation of the Helsinki final act and its three 
baskets, the provisions of which, on the one hand, 
ban (section I, paragraph VI) "any intervention, 
direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the 
internal or external affairs falling within the 
domestic jurisdiction of another participating 
State, regardless of their mutual relations" and, 
on the other, stipulate (section I, paragraph VII) 
that: 
"The participating States will respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief, for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion. 
They will promote and encourage the 
effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and free-
doms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essen-
tial for his free and full development." 
14. Not only since Helsinki but for far longer, 
there have been discussions the world over to 
determine where intervention in the internal 
affairs of another State actually starts. An 
accurate answer has never been found. There is 
a margin of interpretation which always and 
above all depends on the state of relations and 
hence of confidence between the various coun-
tries. This margin of interpretation also applies 
to the Helsinki final act which, as a declaration 
of intention and not a treaty, makes no provision 
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for penalties against defaulting contracting 
parties. It nevertheless sets a precedent in inter-
national law since it is central to matters con-
cerning relations between States and also their 
domestic affairs. This makes it difficult to find 
and define an appropriate code of conduct. The 
ensuing discussion included comments on the 
existence of a degree of contradiction noted by 
several commentators in the general principles of 
the Helsinki final act between the said section VI 
establishing the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of the participating States 
and section VII calling for respect for human 
r1ghts and fundamental freedoms. The con-
tradiction, if it does in fact exist, stems from the 
real state of international political relations on 
which the Helsinki act was erected ; what we 
must realise above all is that the contradiction 
can only be resolved by maintaining and 
fostering the process of detente, and in any case 
only in the longer prospect. Your Rapporteur 
thinks it obvious that violations of such rights 
are committed in both East and West. President 
Carter's comment at his press conference on 23rd 
lt'ebruary is significant in this respect. He said : 
''We have, I think, a responsibility and a 
legal right to express our disapproval of 
violations of human rights. The Helsinki 
agreement, so called basket Ill provisions, 
ensures that some of these human rights 
shall be preserved. We are signatory to the 
Helsinki agreement. We are, ourselves, cul-
pable in some ways for not giving people 
adequate right to move around our country, 
or restricting unnecessarily in my opinion 
visitation to this country by those who 
disagree with us politically." 
15. It is, on the other hand, an incontrovertible 
fact that what has caught the notice of public 
opinion in recent months has been chiefly new 
items emanating from some of the Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union, and 
reflecting a great variety of situations and 
behaviours in a context which, while demonstrat-
ing, to say the least, the continuance of "con-
tradictions and limitations which have so far 
prevented those societies from achieving that full 
measure of freedom, democracy and participation 
which is an essential characteristic of the socialist 
ideal" (Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of 
the Italian Communist Party), also indicates, 
with due allowance for exceptions, that things 
are no longer the same as they were in the 1950s. 
With respect to that period there has moreover 
been a growing demand on all sides for demo-
cracy and effective participation in decision-
making. This is as true of the East as it is of 
the West, within the framework of the deep-
seated processes which are everywhere at work. 
16. It is plain to most observers that this has 
also, and largely, depended upon (a) the new 
climate of international relations that has set in 
with the transition from the cold war to detente, 
(b) the new interdependencies that have been 
growing up in the contemporary world, (c) the 
weight and influence of a public opinion that 
lives in an ever-smaller and intercommunicating 
world. These are factual circumstances to which 
every country is, and will increasingly find 
itself, compelled to pay heed, whether it likes it 
or not, given the interconnections which exist in 
effect between its own internal behaviour and 
its external relations, and more generally 
between its own behaviour and the prospects 
ahead for detente. This had led to the growing 
conviction, particularly in Europe, about the 
nature of the process for applying the Helsinki 
agreements and the fact that detente, apart from 
being essential to coexistence in the world, is 
also the necessary framework for gaining major 
sectors of democracy and freedom within each of 
the individual countries. 
17. It is not merely a question of Helsinki. 
International pacts on civil and political rights 
and on economic, social and cultural rights had 
already been approved even before the conference 
on security and co-operation in Europe (and have 
often not yet been ratified by the United States 
and many western countries). The various 
articles of these pacts define a perfect world, a 
sort of radiant city, very remote in any event 
from circumstances in any given country. "The 
right to employment is a human right", said the 
communique of the conference of European 
Social Democrat parties and trade union organi-
sations held in Oslo from 1st to 3rd April 1977. 
Nothing would be easier than an exchange of 
accusations and counter-accusations between the 
various States about their respective abuses, for 
instance as regards the application (or non-
ratification) of the two pacts endorsed unani-
mously by the United Nations General Assembly 
at its meeting on 16th December 1966. But such 
a performance would bring us neither civil and 
political rights nor economic, social and cultural 
rights. The only real result - in a world formed 
of countries destined to live together in peace, 
to co-operate and to solve common problems -
would be to unleash a spirit of crusades. 
Mistrust, not confidence, would govern relations 
between States, with all the serious consequences 
that involves. It is therefore evident that the 
discussion in recent months - although it has 
undeniably had its bitter moments - has 
certainly not been useless and will perhaps have 
a positive influence on the preparation and 
conduct of the Belgrade conference. This discus-
sion is indeed an important stage in an overall 
process and of more detailed thinking about all 
the complex interdependent features of the 
world today which the Helsinki final act in fact 
confirmed. As one of the principal representa-
tives of christian-democracy in Italy, Luigi Gra-
nelli, head of the party's international office and 
former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
43 
DOCUMENT 732 
Affairs, recently remarked, it is essential, in 
view of the complexity of this process "to take 
any action which would avoid culpable inaction 
or sterile provocation : ... to do this, and we say 
so quite clearly, we oppose those who, under the 
illusion of better defending their own convic-
tions, may suddenly revert to the logic of the 
Manichean struggle between East and West, 
ultimatums, demonstrations of force, in short, to 
the more or less covert spirit of the cold war ... 
And for the very reason that we must firmly 
uphold the right of the opponents, we must not 
maintain a complacent silence, which would 
amount to complicity, but act", added the repre-
sentative of the christian-democrats, "with 
determination and a sense of measure in calling 
for respect for the principles of human rights 
adopted in Helsinki and upheld by the United 
Nations Charter. At the same time we must avoid 
provocation or pure propaganda which might 
bring a few short-lived results which would soon 
come back like a boomerang". Indeed, "the return 
to inflexible opposition between the two blocs, 
a split between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the abandonment of dialogue and of the 
search for understanding" would impede any 
possibility of positive developments either in 
international relations or in each country 
progressively gaining ever wider areas of 
freedom and democracy. Fairly similar opinions 
were expressed at the meeting of Socialist and 
Social-Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th 
and 17th April 1977 to review implementation 
of the Helsinki final act and consider prospects 
for Belgrade. Inter alia, it is stated in the final 
communique that : 
"Abuses of human rights, wherever in the 
world they occur, should be met by adequate 
action. 
The member parties of the Socialist Inter· 
national do not see any contrast between 
these efforts and the policy of detente. 
Therefore they are opposed to conservative 
forces putting into danger in the name of 
human rights what has been initiated in the 
field of humanitarian reliefs by the policy of 
detente." 
18. The need for "the full application, by all 
States, of all the provisions of the final act of 
the Helsinki conference" and for "positive work 
at the Belgrade meeting" was also stressed 
recently by the Secretaries-General of the 
Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties 
when they met in Madrid on 2nd-3rd March. 
19. In short, in Western Europe, there is now a 
major convergence of political forces of various 
leanings on the fundamental difficulties raised 
by the approach to problems arising since the 
Helsinki conference and prior .to the Belgrade 
meeting. This is a political fact whose importance 
must not be underestimated. 
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20. And here we come to the real difficulty : 
on the eve of the Belgrade conference, the 
dialectical relation between (a) the process set 
in train at Helsinki, (b) the satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory state of its progress (and here, to 
be able to give an overall picture, the analysis 
will have to determine how far the contracting 
States have "paid due regard", unilaterally, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, to the provisions 
of the final act), and (c) the best way to be 
taken, at the follow-up conference in Belgrade 
and more generally in intergovernmental rela-
tions in general, to ensure that the process can 
come to full fruition in a climate of trust. Hence, 
it is obvious that an appraisal of the status of 
implementation of the Helsinki act, critical to 
be sure, but historically, indeed historically 
balanced, is one of the factors that can contribute 
effectively to the promotion of co-operation and 
detente. 
IV 
21. In the face of such a factual situation, in 
that part of Europe in which we are chiefly 
interested, i.e. Western Europe, two substantially 
diametrically-opposed attitudes have emerged. 
One, advocated by a minority, starts from the 
postulate that the Soviet Union has now emerged 
upon the international scene not merely as a 
superpower in its global characteristics but as a 
country nurturing more or less overt intentions 
of seeking world dominion. For countries 
endorsing this view the policy of detente would 
therefore be, for the Soviet Union, a mere tactical 
expedient having as its object to lull the western 
democracies into a false sense of security and 
make them drop their guard, thus enabling the 
USSR to achieve the more easily its imperialistic 
ends. The result is a deeply-pessimistic evalua-
tion of the Helsinki act as such and of the initial 
phase of its implementation, an emphasis on the 
latest Soviet policy for nuclear and conventional 
armaments, a refusal to develop East-West 
economic co~operation, a highly polemical denun-
ciation of the non-application by the socialist 
countries of the provisions of the third basket, 
and a substantial opposition to any broadening 
or stabilisation of the policy erected around the 
Helsinki act. In short, the upshot is a unilateral 
appreciation ignoring, to such an extent as to 
turn it completely inside out, the example 
provided by the difficult and laborious process 
at work in Spain, and the responsibility of the 
attitudes taken by the various countries and 
political formations towards it. 
V 
22. The alternative hypothesis starts from the 
premise that Europe is now, and probably will 
for a long time to come remain, in a situation 
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characterised by the existence of two blocs 
(inside which at present the United States and 
the Soviet Union objectively play a dominant 
role, if only by reason of their own specific 
weight) and a great many neutral and non-
aligned countries. Simply taking note of this 
reality means regarding the European situation 
not solely in terms of a bipolarity and recognising 
the greater room for autonomy and initiative 
which, at any rate in the abstract, the progress 
of detente opens up for the various countries. 
Yet nonetheless the two alliances, of the Atlantic 
and Warsaw Pacts, still constitute the principal 
factor in the pattern of post-war Europe. The 
dominant trend in recent years, in a Europe 
organised with sufficient stability to stand up to 
a confrontation not involving any conflicts, has 
been to go beyond the idea, still very obvious 
for reasons we do not propose to go into here, 
that we are all strangers to each other. In short, 
what is proposed is to endeavour, by accepting 
the process begun at Helsinki, to introduce more 
normal relations between Eastern and Western 
Europe, better able to take account of human 
fa0tors in a new spirit of co-operation, to the 
benefit of both sides. This interpretation, which 
of course lays stress on the overriding importance 
of the political aspect, carries as a corollary a 
continuing search to find common ground for 
co-operation, and as a premise, based on com-
pulsory reciprocity, maximum good faith in 
implementing "measures aimed at increasing 
mutual trust". While the criteria for determining 
the degree of respect and activation of the pro-
visions of the final act may differ and these 
criteria are themselves at present a bone of con-
tention, your Rapporteur believes it is clear that 
this kind of approach is capable not so much of 
"saving Helsinki" (for in fact, and luckily, it has 
not yet come to that), as of allowing the CSCE 
to realise in future, and more and more as time 
goes on, all its great potentialities. Hence the 
fact that: 
"At the meeting of representatives of the 
CSCE participating States to be held in 
mid-June 1977 at Belgrade, it will not be a 
question of fending off accusations, but first 
and foremost of ascertaining what it has 
been possible to put in train on the lines of 
the common resolutions, and secondly, of 
examining what can, more realistically, more 
quickly and more rationally, be attempted." 
(Willy Brandt) 
23. Developing this viewpoint in his opening 
speech at the conference of Socialist and Social-
Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th April, 
Willy Brandt added : 
"The chances of detente must not necessarily 
be considered with pessimism ; on the con-
trary, dangerous errors of appreciation must 
be fought and illusory ideas opposed. 
The policy of detente has never sought to 
eliminate differences between States and 
types of society in East and West. Now as 
before, it is far more a matter of learning to 
live with these differences, abolishing or 
mastering possible tension and at the same 
time developing fields of joint interest. The 
policy of detente and the defence of human 
rights are not contradictory. If we do not 
manage to eliminate tension, thereby making 
peace more stable, it is not worthwhile or 
possible to talk seriously about human 
rights. Reference to human rights is then 
merely a slogan and ineffective if it moves 
too far from reality. Anyone who nurtures 
illusions about the policy of detente does 
not help to ensure peace but encourages an 
atmosphere of insecurity, instability and 
tension." 
24. On the prospects of Belgrade, Willy Brandt 
noted in the same speech that it was necessary 
to: 
"pursue what was started in 1975 through 
European co-operllltion. The Belgrade con-
ference is certainly not intended to add to 
the already ambitious Helsinki catalogue. 
All participating States must naturally have 
an opportunity of expressing critical 
opinions in the context of this provisional 
review. To this end, a sufficiently clear 
picture must be obtained of the positive 
developments noted since Helsinki, parti-
cularly in the humanitarian field. But in 
Belgrade the representatives of the thirty-
five governments concerned would not get 
very far if they were asked to put each other 
on trial as if they were in court. 
One thing to be attempted must be to define 
two or three concrete tasks under a few 
major headings. These projects, which would 
encourage closer co-operation, might be 
launched in the economic field to solve the 
problems of energy and raw materials sup-
plies, in the field of environmental policy 
and transport." 
VI 
25. To attempt to define more precisely the 
areas in which one or other of the alternative 
hypotheses prevails, it would have to be 
acknowledged (with all the defects always in-
herent in any generalisation, and all the natural 
shifts of emphasis and concept) that the govern-
ments of Western Europe, in general, espouse 
the second hypothesis in the context of an effort, 
whose importance should be underlined, with a 
view to preventing the Helsinki process becoming 
bogged down and seeking the bases and broad 
lines of its subsequent development. In view of 
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the relations between them, particular attention 
should be paid to the EEC countries and the 
neutral and non-aligned countries. 
26. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate 
this orientation. 
27. In the case of France, the declarations by 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Barre (16th March), 
define the principles which guide government 
action: 
"Detente is a lengthy process which will 
inevitably encounter difficulties. But we 
still consider it to be the only means of 
tackling opposition between blocs and 
avoiding a split between countries with dif-
ferent social systems ... As for the long-term 
prospects of detente, no country is more 
attached to it than France which, since the 
beginning of the last decade, has made it 
one of the essential bases of its foreign 
policy." 
28. Referring to the new American leaders, 
Mr. Barre then said: 
"We trust that, without prejudice or 
dogmatism, they will view the world as it 
is. They will see that each country has its 
problems, its interests, its policy, and that 
if each one's independence and dignity is 
respected, there is every chance that the 
international co-operation which the world 
needs will be intensified." 
29. All these views were subsequently developed 
more fully by President Giscard d'Estaing in his 
televised talk on 12th April, during which he 
gave some interesting indications about France's 
general attitude. Inter alia, the French President 
said with regard to political and methodological 
problems: 
"First, what is our concept of the policy of 
detente which is being talked about ' For 
me, the policy of detente is an effort to 
improve relations between countries of East 
and West, accepting their reciprocal 
existence on a basis of equality. Fundamen-
tally, therefore, the policy of detente is an 
attempt to improve relations between the 
countries of East and West. It is not a 
policy for the ideological conquest of the 
West by the East or of the East by the 
West. To this policy of detente, which calls 
for patience since it aims at improving rela-
tions, are to be added certain fundamental 
concerns which for us are human rights and 
application of the Helsinki agreement. 
First, where human rights are cnncerned, I 
would remind you that France, in all its 
fundamental texts, in its constitution, insists 
on the recognition of human rights, freedom 
in all its forms and the full exercise thereof, 
and when President Carter wishes to intro-
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duce a cliearer and stronger affirmation 
of human rights into world politics, he will 
find an active part being played by France. 
Then there are the Helsinki agreements, in 
which a number of principles are laid down. 
They were laid down by all the countries 
which signed the agreements, including the 
Soviet Union. I brought the Helsinki agree-
ment with me, thinking this question would 
be raised. It reads as follows : 'The parti-
cipating States'- and thus the Soviet Union 
- 'will promote and encourage the effective 
exercise of civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and other rights and freedoms all 
of which derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person and are essential for his 
free and full development.' And a little 
further on the agreement reads : 'They con-
firm the right of the individual to know and 
act upon his rights and duties in this field.' 
France therefore considers that application 
of the Helsinki agreements does in faet 
include the exercise of civil rights and 
freedoms and France will express or recall 
this each time there is a question of applying 
the Helsinki agreements. In this connection, 
France disapproves of action which seeks to 
ill-treat or persecute individuals or groups 
of individuals because they are urging their 
countries to apply the agreements. You 
asked whether, in view of this attitude, 
France - and I myself - should receive 
a specific individual, from the Soviet Union 
or another country, who considers he is 
being persecuted. There are relations 
between States and personal relations. 
Where relations between States are con-
cerned, France will continue to stress the 
need to recognise the effective exercise of 
freedoms. If' freedoms are not exercised, it 
will pass judgment accordingly. Conversely, 
it will not intervene in particular situations 
within other States. Why nat T First, because 
we would not agree to others taking such 
action towards us. How would the French 
people react if, with regard to a trial or con-
testation, the leaders of another State were 
to express opinions on the position of a 
French citizen Y We would not accept it. 
Second, we will not do so because I am not 
sure that it is the most effective way of 
encouraging respect for human rights and 
freedom. I can tell you that each time we 
have an opportunity, with the principal 
leaders of the eastern countries, we raise 
and solve personal problems, i.e. persons 
wishing to leave their country or families 
wishing to be reunited or situations to which 
our attention has been drawn because they 
are distressing, and we solve a large number 
of problems. 
Conversely, to want to intervene in public 
in particular cases is imagining that by 
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doing so a country such as the Soviet Union 
can be made to go back on its own decisions. 
Those who know the Soviet Union know that 
it would consider this a setback or humilia-
tion and it is not by such methods that the 
problems arising will be solved." 
30. He subsequently made his own thoughts 
clear in the following terms : 
"To revert to what I was saying earlier, 
detente is not a means of conquering each 
other but of improving relations by 
recognising the existence of both sides in 
present circumstances. Of cou:rse we stand 
by our ideology and attachment to our 
political and economic system. We know the 
same is true for the Soviet Union. We are 
not trying to make use of this occasion to 
substitute our's for their's, nor the contrary ; 
we are trying to improve our relations in the 
world of today. I believe that, in view of 
the considerable threat to humanity from 
nuclear means - we shall not have time to 
speak about this- because of the volume of 
armaments, detente must continue to be the 
course to be followed in our efforts." 
31. In the case of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Chancellor Schmidt, on 17th February, 
commented on the prospects for Belgrade in the 
following terms : 
"There, a kind of interim balance-sheet will 
be drawn up of what Helsinki has actually 
achieved. On this occasion, the Soviet Union 
is likely to put forward three proposals, for 
international conferences on the environ-
ment, transport and energy. Possibly· con-
ferences on other topics will be proposed by 
the West. But Belgrade ought not to become 
an occasion for confrontation, a8 the CDU 
would like it to be. Such mischievous talk 
can only be indulged in by members of the 
opposition who have no responsibility of 
office." 
32. More recently, in a speech in Amsterdam on 
16th April during the conference of Socialist and 
Social-Democrat Parties, Chancellor Schmidt 
inter alia summed up the position of the Federal 
Government towards the trend of East-West 
relations since the Helsinki conference as fol-
lows: 
"1. The Helsinki agreements represent a tre-
mendous progress compared to the situation 
thirty years ago. While their implementa-
tion has not yet produced satisfactory 
results, there have already been positive 
consequences for Europe, i.e. with regard to 
economic co-operation and the reunification 
of families. 
2. However, governments must recognise 
that there is still a danger of the dialogue 
on detente becoming bogged down. 
Development of the policy of force in other 
parts of the world confronts the process of 
detente with other problems. Africa, the 
Indian Ocean and other regions must not 
remain outside the attempt to eliminate 
tension. It is essential to maintain the 
dialogue on detente and to deepen and 
enlarge it geographically. 
3. The Belgrade follow-up conference could 
be a major intermediary stage. The thirty-
five governments should adopt as their in-
termediary aim support for the joint deci-
sion taken in Helsinki to renounce solving 
disputes by means of arms. The western 
bloc must be careful not to play the role of 
public prosecutor and leave itself open to a 
situation in which it would only react to 
proposals emanating from communist States. 
A joint western position can be discussed 
beforehand with member and non-aligned 
countries. 
4. In the long run, the discussion on human 
rights will play a capital role in the ideo-
logical confrontation between democratic 
and communist societies. The true meaning 
of the policy of detente is to ensure respect 
for human dignity. To this extent, there is 
no contradiction between the policy of 
detente and action in favour of human 
rights. This trend should not therefore be 
compromised by verbal violence ; the discus-
sion should be conducted so as to ensure the 
maximum chance of success for the indi-
viduals concerned. 
5. Detente is a long-term process whose two 
main aims are : 
- progressively to defuse hostilities; 
- to bring together the elements for better 
co-operation, for instance in the economy, 
production and trade, energy policy, raw 
materials supplies or environment 
policy." 
33. Certain statements by the SPD's spokesman 
for foreign affairs, Mr. Horst Ehmke, during the 
debate in the Bundestag on 19th January, are 
also significant : 
"But let everybody be clear that at Helsinki 
far-reaching measures were laid down that 
it will take a great deal of patience to 
implement. The Helsinki resolutions are only 
two years old. The EEC treaties are twenty 
years old, and even these have not yet been 
fully applied. Helsinki is no legal instrument 
whose execution can be enforced. It is the 
starting point of an arduous political process 
in Europe." 
34. Still more recently (6th April), Mr. Ehmke 
said: 
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"The Federal Republic must now make an 
active contribution to avoiding a return to 
East-West confrontation and allowing the 
two great powem to pursue their policy of 
detente in Europe." 
35. In the case of the United Kingdom, the new 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
David Owen, having noted in a speech on 3rd 
March that "the present relationship is essen-
tially unstable. It still carries the risk of miscal-
culation and disaster. We have to reduce this 
risk", underlined "the Jekyll and Hyde nature 
of detente - competition on the one hand, co-
operation on the other" and described the out-
look as follows : 
"Public opinion in the West has tended to 
display an increasing scepticism both 
towards the final act and by extension 
towards the process of detente itself. But it 
is equally true that some of this scepticism 
and disappointment has been misconceived, 
and that expectations have outstripped by 
far the limits of what detente could have 
reason.ably delivered. 
For while detente has substantial achieve-
ments to its credit, the process started from 
a low threshold and represents to date only 
a limited, though vitally important, accom-
modation in Europe and between the super-
powers. We are witnessing the early stages 
of this process, not its culmination. Detente 
has solved some of the most urgent and 
obvious problems in East/West relations 
and it has established a basic framework for 
the solution of those which remain. But 
there is still a long way to go. 
The blunt truth is that the first and easier 
stage of detente is over. The issues which 
are today on the agenda of EastjW est 
relations are more complex, more contentious 
and far more intractable. We are beginning 
to encroach on fundamental attitudes on 
human behaviour, and the issues go to the 
heart of each side's perception of itself and 
its interests. Inevitably we cannot expect to 
maintain the momentum of the early 1970s. 
This makes it all the more important that we 
should be realistic. Detente on its own could 
not, and was never intended to, stop the 
Soviet Union from being a world power, still 
less to convert the Russians and their allies 
from communism. Already in the last 
century it was clear that it was only a 
matter of time before a country of the size, 
population and resources of Russia emerged 
as a global power. Any idea that detente 
could or should have reversed this process 
is absurd. The basic premise from which we 
in the West must start is that the Soviet 
Union is a world power with national 
interests and ambitions to match, which 
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inevitably bring it into competition, and 
sometimes confrontation, with the West. To 
this we must add that communist ideology 
invests the natural rivalry between East and 
West with a dynamic of unceasing struggle. 
Detente is an immensely complex process, 
comprising innumerable strands and rela-
tionships on different levels : political 
dialogue, commercial and technological 
exchange, cultural contacts, ideological 
debate and military vigilance. There is no 
magic formula which will enable us, East or 
West, to strike the right balance in our 
relations at all times. Both sides are still 
feeling their way. All we can say is that 
balance there must be between the elements 
of confrontation and co-operation, whether 
we are talking of the detente process as a 
whole or of its constituent parts. 
These considerations apply with particular 
force to the Helsinki final act. While the 
act marked an important stage in the deve-
lopment of co-operative relations between 
East and West, there is no denying that 
several of its provisions contain the seeds of 
confrontation. 
It is important therefore that we should 
clearly understand its significance. The final 
act is not a treaty which has given the 
sanction of international law to the status 
quo in Europe. It is, on the contrary, a 
d~laration of purpose which looks to the 
future, not to the past. It provides specific-
ally for peaceful change. Its value is funda-
mentally long-term: as a charter and code of 
behaviour for what we hope will in time 
become a more normal and open relationship 
between both governments and peoples in 
East and West. It reflects detente's highest 
aspirations. 
Anyone judging the final act in terms of 
quantifiable, concrete results, would con-
clude that progress so far has been 
extremely limited. But the government never 
expected the provisions of the final act to 
be implemented immediately or all at once. 
Those in this country who have already 
dismissed the final act as not worth the 
paper on which it is written are at best 
short-sighted, at worst all too ready to 
substitute short-term political rhetoric for 
long-term political progress. In pressing for 
the implementation of the final act, we are 
in many areas dealing with entrenched 
attitudes which in the nature of things will 
not change overnight. But recent events in 
Europe have shown that the final act has 
already begun to be an inspiration and a 
point of reference for those who want to see 
their societies evolve peacefully and constitu-
tionally in a more open direction." 
36. The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, in 
turn defined Britain's position in a speech to the 
conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat 
Parties on 17th April: 
4
'Y ou will see that Britain looks towards 
Belgrade with a determination that it should 
be a further positive development of detente. 
We shall not go there to win propaganda vic-
tories, but to have a businesslike and 
constructive discussion if at all possible. We 
do not nurse expectations which are too 
high - of what can be achieved at Belgrade. 
We are both realistic and patient. European 
security and co-operation is essentially a 
long-term process. Nevertheless we are 
convinced of the political importance of the 
Belgrade meeting for its long-term value in 
continuing the dialogue which has opened 
between East and West, and in emphasising 
the seriousness of the political commitment 
which all the signatory States have assumed. 
It will not be the task of the Belgrade 
meetings to rewrite or prejudice the final 
act. This remains a central and fundamental 
document, and we should satisfy ourselves 
that the final act is working effectively 
before we plan sequels or supplements to 
it. The implementation of the final act is 
a continuing process, and at Belgrade we 
shall be looking for steady and measured 
progress towards the equal implementation 
of all three baskets, which in our view 
constitute a balanced whole. I must point out 
that public opinion in Britain is concerned 
about the freer movement of peoples and 
ideas, and respect for human rights. We 
will draw attention at Belgrade to short-
comings where there is good evidence ·that 
they exist. We have never denied that abuses 
of human rights, wherever in the world they 
occur, are a legitimate subject of interna-
tional concern. Concern for human rights -
whether voiced at international fora like 
Belgrade or in private bilateral representa-
tions - is an integral part of British policy, 
and not a diversionary tactic, hastily con-
ceived and as quickly forgotten. The CSCE 
process has already achieved a number of 
gains ; it has opened a dialogue from which 
we work for improvements in many fields ; 
it has enabled us to develop ha;bits of co-
operation ; it is serving as a source of 
encouragement to those who seek to make 
their own societies more open. These gains, 
and the many opportunities which CSCE 
may provide us in the future, are not lightly 
to be abandoned. We in Britain attach real 
importance to the development of the CSCE 
process, and we intend to play an active 
role in the Belgrade meetings." 
37. In the case of Italy, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Arnaldo Forlani, in statements in 
Strasbourg (28th January) and London (meeting 
of EEC Foreign Ministers, 1st February), 
emphasised that : 
"The principles of Helsinki cannot be 
implemented by the wave of a magic wand. 
Radically different institutional systems 
stand confronted : yet there is no lack of 
ferments at work and new developments 
indicating a possibility for evolution. These 
ferments will have greater possibility to 
mature the more we advance along the path 
of detente and collaboration, even if only on 
a sector-by-sector basis." 
38. :M:r. Forlani remarked in London, of the 
exchange of persons and ideas between East and 
West, albeit in the context of a critical appraisal, 
that: 
"There is, at certain levels in the USSR and 
other Eastern European countries, a new 
ferment at work allowing the tentative 
assertion of personal autonomy. This is 
possible for few people only, and carries 
with it very high risks : it is nevertheless a 
sign and indication that the path of discus-
sions and negotiations may open upon some 
new gleams of hope ... \Ve should", the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs went 
on, "take this fact as a reason to go to 
Belgrade with a common attitude : clear, to 
be sure, on the invocation of principles, but 
also realistic and constructive as regardB 
further progress on the road of detente, 
within a process of searching that can only 
be gradual and slow." 
Mr. Forlani also said, at that forum, that : 
"The optimism of willpower must prevail 
over causes of pessimism. I think the convic-
tion is steadily gaining ground that any 
hardening of the international situation 
would not only bring with it the grave perils 
that we already knew in the dark years of 
the cold war. It would also stifle, perhaps 
for good, the hopes we cherish of a gradual 
process of liberalisation in Eastern Europe ... 
The way towards detente is narrow and 
rough, but is in any case the only one we can 
travel. 
If we really want to arrive at a different 
relationship of trust, we must aim at 
achieving a balance of armed forces and 
weaponry at lower levels, and resume the 
nuclear disarmament talks between the 
United States and the USSR. Only if 
tangible results are achieved in this sense 
will the goal of general disarmament appear 
less utopian." 
39. In the case of Finland, the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Martti Miettunen, said : 
"In the implementation of the principles of 
the final act of the European conference at 
Helsinki promising results have already been 
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achieved. To assist towards further progress, 
constant efforts must be exerted in all 
directions. To this end we should like the 
Belgrade follow-up conference to become a 
constructive phase in the same process, so 
vital for the peace and security of the 
nations. Maintenance of the positive spirit 
of collaboration should not be jeopardised 
by choosing to tread the path of exchanges 
of abuse. In my opinion the final act forms 
a single whole and is to be regarded as such 
throughout the implementation of its 
provisions." 
40. In the case of Sweden, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs said in his report to the Riksdag 
on 30th March 1977 : 
"The question at present arousing the 
greatest interest in international politics is 
that of the immediate prospects of detente. 
Efforts at detente have now been a feature 
of East-West relations for more than half a 
decade. Considering earlier relations, parti-
cularly during the cold war, the results 
achieved are significant. This ooes not mean 
that fundamental differences and suspicion 
between the great powers are no longer 
there. But a network of contacts has been 
established, the practice of exchanging views 
has developed and confidence has been 
strengthened and this should gradually lead 
to the realisation that security can be 
obtained by means other than a constant 
increase in armaments." 
41. On the preparation of the Belgrade con-
ference, Sweden's position was defined as 
follows: 
"The government is now carefully preparing 
its participation in the Belgrade meeting 
which, in accordance with a decision taken at 
the Helsinki conference almost two years 
ago, is to verify how the commitments 
entered into in the final act have been 
fulfilled and lay down guidelines for the 
pursuit of co-operation. These preparations 
are being made in close co-operation with 
other participating States, including in 
particular the Nordic countries and the 
group of neutral countries which, apart 
from Sweden, also includes Austria, Finland 
and Switzerland. 
The Helsinki text sets out at length the 
undertakings and recommendations intended 
to promote co-operation in a host of fieldB 
and facilitate detente in the long term. The 
various parts of the text have an internal 
relationship and together form a balanced 
entity. The achievement of the aims which 
participating States set themselves means 
that they must move clearly and energetic-
ally in the agreed direction but with 
patience and caution. They have no reason 
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to conceal their feelings about the way a 
State, or group of States, fulfils its under-
takings. 
There is nothing to prevent them from 
criticising objectively situations which they 
consider contrary to these undertakings. 
Such criticism is obviously not contrary to 
the wish to pursue efforts towards detente 
and peaceful co-operation. 
In the light of these considerations Sweden 
believes that the Belgrade meeting should 
not be transformed into a forum for 
ex;changing accusations and charges which 
might obscure the ultimate aim, the promo-
tion of peace. 
We shall endeavour to make the work at 
. Belgrade look to the future. The Helsinki 
text provides a good basis. We hope that 
understanding will be established on this 
basis with a view to pursuing co-operation. 
Inter alia, we are considering submitting 
proposals to allow participating States to 
draw greater benefits from so-called con-
fidence-building measures. The purpose of 
these measures is to give real information 
about certain troop movements and military 
manoeuvres so as to avoid any unjustified 
suspicion about their aim and direction. 
We shall strive to ensure that the discussions 
in Belgrade on economic and cultural co-
operation lead to real progress. We know 
that in this respect there are particular 
difficulties in the way of co-operation 
stemming from differences between systems 
applied in the various countries. But we feel 
~hat there will be sufficiently strong joint 
mterest to allow agreement to be reached on 
certain worthwhile measures. It might be a 
matter of affording greater facilities for 
econ?mic contacts between the partners, 
opemng the way for a wider exchange of 
information and more widespread reporting 
by the mass media or allowing countries to 
become better acquainted, in a free manner 
with their respective cultures. ' 
!n this connection, it is particularly 
rmportant to be able to continue work to 
reunite divided families. This work is closely 
connected with the destiny of individuals. 
We shall persevere in finding solutions for 
cases still unsolved and for new cases which 
arise. 
Muc~ attention will be paid at the Belgrade 
meetmg to matters affecting the protection 
of human rights. This is both natural and 
necessary. We have great sympathy for 
those who are subjected to humiliation and 
per~ecuti.o~ because they wish to express 
their opm10ns on matters concerning the 
community, for instance, because they wish 
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to practise their religion because they wish 
to meet and work together for political 
trade union or other aims. We admire th~ 
heroism of those who are fighting for these 
funda~ental freedoms in Eastern Europe. 
PursUit of the process of detente lies in 
governments' respect for and satisfaction of 
individual needs and rights. That is why 
we consider that criticism of the violation 
of human rights is beneficial rather than 
harmful to detente. 
The Helsinki final act specifically mentions 
the connection between protecting human 
rights and developing peaceful relations 
between States. When, by statements and 
measures, we endeaV'Our to protect human 
rights, our action is not only beneficial to 
specific individuals ; it also consolidates the 
foundations of peace. 
But although this is our attitude, we must 
also ensure that our words and deeds have 
the desired effect and do not run counter to 
the goal sought. Our criticism must be such 
as not to jeopardise the cause we wish to 
defend. This balance is often difficult to 
achieve. 
All countries are very sensitive about any-
thing which might be considered as inter-
ference in their internal affairs. The fact 
that at international level human rights are 
no longer considered to be the exclusive con-
cern of each separate State is naturally a 
very significant achievement." • 
4~. For reasons of space, it is impossible to 
give a complete review of the judgments and 
orientations formulated: in the different Western 
Europ~an capitals. One political-geographical 
exc~ptlon must, however, be permitted, in order 
to Illustrate the opinion of the government of 
the host country for the follow-up conference 
Yugoslavia. The Vice-President of the Federai 
Executive Council, Anton Vratusa, wrote · 
recently that : 
"Over the past two years there has been 
di_scernible a favourable development in line 
With the final act of Helsinki. Such changes 
for the better are even more impressive if 
we compare current trends and relations in 
Europe with the situation prevailing in 1967 
when, on the initiative of nine European 
countries, the resolution of the United 
Nat~o~ General Assembly was barely 
begmmng to encourage regional action 'with 
a. view to improving good-neighbourly rela-
ti~ns among European countries having 
different social and political systems'." 
He went on: 
"It is all the more essential that the coming 
Belgrade conference should examine, as well 
as the results of the activities deployed 
following adoption of the final act of the 
CSCE, the essential measures to be taken 
in order to liquidate more speedily any foci 
of crisis and causes of antagonistic division 
in Europe and the world, and ensure the 
progress of the processes initiated, of 
reconciliation among the nations and 
consolidation of peace. This is no time for 
vying with one another, for propaganda 
purposes, in denouncing whatever some 
people have failed to do in implementing 
the final act of Helsinki, but a time for 
conducting an honest and responsible 
analysis of what must be done in order for 
the democratic processes set in motion in 
Europe and the rest of the world by the 
Helsinki conference to be continued with as 
few impediments as possible, and lastingly 
consolidated. The final act of Helsinki forms 
a balanced whole, but is still a compromise. 
Consequently it cannot be implemented 
unless account is taken of the interests of 
all the participants. There can be no 
question of scrutinising the attitude of the 
participating States to any one particular 
basket, but only of surveying political 
security and economic and cultural relations 
as a whole, and the need for firmer reci-
procal commitments guaranteeing continuity 
of effort. It would be no use judging things 
in a spirit of winners and losers. Everyone 
will be a winner if we resolutely address 
ourselves to removing the obstacles impeding 
free contacts between the independent 
peoples of Europe, and everyone will be a 
loser if we obstinately strengthen the 
exclusive attitudes and barriers of separate 
blocs. In that case the real loser is the cause 
of world peace and security, and the real 
winner ·the forces of violence and passion. 
Undoubtedly, by reducing the issue to one 
of the stance of individual members of the 
intellectual elite of one country or another, 
we distract attention from the big, urgent, 
socio-economic and political problems, a 
settlement of which is a prerequisite for the 
achievement of democratic freedoms for all, 
in the different countries and among nations 
with equal rights." 
VII 
43. Having thus briefly summarised the opinions 
which have emerged, or are emerging in the 
position of the western governments, and which 
are logically founded on a comprehensive and 
complex analysis of the status of implementation 
of the final act of Helsinki, the next problem 
is to identify what steps forward have been 
taken, bilaterally and multilaterally, in applica-
tion of the provisions of Helsinki. The balance-
sheet at the end of the early months of 1977 
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cannot be termed wholly negative. It would have 
been foolish to expect much more progress to 
have been made in such a short time. And it 
would, in any event, be misleading to fail to 
perceive, or ignore, the nature of the implementa-
tion of the final act as an ongoing process. 
However, there are two general aspects that 
deserve to be underlined. The final act looms 
considerably larger now on the international 
scene, compared with the time of signature, and 
more and more references to it are being made, 
albeit for very different reasons. Moreover, and 
this is my second comment, the Central European 
set-up which some may have seen as underlying 
its conception is in rapid transformation : partly 
for negative reasons, such as the macroscopic 
breach of the act constituted by the Cyprus 
question, but also for a number of positive ones, 
such as the Italo-Yugoslav agreement, the 
beginnings of technical collaboration among the 
Balkan countries, and the growing demand for 
extending the system to take in the Mediter-
ranean region. 
VIII 
44. As regards the concrete achievements con-
nected with the first basket, mention should be 
made of certain bilateral co-operation agreements 
which have assumed fundamental importance for 
the signatory countries : the agreement between 
Italy and Yugoslavia, the one between Poland 
and the Federal Republic of Germany for the 
repatriation of families. The conclusion of the 
Osimo treaties between Italy and Yugoslavia 
represented for both countries the final settle-
ment of a dispute dating back to the birth of the 
two States and in fact completed in Europe the 
fundamental process of recognising frontiers 
which started with the Ostpolitik and was 
confirmed by the Helsinki final act. Nor is its 
importance political only, but economic and 
cultural too, given that these agreements, by 
putting paid to a past fraught with hostility (we 
need only recall the boost of agr,ressivity the 
question of the Adriatic for so long supplied 
to fascism arid neo-fascism), open the way to 
a future of co-operation, in some ways highly-
innovating compared with previous international 
experiments carried out in this field. It is 
extremely significant that this agreement should 
be connected with the Helsinki act, and at the 
same time noteworthy that, within the framework 
of this multilateral approach, it should stem 
from a fully-independent decision by both coun-
tries. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Forlani, specifica1ly drew attention to this 
aspect when winding up the debate in the 
Chamber of Deputies: 
"I note that the Osimo treaties consistently 
conform to the spirit of the letter of the 
conference. on security and co-operation in 
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Europe, to which Italy wholeheartedly 
subscribes." 
45. The same could be said of the agreement 
between Poland and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the repatriation of families, which 
also gratified the wishes of tens of thousands 
of people of German origin, at the same time 
offering them a free choice of going back to 
their homeland or definitely staying on in their 
country of adoption. In this case too, the inde-
pendent decision of the two governments, 
unrelated to any question of blocs, contributed as 
we believe very profoundly to rapprochement 
and friendship between the two countries. It is 
worth remembering, too, the concrete use by the 
Vatican of the Helsinki act for normalising the 
situation of the church in Hungary and, more 
recently, regularising the Berlin bishops' con-
ference, the communiqu~ concerning which (27th 
October 1976) explicitly refers to the Helsinki 
act. 
46. On the multilateral plane we have witnessed 
interesting developments like the inauguration 
of technical co-operation between the Balkan 
countries, whether, like Greece and Turkey, 
members of NATO or, like Romania and 
Bulgaria, members of the Warsaw Pact, or again, 
like Yugoslavia, one of the non-aligned. Such 
co-operation gives hope of an expansion within 
the Helsinki framework of detente and agreement 
among the European countries of the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin. Another notable result of 
the Helsinki act has been the co-operation 
established among countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean for collectively combating the 
pollution of its waters, which led in February 
1977 to their signing an agreement at Split. 
In this case too Helsinki seems to have opened 
a way that could be followed by countries belong-
ing to both military blocs as well as neutral and 
non-aligned countries, and bring about tangible 
results beneficial to all the populations 
concerned. 
47. Steps forward of some importance have also 
been taken in the field of confidence-building 
measures (point 2 of the first basket). Important 
manoeuvres have been notified, by one side or the 
other, to the adjacent countries, which have 
generally been able to send observers. There was 
at first some grumbling on the NATO side, but 
things have settled down subsequently in patterns 
apparently satisfactory to all. True, these are 
measures of limited scope, in that the territories 
in which they are compulsory are limited so that 
it is still possible for either side to engage i.n 
large-scale manoeuvres without giving notice, 
while only a non-aligned country like Yugoslavia 
is, in practice, obliged to notify all the 
manoeuvres carried out on its territory (nor 
has it made any attempt to evade this obligation). 
Whether these are actually measures sufficient 
to the end of strengthening mutual trust is 
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another matter, hence the necessity for genuine 
progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna, but 
within the scope of the Helsinki act provisions, 
it does represent a real achievement. 
48. Some see as the main obstacle to greater 
progress in the reduction of armed forces and 
armaments in Europe the continued existence of 
the two military blocs whose strategies are still 
offensive, even if the political lines accompany-
ing them are defensive. Others instead argue that 
the existence of blocs themselves may in fact 
facilitate, at least in the present stage, a balanced 
and controlled reduction of armaments. 
49. Certainly there are firm, albeit contested, 
statistical grounds for asserting that the Warsaw 
Pact countries have a growing preponderance 
in Central Europe. But we know that in the other 
camp statistics compiled on a different basis point 
to a totally opposite conclusion. According to 
whether forces in the Mediterranean theatre, 
where the West has a marked preponderance, are 
or are not included, radically different conclu-
sions are reached about the balance of forces in 
Europe. Depending on whether numbers of 
divisions or numbers of men are counted, whether 
this or that definition of an armoured vehicle, 
strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is adopted, 
opposite results are reached, with the result that 
either side, considering itself to be in a state 
of inferiority, could think itself threatened and 
seek to restore or alter the balance of forces in its 
own favour. 
50. Plainly, methods like these cannot produce 
any results in the area of detente and disarma-
ment, and are largely responsible for the pro-
tracted dragging out of the MBFR negotiations 
the last round of which terminated unsuccessfully 
on 15th April. 
51. These talks are in turn influenced, positively 
or negatively, by the course of American-Soviet 
strategic negotiations. In addition to this 
obstacle, it should be noted how the question of 
the Vienna talks has been viewed recently, at a 
very important political juncture. In his speech 
to the conference of Socialist and Social-Demo-
crat Parties in Amsterdam on 5th and 6th 
November 1976, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the 
SPD, said in this connection: 
"In 1975, almost $300,000 million were spent 
throughout the world for military purposes, 
of which 80 % by States taking part in the 
CSCE. According to expert estimates, 
tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in 
Europe alone represent a destructive power 
equivalent to 10,000 times that of the 
Hiroshima bomb. These figures show to what 
extent material, financial, technological and 
human resources are being wasted for 
destructive purposes, whereas if they were 
used for improving the condition of man-
kind, this could relieve considerable 
poverty." 
Mr. Brandt also said : 
"A balanced reduction in these destructive 
forces is of capital importance for the future 
of detente and the establishment of mutual 
confidence in East-West relations, but 
success cannot be achieved by one side 
alone." 
And he added : 
"The aim of the policy of detente in this 
field is to move gradually towards a situation 
in which a surprise attack is impossible. 
This will take time ; it will unfortunately 
be a long time before savings are felt in the 
budgets. However, it is possible, without 
being unrealistic, to agree in the coming 
years on two measures to be implemented, 
one being an initial limitation of armed 
forces in the same context." 
52. More recently (Europa Archiv, 25th January 
1977), the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on 
Disarmament and the Control of Armaments of 
the Bundestag Defence Committee, Mr. Alfons 
Pawelczyk (SPD), noted in Vienna that: 
"The process of clarification is making such 
good progress that a first agreement seems 
possible. At this stage of development, it 
might include the following elements : all 
States playing a direct part in the negotia-
tions would undertake to reduce their armed 
forces ; the process of reduction would be 
divided into two stages. To strengthen and 
improve confidence in the policy of detente, 
a first measure might be limited to the 
reduction of American and Soviet forces. 
Ways to reduce the forces of the other direct 
participants would then have to be agreed 
upon. This reduction might cover land and 
air forces and to a certain extent conven-
tional and nuclear weapons. A limited reduc-
tion of the forces of both parties would not 
endanger security but could be an essential 
part of the process of detente. Such an agree-
ment would help to ensure that the policy 
of detente led not only to the establishment 
of confidence but also to an effective reduc-
tion of forces. In this way we should be 
approaching the goal, which is to find a 
means of making it increasingly impossible 
to use military means to impose political 
aims." 
In mid-April, Mr. Pawelczyk again underlined 
that: 
"At the present stage in the Vienna talks, 
it is possible to negotiate a first agreement 
preventing the conventional armaments race 
and allowing a first reduction measure. At 
the present international juncture, what 
really counts for security policy is not the 
size of the first reduction but the very fact 
that there is a reduction." 
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53. The difficulties encountered in the. Vienna 
negotiations already show that while the dis-
mantling of the military blocs may possibly be 
a long-term goal, it is quite out of the question 
at present. Now, the disappearance at this time 
of the existing military blocs would, in the 
opinion of many experts, present a number 
of perils (in particular, a multiplication of 
disputes among smaller powers with the con-
sequence of one or more larger ones being moved 
to intervene to settle the dispute and thus bring 
to an end the period of peace, armed peace 
certainly, but still peace, that Europe has known 
since 1945). It would therefore be a very tricky 
path that Europe would have to tread, at least 
initially, once effective action is begun, to open 
up the prospect of dismantling the blocs. Most 
likely, the time is not yet ripe, but already 
it should be possible to imagine a number of 
changes in foreign policy and defence policy by 
one or other side with a view to paving the way 
for such a future development. 
IX 
54. As regards the problems of the second 
basket, considered the easiest sector at Helsinki, 
there are also considerable difficulties, though 
not so serious as those in other sectors. We have 
ta;bled before us the three Soviet proposals con-
cerning energy, transport and ecology. These are 
long-term projects in areas which have made 
little progress to date, among other reasons 
because the promoters have lately shown little 
sense of urgency, and which are still under study 
in the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe. 
55. With more specific reference to trade, there 
is a series of both general problems (non-dis-
crimination and most-favolH'ed-nation treatment, 
reciprocity, the abolition of quantitative restric-
tions and administrative obstacles, the indebted-
ness of the eastern countries and their shortage 
of capital), and particular problems concerning 
concrete conditions for ·business contacts and 
commercial information. Certainly, we find 
ourselves at present in a difficult pass, but the 
fact remains that there is still a steady flow 
of western businessmen towards the socialist 
countries, since the problem of the growing 
interdependence of the capitalist and socialist 
economies, especially in the current international 
economic situation, is clearer to both parties 
than ever before in the past. Long-term co-
operation programmes in various fields including 
energy and exploitation of the sea are now 
prepared in both East and West in different 
economic and government circles. The highly 
favourable fact must also be stressed that this 
year for the first time contacts have been 
established between the EEC and Comecon and 
genuine discussions between the two economic 
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areas, Comecon and the Common Market, have 
been opened with the multilateral negotiations 
about fishing. 
56. These programmes provide for co-operation 
agreements in trade (long-term agreements, joint 
companies, compensatory trade and related prob-
lems), agreements on joint production (with the 
possibility of joint ventures and triangular co-
operation), agreements on technological co-
operation including the joint development of 
specific technologies, aimed at supplying 
technical equipment to third countries, and agree-
ments on recourse to the international financial 
system. 
X 
57. The third basket is the section of the final 
act which has roused, and continues to rouse, the 
fiercest controversy, for the reasons stated above. 
The problem is particularly delicate in that it 
involves in fact each country's internal 
legislation and not merely problems of govern-
ments' behaviour. Nor can the question be strictly 
localised in its incidence. It is quite true, as 
already said, that for the last few months public 
opinion has been mainly focused on the USSR 
and the various socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe, in which persons and groups of persons 
have invoked the final act to denounce breaches 
of its provisions and claim wider freedoms. But 
the question arises elsewhere too. We have already 
alluded to what President Carter has said about 
entry visas. Other situations can also be cited 
(the transition phase through which Spain is 
passing ; the controversy about Radikalenerlass 
and telephone monitoring in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany; Cyprus and Northern Ireland). 
Therefore the problem has two aspects : one 
internal to each country and one international, 
in view of the growing importance the question 
of human rights has assumed in international 
relations. The Helsinki act has in this respect 
been certainly innovatory, as the first of its kind 
devoting so much space, albeit with no com-
pulsory force, to economic, social and cultural 
questions of universal impact. 
58. However, a philosophy of conduct has still 
to be formulated. As Mr. Vance says, "It is a 
balancing process". But already one element 
seems to emerge with sufficient clarity, the more 
and more commonly-held conviction - already 
mentioned above - that there is a close connec-
tion between progress in detente and co-operation 
and the creation on all sides of wider and wider 
areas of freedom and democracy. Any pause, or 
worse still backsliding, would certainly not 
encourage a growing and widespread assertion of 
human rights. On the contrary, it is precisely 
progress towards detente that will, in an inter-
communicating world, render more and more 
difficult any transgressions of the major goals 
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which the final act of Helsinki sets for Europe. 
An apt illustration is the remarks by Marshall 
D. Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute of 
Columbia University, and now President Carter's 
adviser on Soviet affairs (Foreign Affairs, 
January 1977, pages 333-334) : 
"It should be clear that the effort to compel 
changes in Soviet institutions and practices 
by frontal demands on the part of other 
governments is likely to be counterproduc-
tive. Yet external pressures may well be 
marginally effective, provided they take into 
account a scale of reasonable feasibility ; for 
example, demands for humane measures in 
reuniting families may be feasible, whereas 
demands for measures which threaten to 
undermine the system's monopoly of political 
authority are not. 
We cannot predict which way the Soviet 
system will evolve in the future. But it seems 
reasonable to believe that easing of repres-
sion is more likely to result from evolution-
ary forces within the society under prolonged 
conditions of reduced international tension 
than from external demands for change and 
the siege mentality they would reinforce." 
He added the basic consideration that : 
"For governments, therefore, the first order 
of business must be to regulate the military 
competition" and that "the objective of the 
United States and other democratic govern-
ments to seek to reduce the danger of nuclear 
war by negotiations with the Soviet leaders 
is a moral obligation." 
59. Still more, the achievement of agreements 
to ensure for the world the possibility of living 
under a system of peaceful coexistence, detente 
and co-operation, is increasingly coming to be 
seen as a path for which there are no rational 
alternatives: the only one that can, at the same 
time, lead the world onwards toward the more 
advanced goals of democracy and freedom. 
XI 
60. Lastly, there are two problems that remained 
marginal at Helsinki but on which the Belgrade 
conference cannot abstain from taking a stand. 
One is that of the Mediterranean. From the fore-
going it is clear that this area with its Middle 
East extension is now one of the world's "hot-
spots" and there is a growing body of opinion, 
even among governments which opposed its inclu-
sion among the topics for discussion at Helsinki, 
that genuine security in Europe cannot be achie-
ved without a solution to Mediterranean problems 
and crises being found. Here too, we must. tread 
softly, with a realistic appreciation that the blocs 
and their bases and fleets do exist, and cannot 
be wished away. But there is already during the 
\ 
current phase broad scope for action and initia-
tion by way of bilateral and multilateral co-
operation, and extension to the Mediterranean of 
confidence-building measures in the longer pro-
spect of stable security arrangements in that 
area. The other question is that of the follow-up 
of the Belgrade conference. A theme which 
already made heavy weather during the pre-
paratory discussions for the Helsinki conference, 
it lies particularly close to the hearts of the 
smaller and uncommitted countries, which see in 
it a possibility of their making a more effective 
contribution to intra-European relations and 
securing a better safeguard of their own inde-
pendence. At all events, Belgrade can definitely 
not be left without a sequel, and it would not 
suffice merely to decide on a further conference 
once it is over. 
XII 
61. The experience of Helsinki and the follow-up 
actions for the first two years allow us to advance 
certain considerations in connection with the 
coming Belgrade meeting. It is undoubtedly too 
early yet to attempt to convert a declaration of 
intent and informal commitments into legal 
obligations. With the exception of a few precise 
and clearly-defined points, any attempt to do so 
would end up in failure, or in a retreat from the 
results achieved at Helsinki. These are still sub-
stantial. A process has been set in train (both in 
relations between States, and in inducing the 
latter to adapt to this new philosophy of inter-
relations and interdependence), and it is only 
logical that this process should become increas-
ingly irreversible, unless the way is barred by 
a serious international crisis. It follows that the 
Belgrade meeting must be a success, and every 
effort made to reduce the danger that the pole-
mics now in course be turned into an exchange 
of accusations and insults between the two blocs 
which could seriously compromise the results of 
the conference and diminish, de facto, the import-
ance, function and independence of the neutral 
and non-aligned countries. At the same time we 
cannot but recognise the limitations stemming 
from an attempt to achieve an overall balance of 
concessions and advantages of the sort that was, 
to some extent, striven for or accepted at Hel-
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sinki. This sort of tendency will not allow us to 
advance very far, and carries some risk of streng-
thening the bloc mentality, with a consequently 
greater importance and influence of the bigger 
powers over the smaller. The search for realistic 
and balanced solutions to the major problems 
must instead leave more room for the autonomy 
of the individual States, starting from those 
which are not members of the blocs, so as to 
permit the flexible and open-ended solutions 
which alone can secure genuine progress along 
the guidelines laid down at Helsinki. 
62. As Mr. Luigi Granelli, leader of the Inter-
national Department of the Christian Democrat 
Party and former Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, recently wrote : 
"There is no sense whatever in taking an 
'all or nothing' attitude, when the subject 
matter of the negotiations is, objectively, 
extensive and complex, and demands, by its 
very nature, a strictly gradualist procedure. 
Helsinki and Belgrade, at different levels of 
course, are not final goals and as such 
subject to definitive criticism as concerns 
their limitations or to empty triumpha1ism 
as concerns their partial successes. They 
constitute the meaningful stages along a 
laborious road where there would be nothing 
to gain from stoppages occasioned by more 
grandiose ambitions or wishful thinking. A 
breaking off of the dialogue, or a specious 
search for pretexts for not reaching a con-
clusion on questions that can be solved 
through frank and honourable agreement, 
lead in the best of cases to preserving the 
status quo, and in the long run to the inevi-
table erosion of relationships, in a climate 
of growing mistrust. Would not this be the 
opposite of detente ? " 
63. Wisdom and reaJism dictate that we should 
foresee a slow and uneven progress, depending 
on the different sectors. There is no use wringing 
our hands over this. On the contrary, we must 
allow for it, and not incur the risk of jeopar-
dising this intricate and interdependent growth 
process which, in its underlying gu.ideldnes, 
answers the true interests and aspirations of all 
the peoples of our continent and all the countries 
signatory to the Helsinki final act. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Opinion of Sir Frederic Bennett on the 
application of the final act of the CSCE 
1. If the final act of Helsinki is to be regarded 
as an integral feature of detente the same basic 
considerations surely have to apply to the former 
as to the latter. 
2. Detente itself has become increasingly 
regarded with a sense of disillusionment 
throughout the western world, the best that can 
be said of it being that it is preferable to the era 
of cold war that preceded it, the worst that it 
has proved an invaluable opportunity for the 
USSR to advance its own expansionist aims. 
3. Such strong feelings have been aroused in 
the West in this context that both candidates in 
the recent American presidential election decided 
to drop the word detente from their political 
vocabulary. 
4. Yet there never should have been any such 
misunderstanding if there had been an initiaUy 
agreed interpretation of detente, which was not 
the case. 
5. The West, for their part, until events forced 
on them a more realistic appreciation, believrd 
that the introduction of detente in place of cold 
war wouM lead, and w:as intended to lead, 
through relaxation of East-West tensions, to 
meaningful, peaceful coexistence, entailing 
mutual respect, but without approval of each 
other's differing political, economic and social 
systems. 
6. From the Kremlin's point of view however 
the Marxist-Leninist principle of international 
relations as interpreted and exploited by the 
Krem1in for Soviet nationalist purposes, dictates 
that there can be no real enduring peace, either 
externally or internally, in an inexorable thread 
of contemporary history, between the so-caJJed 
capitalist world, including social democracies on 
the one hand and a global communist hegemony 
on the other. 
7. Consequently, peaceful coexistence, which is, 
or purports to be, the real basis of detente, is in 
Soviet eyes not really peace, but an indulgence 
in continuing expansionist imperialism, without 
resort to war, leading ultimately to the establish· 
ment of such a hegemony, under Soviet domi-
nation. 
8. If the early high hopes of the final act are 
not in their turn to follow detente into ddsap-
pointment and cynicism, there must be no repeti-
I. In a vote on 9th May 1977, the General .Affairs 
Committee by 11 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions decided, 
in application of Rule 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly, to append to the report submitted by 
Mr. Segre and adopted by the Committee the text in 
which Sir Frederic Bennett set out a minority opinion. 
tion of differing interpretations of the stated 
aims of Helsinki, nor a failure to appreciate the 
different motivations of the vrarious signatory 
powers. 
9. For their part, at 1east until the arrival of 
Mr. Carter on the scene, the Americans never 
attached great importance to the final act, sup-
porting, rather than initiating, positions adopted 
by the European democracies. 
10. These latter mostly felt that the agreements, 
however limited, contained in the act, in all 
three baskets, did open windows in the iron 
curtain, which in the long run could lead only 
to a lessening of totalitarian excesses and dis-
trust and in consequence create greater East-
West tolerance and so lessen tension, not only in 
Europe but anywhere else in the world where 
Soviet ambitions thre&ten long-established vital 
western interests. 
11. The neutral and the non-aligned signatories 
of Helsinki quite simply felt that any measure 
which made them feel less insecure, however 
flimsy the guarantees offered to them, was 
worthwhile. Most probably the first test of the 
effectiveness or otherwise of such guarantees will 
sooner, rather than later, arise in Yugoslavia. 
12. Finally, the USSR has never coneealed itll 
dislike of basket Ill on human rights anu 
associated matters, or parts of basket I for that 
matter, from the very start of the negotiations ; 
and only reluctantly agreed to the relevant pro-
visions being included in the act as a price that 
had to be paid for their main ambition being 
achieved : the legitimisation of the present 
frontiel'9 of Europe, irrespective of the wishes of 
their various inhabitants. Even so, to obtain the 
inviol&bility clauses the Kremlin had to accept a 
western reservation that the denial of any future 
changes in these frontiers was limited only to 
the use of force, not to negotiation : but Soviet 
political leaders have never regarded this reser-
vation as a valid one. 
13. Other areas where undoubted different, 
indeed conflicting, interpretations are increas-
ingly becoming apparent are the provisions 
regarding non-interference in the internal affairs 
of another State. These are not seen by the 
Kremlin (the Brezhnev doctrine) as applying to 
subversion of democratic countries inside or out-
side Europe that show possibilities of conversion 
to communist rule, as part of what Soviet leaders 
have described as an inescapable progress 
towards a world-wide acceptance of Russian-type 
Marxist-Leninism, as the only enduring form of 
government. Pursuant to the same reasoning of 
course any attempt by the western countries tAl 
combine to strengthen their defences against 
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communist penetration (and even more so to try 
to reverse trends or situations in favour of 
pluralism in countries already regarded by the 
USSR as won over to the cause of Marxism-
Leninism) is decried as aggressive interference 
with a naturaJ. inevitable course of events, 
contrary both to Helsinki and, for that matter, 
detente too ! Be that as it may, it was also hotly 
denied in Moscow that Russian intervention in 
Angola eame within the purview of Helsinki 
because the latter was not a signatory of the 
final act and therefore did not thereby earn any 
right of protection against external intervention. 
The same claim is being made as each successive 
attempt to increase Soviet influence in Africa is 
undertaken. 
14. Clarification on this latter point is therefore 
or should be a major western objective at 
Belgrade. 
15. With so many separate and often incompa-
tible strains of thought existing among the 
Helsinki signatories about the raison d' et re of 
the final act it is not surprising that different 
estimates should also exist about the progress, if 
any, of steps towards its implementation, in 
regard to all the baskets. 
16. The difficulties of obtaining a consensus 
under such conditions have been compounded by 
the emergence of an increasingly significant arid 
articulate element in the original calculation, not 
directly represented in HelBinki, i.e. the dis-
sidents within both the USSR and the satellite 
States that have achieved a prominence and an 
influence never envisaged in August 1975. 
17. Those behind the iron curtain who are philo-
sophically, ideologicaH~ or culturally opposed to 
totalitarianism, whatever its colour, have seized 
on Helsinki as a drowning man clutches at a 
straw in order to support and justify their 
aspirations for another way of life ; and with a 
considerable degree of success such dissidents 
have enlisted popular sympathy and support for 
their dissent, within the western democracies, 
which their governements cannot or dare not 
afford to ignore. 
18. Thus an admittedly embarrassing situation 
has arisen for the USSR, and to a differing 
extent for each of the other Warsaw Pact 
governments too. 
19. The more they indulge in repressive 
measures to hold back the new forces of dissent 
in their midst the more they contravene the pro-
visions of Helsinki basket Ill which they have 
signed, and the more they increase doubts in the 
West about the validity of the whole concept of 
detente. 
20. If on the other hand they adopt a soft line 
with the dissidents these latter accentuate their 
voices of protest and reach an ever-increaBing 
audience in the West, proving that criticism of 
Soviet tyranny is not limited to reactionary 
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capitalist circles abroad but is shared by men 
and women living inside the Warsaw Pact -
and who, after all, should know better than these 
latter the truth ? In the result too the millions 
of those who in the aftermath of the last war 
and during the last thirty years that have 
decided to live in exile, voluntary or enforced, 
in the West - Ukrainians, Armenians, Poles, 
Hungarians, Czechs and East Germans and 
many others deriving from East and central 
Europe - have found a new public focus for 
their unchanging disapproval of the regimes 
now in power in their homelands. 
21. Under circumstances when there is 811Ch 
wide variance about objectives and differing 
interpretation.~ of some of the most important 
provisions of the final act, it is impossible to 
draw up a single balance-sheet of what has been, 
or has not been, attained at the end of the 
treaty's first two years of operation. Selective 
quotations aimed at lowering the political 
temperature, drawn from speeches by political 
leaders from East and West alike wi1l not and 
cannot resolve this dilemma. 
22. For none can alter, even if they manage to 
obscure, the fact that our Rapporteur, despite 
his gallant and sincere efforts, has been asked 
to reconcile the irreconcilable. Once again it has 
been shown that a joint international declaration 
of high principles and laudable aspirations can 
have little validity, if it requires for fulfilment 
· an abandonment not just of different forms o.f 
government, but wholly incompatible outlooks on 
a way of life. To urge the Soviet Union to accept 
our ideals in the West is something we are 
bound to do if we are true to our own faith in 
the basic purposes of Helsinki; but for the 
Russians to make any substantial concession..l 
would imperil the whole system and structure of 
their society - unlikely to receive their concur-
rence - and which in this context could even 
turn out to be counterproductive. 
23. Belgrade can therefore be expected tu 
achieve little more than a restatement of stand-
points by the various signatories. The USSR will 
claim that active overt western concern about 
human rights in the eastern bloc represents 
interference in the internal affairs of another 
State and is contrary to Helsinki, despite the 
terms of basket Ill. The United States and most, 
if not all, the western nations will deny tl~ 
premise, and also assert that non-interference in 
what form of government the people of a coun-
try freely choose is not a one-way privilegeJ 
process; and furthermore emphasise that 
restraint should be observed right across the 
global board and not just in Europe. 
24. So by the time the Belgrade conference 
ends, it is reasonable to assume that the ideologi-
cal conflict between Marxist totalitarianism and 
those who will have none of it will continue, as 
heretofore. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Application of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer and others 
21st June 1977 
I. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Helsinki" insert 
"together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries". 
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out all the words after "achievement" and insert "of 
further steps towards detente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations, especially at the Vienna 
talks on mutual balanced force reductions, is essential for the pursuit of the process of detente;". 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "meeting" and 
insert "in parallel with relevant European and Atlantic organisations ;". 
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "European States" and insert "par-
ticipating States". 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
6. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
7. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper : 
(a) insert before "principles" the words "provisions and" ; 
(b) leave out "a similar policy" and insert "similar policies". 
Stfi'MII: txm Botkmer, Danlcert, Ropet' 
1. Bee 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Application of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by MM. Leynen and Bort11el 
l. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation pt:Oper. 
2lsi Jane 1977 
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "principles laid down in Helsinki" 
and insert "clauses of the Helsinki final act". 
Signed : Leynet!., Bonnel 
1. See 6th Sitting, 28rd June 1977 (:Amendment referred back to Committee). 
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Amendment No. 3 
Applbltlon of the final aet of the CSCB 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Pecoraro and othert1 
22nd lane 1977 
In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "detente" insert "and, in 
parallel, the progressive and effective effort to ensure respect for human rights by all the participating 
States"~ 
1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back· to Committee). 
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Amendment No. 4 
AppUcation of the final ad of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Pecoraro and others 
Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
22nd Jnne 1977 
Biped : Pecora4'0, Oatxiliere, Treu 
1. Bee 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (-Amendment reterred back to Committee):· 
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Amendment No. 5 
Appllclltion of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. &1 
tabled by Sir Fredllrl.c Bennett and others 
22nd. Jnne 1917 
1. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Regretting that the development of this process has been disappointing ; " 
2. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "dt§tente" insert "and 
respect for human rights". 
Signed : Bennett, de Koster, Page, Okannon 
1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (AQ!en~t .ref!me<l ~ to Conmrlt*l· 
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Amendment No. 6 
AppUeation of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Roberti 
22nd Jnne 1977 
1. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert "in accordance 
with the spirit and letter of the Charter of Hlllll&n Rights ;". 
2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "a.nd with the Atlantic powers, 
i.e. the United States a.nd Canada. ;". 
3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed : Roberti 
1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committcle). 
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Amendment No. 7 
AppUcatton of the fltaal act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Leynen and others 
This .Amendment replaces Amendments Nos. I and 2. 
22nd June 1977 
I. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Helsinki" insert "together 
with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries". 
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after 
"achievement" and insert "of further steps towards detente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotia. 
tions is essential for the pursuit of the process of detente;". 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "meeting" and 
~ "in _parallel with governments and relevant European and Atlantic organisations ;". 
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "European States" and insert "all 
the signatory States and affirming human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper : 
(a) leave out "necessary" and insert "of the member countries" ; 
(b) leave out "of member countries". 
7. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper: 
(a) leave out "principles laid down in Helsinki" and insert "clauses of the Helsinki final act"; 
(b) leave out "a similar policy" and insert "similar policies". 
Signed: Leynen,, BetJUf1&01&1 of Whitley, Danktrl, Segre, Urwin 
I. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment refel'l'ed back to Committee). 
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Ameadm.eDt No. 8 
23rd June 1977 
1. 
Applk«tion of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 8 1 
tabled by Mr. RtvUre 
Replace paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper by the following text : 
"3. Ensure in all events the application by all the signatory States of the ten principles to govern 
relations between States defined in Helsinki, particularly those on respect for fundamental freedoms 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of all States;". 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "member countries" and insert "signa-
tory countries" and at the end of the paragraph insert "in order to create the conditions for effective, 
general, full and controlled disarmament ;". 
l. See 8th Sittm,, tard June 19'7'7 (Amendment Nfened back to Committee). 
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Document 733 
Political activities of the Council 
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
~May 1977 
on the political activities of the Council- reply to the twenty-second annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
(a) Joint meetings 
(b) National parliamentary procedure 
Ill. Activities of the Council 
IV. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Oommittu: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chair-
man); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Abens, Amrehn, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : McNamara), 
Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brugnon (Alternate : Fomi), 
Cermolaooe, Faulds, Gessner (Alternate : :schwencke'j; 
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Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate : 
Roberti), Grangier, von Hassal, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, 
N68sler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Peridier, Portheine, Segre, 
Urwin, Van Hoeylandt. 
N. B. The namllB of those taking part in the vote are 
pnmeiHn itaUca;· · • : ~ ' · · · -
' 
-· 
' J 
I 
DOCUMENT 733 
Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the positive statements on the present and future prospects of WEU made by 
several ministers at the Assembly's twenty-second session; 
Thanking Mr. von Plehwe for so ably leading the WEU secretariat during a particularly diffi-
cult period ; 
Noting that the Council has appointed a titular Secretary-General in the person of Mr. Longerstaey ; 
Regretting that the Council is allowing certain procedure essential to its relations with the 
Assembly to lapse ; 
Recalling that the Council has frequently undertaken to report to the Assembly on the appli-
cation of the Brussels Treaty, even if it is exercised by bodies other than WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that a joint meeting is held with the General Affairs Committee in the near future 
allowing a true dialogue to be held on essential matters concerning the future of WEU and the deve-
lopment of international relations, particularly between Eastern and Western Europe; 
2. Ensure that, in accordance with customary procedure in national parliaments, governments pro-
vide substantial information on the aspects of their foreign policy raised in recommendations of the 
Assembly; 
3. Continue to include in the annual report a detailed account of its work as was its practice 
until the twenty-orecond annual report; 
4. Report more fully to the Assembly on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in 
other bodies ; 
5. Maintain its activities in accordance with the assurances given to the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(•ubmitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When in 1976 Mr. Peridier submitted, on 
behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the 
reply to the annual report of the Council on its 
activities in 1975, he had to note that the political 
situation in Western Europe and the Atlantic 
Alliance left open a number of options. His 
report and the one submitted by Mr. de Bruyne 
on European union and WEU proposed a number 
of courses for terminating this state of uncer-
tainty. The main proposal was probably that 
WEU would one day take its place in the frame-
work of the European union, which impLied that 
in the meantime all the responsibilities incumbent 
on it under the modified Brusse1s Treaty should 
be maintained in full and that no changes what-
soever should be made in its structure. 
2. In 1976, the Assembly received encourage-
ment in this sense from a number of sources, 
including the Ministers who addressed the 
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
second ordinary session. 
3. For instance, Mr. Taittinger said that 
France: 
" ... attaches great importance both to the 
spirit and to the letter of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Anxious that the treaty 
should not sink into obsolescence, France 
wishes to reaffirm strongly before you its 
permanence, its fundamental character." 
He went on to say that WEU : 
" ... constitutes a perfect forum for raxsmg 
questions on security and defence in Europe 
and ... must ensure application of the revised 
Brussels Treaty and pursue, in its own parti-
cular field, the important task of concerting 
our efforts, reflecting on our problems and 
formulating proposals. " 
4. Mr. Thorn, Luxembourg Prime Minister, 
said that: 
" ... this Assembly's powers to handle prob-
lems of the defence of Europe are not only 
politically and legally indisputable, but even 
unique of their kind, since no other Euro-
pean assembly has been specifically given 
such a remit. Moreover, being eminently com-
petent in defence matters, it is also the only 
assembly having statutory powers to con-
sider as a whole interlinked problexns of 
policy and strategy." 
5. Mr. Thorn then turned to Mr. Tindemans' 
proposal that the European Parliament discuss 
matters devolving to the future European union 
68 
but outside the scope of the Paris or Rome 
Treaties and said : 
"This idea, too, was rejected by the Foreign 
Ministers. Moreover, as the Ministers 
nowhere propose to invest the European 
union with new powers in defence matters, 
it seems clear that there will be no substan-
tial change in the foreseeable future in the 
European Parliament's occasional forays into 
security matters during debates on co-opera-
tion by the European union. It may therefore 
be inferred that a European union having 
full powers in matters of defence and secur-
ity is not about to see the light of day. 
Western European Union is therefore called 
upon to continue its mission on the same 
basis as in the past. I am convinced that 
it will do so with the same authority and 
competence as before." 
6. Finally, :Mr. Wischnewski, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, said: 
"The modified Brussels Treaty which set 
up WEU combines in a very constructive 
way the two objectives which must guide 
Europeans in their efforts to strengthen the 
European component of NATO - consoli-
dating the Atlantic Alliance and uniting 
Europe." 
7. At the end of 1976, it was therefore to be 
expected that the Assembly would receive from 
the Council the clarification it had been seeking 
for some time. But the Council's twenty-second 
annual report fails to confirm in any way what 
was asserted by the Ministers. Examination of 
the information it gives about relations between 
the Council and the Assembly and about the 
Council's poLitical activities proper causes even 
greater concern in that the practice of certain 
governments differs, sometimes considerably, 
from the solexnn utterances of those responsible 
for their foreign policy. 
D. Relatio1J8 between the Council and the 
Assembly 
8. As usual, the Council affirms its constant 
concern to maintain good relations with the 
Assembly. It is in fact evident that the Council 
has made a great effort in this sense by transmit-
ting its annual report in good time and by the 
role its members have played in the work of 
the Assembly at the two part-sessions in 1976. 
The importance of the addresses made by several 
Ministers, members of the Council, was noted 
by all the parliamentarians and the information 
given by these Ministers on the views of several 
member countries on the future of WEU was 
particularly V'aluable. The Assembly was able to 
group extracts from these speeches in an infor-
mation document published for the symposium on 
a European armaments policy held in March 
1977. 
9. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur feels that 
there is still some ambiguity in relations between 
the Council and the Assembly as can be clearly 
seen from the Council's report for 1976. 
(a) Joint meetings 
10. The first ambiguity lies in the confirmation 
that the Council refuses to hold a joint meeting, 
in the strict sense of the word, with the General 
Affairs Committee. The very wording of the 
annual report in this respect gives the impression 
that this refusal might become permanent since 
it is said that the Council : 
" ... consider that informal meetings provide 
an appropriate means of fulfi1ling the par-
liamentarians' desire for information because 
member governments' positions on the ques-
tions raised can be more freely expressed ... " 
11. The Council is not therefore invoking cir-
cumstances to justify its refusal but is setting 
it out as a principle. The General Affairs Com-
mittee could of course recall that it was the 
Council itself that proposed a new procedure for 
joint meetings, which has moreover never been 
applied in the form proposed, and that the Coun-
cil also believed at one time that the "formal" 
procedure which it now rejects was essential. 
The Committee for its part had always in the 
past wanted a true dialogue with the Council, 
without insisting on one procedure or another. 
12. However, it felt the procedure proposed by 
the Council had the great merit of obliging the 
Council as such, i.e. with the unanimity of the 
seven governments, to express what might be 
a joint Western European position on questions 
put in writing by the Committee while at the 
same time retaining the possibility of a freer 
dialogue with representatives of each country. 
13. Experience of earlier procedures, the major 
part of which was "formal", proved that at joint 
meetings where only the country of the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council was represented by a 
Minister or a Secretary of State, the others being 
represented only by Ambassadors, the Chairman-
in-Office alone actually spoke, even during the 
so-called "informal" part of the meeting. The 
General Affairs Committee therefore has dis-
couraging memories of the "informal" part of its 
past joint meetings with the Council, although it 
agrees with the Council that the "formal" pro-
cedure is most cumbersome. 
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14. For these reasons, the Committee approved 
the letter in which Mr. Sieglerschmidt, then 
Chairman of the Committee, asked the Council 
in December 1976 that there be several Ministers 
at the joint meeting if it were to be "ilnformal". 
The Council gave no specific answer to this point 
but, when it fixed the date of 26th April 1977 
for a joint meeting with the Committee, it again 
adopted an ambiguous stand. The choice of date 
gave hope that since the Ministers were there 
several of them would attend the joint meeting 
with the General Affairs Committee. But on the 
other hand, since the Council must have known 
that the parliamentarians would be unable to 
be in Paris on that date, one might wonder to 
what extent the Council wished to entertain the 
Committee's request. 
15. The Council now proposes that the meeting 
be held in the autumn. There is nothing against 
this provided several Ministers will be able to 
attend and a real exchange of views is possible 
between the Committee and the Council. If the 
choice of date were to mean the joint meeting 
having all the disadvantages of a "formal" 
meeting plus those of an "informal" one, such 
a meeting would be pointless. 
(b) National parliamentary procedure 
16. The second reservation which the Committee 
feels it must express concerns the implication of 
the paragraph of the report on speeches by mem-
bers of the Assembly in national parliaments. 
17. The Council says that it was : 
" ... pleased to note the opportunities taken 
in 1976 by members of the Assembly to put 
questions or to speak in their parliaments 
on subjects of particular interest to WEU." 
But certain government practice quite obviously 
makes it impossible to use this procedure which 
had, however, produced fairly satisfactory results 
in the past. 
18. On several occasions, the Belgian and French 
Governments have stated in reply to questions 
concerning their countries' application of recom-
mendations adopted by the WEU Assembly that 
the reply given or to be given by the WEU Coun-
cil is the only one these governments will make. 
The Belgian Government has sometimes merely 
reproduced the reply of the WEU Council. Per-
haps such replies were due to certain written 
questions being put late, thus obliging the govern-
ment concerned to answer after it had expressed 
its position in the WEU Cotmeil. In any case, 
this would be justified only if the policy of the 
country concerned corresponded exactly to views 
expressed unanimously by the Council. This is 
possibly quite a rare occurrence and in general 
each member country also pursues its own inde-
pendent aims, apart from the joint aims of the 
Seven. 
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19. But the reply published in the French Jour-
nal Officiel of 8th March 1977 to Question 22,548 
put by Mr. Schmitt, Senator, on 22nd January 
1977, refers to a recommendation to which the 
WEU CoUJilcil has not yet replied. Moreover, this 
question concerned French policy and not the 
policy of WEU as a whole. But according to the 
French Government's reply: 
" ... it is for the Council of Western Euro-
pean Union alone and not each government 
to work out the answer to be given to a ques-
tion put to it. The French Government 
cannot therefore express an open opinion 
on Recommendation 296." 
20. There is thus a flagrant contradiction be-
tween such a reply and the relevant paragraph 
in the Council's report, particularly since in 
Section B of Chapter I of the report the Council 
recalls that replies to Assembly recommenda-
tions: 
" ... reflect the common view of the seven 
member countries, in accordance with the 
principle of unanimity whioch governs their 
work. It is only in the most exceptional cir-
cumstances that the Council may find it 
necessary to indicate that members' positions 
differ as, for example, when those positions 
are a logical consequence of the differing 
relations which member States have with a 
particular outside organisation." 
21. This is tantamount to saying that in its 
replies the C<>uncil can express only the unani-
mous opinion of the governments and that the 
individual opinion of eaoh of them may be com-
municated to the Assembly only in the framework 
of questions put in national parliaments. But 
if the governments refuse to answer such ques-
tions, the possibilities for a dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly become very limited. 
It will therefore be understood that the Asembly 
cannot be satisfied with its relations with the 
Council and that it has the impression that the 
latter is increasingly evading a dialogue which it 
nevertheless claims to be seeking. 
ID. Activities of the Council 
22. For a long time, it has been clear that in 
political matters the Council allows a number 
of its responsibilities under the modified Brussels 
Treaty to be exercised by other bodies which 
inter alia have the merit of including more coun-
tries than WEU. This must not therefore be 
held against it and even if it has to be recognised 
that the Council's activities in the political field 
have remained on a very small scale, it is not on 
this aspect of its work that the Assembly's main 
criticism will be brought to bear, although it 
remains to be seen whether all the problems 
raised by the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty are effectively dealt with by the Seven 
in other institutions. 
70 
23. However, the Council, as it has often under-
taken to do, should report as fully as possible 
to the Assembly on the results of these delibera-
tions, in whatever forum, and above all, as the 
Assembly has continuously urged - and the 
Council has always agreed - it should distin-
guish clearly between the responsibilities devol-
ving to it, particularly under Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, and the exercise of 
these responsibilities as it may be effected in the 
framework of other bodies. 
24. But in the fifth paragraph of Chapter II 
of the annual report, the Council says that it is 
not the only international body empowered to 
deal with the questions covered by Article VIII 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. This raises the 
question of what is meant by "empowered". 
Article VIII defines the role and responsibilities 
of the WEU Council in the framework of the 
alliance instituted by the modified Brussels 
Treaty. But neither the European Community 
nor the OECD is empowered to apply a defence 
alliance. This is obviously not so for the North 
Atlantic Council, but in that WEU is considered 
the nucleus of Europe in defence matters it 
cannot be replaced by an organisation based on 
another treaty and not truly European. More-
over, the Council notes that these bodies are 
empowered to discuss only some of the matters 
covered by Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The Council cannot therefore be criticised 
for taking account of work in these bodies in 
exercising its own activities, but it must be stres-
sed that taking account of such work does not 
imply such a restrictive limitation of its respon-
sibilities under the Brussels Treaty as the Coun-
cil claims. 
25. If this fifth paragraph is compared with the 
third paragraph of Chapter II of the Council's 
annual report for 1975, the impression is given 
that the Council's position in 1976 is far more 
restrictive than it was in 1975 regarding the 
division of responsibilities and activities between 
the various consultative bodies in which the seven 
member countries take part. 
26. This is a most important matter and the 
Assembly is entitled to know whether the Council 
still considers its 1975 definition of its responsi-
bilities to be valid. There seems to be further 
justification for this question in that Chapter IT, 
Section A, of the annual report on political ques-
tions is much shorter than in previous years, 
although the Council's activities in 1976 do not 
appear to have differed significantly compared 
with 1975. For instance, political questions as a 
whole are now covered in only two sub-para-
graphs compared with four in 1975, and a num-
ber of details included in the annual report 
for 1975 have been left out of the 1976 report. 
27. For instance, no mention has been made of 
the points covered by bilateral relations between 
the WEU member countries and the eastern coun-
tries in 1976 nor of ministerial meetings between 
WEU countries and eastern countries. Similarly, 
the nevertheless essential question of relation.~ 
between WEU countries and the United States 
has totally disappeared from the annual report 
for 1976, whereas it occupied considerable space 
in the report for 19'75. Is this to be considered 
as illustrating a deliberately restrictive view 
adopted by the Council tow&rds it!! own duties T 
This question is worthy of serious consideration. 
28. Incidentally, another detail has been noted 
which is perhaps not without significance : the 
Council has so far always informed the Assembly 
of the number of meetings of the working group, 
but now it. merely indica,tes that the workin_g 
group met "regularly as in the past". Does this 
mean that there were fewer meetings in 1976 
than in previous years, i.e. 26 in 1975 Y If so, 
there is no need to conceal the fact from the 
Assembly. If not, why should the Council not 
say so? 
29. In short, the introduction and Section A of 
Chapter II do not perhaps show that the Council's 
activities in 1976 were even less than in 1975 
but it is felt that the Couneil is increasingly 
determined to provide the Assembly with as little 
information as possible and there is a hint that 
the Council is in fact envisaging the possibility 
of eventually relinquishing the application of its 
responsibilities under Article VIII of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and the withholding of 
information apparent in the twenty-second 
annual report is intended to facilitate the transi-
tion. If this is not the case, the Council should 
say so clearly and act accordingly in all its rela-
tions with the Assembly. One way or the other, 
there is a striking difference between the com-
ments of Ministers in the Assembly and the tone 
of the annual report describing the Council's 
political activities in 1976. 
IV. Conclusions 
30. It can thus be seen that there is a wide 
gap between the good words of the Ministers and 
.... , 
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tne practice of the Council. To what is this due T 
Is it merely a question of reluctance or unwil-
lingness on the part of the officials who represent 
the governments on the WEU Permanent Coun-
cil, . the real author of· the Council's annual 
report ? But the Council has often emphasised 
that the Assembly need draw no distinction bet-
ween the Council meeting at ministerial level and 
the Permanent Council. Or do the governments 
speak one language in official pronunciations but 
fail to practise what they preach ? 
31. Consideration of the twenty-second annual 
report of the Council brings these questions to the 
fore, particularly since government practice 
seems to be concentrated increasingly on depriv-
ing parliamentarians of the means of expression 
available to them in the past. This is probably 
the nucleus of what the General Affairs Com-
mittee will be asking the Council at a joint 
meeting if the Council agrees to hold such a 
meeting in circumstances allowing a true dialogue. 
32. Finally, the appointment with effect from 
March 1977 of a titular Secretary-General -
Mr. Longerstaey- has terminated a long interim 
period which the Assembly always deplored, 
although welcoming the unswerving ability with 
which Mr. von Plehwe has directed the WEU 
secretariat. It can but trust that this appoint-
ment, less than a year after giving a new mandate 
to the Standing Armaments Committee, is a sign 
of the determination of the seven governments 
to apply the modified Brussels Treaty to the 
full. The personality of the new Secretary-
General and the reputation he earned as Belgian 
Ambassador to Italy and Permanent Represen-
tative to the United Nations give hope that he 
will co-operate with the Assembly in encouraging 
the Council to play the full role assigned to it by 
the treaty. Having urged the appointment of 
a politician as Secretary-General for so long, the 
Assembly is prepared to extend a warm welcome 
to an ambassador insofar as the Council allows 
the Secretary-General enough initiative to ensure 
that the Council's activities conform more closely 
to the options expressed by the government 
authorities of member countries . 
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Draft Recommendation 
on W•tern Barope'• poUcy toularda Mediterranean problema - the Weatern Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
Having surveyed the present political situation in Spain ; 
Noting the decision of the Spanish Government to hold elections in June 1977; 
Recognising the important constitu~ona.l a.nd political changes which have occurred in Spa.in 
during the la.st sixteen months ; 
Welcoming the moves towards a. more liberal system of government which have ta.ken place 
since the death of Genera.! Franco, in particular the lega.Jisa.tion of political parties and of free and 
independent trade unions ; 
Recognising the important advances ma.de in the new prelimina.ry constitution of Spain, a.nd 
expressing the hope that a.fter free a.nd completely unfettered elections Spain will proceed on its 
way towards a full system of pa.rlia.menta.ry democracy, 
RBOOliDDINDS TlU.T TIIB 0oUNOIL 
Give every encouragement and a.ssista.nce to Spain, looking forward to the da.y when the new 
Spain oan be welcomed in the various joint pa.rlia.menta.ry and democratic European organisations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Mendelson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur visited Spain from 9th to 
14th January 1977 to examine future possibilities 
of co-operation between Spain and Western 
Europe, this being an essential part of Euro-
pean policy in the Western Mediterranean in 
view of Spain's importance and its place at the 
western limits of the Mediterranean. Spain's 
internal situation has so far prevented it from 
taking part in the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Economic Community and NATO because 
the members of these organisations expect coun-
tries wishing to join to be governed by a 
democratic parliamentary system. 
2. The death of General Franco, after more 
than thirty-five years of dictatorship in Spain, 
left the way open for new developments. The 
choice before the people of Spain was between 
"rupture with the old regime and reform from 
within". 
3. In the long run, the action of the countries 
of Western Europe will depend above all on 
these developments and their opinion of them, 
since the main lines of Spain's foreign policy 
seem but little affected by the changes now 
taking place. 
11. Basic facts 
4. General Franco died on 20th November 
1975 after appointing a member of the former 
Spanish royal family, Prince Juan Carlos, as 
his successor. This was not a full restoration of 
the monarchy insofar as Prince Juan Carlos 
was not the first successor to the Crown but 
became King by the will of the dictator, Franco, 
and not by right of primogeniture. The present 
regime in Spain is thus still the one instituted 
after the civil war and the system established 
by the Franco dictatorship will remain in force 
until another takes its place. 
5. It is quite certain however that King Juan 
Carlos wishes to introduce important political 
changes in Spain and the country is now passing 
through a period of transition. But the outcome 
of this transition is still uncertain : will it merely 
be a more liberal edition of the Franco regime 
or will the State be reorganised on a new and 
truly democratic basis? The trend so far is 
towards liberalisation without as yet any decisive 
measure indicating a radical change in the 
regime. If there were to be a radical change, 
the transitional period would be a long one. 
6. It should be noted however that present 
conditions in Spain are no longer those in which 
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General Franco was able to overcome democratic 
forces thanks to a military uprising. More than 
60 % of the Spanish population today is less 
than forty years old and has therefore known 
no other regime than that of Franco. But the 
civil war left deep scars and the population 
as a whole is mainly· concerned with avoiding 
any recurrence of such hostilities. 
7. Spain's economy has made rapid progress in 
the last ten years. It has had one of the highest 
growth rates in Europe. There has been a flow 
of population from the countryside towards the 
towns, reducing the percentage of those employed 
in agriculture to less than 25 % of the popu-
lation. Education has been improved and illiter-
ary has been considerably reduced. The 9evelop-
ment of tourism has increased contacts with 
people from other parts of Western Europe 
which is that part of Europe to which Spain 
has traditionally belonged. The standard of 
living has risen and the gross national product 
per inhabitant is now over $2,000, which is 
bringing it close to the least favoured of the 
EEC member countries and it had an annual 
growth rate of over 7% from 1968 to 1974. 
The way of life, interests and civilisation are 
increasingly similar to those of other western 
countries. 
8. There are therefore no longer any fun-
damental obstacles to that country's participation 
in all the joint activities of the Western Euro-
pean countries, whether in economic matters or 
in terms of civilisation. The remaining dif-
ficulties are mainly political, although many 
delicate problems may arise for the integration 
of certain sectors of the Spanish economy in the 
overall economy of the community. 
ID. The economic position 
9. Although Spain's economic progress has 
been particularly remarkable in recent years, 
General Franco died at a particularly difficult 
time for preparing a new course for Spain. 
10. In 1976, Spain began to feel the crisis which 
had been affecting the industrialised countries 
of Western Europe since 1973. This delay is 
explained by the special characteristics of the 
Spanish economy, there being a sharp recession 
in tourism, a major factor in the Spanish balance 
of payments and employment. 
11. The peseta suffered from rampant inflation 
as testified by a tremendous increase in prices 
in 1976. Official statistics set the increase in 
cost of living in Spain in 1976' at over 20% 
compared with 16.9 % in 1975 and 15.7 % in 
1974. Unemployment also increased considerably, 
the official figure being 800,000 unemployed. 
The above figures are challenged by the opposi-
tion, however, who consider that the increase 
in consumer prices and the number of 
unemployed must be much higher than official 
statistics show. 
12. There has been a marked drop in invest-
ment due to industry working well below 
capacity. 
13. A provisional government with its sights set 
on legislative elections which are essential for 
the future of the country is hardly in a position 
to launch a valid cleaning-up policy and imple-
ment an economic recovery programme. The fact 
that the economic crisis coincides with the 
political crisis inevitably makes more difficult 
the search for solutions to the economic prob-
lems of the country and, insofar as the political 
crisis is expected to be a long one, it is to be 
feared that Spain will take a long time to over-
come the economic crisis whose social and polit-
ical effects cannot be measured accurately at 
the present time. 
IV. The government 
14. At the present time the King has full 
powers. On acceding to the throne, he was 
sworn in under the Spanish Constitution in the 
same way as all his ministers. It was he who 
appointed the two successive prime ministers : 
Mr. Arias Navarro who was already Prime 
Minister towards the end of the Franco dictator-
ship and then, with effect from July 1976, 
Mr. Adolfo Suarez Gonzales who had been 
national secretary of the only legal Spanish 
political organisation under the Caudillo. 
15. The powers of the King and of the govern-
ment are limited, however, by the existence of 
the Cortes appointed during General Franco's 
time. In several respects the Cortes amended 
in a conservative sense reformist bills presented 
by the government. The renewal of the Cortes 
is therefore of decisive importance because only 
then will it perhaps be possible to speak of a 
true change in the regime. The indications are 
that this will occur between May and July 1977, 
although no date has yet been fixed, and the 
responsibilities of the new assembly have not 
yet been finally spelt out. 
16. The members of the government, including 
the Prime Minister, are all relatively young. 
However, they all have their roots in the Falan-
gist Party, the Franco administration or the 
army which makes one wonder to what extent 
they want changes and are prepared to accept 
the fundamental changes sought by the opposi-
tion parties. 
75 
DOCUMENT 734 
17. It is a general- General Gutierrez Mellado 
- who occupies the post of Deputy Prime Min-
ister and three other generals are members of 
the present government as Ministers of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force. The question is therefore 
how far military leaders are in a position to 
influence government decisions and to what 
extent they are prepared to encourage or tolerate 
a true change in the regime. 
18. On 18th November 1966, on a proposal by 
the government, the Cortes adopted a political 
reform bill which was the subject of a referen-
dum on 15th December and then endorsed by 
94 % of those taking part in the vote (77 .4 % of 
the electorate) . This bill established a transitional 
regime under which the Cortes henceforth was 
composed of two chambers, thus confirming its 
democratic nature with greater and specific 
powers in legislative matters, although without 
true supervisory powers over the executive. The 
government remains responsible only to the King. 
In addition, the King has the right to resort to 
a referendum in the event of differences between 
the government and the Cortes. However, the 
fact that in the future the Cortes will have 
constituent powers implies that the regime 
established under the new bill will be provisional. 
It is expected that the main task of the new 
assembly to be elected in the forthcoming gen-
eral election will be to frame a new constitution. 
V. The political parties 
19. Throughout the Franco era there was a 
single-party system. The political parties of 
Republican Spain went underground and new 
political groups were formed illegally, which 
denied them a wide audience. These illegal poli-
tical parties were too small to be strong enough 
to present themselves successfully at the polls 
once democratic consultation became possible. 
20. The result is that recent political trends 
that have shaped Spanish opinion are represented 
by a multitude of parties whose following cannot 
be assessed since most of them have never stood 
for election and there are only vague indications 
of the number of members or sympathisers. For 
the elections to be held at the beginning of the 
summer of 1977, it would be essential for these 
parties, which alone are truly democratic, to 
regroup themselves according to general trends, 
perhaps even forming elootoral alliances. 
21. Any such regrouping or a11iances, however, 
is most difficult since nothing is yet decided 
about the conditions in which elections will be 
held. Further difficullties stem from the fact that 
political parties have only just been legally 
authorised in Spain. Only a few right-wing 
parties have taken advantage of the authorisation 
granted since Franco's death to form political 
DOCUMENT 734 
associations in accordance with the la.w. Most of 
the democratic parties have preferred to remain 
under the cloak of illegality as long as they were 
not legally authorised to exercise their political 
activities in full. Until very recently they were 
tolerated, but to varying degrees, depending on 
the parties' poldtical leanings - for instance 
the communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, was 
again arrested for a few days at the end of 
December 1976. Some parties still had to take 
refuge behind names destined to conceal their 
nature or their political leanings. They have very 
few means at their disposal. Since radio and 
television are State-controlled they do not have 
access to them. It is even difficult for them to 
publish and distribute newspapers. The regime 
is not therefore one of freedom of parties but 
one in which democratic parties are merely tole-
rated without any guarantee of the limits of 
tolerance. Their leaders were until: recently in 
danger of being arrested since their activities 
were ipso facto against the law. Admittedly, 
negotiations are being conducted between the 
Prime Minister and the political parties but they 
are particularly difficult because the government 
cannot negotiate with all the parties, little being 
known about what each one represents. They 
have therefore been obliged to organise them-
selves to conduct these negotiations. They have 
appointed a group of nine persons, joined infor-
mally by Santiago Carrillo for the Spanish 
Communist Party, to prepare the negotiations 
which are conducted by four representatives for 
all the opposition parties and the Prime Minister. 
The aim of the negotiations is to draw up legisla-
tion granting political parties a status and right 
to a normal activity. 
22. On 11th January, an important step was 
made in these negotiations since the Prime Min-
ister, by making them formal, indirectly recog-
nised the existence and the right to exist of the 
political parties. It was even possible to issue 
a joint communique after that meeting. 
23. The purpose of that sitting was to define 
the conditions of an amnesty and to spell out 
the freedom of the poLitical parties. The negotia-
tors agreed to no longer make the existence of 
political parties subject to a government decision 
but merely to registration by statement as for 
public companies. Should the programmes, prin-. 
ciples or activities of these parties not be in 
conformity with the law, they could be taken to 
court but not made subject to a government deci-
sion. 
24. Following upon these negotiations several 
political parties have since been legalised, i.e. 
the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, two 
Socialist Parties, and the Socialist Party of 
Catalonia. But the application of the Communist 
Party to be legalised has not been approved, but 
referred to a court of law for a decision. This, in 
spite of the demands by all the opposition parties 
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that the Communist Party should also be made 
legal. 
25. The main political parties may be classified 
in a number of main groups. The referendum 
on 15th December 1976 allowed an assessment 
to be made of the numbers opposing any change 
in the country. This figure is less than 3% of 
the electorate since only 2.6 % voted no in the 
referendum. This represents the most conserva-
tive element of Francoism, the main party of 
this tendency being the "new force" led by 
Mr. Blas Pinar. 
26. The major right-wing grouping of Spanish 
politics is represented by the Popular Alliance 
Party, lied by Mr. Fraga Iribarne, which has the 
considerable advantage of being authorised as a 
political association and, consequently, of being 
able to exercise influence on society and the 
electorate. It has widespread and valuable back-
ing among the ruling classes. It represents a 
will to prolong in a more liberal manner the 
regime instituted by General Franco and it is 
clear that it has a wide following in Spanish 
society. 
27. A former member of the Falangist Party and 
Minister of Information under Franco, Mr. Fraga 
Iribarne, was the author of one of the rare 
reforming laws under Franco introduced in 1966 
aboLishing prior censorship of the press. Since 
leaving the government in 1969, he has been 
very outspoken in calling for further limited 
reform measures. On Franco's death he became 
Minister of the Interior in the Arias Navarro 
government but is not a member of the Suarez 
government. In the Cortes he voted for the 
reform bill on 18th November 1976. He calls 
himself liberal but members of the Liberal Party 
do not agree. Mr. Fraga Iribarne's Popular 
Alliance Party includes five other former Franco 
ministers among its leaders. In his interview 
with Der Spiegel, Mr. Fraga Iribarne said that 
the liberalisation of Spain was sti11 his aim but 
it would take at least four years to achieve. 
Throughout that period he called for the main-
tenance of the ban on the Communist Pa.rty and 
on the Basque or Catalan separatist organisations. 
28. On the other hand, the three traditional 
branches of western democracy - liberal, 
christian democrat and socialist - are very 
widely dispersed because of their semi-clandestine 
existence. Finally, there are the Spanish Com-
munist Party, several extreme left-wing group-
ings, ~d a number of regionalist parties, parti-
cularly in the Basque country, Catalonia and 
Galicia. 
29. A very wide range of parties will therefore 
be standing for e1ection in Spain. The Popular 
Alliance Party might well obtain many of the 
votes from those who do not want to break with 
Francoism, whilst their opponents will be frag-
mented into a number of different groups. 
30. The opposition parties have shown true 
solidarity with the Spanish Communist Party 
by refusing to negotiate freedom for their own 
parties which did not allow equal treatment for 
the Communist Party. 
31. This active solidarity produced results since 
a representative of the Communist Party is 
taking part in the discussions between the opposi-
tion parties to prepare the negotiations with the 
government on this essential question. The Com-
munist Party for its part seems intent on pre-
serving this solidarity and not jeopardising the 
liberal trend in Spain by pushing itself to the 
fore or by adopting positions which might disturb 
public opinion. 
32. The strength of the democratic parties which, 
in principle, have remained clandestine, is extre-
mely difficult to assess. Most of them had recom-
mended abstaining in the referendum on 15th 
December 1976, but abstentions numbered only 
23 %, all of which are obviously not due to the 
instructions of these parties. The inference is 
probably that even if they represent the inner 
feelings of many Spanish people, the democratic 
pa.I'Ities cannot expect a sweeping victory in the 
spring elections and they wiH no doubt have to 
find an acceptable compromise with other 
political forces if they wish to play an active 
role in establishing a democratic Spain. 
VI. Trades unions 
33. There are similarities between the position 
of the trades unions and of the political parties, 
but a number of problems are peculiar to the 
unions. Under the Franco regime, an official 
union was set up associating employers and em-
ployees. Membership of and consequently subs-
criptions to this union were compulsory. It was 
responsible for various welfare services. 
34. Nowadays, trades unions are again tolerated, 
although not officially recognised. However, the 
official, compulsory trade union still exists, thus 
considerably hindering recruitment by demo-
cratic trades unions since workers can hardly be 
asked to subscribe to two trades unions at once. 
The result is that the trades union bodies which 
have been formed or reformed in recent months 
can give only very partial and approximate indi-
ca.tions of the number of their members. 
35. Here we must mention the special place 
occupied by the workers' commissions, set up 
clandestinely. They have endeavoured to use the 
possibilities made available to the official 
national labour organisation and the electoral 
procedures applied by the Franco system at 
pla.nt level for the appointment of representatives 
of that organisation. The national labour front 
has been infiltra.ted by many militants from the 
workers' commissions, in order to find a basis 
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for their infiuence in the framew.ork of the 
Franco system. 
36. This tactic brought them into conflict with 
the trades union bodies which had been officially 
disbanded under the Franco regme but continued 
covertly, refusing any form of co-operation with 
the official trades union and the Franco regime. 
37. A serious drawback of this situation is that 
it prevents the trades union unity which they all 
say they want. The workers' commissions have 
said they want immediate trades union unity, 
even before forming a confederation themselves. 
38. The traditional union bodies, particularly 
the General Workers' Union (UGT), wished to 
reorganise themselves first before embarking on 
negotiations on unification. Since their reorgani-
sation is far from complete, early unification 
seems unlikely and the workers' commissions too 
have had to form a confederation. To these diffi-
culties are added political issues as in many 
other countries, the UGT seeming to be linked 
with socialism whereas the communist element 
pLays a greater role in the workers' commissions. 
39. There is every reason to think that trades 
union rights could be recognised in a similar 
manner to th~ of political parties. However, 
the problem raised by the existence of the offi-
cial union is still serious. Will workers still be 
obliged to belong and subscribe to this union 7 
What will happen to the large sums invested 
by this union in forty years of contributions 
by workers ? The democratic trades union bodies 
seem in no way inclined to abandon such con-
siderable wealth, which belongs to the workers, 
to an organisation which they consider to be in 
no way representative. 
VII. Regional problems 
40. ALthough the Spanish Republic had granted 
considerable independence to the provinces, some 
of them, such as Catalonia, having a real govern-
ment, Francoism was very much in favour of 
centralisation. In a number of regions a large 
proportion of the population considers that the 
restoration of freedom means re-establishing 
regional and local autonomy. In the case of the 
Basque country and Catalonia, there are very 
strong claims for autonomy. Many Basques and 
Catalans consider that they are true nations 
which should constitute States federated within 
a Spanish confederation. Regionalism also seems 
quite strong in Galicia. 
41. Basque nationalism led to a series of acts 
of terrorism, attacks and demonstrations, as 
in Pamplona on 16th January 1977. Basques 
were to the forefront of the fight against Franco-
ism and are the only ones to };lave carried out 
attacks since Franco's death. The Basque prob-
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lem is therefore there for all to see, both in 
Spain and abroad. Everyone knows it can be 
solved only through substantial concessions to 
Basque nationalism. But demands are being made 
for an immediate extension of the amnesty 
granted by the new regime to political prisoners, 
there still being about 180, most of them Basques. 
42. In the negotiations on 11th January, the 
representatives of the opposition parties appear 
to have obtained from the government a number 
of measures which, although not granting amnes-
ties in the case of crimes involving bloodshed, 
would nevertheless lead to all political prisoners 
being freed before the elections. 
43. The left seems far stronger in the Basque 
country and Catalonia than in the rest of Spain 
and if local governments are set up it can hope 
to have considerable influence, which might not 
be the case in other regions. For instance, the 
Catalan Socialist Party claims to have ten times 
more members at present than the Spanish Socia-
list Party in Catalonia, and it seems clearly in 
favour of the claim for very wide autonomy in 
Catalonia. 
44. Whatever sympathy there may be for a 
federalist concept of the State and the right of 
cultural communities to govern themselves, it 
must be borne in mind that the importance of 
regionalist movements may be considerable in the 
next elections, since although they may bring a 
large number of electors to vote for the demo-
cratic parties, they may also lead those who 
oppose regionalism, which some may consider as 
a threat to the unity of Spain, to vote for the 
Democratic Ailiance or other nationalist parties. 
VIII. Elections 
45. No date has yet been fixed for the general 
elections, but they can hardly be held before 
lOth May and must be held before the end of 
July 1977. The date is of some importance 
because of the disorganisation of the democratic 
parties, which need several months to reorganise 
themselves and prepare the elections. If the 
elections were to be held earlier it would in no 
way imply that Spain would be progressing more 
quickly towards democracy. Again, it is not yet 
known what electoral system will be applied, 
although the law provides for regional represen-
tation. The future electoral law has yet to be 
negotiated by the four representatives of the 
parties and the government. 
46. One aspect of uncertainty about the coming 
elections is the extent to which they will be 
influenced by the authorities. Strict government 
neutrality in electoral matters would not be 
enough to ensure an independent ballot. Local, 
municipal and provincial authorities are still 
those set up by the Franco regime and they still 
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have great authority. The terror on which their 
authority was based in Franco's day has left 
many traces and without far-reaching changes in 
the administrative staff it is to be feared that 
many electors may be influenced by staff many 
of whom have every interest in preventing 
genuine radical changes in the political life of 
Spain. 
IX. Future of the regime 
47. It now seems an accepted fact that the Cortes 
to be elected at the beginning of the summer 
will play a constituent role, although this has 
not been stated with absolute clarity. It might be 
just a question of revising the present constitu-
tion and not drawing up a new one. This means 
that perhaps the break with the past and the 
Franco regime may be held up by the procedure 
for forming the new assemblies, since the new 
Cortes is to be composed of a Chamber elected 
in accordance with the principle of proportional 
representation and a Senate elected by majority 
ballot for four-fifths of its members, the remain-
ing fifth being appointed by the King. 
48. Furthermore, it would appear that the 
political system on which the Spanish State will 
be based after the elections will not be a parlia-
mentary one. There is nothing to oblige the King 
to choose his ministers from a parliamentary 
majority and, while the next Cortes will be far 
more democratic than earlier ones, it does not 
mean that the next Spanish Government will be 
more liberal or democratic than the present one. 
However, it may be expected that if the elec-
tions are held correctly and the parties are able 
to express themselves freely, the King will have 
to take account of the results of the ballot and of 
the majority in each of the two assemblies in 
forming the government. But there is a risk of 
conflict between the government and the Cortes 
which the army would still be in a position to 
arbitrate, particularly if the economic crisis and 
unemployment were to become worse or if there 
were unrest, especially in the Basque country. 
X. Foreign policy 
49. The democratic parties show no signs of 
wishing to make radical changes in the present 
course of Spanish foreign policy, which will con-
tinue to be directed towards maintaining and 
improving links between Spain and Latin America 
and between Spain and other Mediterranean 
countries, particularly the Arab countries. It 
would be normal to think that a more democratic 
regime would look for partnel'S in Latin America 
and the Mediterranean among countries which 
are more democratic than those which have been 
Spain's partnel'S in recent years. 
50. Moreover, Spain considers itself to be a 
wholly European country and all the parties, 
from the Popular Alliance to the Communist 
Party, have ·expressed a keen desire for_ Spain 
to join the Common Market as early as possible, 
alrthough they may have certain illusions about 
the political ·and economic difficulties which this 
might encounter. They know that some countries, 
including the Federal Republic and France, have 
shown their desire for Spain to join the Euro-
pean Community without delay, but that other 
countries, including the Netherlands, insist on 
a truly democratic regime being established in 
Spain before opening negotiations. But what 
would be the reaction of the EEC countries 
towards Spain's application for membership if 
there were no major changes in the Spanish 
regime y 
51. Moreover, present economic difficulties in 
Spain, the competitiveness of much of its agri-
cultural produce with that of France and Italy, 
the fact that its per capita gross national product 
is lower than that of the EEC member countries 
and the vast disparities between the regions will 
inevitably raise problems which will become worse 
if the present recession continues, in Spain as in 
the rest of Europe, particularly because the prob-
lem of Spanish manpower would then become 
acute. 
52. More controversial is the question of Spain 
acceding to the Atlantic Alliance. Spain is at 
present associated with western defence through 
special agreements with the United States, by 
which American bases have been set up on 
Spanish territory. Some parties wish Spain to 
join NATO and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole 
to take over the place now occupied by the Ame-
ricans alone. 
53. Conversely, other parties consider that the 
maintenance of present agreements would be 
preferable and this is the position inter alia of 
Mr. Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Communist 
Party. 
54. In an interview in the futernational Herald 
Tribune of 9th January 1977 he said: "We are 
in favour of an ever-stronger Europe that is 
independent of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, a Europe that can contribute to ending 
bipolarity and create a multipolar world". But 
at the same time he considers that the present 
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balance in Europe is a guarantee of peace. He 
does not wish Spain to join NATO but would 
not oppose it outright. The idea that Spain's 
membership might change the balance and con-
sequently endanger peace was expressed by 
several Spaniards with whom your Rapporteur 
spoke. Very few of them showed a real desire to 
join NATO, although some of them considered 
that this might be the price that Spain would 
have to pay to join the EEC. 
55. However, it must be realised that Spain does 
not consider itself isolated in the mildtary field. 
The Spanish army already carries out combined 
manoeuvres with the French army and the new 
direction some people feel its defence policy 
should take is mainly seen as a means of better 
ensuring Spain's security while reducing the 
military effort it would have to make. 
XI. Conclusions 
56. All the information obtained by your Rap-
porteur during his visit to Spain leads him to 
believe that premature steps should not be taken 
as regards relations between Spain and the West-
ern European countries. Developments in Spain 
since Franco's death are still uncertain in too 
many respects and, until the next elections at 
least, Spain is still a country with a basically 
authoritarian regime even if the government pur-
sues a relatively liberal policy. OnLy when Spain 
has worked out the new regime under which 
it intends to live will it be possible to examine 
how democratic that regime is. 
57. Secondly, it became clear that the increasing 
number of interventions from without might have 
the contrary effect on developments in Spain to 
that which was expected, such interventions pos-
sibly leading to an anti-European and anti-
democratic reaction, which is precisely what must 
be avoided. 
58. This in no way means that material assist-
ance and expression of solidarity with the 
Spanish democratic parties must be avoided, but 
such assistance and solidarity must be cautious 
insofar as the political forces have not yet organ-
ised themselves and it is difficult to ascertain 
which groups supporting which tendencies are 
the most representative of Spanish society. 
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Draft Reeommendcdion 
on a reuierD of adf1GIIeed t.chnology fn Ierael 
The Assembly, 
Considering Israel's wish to establish closer links with Western European countries in the research 
and development of advanced technology ; 
Aware that in various fields such as the desalination of water, Israeli research and development 
might be of great benefit to several Western European countries; 
Convinced that collaboration between Israel and Western European countries would be mutually 
advantageous, especially in : 
(a) new sources of energy such as solar energy; 
(b) oceanography, desalination engineering and piaciculture; 
(e) aircraft construction and space programmes; 
Considering that Israel, although not geographically part of Europe, is already co-operating with 
such European organisations as CERN and Euratom ; 
Conscious of the need for Europe to play a more important geo-political rale and to act as a . 
balancing factor for the world superpowers ; 
Aware of the necessity to have good relations with all Middle Eastern countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THB CoUNCIL 
Invite member countries: 
1. To intensify co-operation between Western European and Israeli scientific and technological 
communities ; 
2. To promote greater co-operation with Israel in aircraft construction, oceanography and the develop-
ment of new sources of energy ; 
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Israel in ita work on scientific 
and application satellites ; 
4. To promote a permanent di8CU88ion with all Middle Eastern countries in the field of science and 
technology. 
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Explanatory .Memorandum 
(aullmltted by Mr. uan Ooijen, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. After visits to the United States; Japan, 
Canada and a number of European countries, 
the Committee decided to visit Israel when it 
became apparent that the Israeli authorities 
would welcome sueh a visit. From members' 
contacts with Israeli· parliamentarians, especially 
those with an interest in technological questions, 
it was clear that Israel has much in common with 
the member countries of WEU, espooially in such 
fields of advanced technology as aircraft construc-
tion, nuclear energy, oceanology and electronics. 
2. Once the Presidential Committee had agreed 
to the visit, the Israeli National Council for 
Research and Development in the Prime Minis-
ter.'s Office drew up a programme which was 
communicated to the Committee through the 
good offices of the Israeli Embassy in Paris. The 
Chairman of the Committee was rooeived by the 
Ambassador, Mr. Gazit, and having explained 
the wishes of the Committee the programme was 
finalised 1 with the help of the Embassy staff. 
3. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his and 
the Committee's gratitude to the Israeli officials 
of the National Council for Research and 
Development and especially its international 
affairs division, the Embassy officials in Paris 
and all ministries and private industries involved 
in the organisation of the visit. 
4. The Committee's discussions with officials 
from several ministries on the. Israeli Govern-
ment's general policy in scientific and technolo-
gical matters were extremely interesting. 
5. The Committee Was highly hOnoured to be 
addressed by His Excellency Professor E. Katzir, 
President of Israel, who received the Committee 
at his residence. Professor Katzir is also a 
scientist of renown and chaired the 1966 Com-
mittee set up to examine the organisation and 
management of government research. 
6. The visit started at "Yad Vashem- Remem-
brance Authority", a memorial to Jewish victims 
of the second world war who had been subjected 
to Nazi persecution. Of the sixteen million Jews 
in the world at that time some six million met 
their deaths during the holocaust in Europe. The 
Chairman of the Committee laid a wreath by the 
eternal flame. 
7. Afterwards the Committee was received by 
Mr. G. Hausner, a Cabinet Minister and Chair-
man of the Council of "Yad Vashem". In his 
1. See Appendix I. 
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address to the Committee the Minister pointed 
out that the Israeli Government and its people 
could never again accept a situation where there 
was no refuge in the world for Jews who were 
being persecuted only booause they were Jews. 
They could never forget what had happened 
during the sooond world war in Germany and 
German-occupied territories, considering also that 
no other countries inside or outside Europe had 
been willing to do anything to save European 
Jews from their terrible fate. 
8. After this ceremony the Committee was 
received by the Speaker of the Knesset who 
expressed the Israeli people's desire for peace. 
He was sure that during its visit the Committee 
would be aware of this general feeling. Moreover, 
the Committee had come at an important moment 
as the Knesset elootions would be held shortly. 
The Knesset had 120 members ; according to the 
Speaker, this number had been chosen because 
in ancient times the tribes of Israel had con-
stituted a 120-member council to discuss import-
ant events affecting their people. 
9. The Knesset also had seven non-Jewish 
members : Arabs, Christians and one Bedouin 
member. 
10. The Speaker then explained a number of 
constitutional rules and facts of Israel. 
L General policy on research and development 
11. In the Knesset building the Committee met 
the Director and Deputy Director of the National 
Council for Research and Development and 
discussed 'procedure for research and develop-
ment, its structure and functioning in Israel, and 
Israel's scientific relations with Europe. 
12. Dr. E. Tal, the Director, explained the 
historical development of the ministerial com-
mittee for science and technology which had been 
set up in 1965. This committee had replaced the 
scientific council whose chairman in 1949 was the 
then Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. The 
main reason for setting up the council was to 
handle the research requirements of the defence 
forces. Prior to independence some defence 
research had been conducted as an underground 
activity. Another reason for setting up the coun-
cil was the need to foster scientific research for 
the developement of the economy and especially 
industrial and agricultural research. 
13. From the very beginning the council entru-
sted the universities with basic research. Seven 
institutions of higher edueation were set up from 
1949 onwards. 
14. During the first decade, the pressure of 
urgent national requirements had resulted in 
fragmentary development of the research system. 
In the second decade, the government became 
more involved and the scientific council was 
replaced by the National Council for Research 
and Development which was entrusted with the 
formulation of an overall policy. Special emphasis 
was placed on applied research for industry and 
agriculture and applied research institutes were 
set up for this purpose ; industrial enterprises 
were encouraged to do in-house research. As the 
implementation of government policy had to be 
supervised, direct links were established between 
these research institutes and the national 
ministries. In many ministries chief scientists 
were appointed who were ex officio members of 
the National Council for Research and Develop-
ment. 
15. The council co-ordinated different interests 
and supervised the long-term interests of science 
and technology. :M:ajor projects such as sea water 
desalination and the technology involved in the 
development of potassium mining in the Dead 
Sea were examples of applied research and 
development which could be undertaken only 
with direct collaboration between the council and 
local State industries. 
16. The seven universities, including the W eiz-
mann Institute, were all private organisations 
subsidised by the government for about 80 %. 
Their main task was to train young people and 
promote basic research. 
17. In order to indicate the structure and overall 
level of the national research effort, Dr. Tal gave 
a number of figures of interest in this connec-
tion. He pointed out that 2.2 % of the gross 
national product was invested in civil and milit-
ary research and more or less equally divided 
between the two sectors. This was the same level 
of research and development expenditure as in 
most developed countries, i.e. the United States 
and West Germany. 
18. In Israel, 49 % of the funds for civilian 
research were allocated to institutions of higher 
education and 51 % to institutes of applied 
research and development. The government was 
the main sponsor of research and development 
in Israel and its role was more important than 
that of other governments in comparably develop-
ed countries since it reflected the Israeli Govern-
ment's policy of promoting intensive research and 
development. 
19. As far as graduates were concerned, the 
Israeli figure per 10,000 population was 155, the 
same as that of Sweden, compared to 380 in the 
United States. The continued growth of scientific 
research and the necessary future manpower were 
therefore assured. 
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20. Furthermore, it was the government's policy 
to obtain as much spin-off as possible for civil 
purposes from military research and develop-
ment. The knowledge acquired therefrom was 
exploited to the greatest possible extent without 
jeopardising the defence effort. The government 
wished to promote more research and develop-
ment in industry. For the moment few companies 
reached a level of commercial turnover which 
enabled them to maintain an intensive research 
activity comparable to that of large European 
and American companies. 
Relations with Eu,rope 
21. Mr. Y. Saphir, Deputy Director for Inter-
national Affairs of the National Council for 
Research and Development, pointed out that 
scientific relations with other countries and with 
Europe existed prior to the formation of the State 
of Israel. One of the difficulties was of course 
that it was impossible for Israel to have scientific 
relations with its neighbours ; relations with 
Europe had therefore been essential from the 
very beginning. There was a network of bilateral 
and multilateral links with all Western European 
countries and with Romania, as well as with 
international organisations. Israel could not rely 
on its industries having scientific contacts be-
cause, generally speaking, they were too small 
and therefore government responsibility for inter-
national contacts had to be established. 
22. Formal arrangements had been concluded 
with some twenty countries for holding exchanges 
between scientists, joint projects and symposia. 
So far some six hundred scientists had been 
exchanged, fifty research projects had been 
launched in various fields and Israeli scientists 
had taken part in some fifty joint symposia. 
Although geographically Israel was not part of 
Europe, it would appreciate nevertheless parti-
cipating in or becoming a member of European 
scientific organisations. In the field of science, 
geography did not really play an important part. 
23. In spite of the fact that it consumed much 
of Israel's badly-needed foreign currency, the 
government had accepted the system of the sab-
batical year which enabled scientists to go abroad 
and thus further strengthen relations between 
Israel's scientific community and the scientific 
world outside. At the same time many scientific 
journals were distributed in Israel to keep infor-
mation flowing. 
24. In general scientists heeded the government's 
wishes in directing scientific research towards 
the main interests of the country. 
The Scientific Resea-rch Foundat·ion, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem 
25. Dr. H. Z. Tabor, Scientific Directo:r, 
explained to the Committee that for political, 
social and economic reasons it was very difficult 
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to solve the energy problem. Energy consumption 
was increasing rapidly and present electricity 
output of some 1,800 megawatts would be 5,000 
megawatts in 1980. The heating load in Israel 
was of course smaller than in Europe but the 
cooling load in summer was much higher. As the 
standard of living rose, more and more energy 
would be needed. Alternatives were the conserva-
tion of energy, hydroelectric power, solar and 
wind energy. 
26. The Ministry of Housing was doing its best 
to make people aware of the need to conserve 
energy by redesigning buildings and applying 
conservation measures. 
27. Hydroelectric power had been studied for 
a long time and a tunnel-plus-canal system be-
tween the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea might 
offer a solution. The Dead Sea had to be replen-
ished and it might be possible to build a canal 
and tunnel under the mountains to link the two 
seas. There was a 600-metre altitude difference 
and such a project could include a 300 megawatt 
power plant. Another benefit might be the use 
of such a canal for cooling a nuclear power 
station. 
28. Hydroelectricity might also be used for a 
desalination plant. Detailed studies were being 
carried out to take account of all the problems 
connected with this project. However, there was 
no doubt that the Dead Sea's water level was 
too low and this could endanger the potassium 
plants in the area. 
29. In this connection, Dr. Tabor mentioned the 
use of solar energy which could be stored as 
heat in a solar pond filled with salt water. The 
Dead Sea could possibly be used for this pur-
pose ; heat was absorbed from sunlight and 
stored at the bottom while the surface acted as 
an insulator greatly reducing overnight heat loss. 
A solar pond of one square kilometre could 
replace fifty million tons of fuel. Fifty square 
miles of the Dead Sea would provide enough 
energy to double Israel's water resources through 
a desalination process, using the heat thus stored. 
Solar energy 
30. For years Israelis have taken advantage of 
solar energy water heaters to produce hot water 
for their homes. Studies were being carried out 
to develop a technique involving the direct con-
version of solar energy into heat. Another 
approach was the direct conversion of solar 
energy to electricity. Equipment was being 
developed for using solar energy for air con-
ditioning buildings. 
31. Studies were being undertaken to produce 
an efficient photoelectrochemical cell. Solar 
energy might also be used for the development 
of algae in highly saline water from which oil 
could be produced. 
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32. Other possibilities were the establishment 
of a peat power station which could produce some 
1,000 megawatts. This technology was well-known 
but involved certain engineering complications. 
Israel also had some brown coal and oil shale. 
33. However, all these possibilities did not solve 
the problem of liquid fuels for transport. 
Research was therefore being carried out on new 
electric vehicles. There was a possibility that 
batteries might be developed giving a 100-km 
range for such vehicles. Government scientists 
would enlist the help of industrialists to over-
come the problems of large-scale production. 
D. Oceanography 
34. On Tuesday, 8th February, one half of the 
Committee, Group A, visited the Israel Oceano-
graphic and Limnological Research Institute near 
Haifa, where it was received by the Director-
General, Admiral Yohay Ben-Nun, and where all 
government-inspired research in oceanography 
and limnological problems is conducted. One 
current project is mapping the seabed in the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf of Eilat, the Dead Sea 
and the Sea of Galilee. This should provide vital 
information regarding the possibilities of dis-
covering oil in this region. In addition, geothermal 
studies on the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea 
are being carried out with an eye to discovering 
possible sources of exploitable geothermal energy. 
35. The aim of the institute is to study the imme-
diate needs of the country in terms of applied 
research. Basic oceanographic research is carried 
out at the universities. To find minerals in the 
continental shelf which extends in the north up 
to five miles and in the south of Israel up to 
twenty miles, drilling is being carried out at 
various points. Actually there is no reason why 
the neighbouring Arab countries should find oil 
and not Israel. It should not be forgotten that 
France spent fifty years looking for oil in 
Algeria and finally found it. 
36. Another main aspect of the institute's work 
is the study of methods of spawning edible fish. 
Fish farming (bream) is extremely important for 
Israel because of its long coastline and favourable 
climate in the Red Sea near Eilat. The institute 
has already been able to cultivate fish three times 
faster than in normal circumstances. There is 
close collaboration on this project with CNEXO 
in France. Fish are made to spawn in captivity 
and are then placed in cages of 5m X 5m in open 
sea water ; a similar operation is also conducted 
in ponds. The institute hopes that in three or 
four years' time the project can be handed over 
to fishermen as an aquaculture means of pro-
duction. 
37. A special task of the institute is to advise 
local municipal councils on the coast how to 
preserve the coastline which is of great import-
ance for the tourist industry. 
38. On marine pollution, preliminary surveys 
have been undertaken and analyses have been 
made of tar pollution to identify the sources of 
tar balls that pollute the Israeli coastline. It is 
possible to establish their origin as different 
crudes have different concentrations of tar. 
39. Of special interest for Israel is the Sea of 
Galilee which is its only fresh-water reservoir. The 
sea is now being studied in an attempt to under-
stand the physical processes to which it is sub-
jected and now, with eight years' experience, 
many aspects of the sea's behaviour are under-
stood. The sea has a number of underwater 
saline sources and special measures have to be 
taken to reduce salinity. The main fish stocks 
have been assessed and the fish productivity of 
the sea has been improved. 
40. Special studies are also being made at the 
institute on hyperbaric physiology, diving tech-
niques, decompressing problems, the construction 
of offshore rigs and problems submitted to the 
institute by the navy. The institute has a team 
of civilian divers. It employs some 120 people, 
70 % of whom are scientists. Four research 
vessels are in operation and two laboratories -
one in the Red Sea and the other in the Sea of 
Galilee - have been established. Its budget is 
some ten million Israeli pounds ($1 million), half 
of which is a government grant, ,the other half 
being earned by selling the institute's services to 
local authorities or industry. 
m. ELBIT Computers 
41. Also on Tuesday, 8th February, Group A 
visited ELBIT Computers where it was received 
by the President, Mr. U. Galil, who described the 
development of his company which had grown 
from Elron Electronics Industry, now the holding 
company of ELBIT Computers Limited and 
Scientific Data Systems Israel. Elron started 
with eight people and now employed 2,300. It 
had developed and produced many computers 
and computerised military and industrial systems 
and had two production lines : one military and 
the other civil. The system produced by ELBIT 
was compatible with mM systems. Great 
emphasis was placed on exports of both civil and 
military products. 
42. A special branch of Elron was Elscint which 
produced nuclear medical equipment. 
43. In the electronic field sensors for fighter 
aircraft and ships, inertial navigation systems, 
radar signal processing equipment and radar 
signals analysis equipment were being produced. 
Last year sales had amounted to $100 million. 
44. After this introduction, the Committee 
visited the plant. 
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IV.fAgrieultural research organisation 
45. On Tuesday, 8th February 1977, Group B 
of the Committee went to the Volcani Agricul-
tural Research Centre at Bet Dagan where it 
was received by Professor Va'adia, Chief Scien-
tist of the Ministry of Agriculture and Director 
of the centre. 
46. The Volcani Agricultural Research Centre 
was set up in 1921 by Professor I.E. Volcani. 
The major research problems regarding Israel's 
agriculture during the 1960s included the need 
for saving water through development of more 
efficient irrigation systems, raising the yield and 
quality of crops, increasing production and 
reducing agricultural imports. The centre is 
organised in the following sections and divisions : 
soil and water, garden and field crops, fruit tree 
plantation, livestock, plant protection, mechanisa-
tion, food technology and afforestation. The 
centre has three large research farms in the 
north, centre and south of the country. 
47. The centre employs 1,300 persons and in 
1975 had a budget of 73 million Israeli pounds 
($1 = 10 Israeli pounds). 
48. The major part of the land belongs to the 
State or the National Jewish Fund. The Ministry 
of Agriculture directs and co-ordinates all the 
economic agricultural activities. Apart from 
cereals, most products are produced locally and 
large-scale exports of certain products, especially 
vegetables and fruit, cover the import of cereals. 
49. The main problem is the scarcity of water 
and irrigation farming is a necessity. Over 90% 
of the total water resources in the country are 
fully utilised. Water comes from the north from 
the Sea of Galilee and the River Jordam. It flows 
through a national pipeline from north to south. 
Without desalination on a large scale, no more 
arable land can be made available. The rural 
population in Israel is 17.4% of the total popula-
tion, i.e. about 540,000 people in some 800 
villages. 
50. Israeli agricultural policy is directed towards 
the production of high-quality products, such as 
citrus fruits, which require a minimal amount 
of water. In view of the scarcity and hence high 
price of water in Israel, it is advisable to import 
such necessities as fodder which require a great 
deal of water. 
V. The Weizmann InRttute of Science 
51. Group B also visited the Weizmann Institute 
of Science at Rehovot. This institute was origin-
ally set up as the Sieff Institute in 1933 and 
expanded in 1949 when it became known as the 
Weizmann Institute. Your Rapporteur will only 
refer briefly to the institute as a detailed docu-
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ment on this subject has been produced by the 
Council of Europe's Committee on Science and 
Technology. 
52. The institute is a member of a relatively 
large number of European scientific bodies : the 
European Seismological Commission, the Euro-
pean Cell Biology Organisation, the European 
Association for Cancer Research, the European 
Federation of Chemical Engineering, the Federa-
tion of European Biochemical Societies, the 
Federation of European Immunological Societies, 
the European ABsociation of Leukemia, the Euro-
pean Association for Theoretical Computer 
Science, the European Peptide Committee, the 
European Brain and Behaviour Society, the 
European Committee for Carbohydrate Chemists, 
the European Federation of Chemical Societies, 
the•European Committee for Microcirculation, 
the European Molecular Biology Organisation, 
and many others. 
53. It also co-operates with such scientific bodies 
as the Max Planck Society, the Institut Pasteur, 
the Basel Institute for Immunology, the Institut 
de Biologic Physico-Chimique (Fondation Edmond 
de Rothschild), the International Atomic Energy 
Commission in Vienna, etc. 
54. The Weizmann Institute serves as an 
indispensable reservoir for Israel's industry and 
teaching institutions. It is in no sense a 
coincidence that institute scientists serve in 
policy-making and advisory capacities in most of 
the nation's ministries, i.e. the Ministries of 
Development, Defence, Health, and Agriculture, 
in addition to Israel's Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and the National Oouncil for Research and 
Development. 
55. Moreover, this pattern has held true since the 
first days of the State of Israel. It is enough 
perhaps to recall the institute's involvement-in-
depth with Israel's initial search for phosphates, 
uranium and copper which led, in turn, to the 
creation of Israel's mining industries and the 
geophysical survey carried out by institute 
groups that drilled successfully for oil in Israel's 
Heletz area. Nor has the institute's response to 
Israel's needs lessened in any way in the 
intervening years. 
56. Extensive studies are now being conducted 
in the energy field, including research and 
development of new sources of energy. 
VI. Israel Desalination Engineering 
57. Mr. N. Berkman, Director of Israel Desalina-
tion Engineering, briefed the Committee on the 
desalination process of his company which was 
set up in 1965. It specialises in the research and 
development of saline water desalination pro-
cesses and the engineering and construction of 
plants based on these processes. 
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58. The company had sought a process that would 
at the same time be economical and effective. In 
order to avoid corrosion of the pipes and equip-
ment it had to reduce the temperature of the 
process as much as possible. For this purpose it 
utilised a conventional steam jet compressor 
and a horizontal tube connecting a number of 
evaporative condenser units. 
59. After a number of years the process ha<l 
been developed and small plants of 50 to 500 m3 
water per day had been built in various foreign 
countries. In 1971 a large plant was built in 
Ashdod : 40,000 m3 water per day. So far the 
firm had reserved most of its production for 
export. The Israeli Government did not wish to 
place any orders until the process had been 
proven on the export market. In order to get the 
Ashdod plant started, financial assistance had 
been needed from the United States. This had 
been obtained after approval by Congress on the 
condition that American companies be allowed 
to employ this process. The company had 
accepted this condition because it could not 
manage without the $20 million and also hoped 
to get many more orders with American 
assistance. 
60. The water thus far produced has been used 
for drinking. If plants for irrigation had to be 
built they would need a capacity of 200,000 to 
500,000 m8 per day. The cost of the water 
depended mainly on three factors: energy, 
equipment and labour. Before 1973 the cost of 
fuel was about 40 %, the capital cost 
also about 40 % and labour about 20 %. 
Since then fuel costs had risen to about 60 % 
and the price of the water had therefore risen 
accordingly. If nuclear energy could be used for 
these desalination plants the original percentages 
would apply and the price of water would be 
about $0.75 per m8• 
61. After discussion, the Committee visited the 
plant, near Tel Aviv. 
VU. Nuclear energy 
62. On 9th February the Committee visited the 
Soreq Nuclear Research Centre where it was 
received by the Director, Dr. Yona Ettinguer, 
who was representing Mr. Uzi Eilam, Director-
General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. He welcomed the Committee and explained 
that the Atomic Energy Commission, founded in 
1952, was composed of twenty-two scientists and 
politicians ; the Chairman was the Prime Min-
ister. The Atomic Energy Commission advised the 
government on nuclear research, development 
and power. 
63. A special committee on nuclear safety 
advised the Director-General of the Commission. 
64. Nuclear research and development activities 
were concentrated here and at the Negev Nuclear 
Research Centre. In certain research areas close 
co-operation had been established with univer-
sities in Israel, Euratom, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and with 
corresponding institutions in other countries. 
65. The Commission had three main divisions : 
licensing, power and water, and radiation and 
radioisotope applications. 
66. The centre had a nuclear reactor using 
enriched uranium fuel with a maximum output 
of 5 megawatts. This reactor had been built in 
1958 with the help of the United States and its 
research was directed towards medical, agri-
cultural and industrial applications. 
67. After the Committee had visited the centre, 
Mr. Uzi Eilam, Director-General of the Israel 
Atomic Energy Commission, spoke on Israel's 
need to use nuclear energy as an alternative to 
oil. However, Israel was not among the most 
advanced countries in the field of nuclear energy 
research and it hoped to draw on the experience 
of other countries. Problems of nuclear safety 
and the disposal of nuclear waste would not 
arise in Israel before other countries had had to 
find solutions. Solutions would certainly have 
been found in Europe and the United States 
within about ten years and Israel might then 
profit from them. 
68. Mr. Eilam next gave the floor to Mr. Amnon 
Einav, Director of the Water and Power Divi-
sion, who stated that the demand for electricity 
in Israel was increasing rapidly. For its 
electricity production it had needed fifteen 
million barrels of oil in 1961, thirty million 
barrels in 1970 and fifty million barrels 
in 1975. It was evident that Israel needed 
to drill for oil on its own territory and to use 
alternative sources of energy. 
69. However, the main alternative to oil was 
nuclear power and in ten years' time 46 % of 
Israel's electricity requirements would have to 
be met by nuclear energy. Its nuclear policy was 
based on five major considerations: (a) to use 
only proven technologies, i.e. light-water reactors 
supplied by the United States ; (b) to involve 
Israeli designers of power plants as much as 
possible ; (c) to maximise the buying of Israeli 
hardware ; (d) to develop assured nuclear fuel 
supplies; (e) to develop a level of mature 
competence in nuclear technology. 
70. The Israeli Government had decided that 
the best solution for meeting its requirements 
would be a light-water reactor in the range of 
900 megawatts. Sixty-eight per cent of the 
engineering could be done in Israel and Israeli 
participation would raise the industrial level of 
the country. Long-term contracts would be 
concluded with the United States for nuclear 
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supplies and enrichment services would also be 
provided by the United States. Special scientific 
teams would be formed to master the necessary 
techniques. 
71. Israel was especially interested in using 
nuclear energy for desalination projects and the 
two problems would be studied together. 
72. Mr. Joseph Alter, Director of the Licensing 
Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
addressed the Committee on aspects of licensing 
nuclear power plants in Israel. His address was 
divided into two parts. The first part dealt with 
legal bases and organisation and the second 
part with problems of locating and licensing 
sites for nuclear power plants in Israel. 
73. In the first part, he said that the need to 
make laws and regulations in the nuclear area 
and to force constructors and operators to abide 
by such rules, emanated historically from the 
production of nuclear materials and their 
exploitation in industry, agriculture, medicine 
and research. This need was by no means specific 
to reactors. The aim of these laws and regula-
tions was to create a framework for the safe 
working of the nuclear industry, the safe 
handling of nuclear material and the safe opera-
tion of nuclear reactors without risk to the 
population at large. 
74. A decision taken in 1973 to provide 
organisational means for coping with the possible 
harnessing of nuclear energy to supply power 
in Israel had prompted the Israel Atomic Energy 
Commission to set up a licensing body and 
immediately sponsor nuclear legislation. The 
formulation of nuclear legislation and its 
approval was a lengthy process. Gaining from 
the experience of other countries, an all-embrac-
ing nuclear law covering all aspects of nuclear 
energy for medicine, agriculture and industry 
additional to nuclear power generation would 
take about five years' study. 
75. In order to fill a gap in legislation the IAEC 
had had recourse to an order regarding super-
vision of nuclear reactors. This order entitled 
"Order concerning the supervision of nuclear 
reactors" had been published in November 1974. 
76. Overriding the need to fill this loophole in 
legislation was the consideration of the relative 
ease with which an order could be modified 
compared with a law. It should also be remem-
bered that in this new area of licensing in Israel, 
allowance should be made for future amen~ 
ments in the light of experience. 
77. The Director of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission acted as supervisor at the various phases 
of approval of the nuclear reactor by the Licens-
ing Division (a technical group of experts) and 
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety 
(ACNS). The Prime Minister acted as a court 
of appeal. 
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78. The Licensing Division, created in December 
1973, drew on local manpower for vocational 
training. The total staff today numbered twenty-
four. The Licensing Division also employed 
outside experts and consultants from both home 
and abroad. 
79. Licensing was nowadays mainly concerned 
with problems affecting the Nitzanim site, two-
thirds of the staff being engaged on environ-
mental, geotechnical, geological, seismic and 
hydrological issues. 
80. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety 
was a high-level group of scientists and engineers 
representing the many aspects of nuclear power 
plant technology. Each member of ACNS was 
personally appointed by the Prime Minister on 
the recommendation of the Director of the AEC. 
81._ The law for planning and building provided 
for the licensing of each building erected in the 
coUDJtry. Nuclear reactors had to be approved 
by one of the planning and building committees. 
The site for a nuclear power plant had to fit 
into the central planning envisaged by the Plan-
ning and Building Council. 
82. This council reviewed aspects of rural and 
urban master plans with particular regard to 
environmental and ecological issues. 
83. The Israel Electric Corporation included in 
its application for the construction of nuclear 
power plants a preliminary safety analysis 
report and an environmental report to the appro-
priate planning and building committee and to 
the Atomic Energy Commission. 
84. Throughout the construction period plants 
were subject to inspection and control by the 
licensing staff. After installation of equipment, 
operational tests of systems commenced, Tests 
were carried out under surveillance, and condi-
tional to partial permits for fuel loading, cri-
ticality and gradual load raising. Following these 
tests the electricity authorities had to apply for 
an operating licence. 
85. In the second part of his speech on Israel's 
problems in locating and licensing sites for its 
nuclear power plants, Mr. Alter said that two 
factors had been obvious in the early stages of 
planning for Israel's first nuclear power plants : 
the lack of inland cooling water, which meant 
a coastal site to use sea water, and the limited 
space still available on the densely-populated 
coast. These two considerations had dominated 
the preliminary site selection, and thus in the 
mid-sixties four coastal sites had been administra-
tively reserved for nuclear power stations : 
the Habonim site, south of Haifa ; the site of the 
Soreq experimental reactor (Palmahim) ; the 
Nitzanim site, between Ashdod and Asqelon. ; and 
the Siqim site, just north of the Gaza strip. 
Among these sites, population densities clearly 
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pointed to the relative advantages of the 
Nitzanim site, which was therefore chosen for the 
planned dual-purpose (desalting) reactor. Today, 
for various reasons Nitzanim remained the only 
site actually available at the coast. 
86. Unfortunately, in the early days, it had not 
been fully realised that certain geological factors 
might make a site unpractical, and no detailed 
site investigations had been concluded at that 
time. The geological problem was aggravated by 
difficulties in investigations : the coastal area was 
overlain by a thick sediment cover of semi-con-
solidated sandstone and marly layers, making 
poor foundation material and hampering 
geological fact-finding. 
87. A second problem was that Israel was a 
seismically active area, though less than the 
United States west coast, but more than Central 
Europe. 
88. A third problem was that liquefaction might 
occur, due to earthquake shook lowering the 
strength of the semi-consolidated soil, causing a 
problem in foundation engineering. 
89. The last of the major problems was that 
of safeguarding against attack. Various avenues 
had been explored, among them underground 
construction or protecting vital parts of the 
plant. However, the nature of the soil and a 
high water table combined to make the problem 
even more difficult to solve. 
90 .. In many respects site investigations were 
still being conducted or planned. The Israeli 
licensing authorities scrutinised incoming site 
information and compared licensing procedures 
and criteria from various countries and agencies. 
91. Much could be said for adopting the United 
States Code of Site Licensing as the most 
detailed and comprehensive body of criteria and 
guidelines, yet unequalled. However, United 
States rules and guidelines might need modifica-
tion to conform to Israeli conditions. 
92. In summary, Israel was beset by great and 
unusual problems, even in such technical fields 
as Biting and licensing nuclear power plants. 
VUI. Israel Aircraft Industries 
93. The Committee visited Israel Aircraft 
Industries on lOth February and was received by 
Brigadier-General Israel Roth, Vice-President of 
the company. He apologised for the absence of 
the Director-General, Mr. A.W. Schwimmer, who 
was abroad. 
94. He stated that the dominant effort in the 
present defence research and development pro-
gramme was being made by Israel Military 
Industries and Israel Aircraft Industries, both 
affiliated to the Ministry of Defence. 
95. Israel Aircraft Industries Limited had been 
established in the early 1950s and originally 
provided only aircraft maintenance facilities. It 
had since been reorganised several times and its 
main aim was to reduce Israel's dependence on 
outside aircraft production, maintenance and 
accessories. It was one of the few companies in 
the world in which all aspects of aircraft produc-
tion, including engine parts, aerospace equip-
ment and missiles, were dealt with under one 
roof. 
96. It was a normal commercial shareholding 
company with all shares in government hands. 
The situation was peculiar in that the share-
holder, the Minister of Defence, was also the 
largest customer as 50 % of the company's work 
was for that ministry. 
97. The company employed 18,500 workers of 
whom 2,500 were scientists or academic personnel. 
The industry had three main divisions : 
engineering, aircraft manufacturing and missiles. 
98. As Israel had a population of only three 
million it could not support a large aircraft 
industry and therefore had to opt firmly for 
the course to follow. 
99. It produced the Arava transport aircraft 
for military or civil use under rough conditions. 
The Arava, a short-take-off-and-landing aircraft, 
was powered by two Canadian Pratt and 
Whitney PT -6 engines and needed no ground 
support. It had been selling quite well, 
especially in Latin America : fifty were on order 
and twenty-eight had been delivered. It would 
also be useful in Africa but could not be sold 
there for political reasons. 
100. When the Israeli navy lost a destroyer in 
the 1967 war the naval staff had to find weapon 
systems which could out-manoeuvre the Soviet 
missile Styx. The system developed by the Israel 
Aircraft Industries and the navy was called the 
Gabriel weapons system. This was manufactured 
entirely in Israel and already had a follow-up : 
the Gabriel II. The missile's range had increased 
the sea-to-sea potential from twenty to forty 
kilometres. As it could be installed on existing 
ships it was quite economical, the more so as it 
could be integrated with other than its own 
fire control systems. 
101. As Israel Aircraft Industries had been 
developed from a maintenance and repair facility 
the building of its own combat aircraft was a 
natural follow up. This aircraft was called the 
Kfir (lion cub). One could call it the result of a 
marriage between the French Mirage-type air-
frame and the American General Electric J -79-
type engine. 
l 02. The electronic part was also Israeli-designed 
and manufactured. The aircraft cost about $5 
million and was a multi-role aircraft: it had a 
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fighter as well as a reconnaissance role. It was 
equipped with advanced integrated weapon 
delivery and navigation systems. It was used 
in the Israeli air force and could be sold abroad. 
Production was five aircraft per month. 
103. Israel Aircraft Industries also built a busi-
ness aircraft, the Westwind 1123. It was sold 
in the United States by Atlantic Aviation and 
its success there had assured its place on the 
world market. It had been developed from an 
American plane called the Jet Commander. 
IX. Israel Military Industries 
104. Having visited the plant of Israel Aircraft 
Industries, the Committee visited Israel Military 
Industries. During the tour of the plant the Com-
mittee saw the production of different types of 
rifles, automatic weapons, artillery, cannons and 
missiles. 
105. The Committee was addressed by the Vice-
President, Mr. Jacob Lihor, who said that Israel 
Military Industries had twenty-four plants 
spread across the country, their main purpose 
being to supply the armed forces. They manu-
factured new types of rifles, pliable and made 
of plastic, sub-machine guns, guns and all types 
of ammunition and employed some 10,000 people 
producing 500 different products. They also 
manufactured spare parts for four different 
types of tanks : British, Russian, American and 
Israeli. 
106. Some civil industries worked as subcon-
tractors for certain types of weapons. An 
important part of the work in Israel Military 
Industries was the training of newcomers and 
immigrants who had never worked in an arms 
industry. 
X. Politfcal-milttary diacassions with Israeli 
authorities 
107. During its visit to the Knesset on Monday, 
7th February, the Committee had a discussion 
with Mr. Abba Eban, former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and member of the Knesset, 
who pointed out that for many years Israel had 
already had contacts in the field of science and 
technology with such European organisations as 
CERN, Euratom and the European Commun-
ities. It would be to the advantage of both 
sides for this relationship to be developed further. 
108. For Israel, it was most important to have 
a balance of power in the Mediterranean as 
well as elsewhere in the world. The geopolitical 
predominance of the United States was therefore 
of the greatest importance as Israel had to create 
an equilibrium between itself and the 100 million 
Arabs who occupied an area of 4.5 million square 
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miles. Israel therefore needed the United States 
to guarantee its existence, but an equilibrium 
cannot be created by allies alone. For this reason 
the people realised from the outset that this 
should also be pursued through the development 
of science and technology, which could give a 
small sparsely-populated country like Israel 
autonomy in defence as well as in economic 
matters. It helped Israel to convert from a largely 
agricultural society to an industrial society. 
Israeli scientists and industrialists had many 
close relationships with their colleagues in the 
United States as well as in Europe and this 
helped considerably. 
109. Mr. Eban believed that a:13ter the frozen 
positions in 1976 there might be some progress 
towards peace in 1977. The Lebanese conflict was 
perhaps nearing solution. The United States 
eleetions had introduced a new government·; the 
United States could now act as a negotiator 
between Arabs and Israelis. This mediation might 
lead to fruitful steps towards peace. The USSR 
could not be a negotiator as it was not accepted 
as such by both parties. The United Nations was 
so biased in favour of the Arab cause that not 
much could be expected from that side. Moreover, 
it was unbalanced by the weight of the develop-
ing world. Europe still had not found a political 
or strategic role in the Middle East because of 
its internal divisions. Only the United States 
could break the deadlock between the two oppos-
ing parties. 
110. Military action had been taken in 1973 when 
there was a diplomatic vacuum. If diplomatic 
discussions were resumed and Israel acquired full 
peace and security, the Arabs would certainly 
be given territorial satisfaction. However, interim 
settlements should pave the way to an overall 
settlement which might not be possible in 1977 
or 1978. 
111. Although Europe would not be able to play 
a role in the discussion, its presenee was never-
theless relevant as it might help to rectify the 
imbalance of power in a geopolitical sense. 
112. The Arab world was not monolithic and the 
Israelis had no choice but to discuss with their 
neighbouring Arab countries. A settlement of the 
Palestinian problem would have to be found in 
the context of a Palestinian-Jordanian composite 
State. In this context he referred to United 
Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 1• The Arab 
governments had not yet replied to these resolu-
tions. 
113. The Israeli Government was not in favour 
of two Palestinian States : one with Jordan and 
the other on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The latter would be irredentist, weak, in the 
hands of the PLO and dominated by the Soviet 
1. See Appendix· II. 
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Union. There was no advantage for Israel in 
the creation of such a situation. 
114. In case of a composite Palestinian-Jordanian 
State demilitarisation of certain areas would 
still be necessary to ensure the integrity of Israeli 
frontiers. 
115. On Thursday, lOth February, at a dinner 
given at a government guest house in Tel Aviv, 
the Committee was addressed by Major-General 
I. Tal on the use of tanks in present-day warfare. 
General Tal stated that the role of tanks in 
modern warfare would remain extremely 
important. They would be used wherever neces-
sary to make a surprise attack on the enemy. 
Tanks could well be used in combination with 
helicopters to back infantry attacks at certain 
points. 
116. He said that western countries had always 
deployed less troops than the eastern countries. 
The East had always been able to amass 
numerous divisions which placed them in a static 
position vis-a-vis the West which had always had 
to employ a mobile strategy. Israel's position was 
similar to that of the West as it had relatively 
few people to withstand possible attacks by the 
Arab masses. Therefore tanks would always be 
needed to provide mobility for a surprise attack. 
117. On Friday, 11th February, the Committee 
had a working breakfast with Major-General S. 
Inbar, Chief of Defence Research. He explained 
that his organisation was a unified organisation 
for all three services and came directly under 
the Defence Minister. This was possible in Israel 
since its small size allowed immediate reaction to 
a given requirement. 
118. As everybody in Israel had to do military 
service, many people in universities and research 
institutes had military experience and easy access 
to all ·possible research activities helped the 
organisation in fulfilling its task. Contributions 
to defence needs were almost spontaneous. Since 
everyone, including high-ranking people, had to 
serve a follow-up of one month a year in the 
forces after completing their military service, 
they remained in constant touch with military 
requirements. 
119. Even so, it was not an easy task to be the 
head of a research and development organisation 
for defence purposes as many difficult choices 
had to be made which might strengthen or weaken 
the Israeli defence posture. It was extremely 
difficult to know what the new war theatre 
would look like in a few years' time. 
120. General Inbar believed that armour would 
play an important role in the field of new tanks, 
personnel carriers and weapons systems. More-
over it would be used in great quantities. If, 
therefore, mobile capabilities were developed this 
implied the acceptance of a mobile front. How-
ever, in certain areas static defence might be 
necessary which meant finding new tactical solu-
tions. One of the great difficulties was the con-
tinuing development of anti-tank obstacles and 
missiles. Where Israel was concerned brute force 
was not possible because of the numbers and cost 
involved and therefore it had to plan tactical 
manoeuvres to make a breakthrough. This meant 
air mobility using helicopters and three-dimen-
sional warfare. Israel had to concentrate on 
helicopters as a means of transport and as utility 
and special-purpose vehicles. The development of 
helicopters would necessitate new electronic 
warfare equipment as fronts would be broader 
and deeper. If helicopters became an important 
factor in modern warfare, anti-helicopter 
weapons systems would be developed which would 
require special means of detection. 
121. Another future development would be in 
the electro-optical spectrum. The development of 
the laser might bring a revolution in military 
thinking as wars which so far could only be 
fought in daytime could now also be fought at 
night using the new electro-optical instruments. 
This meant deploying all military capability 
twenty-four hours a day; the problem here was 
that the units had to be permanently on the move, 
and at the same time provided with their neces-
sary rest. Israel first experienced this type of 
warfare during the Y om Kip pur war ; it was 
extremely difficult to determine the enemy's 
night capabilities, how much equipment they had 
for night fighting and where. 
122. The new electro-optical instruments and the 
laser also gave nearly 100% target accuracy, 
which had a direct influence on the amount of 
ammunition to be carried. In the old days much 
ammunition was lost and therefore large supplies 
were needed. This might change in the future. 
123. The laser range-finder also made for much 
smaller anti-tank rifles. This and the smaller 
amounts of ammunition required would make 
units equipped with these advanced weapons far 
cheaper. Modernisation of the armed forces also 
meant modernising the industrial infrastructure. 
124. General Inbar had often pointed out to 
politicians that refusal to modernise the forces 
would in the long run make them more expensive, 
less effective and leave the country with an 
obsolete industrial infrastructure. 
125. On the other hand, new weapons could only 
be introduced gradually in the armed forces in 
order not to impede their fighting ability. 
126. New ships were necessary for the naval 
forces as they would increasingly be used as 
platforms for missile systems. The same was true 
for aircraft which were also platforms for 
missiles and were therefore becoming so ex-
pensive that they raised procurement difficulties. 
For instance, the F-15 cost $25 million, but for 
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a country like Israel a cheaper plane might be 
more advantageous. The F -16 cost approximately 
$6 million and the Kfir multi-role aircraft had 
a fly-away price of $5 million. The goal was 
to have a platform for launching a missile with 
maximum destruction capability. The best solu-
tion was to construct platforms from which 
varying types of missiles could be launched. 
127. Helicopters could be used for many purposes 
and for this reason Israel should have its own 
helicopter industry. Moreover, piloting a heli-
copter was not as complicated as piloting an 
aircraft because a helicopter pilot was more 
like a tank commander in a three-dimensional 
battle area. In order to make full use of heli-
copters a communication system had to be 
developed together with protection against 
ground-to-air missiles. Missile guidance systems 
had been greatly improved. 
128. Finally General Inbar pointed out that 
comparisons between the different wars during 
the l·ast ten years were not really very valuable 
as, for instance, the Vietnam war was totally 
different to the Yom Kippur war. It was dan-
gerous to draw parallels where they did not 
exist. The main factor in winning a war was 
still the morale of the men conducting it. 
129. l\fajor-General B. Peled, Commander of the 
Israeli air force, then addressed the Committee. 
He declared that the main reason for Israel 
winning the 1948 war against the Arab armies 
was the morale of the men, the level of culture, 
civilisation and superior leadership. At that time 
the Israeli forces had neither tanks nor planes 
but nevertheless they had beaten armies at least 
five times their size. 
130. In the year 70 A.D. the kingdom of Israel 
had lost against the Roman legions because it did 
not have the means and the morale to win. 
Today, according to General Peled, Israel would 
do everything to avoid this type of situation. He 
pointed out that when the British had left in 
1948 Israel had accepted the territorial arrange-
ments but had been attacked by the Arabs. In 
1956, in the Suez war, the Arabs had again 
attacked, ignoring the Rhodes armistice agree-
ment. Twice Israel had given up occupied 
territories and twice the Arabs had attacked. 
This time Israel would not accept any with-
drawal from occupied territory unless a lasting 
peace was assured. He was of the opinion that 
the Arabs were asking too much if they wished 
to go back to the 194 7 frontiers ; the Jews could 
tell the Egyptians that they built the Pyramids, 
but they were not asking to have them back. 
131. In the 1973 war the Egyptians had been 
able to attack because the Israeli Government had 
ordered that under no circumstances should a 
preventive war be started. At the same time it 
was the Israeli· air force which finally made it 
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possible to win the war by beating the Arab 
air forces. 
132. The build-up of the Israeli forces had gone 
hand-in-hand with the social and economic build-
up of the country as a whole. Since 1948 all kinds 
of community achievements, i.e. schools, social 
centres, etc., had been established and this had 
encouraged the people to fight for these achieve-
ments. 
133. At the end of the morning the Committee 
met Mr. S. Peres, Minister of Defence, who was 
accompanied by Mr. Ben Nathan, former Ambas-
sador to Bonn and Paris, and by General Salomo 
Gazit, Chief of Military Intelligence. The 
Minister said he was prepared to answer ques-
tions by the Committee on politico-military 
subjects. He stated that the industrial backward-
ness of the Arab countries could be explained 
partly by the fact that they were rich enough 
to buy ready-made all the equipment they needed 
for their military forces ; in this way oil produc-
tion was an enemy to industrial development in 
their countries. For reasons of prestige the armies 
wanted the best equipment available on the world 
armaments market. This had led to an imbalance 
in the structure of their societies as the armies 
had become the most modern and strongest 
institutions of these countries. Therefore eco-
nomic development had taken second place and 
this had led to general dissatisfaction amongst 
the civilian population. 
134. One could consider the world situation in 
military terms as follows: the United States, the 
USSR and Europe were in a post-belligerent 
phase, Latin America was in a pre-belligerent 
phase, and the Middle East was in a belligerent 
phase. Israel therefore had to spend a large 
part of its resources on military equipment, i.e. 
some 40 % of the budget. The government needed 
to increase the real value of the budget which 
was possible as the average Israeli worker's pro-
duction level was $10,000 a year. In Europe it 
was $15,000 and there was no reason why the 
Israeli worker should not achieve the same level 
of production. Keeping the defence budget at 
40 % of the total budget, it would be possible 
to increase the real amount of military spending 
if production were increased. 
135. Israel would be extremely glad if it could 
reduce its defence budget but peace was not 
likely to come in 1977. There might be chances 
for peace in two or three years' time, but in this 
area no major event had ever been foreseen with 
accuracy. 
136. First and foremost, according to the 
Minister, the Israeli Government was responsible 
for the Israeli people. 
137. Of course there was a Palestinian problem 
but this had arisen because the Arab leaders -
especially the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem- had 
invited the population, some 900,000 or one 
million people, to leave the country. It should 
not be forgotten however that the same number 
of Jews had emigrated from the Arab countries 
and settled in Israel The Arab countries were 
rich enough to absorb their fellow Arabs if 
they so wished. 
138. He believed that where Jordan was con-
cerned, it, like Palestine, was a geographical not 
ethnical notion. The people living in these areas 
had never considered themselves other than 
Arabs. In the period between 1948 and 1967 
they could have set up a Palestinian State on the 
west bank of the Jordan, but they had not done 
so. The best solution would be to set up a 
federated Jordanian kingdom. The Israeli 
Government refused to accept the PLO as 
representative of the Palestinian Arabs. It did 
not wish to deal with this terrorist and Russian-
oriented organisation. 
139. The main problem remained the existence 
of Israel and its recognition by neighbouring 
countries. Once peace had been established the 
Israeli Government was willing to discuss all 
essential problems with its Arab neighbours. It 
should not be forgotten that the Arab countries 
had about eleven million square kilometres of 
land. 
140. The Minister believed that in fields of 
advanced technology Israeli co-operation with 
Europe could be extremely useful for both sides. 
There was no limitation to co-operation on their 
side but there was a political limitation on the 
European side. Since the oil boycott, European 
countries were giving in to Arab threats as they 
were afraid to jeopardise their oil supplies. 
141. As the PLO now had an office in Brussels, 
one could not say that Europe would be of any 
assistance in the negotiations between Israel and 
the Arab countries. The Soviet Union had lost 
much of its influence over the Arab countries 
and especially Egypt. The only real negotiator 
could be the United States. 
142. General Gazit said he had been in charge of 
military intelligence for three years. The main 
question was whether the Israeli forces could 
again be taken by surprise. Various measures had 
been taken to prevent this but one never knew 
what might happen. 
143. A new element was terrorist action, taking 
hostages, to blackmail the authorities concerned 
into taking measures advantageous to the terror-
ists. No civilised government should accept such 
terrorist warfare even if it meant that innocent 
persons might be killed. However, the world had 
not yet found a solution to this problem. Action 
by the Israeli forces in Entebbe was an exception 
to the rule that direct action could be taken by 
the country concerned. The world as a whole 
should take measures to punish this type of ter-
rorist, but many governments were not in fact 
inclined to condemn terrorist action. 
144. A chief of military intelligence had first to 
assure that good intelligence information reached 
the central organisation and second to evaluate 
the information. The second was more difficult 
as attitudes and ways of thinking differed from 
one country to another. During the Yom Kippur 
war the Israelis were completely surprised as all 
information had led the Israeli authorities to 
think the Arab countries were not strong enough 
to attack as they did not have the necessary air 
cover. 
145. The position of the Syrian troops as they 
were deployed in the Lebanon at the moment did 
not constitute a threat to the security of Israel, 
but this deployment might change and the Syrian 
military position vis-a-vis Israel might grow 
stronger. However, for the moment they were 
experiencing difficulties as an occupation force 
which was bound to antagonise the Lebanese 
people. The Israeli authorities were keeping a 
close watch on the situation, especially to see 
if there would be a concentration of Syrian forces 
in the Lebanon. 
146. To the outsider the present political situation 
in Israel's neighbouring countries might look 
quite reassuring, but from the Israeli point of 
view a peace offer, for instance from President 
Sadat, had to be checked and analysed to estimate 
to what extent it was sincere or whether it was 
merely a tactical political manoeuvre. 
147. As head of military intelligence he received 
certain indications, but judging the sincerity of, 
for instance, President Sadat was extremely 
difficult. This was not just political science but 
a question of life or death for Israel. 
Conclusions 
148. Relations between Israel and the European 
countries are based not only on political, trade 
or other such tangible links but on common reli-
gious and secular historical grounds and accept-
ance of common values, especially for Israelis of 
European origin. The sentiments deriving from 
these factors are the source of continuing and 
powerful relationships between Israel and the 
Western European countries. These relationships 
are strong and firmly rooted but not static and 
should therefore be developed. 
149. The Israeli attitude and wish to establish 
continuing close links with Western European 
countries in advanced technological research and 
development has also been shaped by the recogni-
tion of the European Communities as a world 
trade power. The EEC has had a series of specta-
cular successes in its relations with the outside 
world. A pattern of trade and aid deals now 
covers almost the entire developing world. 
Although the EEC has not significantly altered 
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the world's political balance of power, it never-
theless represents a real economic power. Israel's 
wish to establish closer links with the Western 
European countries is also due to the fact that 
it has no relations at all with its neighbouring 
countries, the Arab world, and with most of the 
African countries. The absence of neighbourly 
relationships with the Arab world and most 
African countries is unnatural and contrary to 
the interests of both Israel and the Arab world. 
Israel is and remains a Middle Eastern power and 
will, as such, have to be integrated in that region. 
Your Rapporteur recalls the statement by Mr. van 
der Stool, Dutch Foreign Minister, that the con-
tinuing existence of Israel should be accepted. 
The PLO should do what Egypt has done and 
accept this continuing existence. The creation of 
a Palestinian State incorporating the present 
State of Israel would be unacceptable, particul-
arly since Israel in its present form would actu-
ally disappear. Negotiations on this basis would 
be unacceptable. 
150. Your Rapporteur considers that both sides 
will have to sit down at a conference table after 
the Israeli elections in May. He is convinced that 
a new Arab-Israeli war would be far more 
destructive than any in the past. Both sides now 
possess surface-to-surface missiles and cities and 
civilian populations will almost certainly be tar-
gets and the resulting carnage will far exceed 
that of former wars. Moreover, the likelihood of 
the superpowers being involved will be far greater 
than before. 
151. The Committee visited several Israeli 
industries and installations and was deeply 
impressed by their state of development. It was 
amazed that a small country was able to build 
a fighter bomber with a speed of more than 
Mach 2.3, surface-to-surface (Gabriel) and air-
to-air ~Shafrir) missiles. In no other country in 
the world had it seen so much solar energy used 
as in Israel. Large scientific and technological 
strides have also been made in oceanography, 
desalination and pisciculture. 
152. Israel's political and military leaders are 
very concerned about future co-operation with 
Western European countries as they want Europe 
to play a more important role in this part of the 
world and they do not wish to depend wholly on 
the United States and the possibly changing rela-
tionship between the two superpowers. 
153. Your Rapporteur believes that the best way 
to promote active co-operation is to foster colla-
boration between the scientific, technological and 
industrial communities. The European Space 
Agency could play a significant role in such 
collaboration, especially once peace has been 
restored in the Middle East - hopefully in the 
near future. 
154. Collaboration would be beneficial to all the 
countries concerned and relations with Israel 
could be most rewarding. 
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Sunday, 6th February 
APPENDIX I 
Programme of the visit to Israel 
6th-18th February 1911 
Arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport. , 
APPENDIX I 
Met by representatives of the Knesset and the National Council for Research and Develop-
ment. 
Drive to Jerusalem. 
Monday, 7th February 
7.45 a.m. Leave the hotel. 
8.15 a.m. "Yad Vashem - Remembrance Authority" memorial to the victims of the holocaust. 
Meeting with Mr. G. Ha.usner, Cabinet l'tfinister and Chairman of the Council of Yad Vashem. 
9.45 a.m. The Knesset 
Meeting with the Speaker, Mr. Yisrael Yesha.ya.hu. 
10.30 a.m. Meeting with Dr. E. Tal, Director, and Mr. Y. Saphir, Deputy Director, International Affairs, 
of the National Council for Research and Development. Discussions on the scientific set-up 
in Israel and Israel's scientific relations with Europe. 
11.30 a.m. Meeting with Dr. H.Z. Tabor, Scientific Director, Scientific Research Foundation, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. Discussion on energy research in Israel. 
12.30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. A. Eban, Member of Knesset. 
1.45 p.m. Lunch given by Mr. Z. Shek, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at 
the Plaza Hotel. 
Lunch will be followed by a tour of the city of Jerusalem. 
6.00 p.m. Return to the hotel. 
7.15 p.m. The delegation received by His Excellency Professor E. Ka.tzir, President of Israel, at his 
residence. 
8.30 p.m. Dinner at the Knesset given by the Speaker, Mr. Yeshaya.hu. 
Tuesday, 8th February 
The delegation will split into two groups : 
Group A 
8.00 a.m. Leave the hotel - drive to Tel Shikmona. (near Haifa). 
10.30 a.m. Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research. Admiral (Res.) Y. Ben-Nun, Director 
General. 
12.15 p.m. Lunch. 
1.30 p.m. "Elbit Computers Ltd.". 
Received by Mr. U. Galil, President. 
5.30 p.m. Leave the campus - drive to Tel Aviv. 
7.30 p.m. Arrival at the hotel. 
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GroupB 
8.00 a.m. Leave the hotel - drive to the Volcani Agricultural Research Centre, Bet Dagan. 
9.00 a.m. Agricultural Research Organisation. 
Professor Y. Va'adia, Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Agriculture and Director of the 
Centre. Briefing on arid zone irrigation and irrigation techniques. 
11.00 a.m. Leave the Centre. 
11.30 a.m. The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot (including visits to science-based industries). 
Lunch at the Institute. 
5.00 p.m. Drive to Tel Aviv. 
Wednesday, 9th February 
9.00 a.m. Discussion, in the Dan Hotel, with Mr. N. Berkma.n, Director, "Israel Desalination Engin-
eering (Zarchin Process) Ltd." (IDE) on the subject of desalination. Visit to IDE Head-
quarters. 
11.30 a.m. Leave for Nahal Soreq. 
12.00 noon Soreq Nuclear Research Centre (the visit will include lunch). 
5.00 p.m. Return to the hotel. 
Thursday, lOth February 
10.00 a.m. 
10.30 a.m. 
1.30 p.m. 
2.00 p.m. 
3.30 p.m. 
8.00 p.m. 
Leave hotel. 
Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. Meeting with Brigadier General (Res.) Israel Roth, Vice-
President. 
Tour of the production line of the "Kfir". 
Lunch. 
Leave Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. 
Israel Military Industries. Meeting with Mr. Jacob Lihor, Vice-President. 
Return to hotel. 
Dinner with Major General (Res.) I. Tal. 
Friday, 11th February 
8.30 a.m. Working breakfast with Major General S. Inbar, Chief of Defence Research. 
11.15 a.m. Meeting with Major General B. Peled, Commander of the Israeli Air Force. 
12.00 noon Meeting with Mr. S. Peres, Minister of Defence. 
12.30 p.m. Meeting with General Salomo Gazit, Chief of Military Intelligence. 
1.15 p.m. Leave for Galilee. 
Saturday, 12th February 
9.00 a.m. Atar Sapir Pumping Station of the Mekorot Water Co. Ltd. Talk on the National Water 
Carrier by Mr. Z. Stuhl, Regional Engineer. 
Touring in Galilee. 
Return to Tel A viv. 
Leave for Rehovot. 
Dinner given by Professor M. Sela, President of the Weizmann Institute of Science. 
Sunday, 13th February 
Departure from Israel. 
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APPENDIX IT 
United Nations Secarlty Coandl Raolation 142 
Und Nowmhr 1H7 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
APPENDIX Il 
Emphasising the itwimissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for 
a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphsaising further that all member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United 
Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
(1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles : 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and 
their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force; 
(2) Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through internatioual waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the 
area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones ; 
(3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle 
East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and 
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles 
in this resolution ; 
(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of 
the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
United Nations Security Coandl Raolatlon 888 
22nd Octohr 1973 
The Security Council, 
(1) Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity 
immediately, no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions 
they now occupy ; 
(2) Calls upon the parties ooncemed to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts ; 
(3) Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the 
parties ooncemed under the appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the 
Middle East. 
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/Scientific and technological co-operation in Europv 
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council 
YREPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. ~ru:er, Rapporteu.} 
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Draft Recommendation 
on aeientiflc and technological co-operation in Europe -
reply to the twenty-aecond annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Gratified to note that the Council agrees on the need to seek an overa.ll policy in the field 
of advanced technology designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster 
fruitful co-operation with the United States on an equal footing and that the Council favours the 
harmonisation of national aeronautical policies ; 
Considering that in the military field the Council recognises the need for a joint approach by 
member countries in studying and determining their aircraft requirements ; 
Regretting the Council's decision not to draw up guidelines for a long-term European policy 
in sectors of advanced technology, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. Further to their consideration of the construction of civil aircraft, to consider making a com-
bined study of their civil and military requirements and programmes with particular regard to the 
possibility of developing a transport aircraft, different versions of which could be used for civil or 
miliarity purposes; 
2. To continue to give a high priority to the operational utilisation and commercialisation of 
application satellites developed in Western Europe; 
3. In the field of a common European energy policy, which remains of the highest priority, to 
seek the closest possible co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy ; 
4. To advance the interests of fusion research in Europe by taking an early decision on the 
siting of the Joint European Torus. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions has read with interest 
mingled with disappointment the parts of the 
Council's twenty-second annual report to the 
Assembly dealing with scientific, technical and 
space questions. It regrets that the Council failed 
to mention the guidelines requested last year for 
a long-term European policy in sectors of 
advanced technology and that it did not agree on 
the need for effective decision-making machinery 
to be set up in Western Europe. The Committee 
is convinced that without such machinery 
Western Europe's position in advanced technology 
will deteriorate further to the detriment of its 
internal and external security. 
2. In view of the terms of this report, your 
Rapporteur will restrict himself to three main 
areas of European co-operation : aviation, space 
and nuclear energy. Co-operation is to a con-
siderable extent influenced by the attitude of the 
United States in these matters, a point clearly 
emphasised in the Council's report. 
I. European aviation 
3. Many important decisions will have to be 
taken in the next few years, particularly in the 
field of aviation. European aerospace manu-
facturers are facing a period of uncertainty, with 
nationalisation in Britain and the prospect of 
a shrinking domestic market in France and the 
other member countries. 
4. European industry's sales were $10 billion 
in 1976 and are estimated at some $11 billion in 
1977. When these figures are compared to those 
of the United States the possible danger of the 
European aircraft industry being crushed by 
that of the United States is evident. Total United 
States aerospace sales in 1976 were $32 billion 
and might approach $35 billion in 1977. Overall 
United States aerospace exports in 1977 are 
expected to reach some $8.4 billion, as compared 
with $7.6 billion in 1976. United States aerospace 
imports for 1977 are estimated at $441 million, 
which will give a favourable trade balance of 
some $8 billion. 
5. The dangerous position of the European 
aircraft industry, with no effective decision-
making machinery, is becoming more acute 
although the long-term outlook for new civil 
aircraft is improving on the world market ; traf-
fic is now growing after a decline during the 
recession years of the early 1970s and the manu-
facturers must complete development plans for a 
new generation of aircraft for the 1980s. 
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6. European manufacturers have to be ready 
to play their role in this world market, but how 
can they do this financially or otherwise ? 
7. For the moment the market is saturated by 
American aircraft and it seems extremely dif-
ficult to achieve a greater share of the market 
for European firms. Nevertheless, important 
measures could be prepared for the future to 
improve the prospects of sales, at least in Europe. 
Your Rapporteur would like to list six such 
measures: 
( i) co-ordination of European financial 
means for promoting European aircraft 
products; 
( ii) harmonisation of aircraft importation 
regulations ; 
( iii) harmonisation of customs regulations ; 
( iv) harmonisation of export regulations, 
especially for military aircraft ; 
( v) standardisation of national companies' 
air fleets; 
(vi) establishment of a common company 
law. 
8. In the civil field the Concorde supersonic 
transport programme remained at a standstill in 
1976-77. 
9. The Airbus Industrie A-300B aircraft failed 
to pierce the export market and sluggish sales 
are leading to a slowdown in production from 2 
to 1.5 a month. Airbus Industrie will probably 
not be able to find DM 1,500 million to develop 
the smaller Airbus B-10. The Common Market 
is providing 30 million units of account for a 
preliminary study of this project. 
10. Prospects of launching an advanced version 
of the Dassault-Breguet Mercure 200 in collabor-
ation with McDonnell Douglas are rather un-
certain. 
11. On 16th March 1977, the German-Dutch 
firm Fokker-VFW announced plans to build a 
super F-28, 115-passenger transport plane. The 
great advantage of this type of plane seems to 
be its ease of maintenance and very low infra-
structure costs. The developing countries, which 
were therefore quite willing to buy the F-28, 
might show an equal interest in the new super 
F-28. Fokker-VFW intends to make this a Euro-
pean project and discussions have already started 
with Aerospatiale. The VFW-614 involved high 
infrastructure investments and therefore did not 
find a market in the developing countries, nor 
did it find an easy market in the industrialised 
countries. 
DOCUMENT 736 
12. It has been reported that no large jet trans-
port plane will be developed in the United King-
dom. Lord Beswick, who headed the British 
Aerospace Organising Committee, and who has 
become Chairman of the British Aerospace 
Corporation, apparently does not wish to spend 
money on projects where there is no chance of 
a worthwhile return. The new company might wish 
to become a partner in the Airbus lndustrie if 
the A-300B aircraft promised good sales in the 
export market. 
13. In the field of medium jet transport British 
aerospace industries might seek association with 
Boeing for developing a new 140-180 seat trans-
port aircraft. 
14. In the military field the situation is better 
in view of 1976 export sales: for the United 
Kingdom $1.5 billion, for France $1.6 billion. 
The French are developing a fighter-interceptor 
- the Mirage 2000 - and the first flight may 
take place in 1978. The Mirages Ill and V and 
the Mirage F-1 are still being produced, while 
production is beginning of the Dassault-Dornier 
Alpha-Jet ground attack training aircraft. 
Production of the Franco-German C-160 Transall 
transport aircraft may be started again if there 
are enough orders for it, including about fifty 
export orders. 
15. In the United Kingdom military aircraft 
development is focused on the RAF's requirement 
for a short-take-off-vertical-landing strike fighter 
to replace the Harrier and the Jaguar. The most 
important programme is the Tornado where the 
United Kingdom, Italian and German industries 
are tooling up for production deliveries of 805 
aircraft, beginning in 1979. The British Aero-
space Corporation is also planning to build a 
military transport aircraft. The production line 
of the Harrier VTOL strike fighter will remain 
open until 1980. 
16. Although in the military field problems are 
not so pressing as in the civil field, decisions 
on new aircraft will have to be taken fairly soon. 
17. During the symposium on a European arma-
ments poliey on 3rd and 4th March 1977, 
Mr. Greenwood, Chairman of British Aircraft 
Corporation, said that the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 289 on a European aeronautical 
policy resulting from the colloquy in Toulouse 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 made "dismal 
reading". He further said that : 
"The European industry can no longer 
afford the luxury of partnerships which are 
based upon short-term national advantage 
- be that advantage commercial or political. 
I have no hesitation in repeating my belief 
that in the long term Europe has two 
alternatives. Either we so arrange our indus-
trial and political affairs to give us a con-
siderable degree of independence and self-
lOO 
sufficiency - or we become wholly reliant 
upon the United States of America, both 
for our defence and for our industrial well-
being. That degree of domination would 
reduce our defence industries to the level 
of subcontractors." 
18. In order to arrange our industrial and polit-
ical affairs effective decision-making machinery 
is required, but on 8th March 1977 the Council 
of Ministers of the European Communities only 
discussed these matters piecemeal. In its latest 
document dated March 1977 it talks only about 
large civil transport aircraft. Nevertheless, it has 
been pointed out time and again that co-ordinated 
action on the part of European manufacturers 
is possible only if all civil and military program-
mes are discussed together, and this again is 
possible only if a long-term European policy on 
aerospace matters has been established. If the 
Council of the Communities is agreed on a com-
mon goal it still has not identified the means 
of reaching that goal. 
19. Eurogroup, established in 1968, consisting 
of the European members of NATO without 
France, has not succeeded in obtaining standard-
isation in aircraft production and a new body, 
the independent European programme group, 
established in 1975, has now started to work in 
the field of standardisation. Its purpose is to 
maintain a sound European defence industry. 
11. European space activities 
20. On 14th and 15th February 1977 the first 
meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Euro-
pean Space Agency was held at the new seat of 
the agency in Paris. In addition to Ministers or 
their representatives from the eleven member 
States and Ireland, it was attended by observers 
from Canada, Austria and Norway. The Council 
adopted a declaration on an overall programme 
in the field of communications satellites, a reso-
lution on the Earthnet programme, one on a 
European remote sensing satellite programme, a 
declaration on the Ariane launcher programme 
production phase, a resolution on the agency and 
its external relations and one on the agency and 
operational space systems. 
21. The Ministers also expressed their views on 
the agency's resources for the period 1978-80, 
emphasising that the level should be fixed in the 
light of the economic capabilities of each member 
State. The Council will therefore hold budgetary 
discussions in the next few months. 
22. The ESA budget for 1977 is some $500 mil-
lion, 3 % more than in 1976, of which $70-75 mil-
lion are for extending its current communications 
satellite programme for which ESA has proposed 
a three-year budget of $220-260 million to cover 
the period 1978-80. 
23. Because of the failure of the second stage 
of the Delta launch vehicle, ESA's Geos magneto-
spheric research satellite could not reach the 
required orbit and the main experiments could 
not be carried out. It is not sure what influence 
this part-failure will have on ESA's budget. 
24. A decision on an initial production order 
for Ariane launchers should be taken at the same 
time as the final decision on the extension of 
the communications satellite programme as both 
programmes are closely linked. 
25. The applications satellite programme is 
intended to lead to the introduction of European 
communications satellites in the world market 
and launch services for these and other types 
of satellites. The agency itself cannot enter into 
contracts for the development or provision of 
space systems for external markets except in the 
case of launch services. This was stated in the 
resolution of 15th February 1977 on the external 
relations of the agency. The American example 
has shown that the selling of satellites can be 
good business. 
26. Although your Rapporteur is afraid that 
competition from the United States and the 
member countries will certainly continue to 
become more evident and therefore make unani-
mous decisions more difficult, he feels it is 
impossible to sell satellites to other countries or 
groups of countries without having all the diplo-
matic, economic and commercial means to help 
the European States to conquer a market for 
their products. 
27. The next meeting of the ESA Council will 
be of the highest importance since an overall 
package deal will have to be concluded for ESA's 
work to start a new phase. The governments will 
have to decide how much money they are willing 
to spend in the coming years and for what pur-
poses. 
28. Funds have been earmarked for the first 
maritime communications satellite (Marots) but 
financing has to be found for future generations 
of this satellite. The Marots satellite is an 
advanced spacecraft which Comsat may buy for 
its worldwide maritime communications system. 
This would demonstrate the superiority of Marots 
over the existing American Marisat maritime 
satellites. 
29. A financial decision will have to be taken on 
the ESA communications satellite programme, 
which would include point-to-point telecom-
munications and could possibly compete with 
Intelsat. 
30. The third element in the telecommunications 
package deal would be the development of a 
heavy platform leading to a pre-operational 
television broadcast satellite which might be 
ready in the first half of the 1980s. 
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31. Your Rapporteur considers that financial 
decisions in these matters should be taken as early 
as possible in order to develop new satellites 
which might find their place in the world market. 
32. Another new development is the European 
remote sensing space programme. Earth resources 
and environmental monitoring satellites will be 
extremely important in the future. The Ameri-
cans have so far used optical techniques whereas 
micro-wave techniques might provide more 
accurate and detailed information. The main 
European emphasis might be on the management 
and conservation of known resources, rather than 
on exploration. These satellites could give 
statistical information on agricultural products, 
the use of land, water resources and coastal zone 
surveys. They could also be important in giving 
technical assistance to developing countries. If 
the Council of Ministers gave the green light 
for such a programme and provided the neces-
sary funds, the ground and space segments could 
be prepared by ESA. 
33. Another important decision will have to be 
taken on the production phase of the Ariane 
programme. How many Ariane launchers will 
have to be built between 1981 and 1983 ? It is 
considered that two launchers per year should 
be built for a "demonstration programme" during 
that period. At the same time a decision will 
have to be taken on the satellites to be launched 
by the Ariane launchers. 
34. The Spacelab utilisation programme will 
also have to be adopted and financed. The aim 
is to promote a rapid growth in the use of the 
Spacelab shuttle system by Europeans. A con-
siderable part of the space budgets of the ESA 
member countries and of the organisation itself 
should be earmarked for the Spacelab pro-
gramme. Experiments should be prepared and 
followed up operationally. By the time the first 
flight of Spacelab has been successfully con-
cluded the scientific and technological com-
munities in Europe and America should have 
worked out a programme of scientific experi-
ments and practical applications. It seems certain 
that Spacelab will play an important part in 
future communications programmes. The Ameri-
cans have abandoned the Aerosat programme 
which planned two satellites for communications 
to guide civil aircraft over the oceans. This task 
as well as the meteorological satellite programme 
could also be fulfilled by Spacelab. 
35. If no decisions are taken, in a few years' 
time ESA's activities may well no longer justify 
its continued existence. 
36. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point 
out that the military potential of satellites and 
of Spacelab will become increasingly important. 
The same will be true for the remote sensing 
space programme. 
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W. Nuclear energy 
37. On 4th December 1975 the Assembly adopted 
Recommendation 277 on second-generation 
nuclear reactors1 in which it recommended that 
the Council formulate a long-term common 
nuclear energy policy, act immediately on 
decisions already taken in the Community and 
define the extent of co-operation with the United 
States. On 17th May 1976 the Council replied : 
"As regards the use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, the member countries of 
the European Community are pursuing a 
common policy based on the treaty establish-
ing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity. Decisions taken by the OECD 
Council or the Steering Committee of the 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are 
carried out by member countries with due 
regard to their obligations under the Eura-
tom treaty. Co-operation between the member 
countries and the United States of America 
and between the Community and the United 
States has been resting for years now on 
the basis of co-operation treaties. Under the 
present circumstances and in the light of 
experience, the member governments deem 
the extent of that co-operation to be ade-
quately defined." 
38. Since then the situation has clearly changed 
as there are now doubts about co-operation 
between the United States and Europe. 
39. The new American Administration has 
developed a new energy strategy which might 
mean that more and more fissionable material 
will be needed for the United States domestic 
programme and less will be available for export. 
In his message to a joint session of Congress on 
20th April 1977, President Carter said : "The 
heart of our energy problem is that our demand 
for fuel keeps rising more quickly than our 
production. "2 
40. The United States now has 63 nuclear power 
plants and about 70 more are licensed for con-
struction. The new administration is of the 
opinion that there is no need to enter the pluto-
nium age by licensing or building a fast-breeder 
reactor. It will however increase its capacity to 
produce enriched uranium for light-water nuclear 
power plants using the new centrifuge technology 
1. See Document 686. 
2. See Appendix. 
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which, according to the administration, consumes 
only about one-tenth the energy of existing 
gaseous diffusion plants. 
41. Your Rapporteur believes that this may lead 
to a possible contention between Europe and the 
United States because it seems logical that if 
the United States itself does not want to use 
plutonium for nuclear energy purposes it will 
try to persuade other countries to do likewise. 
42. Apart from the technical hazards of pluto-
nium, there are also the political hazards such 
as theft and terrorism, plus the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons as a result of expanding pluto-
nium production. This change in American 
nuclear policy, a revision of its non-proliferation 
policy, together with growing concern over the 
export of reprocessing technology and installa-
tions, could have an impact on Europe's supplies 
of nuclear material. The member countries will 
have to react with a common policy. 
43. Within the Community, the Council of 
Ministers agreed in April 1977 that the Joint 
Research Centre would have a budget of 346 
million units of account (1 u.a. = US $1.1 
approximately) for its next four-year research 
programme. Sixty per cent of the new budget 
is to go towards energy research and an impor-
tant part of the remaining 40% for environment 
research. 
44. Although your Rapporteur is satisfied that 
the Joint Research Centre budget has been 
adopted, there is disagreement in the Council of 
Ministers on the siting of the Joint European 
Torus (JET). The building of JET is a decisive 
stage in any nuclear fusion research programme; 
it will be the first step towards a fusion reactor. 
The advantages of the fusion process are widely 
recognised: it is less dangerous and cleaner 
than the fission process and the fuel required 
for the process is found in almost unlimited 
quantities. Your Rapporteur considers it un-
thinkable that the Nine will be unable to take 
a firm decision, especially as it has been agreed 
that if a large majority agreed on a site the 
others would follow. 
45. In the recommendation to this report the 
Committee has therefore included a paragraph 
on nuclear energy policy and another on this last 
question. 
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APPENDIX 
Statement by President Carter on nuclear power policy 
7th April 19n 
The second point I would like to make before 
I answer questions is concerning our nation's 
effort to control the spread of a nuclear explosive 
capability. As far back as thirty years ago, our 
government made a proposal to the United 
Nations that there would be tight international 
controls over nuclear fuels and particularly those 
that might be made into explosives. 
Last year during the presidential campaign, 
both I and President Ford called for strict 
controls over fuels to prevent the proliferation, 
further proliferation, of nuclear explosive 
capability. 
There is no dilemma today more difficult to 
address than that connected with the use of 
atomic power. Many countries see atomic power 
as their only real opportunity to deal with the 
dwindling supplies of oil, the increasing price 
of oil and the ultimate exhaustion of both oil and 
natural gas. 
Our country is in a little better position. 
We have oil supplies of our own and we have 
very large reserves of coal. But even coal has 
its limitations, so we will ourselves continue to 
use atomic power as a share of our total energy 
production. 
The benefits of nuclear power, particularly 
to some foreign countries that do not have oil 
and coal of their own, are very practical and 
critical. But a serious risk is involved in the 
handling of nuclear fuels - the risk that com-
ponent parts of this power process will be turned 
to providing explosives or atomic weapons. 
We took an important step in reducing this 
risk a number of years ago by the implementation 
of the non-proliferation treaty which has now 
been signed by approximately 100 nations. But 
we must go further. 
We have seen recently India evolve an 
explosive device derived from a peaceful nuclear 
power plant, and we now feel that several other 
nations are on the verge of becoming nuclear 
explosive powers. 
The United States is deeply concerned about 
the consequence of the uncontrolled spread of 
this nuclear weapon capability. We have no 
authority over other countries. But we believe 
these risks would be vastly increased by the 
further spread of reprocessing capabilities of the 
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spent nuclear fuel from which explosives can 
be derived. 
Plutonium is especially poisonous and, of 
course, enriched uranium, thorium and other 
chemicals of metals can be used as well. 
We are now completing an extremely thor-
ough review of our own nuclear power program-
me. We have concluded that serious consequences 
can be derived from our own laxity in the hand-
ling of these materials and the spread of their 
use by other countries, and we believe that there 
is strong scientific and economic evidence that 
a time for a change has come. 
Therefore, we will make a major change 
in the United States domestic nuclear energy 
policies and programmes which I am announcing 
today. 
We will make a concerted effort among all 
other countries to find better answers to the 
problems and risks of nuclear proliferation, and 
I would like to outline a few things now that 
we will do specifically. 
First of all, we will defer indefinitely the 
commercial reprocessing and recycling of the 
plutonium produced · in United States nuclear 
power programmes. 
From my own experience, we have concluded 
that a viable and adequate economic nuclear 
programme can be maintained without such 
reprocessing and recycling of plutonium. The 
plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, for instance, 
will receive neither federal encouragement nor 
funding from us for its completion as a reproces-
sing facility. 
Second, we will restructure our own United 
States breeder programme to give greater 
priority to alternative designs of the breeder 
other than plutonium, and to defer the date when 
breeder reactors would be put into commercial 
use. 
We will continue research and development, 
but shift away from plutonium, defer dependence 
on the breeder reactor for commercial use. 
Third, we will direct funding of United 
States nuclear research and development pro-
grammes to accelerate our research into alter-
native nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve 
direct access to materials that can be used for 
nuclear weapons. 
Fourth, we will increase the United States 
capacity to produce nuclear fuels, enriched 
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uranium in particular, to provide adequate and 
timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that 
need them, so that they will not be required or 
encouraged to reprocess their own materials. 
Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the 
necessary legislative steps to permit us to sign 
these supply contracts and remove the pressure 
for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels by other 
countries that do not now have this capability. 
Sixth, we will continue to embargo the 
export of either equipment or technology that 
could permit uranium enrichment and chemical 
reprocessing. 
And seventh, we will continue discussions 
with supplying countries and recipient countries, 
as well, of a wide range of international ap-
proaches and frameworks that will permit all 
countries to achieve their own energy needs 
while at the same time reducing the spread of 
the capabilities for nuclear explosive develop-
ment. 
Among other things, we have discussed this 
With fifteen or twenty national.leaders already, 
we will explore the establishment of an inter-
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national nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme 
so that we can share with countries that have 
to reprocess nuclear fuel the responsibility for 
curtailing the ability for the development of 
explosives. 
One other point that ought to be made in 
the international negotiation field is that we have 
to help provide some means for the storage of 
spent nuclear fuel materials which are highly 
explosive, highly radioactive in nature. 
I have been working very closely with, and 
personally with, some of the foreign leaders who 
are quite deeply involved in the decisions that 
we make. We are not trying to impose our will 
on those nations like Japan, France, Britain and 
Germany, which already have reprocessing plants 
in operation. 
They have a special need that we do not 
have in that their supplies of petroleum products 
are not available. But we hope that they will 
join with us, and I believe that they will, in 
trying to have some worldwide understanding of 
the extreme threat of the further proliferation 
of nuclear explosive capability. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies -
new maritime sources of energy 
Concerned that, although Western Europe's energy supplies are far from being adequately 
guaranteed, only 12% of the European Communities' energy research budget is allocated to new sour-
ces of energy and only very small percentages of the member countries' research and development 
budgets are earmarked for this purpose ; 
Deploring the continued absence of consensus on a common energy policy and, therefore, the 
fact that no concrete measures can be agreed upon in the Community and OECD frameworks ; 
Convinced that a common Western European policy should advocate long-term measures to 
reduce dependence on imported energy and therefore promote research and development on maritime 
sources of energy, inexhaustible supplies of which are available to the Western European countries; 
Aware of the United Kingdom's research and development in the field of wave power, and of 
France's tidal power plant and its further research and development on tidal energy, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Request member governments to seek political agreement on a European energy policy in the 
Community framework and on the assignment of a. higher percentage of its research and develop-
ment budget to new sources of energy, in particular to maritime sources of energy; 
2. Promote a. joint working group on tidal and wave-power energy of French and British scien-
tists and engineers, together with experts from other interested countries, to study - in the light 
of experience already acquired in setting up oil rigs in the North Sea and elsewhere - the future 
possibilities of this kind of energy and problems of corrosion and ocean behaviour; 
3. Foster the harmonisation of policies to achieve practical results through joint action in devel-
oping maritime sources of energy in view of their future importance ; 
4. Review the possibilities of exploiting the resources of the ocean for energy supplies. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In this report your Rapporteur will deal 
in particular with maritime sources of energy 
which, although not a new subject, is of growing 
interest at present. The prospect of inexhaustible 
supplies of energy from tides and waves grips 
the imagination. Devising schemes and mecha-
nisms for harnessing this energy in a usable 
manner has occupied the minds of inventors for 
generations. Special attention is now being given 
to these sources. They need not be detrimental 
to the environment and do not require entirely 
new technologies as work already done on oil 
rigs has provided a great deal of spin-off in 
respect of the technologies for mastering tides 
and waves. 
2. .At the last session of the .Assembly, in 
December 1976, Mr. Cornelissen asked Mr. Thorn, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Luxembourg, whether the European Council 
would promote a common European energy 
strategy and whether the Council was aware of 
the dangers to European security if Europe's 
energy supplies were not safeguarded in the 
future. 
3. Mr. Thorn replied that the European Coun-
cil was fully aware of the problems arising from 
the absence of a common energy policy especially 
with regard to a possible increase in oil prices 
which could lead to a political-economic crisis. 
The Nine were nearly unanimous in deploring 
the absence of a consensus and the fact that con-
crete measures had not been agreed upon in The 
Hague. 
4. The Community is still trying to find a com-
mon denominator for the divergent interests of 
the member countries. This is extremely difficult 
as some countries {the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) are already self-sufficient in 
energy resources or will be in the early 1980s. 
Some countries have large reserves of coal (the 
United Kingdom and Germany) and will there-
fore spend money on research on coal gasifica-
tion or liquidation processes. It is believed that 
such processes could be conducted above or below 
ground. Finally, several countries are almost 
wholly dependent on imported energy resources 
(Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland). 
5. The Commission's strategy should be to 
reduce dependence on imported energy and 
improve the security of supplies which have to 
be imported. There is also the question of sharing 
resources which exist within the Community but 
this too is a difficult problem to solve. For 
instance, in the early 1980s North Sea oil will 
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still represent only 20 % of European require-
ments. Several European countries have therefore 
started major nuclear programmes and at the 
end of 1975 in Belgium, for instance, 25 % of 
its electrical energy was provided by nuclear 
plants equipped with light-water reactors. In 
France, 8.9 % of its electricity is produced by 
nuclear means. For the United Kingdom the 
figure is 11.26 %, 2.26% for Italy, 7.34% for 
the Netherlands, and 7.59% for Germany. 
6. Future Community policy should therefore 
propose measures to help reduce dependence on 
imported energy by encouraging Community oil 
and gas exploration and production, coal produc-
tion and consumption, nuclear energy and new 
energy sources. 
New energy sources 
7. New energy sources will not gain great 
importance until the end of this century or the 
beginning of the next . .As WaB stated in Mr. Cor-
nelissen's report 1 : 
"supplies of oil and gas appear to have 
reached their sixty-year peak and their res-
pective shares in the energy market are 
expected to decrease with time. It now seems 
impossible to wait another sixty years to com-
plete the next transition. A major technolo-
gical development programme should expedite 
this process." 
8. However, so far, governments of member 
States have shied away from a common energy 
strategy and are unwilling to establish a major 
Community research and development pro-
gramme. The two-year Community programme 
adopted for 1977-79 is financed to the tune of 
55,000 million units of account (pre-devaluation 
dollars) covering measures for economising 
energy, the production and utilisation of hydro-
gen, solar energy and geothermal energy. On 
the other hand, taken together, individual coun-
tries are already investing very large sums in 
energy ; in the Communities this amounts to 
about 25 % of all industrial investment. The 
total amount of energy investment in the Com-
munity between 1976 and 1985 will be 210,000 
million units of account. 
9. In order to secure vital supplies individual 
countries have made arrangements with indivi-
dual OPEC countries. The latest is the contract 
signed on 24th January 1977 between France 
and Saudi Arabia for delivery of 36 million tons 
of oil over a three-year period ; this contract 
1. Document 721, paragraph 41. 
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replaces a similar three-year contract which 
expired at the end of 1976. The agreement pro-
vides France with oil at the official price and 
therefore with a 5 % increase which is only half 
the increase decided upon by most of the other 
OPEC countries in December 1976. However, 
the price will rise in accordance with future 
official increases. 
10. In Mr. Cornelissen's report on new sources 
of energy, which dealt in particular with solar, 
wind and geothermal energy, he discussed the 
work of the International Energy Agency, the 
position of Western Europe and the North-South 
dialogue. This dialogue has come to a standstill 
and no changes have been reported since Mr. Cor-
nelissen's report was written. 
I. Wave power 
11. In Japan, Canada, the United States and 
the United Kingdom there is a growing interest 
in the possibility of using the motion of ocean 
waves to generate power. The International 
Energy Agency has added wave energy to its 
list of energy research and development projects 
and has designated the United Kingdom as the 
lead country for wave energy research and 
development. 
12. For Britain, with its long coastline and 
extremely rough seas, wave energy is a parti-
cularly enticing prospect, not only because waves 
are plentiful but also because they are at their 
most powerful when energy demand is at its 
highest, i.e. during the winter. 
13. In the United Kingdom, the Department of 
Energy's Advisory Council on Research and 
Development for fuel and power (ACORD), 
under the Chairmanship of Dr. W. Marshall, 
examined the possibilities of wave power in June 
1975. The Council noted that it was an indigenous 
self-renewing energy source which, in principle, 
could furnish the United Kingdom with an 
amount of energy equivalent to an important 
fraction of current demand and that the modular 
nature of the wave-energy devices meant that 
development costs could be kept low while the 
economic and technical viability of the system 
was being established. Wave energy could in 
principle produce about 50% of Britain's present 
electricity requirements, equivalent to about fif-
teen nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts 
each capacity. 
14. Consequently, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment agreed to invest £1.01 million for research 
and development in 1976-78. This has now been 
raised to £2.5 million. The various wave-energy 
collector systems were to be investigated in four 
different centres. 
15. Devices for the extraction of wave energy 
fall into two categories : mechanical and hydrau-
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lie. The mechanical projects are the contouring 
rafts invented by Sir Christopher Cockerell at 
the British Hovercraft Company's factory on the 
Isle of Wight, and the so-called Salter's ducks 
invented by Mr. Stephen Salter at Edinburgh 
University. 
16. The Cockerell device consists of a series of 
hinged floats that contour with the waves, i.e. 
they follow the shape of the waves, so that the 
adjacent rafts rotate relative to each other. 
Hydraulic motors or pumps between each raft 
convert this rotation into hydraulic pulses. 
17. Your Rapporteur was able to visit the 
laboratories of the British Hovercraft Company 
on the Isle of Wight. There it was pointed out 
that the wave power project was still in the 
research stage although scientific research was 
finished. The main problem was the engineering 
studies which might be finalised in 1978 by which 
time it would be known what types of metal could 
be used and how much the device would cost. Al-
though normal operation should not be extremely 
costly, extreme weather conditions had to be 
reckoned with, especially in the sea west of Scot-
land. The assessment was that within ten years 
development would reach the stage where elec-
trical energy could be produced. 
18. In the case of the Salter's ducks, their 
rocking motion can be converted to useful energy 
and transmitted ashore in the form of electricity 
or hydraulic pulses. This device has a string of 
vanes extracting energy from waves. 
19. In the hydraulic category are the wave rec-
tifiers and the oscillating water column device. 
The British hydraulics research station is experi-
menting with a system developed by its Director, 
Mr. Robert Russell, which is a wave rectifier 
device consisting of a large structure divided 
into two reservoirs with valves arranged so that 
waves drive sea water into a high-level reservoir 
and empty a low-level one. This creates a "head" 
between the two reservoirs which can be used to 
drive a turbine. 
20. The National Engineering Laboratory in the 
United Kingdom is experimenting with an oscil-
lating water column, a device which has been 
developed by Masuda in Japan. This system has 
been put into operation by a Japanese firm which 
uses wave action for the power supply in naviga-
tion buoys. 
21. If the Isle of Wight's present two-year pro-
gramme is completed, large-scale models of the 
Cockerell device will have to be built for open-
water trials off the coast near the Isle of Wight ; 
some £200,000 will be needed to cover this phase. 
If this sea-going experiment is successful, 
quarter-scale demonstration models will be com-
missioned for bigger experiments in the North 
Sea. The east coast has the necessary engineering 
workshops and workboats for repairs and main-
tenance. Finally, test devices will be erected near 
the Hebrides off the west coast of Scotland 
where much of the final system will eventually 
be placed. Other sites where these devices could 
be used are off the north and south coasts of 
Cornwall in the United Kingdom and Brittany 
in France, off the west coasts of Eire, Portugal 
and Spain, and possibly off the coast of Israel. 
22. Although not all the technologies of these 
systems are new, many problems remain to be 
solved. On the other hand, waves represent a 
fairly concentrated energy source. In fact, the 
sea acts as a giant wind-power collector absor-
bing wind energy over thousands of square miles 
and concentrating it in the form of waves. 
Engineering problems will also be great ; any 
wave-energy collector-converter system and its 
anchorage will have to be tough and sturdy 
enough to survive exceptionally heavy storms, not 
least because floating devices going adrift could 
be a danger to navigation. Securing these devices 
will be a major cost factor. 
23. During your Rapporteur's visit to the Com-
munity headquarters in Brussels, it was pointed 
out that even if all the technology involved 
worked on a laboratory scale it did not mean that 
full-scale prototypes would work as efficiently. 
In many respects the oceans are still unknown 
quantities and it will certainly be extremely 
difficult to fight corrosion of the devices used. 
Those who are in favour of wave power believe 
that eventually wave energy will become a prac-
tical proposition and will contribute to the 
world's energy demands. There is so much of this 
energy available that, according to those who 
believe in this new source, sooner or later it will 
be used. 
24. The time required to arrive at functional 
wave-power electricity production might be from 
ten to thirty years. If this device were given 
high priority and the necessary financing, elec-
tricity could be produced at a relatively early 
stage, but might involve high risks and expensive 
mistakes. All in all, long-term development might 
therefore cost less. 
D. Tidal energy 
25. In the United Kingdom interest in tidal 
power dates back to the Middle Ages when 
primitive tidal mills were installed on the shores 
of England. Interest in tidal energy was revived 
each time traditional energy supplies were 
threatened. 
26. Tidal energy, like wave energy, has a very 
long history dating back to the time of the 
ancient Greeks. However, only in the course of 
this century has its use on a large scale been 
envisaged with projects being studied in Canada, 
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France, the United Kingdom, th~ United States 
and the USSR. Advantages of tidal energy are 
that the movement of the tides is continuous and 
predictable and the potential energy inexhaust· 
ible. 
27. As from 1920, studies were made for building 
tidal power plants in Passamaquoddy Bay in the 
United States and the Bay of Fundy in Canada. 
Although considered technically feasible, these 
projects were abandoned because they were felt 
to be unsound economically. 
28. In the Soviet Union, an 0.4 megawatt 
experimental plant was built near Murmansk and 
has been in operation for four years. Other 
plans are being studied for building 160 mega-
watt plants on the White Sea and the Sea of 
Okhotsk. 
29. In the United Kingdom, the Bristol 
Channel appears to be a favourable site t, and 
the French have a 240 megawatt pilot plant 
on the Ranee estuary, near St. Malo. 
30. Tidal energy derives from an interaction of 
gravitational forces exerted by the moon and 
the sun. Although wholly predictable, the result-
ing wave form is complex and the availability of 
energy varies over a 12.4-hour cycle. 
31. The energy available varies in quantity and 
timing and there are some seasonal variations 
over the year, but the greatest variations are in 
a 14-day cycle during which the high tide changes 
from day to day, the maximum range being 
during what are known as spring tides and the 
minimum range during neap tides. 
32. It appears that there are only some twenty 
sites in the world suitable for extracting tidal 
energy as the tide level needs to be at least 
seven metres high. 
33. There are essentially two ways of extracting 
tidal power from an estuary. The first is to use 
a single-basin scheme which involves putting a 
dam across the estuary, installing turbines in the 
dam and generating electricity from the flow 
of water either on the ebb alone or both while 
the tide is flooding and while it is ebbing. The 
power is then regulated by moon time. Since 
the turbines of a tidal power plant can operate 
in both directions of flow, to a very great extent 
the generating period can be chosen at will. For 
instance, the turbines are generally switched on 
shortly after high tide and electricity is generated 
as the tide goes out and the basin is emptied. In 
periods of very high tides electricity is also 
produced as the tide rises and fills the basin. 
A scheme producing steady power might be 
more attractive. This could be done with a two-
basin scheme, a high-level one and a low-level 
1. See Appendix I. 
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one. Continuous generation by turbines between 
the high-level and low-level basins would then be 
possible. However, the two-basin system has many 
drawbacks including high cost and effects on 
the environment. 
34. The United Kingdom Department of Energy 
believes that tidal power is a less interesting 
proposition than wave power, the main reasons 
being the need to build a vast barrage for the 
former and the fact that wave power could 
provide five times as much electricity. This 
would be the case for the so-called Severn barrage 
in the Bristol Channel. An outlay in the region 
of several £1,000 million would be required for 
this estuary. In view of the long construction 
period interest rates could well constitute a subs-
tantial addition to the final bill. It is not possible 
to build a small~scale barrage in the Severn and 
no half-measures are possible ; nobody is able to 
guarantee the successful operation of a large-scale 
barrage. If it were built and worked satisfac-
torily, there are indications that it could provide 
something in the order of 4% or so of the United 
Kingdom's electrical power requirements from an 
inexhaustible source. This would be the equiva-
lent of one or two nuclear reactors of 1,000 mega-
watts capacity each or some 4 million tons of coal 
equivalent. 
35. The Energy Resources Sub-Committee of the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Science 
and Technology held a series of hearings from 
November 1975 to May 1976 on the possibilities 
of building such a barrage and several members 
of parliament appeared to be strongly in favour 
of its construction. However, the Department of 
Energy feels there are still too many uncertain-
ties and very extensive and costly studies will 
have to be made to resolve them. In the end, it 
remains largely a question of judgment. 
36. One thing is already quite clear - that a 
future Severn barrage would offer no prospect 
of producing electricity more cheaply than other 
means. For the United Kingdom, therefore, it 
has a relatively low priority as a source of 
energy. At the moment the Department of 
Energy is conducting two small studies to shed 
further light on what have emerged as the two 
key technical issues : the first is the effect of the 
barrage itself on the tidal regime in and around 
the Severn, the second is the problem of closing 
the barrage. 
The Ranee tidal power plant 
37. Through the good offices of the French 
Delegate for New Sources of Energy, Mr. Jean-
Claude Colli, and the French electricity author-
ities, your Rapporteur was able to visit the 
Ranee power plant in Brittany, France, on 24th 
February 1977. In this area many ancient mills 
were operated by tidal power. The operating 
principle of these mills was as follows: a dyke 
no 
closing off a cove created a storage basin ; gates 
permitted this basin to fill up during flood tide 
and a wheel emptied the basin during ebb tide 
producing a driving force in the process. 
38. In 1961, after twenty years of study, the 
French electricity authorities decided to build 
the Ranee estuary power plant. This 750-metre 
long structure goes down to 13 metres below sea 
level and has the same operating principle as 
the tidal mills. However, the turbine action is 
such that power may be produced while the 
basin is filling as well as emptying. The so-
called "bulb units" also permit pumping and it 
is therefore possible to super-elevate the basin 
level compared to sea level at the end of the 
filling, thus increasing power production. 
39. Work was started in January 1961 and the 
plant became fully operational in December 1967. 
As it was considered a prototype plant, extensive 
research and development work had to be done. 
Special care had to be taken to avoid corrosion 
problems, all of which have been overcome. 
Your Rapporteur saw some of the bulb-type units 
being overhauled and no signs of corrosion were 
discernible. 
40. The great success of this work has enabled 
French industry to build up an export market 
for these units ; there are now some 800 all over 
the world. The French electricity authorities 
also use these units in other hydraulic power 
plants on rivers on plains, since bulb-type units 
can be used only in low-drop plants, i.e. in flat 
areas. They therefore constitute an important 
spin-off from the construction of the power 
plant. 
41. The plant's installed power is 240 megawatts 
(24 identical power-generating units of 10 mega-
watts each) and its net annual output is 544 mil-
lion kilowatt hours (not deducting pumping 
energy). This amounts to about 0.3% of French 
electricity consumption. The plant employs a 
staff of fifty. 
42. The cost of the electricity per kilowatt hour 
is about 13 centimes, which is about the average 
price of electricity produced by other power 
plants used by the French electricity authorities. 
43. Your Rapporteur asked whether the fact 
that no new barrages had been built meant that 
the French electricity authorities did not consider 
it advisable to build another plant of this type. 
The answer was that only very few places in 
France or Europe were suitable for this type of 
installation. There was no doubt however that 
the new nuclear energy power plants were more 
economical. 
44. On the other hand, extensive studies had 
been carried out on the building of a similar 
plant in the Mont St. Michel Bay ; this was 
called the Chausey Islands project. Already in 
the early 1950s there were plans to build this 
power plant and it was then thought wiser to 
build the Ranee power plant first as a prototype 
for the second much more important Chausey 
power plant. 
45. This plant could replace ten nuclear power 
stations of about 1,000 megawatts. However, ten 
such nuclear power stations could produce two 
or three times more electricity for about the 
same financial outlay as the tidal power plant. 
46. Your Rapporteur also asked to hear the 
views of the French electricity authorities on 
wave power. In their opinion, with the prevailing 
swell off the French coast, the catchment front 
would be enormous (some 100 km for an annual 
output equivalent to that of a 250 megawatt 
thermal power station), which would lead to 
prohibitive costs and raise extremely serious 
environmental problems. Industrialists are almost 
unanimous in considering that such energy is 
not nearly concentrated enough to become pro-
fitable and hence to be used on the scale of a 
country's requirements. On the other hand, it 
seems suitable for providing small quantities of 
power at isolated sites such as buoys or off-shore 
lighthouses. 
The AUR prime mover 
47. In February 1977, while your Rapporteur 
was preparing this report, Mr. A.U. Reid 
informed him of his scheme for a tidal power 
prime mover. He claims that with this scheme 
a high percentage of the energy available in the 
tidal water of an estuary can be extracted ; 
existing tidal power plants extract far less total 
energy. 
48. The scheme is currently being evaluated by 
the British National Engineering Laboratory. 
The North of Scotland Hydroelectric Board is 
interested in it for meeting the increasing demand 
for electricity in the Hebrides. A design exercise 
is being prepared at Little Loch Roag, a sea loch 
in the Outer Hebrides. A desk-top comparison 
will then be possible with a turbine-operated 
scheme of similar status which has been tried 
earlier by the board at this location. 
Ill. Thermal sea power 
49. Thermal sea power should be considered in 
the framework of marine sources of energy 
although it will never be an important alternative 
energy source. It is a question of generating 
power from temperature differences between 
tropical surface waters and colder currents flow-
ing directly beneath. A major condition is the 
existence of two broad currents of water - one 
warm and one cold - in close proximity. There 
are many places where ocean currents flow 
within 2,000 to 3,000 feet of each other with a 
temperature difference of some 40°F. The cold 
water in the deeper regions of tropical seas could 
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provide a source of energy and thermal sea power 
generation has been proved possible. 
50. This process, suggested by d'Arsonval in 
about 1900, was tested by a French engineer, 
Georges Claude, between 1928 and 1935 on fixed 
and floating installations of several tens of kilo-
watts. Plans for a 10 megawatt coastal power 
station were studied as from 1940 for a site near 
Abidjan (Ivory Coast) by the firm Energie ther-
mique des mers. 
51. The Americans have begun research and 
development in this field and believe that, if 
successful, the cost of power from this source 
could be competitive with that of a fuel-fired 
plant. 
52. In the quarterly review Economic Impact t, 
Mr. John L. Wilhelm wrote about the new dimen-
sions of the technology of solar energy and energy 
from the ocean as follows : 
"A typical ocean thermal-power plant could 
be anchored off Florida. Heat from the 
constantly flowing warm Gulf Stream sur-
face water, with a temperature of about 
28°0, would vaporise a working fluid such 
as ammonia, and the vapour would drive a 
low-pressure turbine to gener81te electricity. 
The ammonia would then be recondensed to 
a liquid by cold water pumped from depths 
of 500 metres. The process would be con-
tinuous, since ocean temperature differences 
are constant, whether the sun shines or not. 
The electricity produced by the offshore plant 
could also be used to break down sea water 
into hydrogen and oxygen by the process 
called electrolysis. The hydrogen could be 
stored in large container ships for transport, 
or piped ashore to be used for fuel or for 
synthesising hydrocarbons. 
This scheme seems like science fiction. Yet 
Carnegie-Mellon Professor Clarence Zener 
declares that 'the probability of economic 
feasibility of ocean thermal-power stations is 
so high that they will make obsolete today's 
advanced nuclear reactors before the reac-
tors' development is completed'." 
53. The French electricity authorities indicated 
that Georges Claude had tried to use ocean 
thermal power before the 1939-45 war, but with-
out success. 
54. They believed that the forecast by Professor 
Clarence Zener just mentioned takes no account 
of objective facts. Just as today's nuclear reactors 
do not make yesterday's hydroelectric power sta-
tions obsolete, tomorrow's generating plants 
(which will not be ocean thermal-power stations) 
will not make today's nuclear reactors obsolete. 
1. No. 16, 1976. 
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55. Finally, it should be pointed out that Car-
not's theoretical output for an ocean thermal-
power station will never exceed 5% which is an 
insuperable obstacle. 
IV. Other energy sources from the seas and 
oceans 
56. Your Rapporteur does not wish to study oil 
in detail as the subject is so vast that it would 
require a separate report. He will therefore 
restrict himself to the Communities' work in con-
nection with seabed oil deposits. At present, 
1.2 million tons of oil are extracted daily from 
the seabed and this represents some 20 % of 
the world oil production. Only 25 years ago oil 
had never been exploited at sea. Exploration 
of the 500-600 metre zone is already being pre-
pared and the oil companies are of the opinion 
that drilling at depths of 1,000 and even 3,000 
~etres might be possible. However, this develop-
ment is very costly; for instance, investment at 
the so-called Ekofisk field in the North Sea has 
risen to over $2,000 million. 
57. In order to promote technological develop-
ment projects directly connected with prospecting 
for, extracting, storing or transporting hydro-
carbons in order to improve the security of 
energy supplies for Western Europe, the Com-
mission and the Ministerial Council of the Euro-
pean Communities decided to give financial sup-
port of some $75 million for a three-year pro-
gra.mme. The Commission believes that large new 
undersea deposits of oil and natural gas are 
likely to be found in particular on the continental 
shelf. Technological developments must therefore 
be concentrated especially on processes and 
equipment designed to allow hydrocarbons to be 
extracted from deep underwater deposits, if 
possible at economically-acceptable cost. 
58. According to the United Nations, marine oil 
reserves are estimated at 350 billion tons, of 
which 200 billion are located on the continental 
shelf. As it is not possible for divers to work 
at a depth of more than 200-400 metres below 
the surface of the sea, remote-controlled and 
even automated equipment must be used to 
extract hydrocarbons from deposits located at 
greater depths. 
59. During the search for hydrocarbons in the 
seas around Western Europe extensive oil depo-
sits have been found which cannot be extracted 
by current processes. New methods have there-
fore to be developed but the costs involved are 
so high that for some years to come the companies 
concerned cannot embark upon them without 
Community support. In selecting the projects 
preference was given to those which would result 
in technological innovation. The Community will 
grant money only if the companies concerned 
agree to contribute 60-70 % of the cost involved. 
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60. The Community is also very much aware of 
the need for wise energy use and conservation. It 
will therefore undertake a study of energy, 
required to produce goods or services, of prob-
lems related to energy use efficiency and of 
energy resource management. 
Israeli plans for hydroelectricity 
61. During the Committee's visit to Israel it 
was informed that the Israeli Government had 
already approved a feasibility study on digging 
a tunnel from the Mediterranean to the Dead 
Sea, in the south of Israel, to produce hydro-
electricity. The cost of this project would be some 
$400 million and a result would be to replenish 
the Dead Sea. 
62. Another plan which Israeli engineers have 
put before the government is much more ambi-
tious and would cost some $800 million. It calls 
for digging a canal from the Mediterranean, near 
Haifa, to the River Jordan. The canal would 
pour sea water into the river which in turn runs 
into the Dead Sea and would also replenish it. 
The idea would involve Israel and Jordan in 
mutual regional development, joint engineering 
and financing and could be one of the elements 
in Israel's definition of true peace in the Middle 
East. 
63. Two hydroelectric power stations, one each 
for Jordan and Israel, could produce 1,150 mega-
watts for each country. 
Conclusions 
64. With rising oil prices, and public opinion 
becoming more apprehensive about the nuclear 
alternative, Europe will nevertheless have to 
find a means of meeting its growing energy 
requirements in the near future. On 23rd March 
1977, the German Minister for Economic Affairs 
gave a solemn warning that if the growth rate 
of energy failed to keep pace with industrial 
development the number of unemployed in the 
Federal Republic could rise from 1.2 million to 
2.5 million. 
65. The high and increasing level of dependence 
of the industrialised world on oil from the OPEC 
countries has been a crucial problem since 1973. 
Over the next decade world demand for oil is 
expected to increase by one-third to something 
in the region of 30-40 million barrels per day. 
But it also has to be recalled that the resources 
of the OPEC countries will fall off within fifteen 
to twenty-five years. This will put considerable 
pressure on the oil-producing countries to 
increase their prices. Governments should there-
fore be conscious of the need to diversify the 
energy requirements of their countries while at 
the same time saving as much energy as possible. 
66. Your Rapporteur believes that the member 
governments should make greater efforts to seek 
political agreement on a common energy policy 
and, in the framework of such an agreement, 
assign a higher percentage of their research and 
development budgets to new sources of energy. 
It is true that at present-day prices the capital 
costs of solar energy, wave and tidal-power ins-
tallations are higher per unit than for conven-
tional or nuclear power plants 1 • But account has 
to be taken of the fact that oil prices will not 
remain at today's level. Tomorrow's energy prob-
lems need to be looked at as intensively as today's 
economic problems. Tides, waves, ocean thermal 
gradients and ocean currents are sources of 
renewable energy supplies resulting from solar 
energy. They are largely undeveloped at present 
but their technical feasibility has already been 
demonstrated. 
67. In the United Kingdom and France a joint 
working group of British and French scientists 
and engineers should be established to study the 
future possibilities of these new sources of 
energy. Duplication could then be avoided and 
solutions to problems found in one country could 
thus benefit others. 
I. See Appendix II. 
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68. The European Commission has made some 
500,000 units of account ($575,000) available to 
finance research projects on solar energy. These 
projects are concentrated on the use of solar heat 
to produce power and on the improvement of 
low-power installations (1-10 kilowatts). 
69. In future budgets in the Communities and 
the member countries, larger sums should be set 
aside for research and development of maritime 
sources of energy. 
70. As your Rapporteur stated in his report, the 
United Kingdom Department of Energy con-
siders that wave energy could in principle pro-
duce about 50 % of Britain's present electricity 
requirements, equivalent to about fifteen nuclear 
power stations of 1,000 megawatts each capacity. 
The French authorities believe a tidal power 
plant in the Mont St. Michel Bay could replace 
ten nuclear power stations of about 1,000 mega-
watts. These are important percentages of energy 
requirements for those two countries. It is there-
fore certainly worthwhile to spend larger sums 
of money on research and development in this 
field. 
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Possible sites for tidal energy 
development in the United Kingdom 1 
The Severn Estuary is the United Kingdom's 
largest single potential source for harnessing 
tidal energy, and has the largest tidal ranges, 
averaging up to 8 or 9 metres according to exact 
location. However, there are many other sites 
where power developments appear practicable. 
Many of these are inlets too small to be of inter-
est except perhaps for an experimental or pilot 
project, but among the others are several which 
might each yield between one-tenth and one-half 
as much energy as the Severn. Relatively few 
schemes have been put forward for these other 
sites, and data are therefore lacking beyond the 
obvious tidal statistics and known topography. 
Most sites of interest are on the west coast, 
where large tidal ranges are most common. How-
ever, some sites not outstandingly endowed in 
this respect may offer other attractions or oppor-
tunities, relating for example to port develop-
ment or coastal protection. 
The other sizable tidal power development 
possibilities include: 
average tidal range 
(metres) 
Solway Firth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Morecambe Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
1. Appendix 3 to the Minutes of Evidence taken before 
the Select Committee on Science and Technology (Energy 
Resources Sub-Committee), 19th May 1976. 
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Mersey Estuary (above Liverpool) 7 
Dee Estuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Carmarthen Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Humber ........................ 5 
Like the Severn Estuary, some of these sites 
would involve ports and would require locks. 
There have also been proposals for construction 
of freshwater storage reservoirs in the Solway 
Firth and in Morecambe Bay (as for the Wash) : 
there is no reason why such schemes if needed 
should not be combined with tidal power develop-
ment. A barrage project at any of these sites 
would obviously offer very interesting possibil-
ities for new and direct road or railway links. 
Viewed solely as prospects for electricity 
generation, these sites appear less promising than 
the Severn Estuary due to their lesser tidal 
ranges which, other things being equal, would 
be somewhat more costly to develop than higher 
ranges. In the context of comprehensive regional 
planning, development of some might never-
theless be found worthy of consideration : there 
is however at present no mechanism likely to un-
cover such a situation. 
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Energy economics - characteristic features 
Apart from the Netherlands, which exports 
a quarter of its energy production, all the WEU 
countries are dependent on foreign supply for 
their energy requirements: the United Kingdom 
43.2 %, Germany 55%, France 73.8 %, Italy 
79.1 %, Belgium 85.7 % and Luxembourg 99.5 %. 
The balance sheet of electrical energy for 
1975 in gigawatt hours (1 gigawatt hour = 106 
kilowatt hours) is: 272,219 gWh in the United 
Kingdom, 310,802 gWh in Germany, 186,008 gWh 
in France, 147,333 gWh in Italy, 54,259 gWh 
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in the Netherlands, 41,066 gWh in Belgium and 
1,483 gWh in Luxembourg. 
In the United Kingdom, the central elec-
tricity generating board's figures for 1975-76 
show that each unit of electricity (1 kWh) from 
nuclear power stations cost on average 0.67 pence, 
while coal- and oil-fired stations produced electri-
city at 0.97 pence and 1.09 pence respectively. 
Domestic electricity consumers were paying 2 
pence per k Wh at the time. 
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Introductory note 
In preparing this interim report your Rap-
porteur has drawn on the proceedings of the 
symposium on a European armaments policy 
which the Committee organised in Paris on 
3rd and 4th March 1977. He gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance in the preparation 
of the report provided by Mr. John Wilkinson, 
Assistant to the Chairman of British Aircraft 
1. Adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Member• of the Oommittu: Mr. Orilchley (Chairman); 
MM. Klepscb, Dcm1cm (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. AArBM, 
Beauguitte, Bizet, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucbeny, FOIIIKm, 
Gran~, Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster (Alternate: 
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Corporation, who was appointed by the Clerk as 
an outside ex~rt, at the request of the Rap-
porteur. 
The Committee intends to prepare a further 
report, incorporating the resulJts of further 
enquiries, for submission to the second part of 
the twenty-third session of the Assembly on 
28th November 1977. 
Piket), Lemmricb (Alternate: Schetfter), Maggion.i, Menard, 
Pawelczyk (Alternate: .Lemp), Peoohioli (Alternate: 
Oalamandrei), RitMn, Roberti (Alternate : Pecomro), 
Roper, Scholten, Schtt.gBM, Schmidt, Tanghe, WMtekead. 
N. B. T'M names of tlwil6 taking parl in the t10t8 are 
printed in ilaliCB. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on a European armamenta poUcy 
The Assembly, 
( i) While wishing for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments in Europe, believing that the 
increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems makes it urgent and imperative for the European 
countries of the Alliance to secure the economic and military advantages of standardisation through joint 
production ; 
(ii) Noting 
(a) that the proliferation of equipment types reduces the operational capacity and the cost effectiveness 
of the defence of Western Europe ; 
(b) that the growing complexity of modem weapons systems causes a la.rge increase in equipment 
costs; 
(iii) Considering the inherent political dangers of any armaments industry which relies on exports to 
third world countries or areas of conflict ; 
(iv) Welcoming recent indications that the United States will increasingly seek standardisation of equip-
ment in the Alliance ; 
(v) Stressing the need for satisfactory parliamentary control both at European as well as at a national 
level of the defence procurement process, and resolving itself to play a rt.le until the European Parliament 
is invested by statute with defence functions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE 0oUNOIL 
Urge member governments, severally and jointly in all appropriate bodies, to pursue the following 
objectives : 
1. Ensure the maintenance of a viable defence production industry in Europe taking account of the 
needs of national defence plans and of the Alliance : 
(a) by giving first priority to the joint production of standardised equipment in Europe while ensuring 
the interoperability of existing equipment throughout the Alliance ; 
(b) by pursuing secondly further standardisation in the Alliance as a whole; 
2. Streamline the institutional basis of joint production : 
(a) by concentrating on the independent European programme group; 
(b) by ensuring that military characteristics of equipment are determined within NATO; 
3. Inform the Assembly accurately and fully of the nature and extent of the terms of reference given 
to the Standing Armaments Committee on 26th April 1977. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(IIUbmitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee organised a symposium on 
a European armaments policy in Paris on 3rd 
and 4th March 1977 1 • This report wi11 3Jlalyse 
the guiding concepts and principles w~ch 
emerged. During the two days of the symposmm 
a nUilllber of eminent experts read papers and 
discussions took place between parliamentarians, 
representatives of the armaments industries, of 
military procurement and headquarters staffs 
and of government departments about European 
armaments manufacture and procurement and 
the consequences of modern weapon technology. 
2. As maJly speakers reminded the symposium, 
the need for co-operation in weapon procurement 
haB been widely understood and repeatedly 
emphasised for over twenty-five years. However, 
in spite of limited progress towards ~ter 
standardisation of equipment and mter-
operabiHty of weapon systems within the 
Alliance, prolifemtion of equipment types ~d 
incompatibilities of ammunition and supphes 
persist and even increase, degrading the opera-
tional capability and the cost effootiveness of 
the defence of Western Europe. Joint produc-
tion has been suceessful in a number of areaB, 
but industrially this has tended to be an ad hoc 
process and for consequent collaborative arrange-
ments, joint companies and consortia have n?t 
U8Ually been maintained once the programme m 
question has been completed. 
3. The need for co-operation in the weapon 
procurement field is based on three imperatives 
- financial, military and socio-economic. 
4. Recession and, as Mr. Greenwood 2 
:oominded the symposium, the political 
unpopularity of high defence spending among 
the populations of Western Europe unused to 
war for over a generation, have squeezed defence 
budgets to the point where they a:oo m many 
instances static in real terms. At the same time 
the increaBed complexity of modern weapons 
systems has caused a dramatic escalation in 
equipment costs. 
5. For example, as Ingenieur General 
Cauchie 1 explained, at constant prices and 
weight for weight, the cost of a tank has 
doubled and that of an aircraft has quadrupled 
over the past fifteen yoors. Inflationary pres-
sures have augmented manpo~r costs aJso. 
I. See official record of the symposium. 
2. Chairman of British Aircraft Corporation. 
3. Directeur adjoint A la Direction des Affaires inter· 
nationales, Delegation Generaie pour I'.Armement (France). 
ll8 
6. It is therefore in General Cauchie's words 
"economically essential to contain the unit costs 
of these modern systems by amortisatioo over 
long runs of the overhead costs of research, 
development and tooling". This is only possible 
through collaboration and joint weapon pro-
duction programmes. Fortunately in this respect 
military and financial considerations coincide. 
7. Militarily the benefits of collaboration in 
the procurement field are considerable. The 
benefits were assessed by General Major 
P. Dirix t, in the following terms: "We believe 
that co-operation in the research, development 
and production of armaments by p:ooventing the 
proliferation of separate national projects might 
avoid wasteful duplication, encourage standard-
isation, and at the same time increase operational 
efficiency and reduce production and mainten-
ance costs". 
8. The military significance of low production 
costs was emphasised by General de Maiziere's 2 
advice that "it would be wry unwise to equip 
them (the armed forces) for only one type of 
confLict because this type seemed the most prob-
able at a given time. In reaLity, types of warfare 
could change very quickly 81Ild far mo:oo quickly 
than the armies themselves. They must therefore 
be equipped to meet various types of attack". 
Such a spectrum of capability - inherent in the 
strategy of flexible response - is costly and 
enhances on military grounds the importance of 
collabomtive weapon procurement. 
9. The other clear military benefits of co-
operation in this field are the twin opemtional 
advantages of standardisation and interopera-
billty. The first predicates the second but this 
did not preclude a marked divergence of expert 
opinion on these subjects at the symposium. 
10. On the one hand Ingenieur General Cauchie 
explained in forthright terms his country's 
views that "whereaB some of our partners swear 
by standardisation, we in France think that, if 
we have to operate together, our equipment has 
to be interoperable and we prefer to lay the main 
emphasis on interoperability. It is our belief", 
he continued, "that while standarddsation may in 
one way offer the same advantages as inter-
operability ... it has drawbacks at the operationai, 
industrial, political and financial levels". 
11. On the other h81Ild General de Maiziere 
argued the contrary caBe. He personally thought 
I. Assistant Chief of Staff, Belgian Land Forces, 
Chairman of the FINABEL Committee of Principal 
Military Experts. 
2. Former General Inspektor der Bundeswehr. 
interoperability of only passing use and that it 
was more expensive than standardisation. He, 
therefore, pleaded in favour of standardisation 
at least where new weapon systems were con-
cerned. 
12. Finally, the economic grounds for co-
operation in the procurement field were 
reiterated by many speakers at the symposium. 
In the words of Mr. Edmond Nessler, President 
of the Assembly of Western European Union, 
"the maintena;nce of our armaments industries 
remains essential for the domestic and social 
balance of our countries and for upholding our 
position in the world and safeguarding our inde-
pendence. The armaments industries of most of 
our countries employ a large number of workers 
and make a major contribution to our exports ; 
they are also instrumental in keeping us in the 
civi-l and military industriaL race at international 
level". 
13. Most speakers saw co-operation in the 
military field as being the only way for Western 
European nations to avoid - in Julian 
Critchley's 1 graphic phrase - either "being 
disarmed by inflation" or being forced to become 
wholly reliant upon the United States of America, 
both for our defence and for our industrial well-
being. As Mr. Greenwood warned the symposium, 
"that degree of domination would reduce our 
defence industries to the leveL of sub-
contractors". 
14. Dr. Ingenieur Gustavo Stefanirni 2, 
explained that an armaments industry provides 
an appreciable contribution to national wealth, 
especially in terms of export revenue. In this 
connection Mr. Nessler's observation that the 
French armaments industry exports some 30 % 
of its production was noteworthy. Arms manu-
facture employs a highly skilled work-
force, it acts as a motor for technological pro-
gress with "spin off" into valuable civil applica-
tions and extends the range of the national 
economy into a field of industrial activity less 
susceptible to cyclical economic recessions and 
reduces the vulnerability of the economy to 
sectoral market crises. At the same time the 
Committee stresses the political dangers inherent 
in any armaments industry which is dependent 
on exports to countries outside the Alliance in 
order to amortise research, development and 
"start-up" costs, or to reduce the unit cost of 
production for national use. Foreign policy can 
be distorted as arms 'Sales considerations come 
into play ; potential conflicts may be sparked off 
in unstable situations in the third world. 
1. Chairman, Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, and official Chairman of the symposium. 
2. Chairman of Oto Melara (Italy). 
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15. The Committee believes that together the 
European countries of the Alliance provide an 
arms market 1arge enough for economic produc-
tion that would be independent of exports to the 
third world, thus enabling such exports to be 
terminated or limited to those deemed to be in 
the interest of Europe according to a commonly 
defined external policy 1 • At the present time, 
however, budgetary constraints have tended 
throughout Western Europe to lead to reductions 
in the appropriations earmarked for equipment. 
In this instance Mr. Nessler quoted the example 
of Fmnce whose expenditure on equipment was 
52.2 % of the defence budget in 1967 and ha.'l 
fallen to 41 % in 1977, while the portion of the 
defence budget earmarked for research has fallen 
from 8.9 % in 1971 to 6 % in 1976. Correspond-
ing figures for other countries show marked 
fluctuations but no particular trend. Thus the 
United States expenditure on research and 
development as a percentage of its defence 
budget ranged from 9.6 % in 1968 to 9.9 % in 
financial year 1978 ; its expenditure on procure-
ment ranged from 29.8 % in 1968 to 28.5 % in 
financial year 1978, with a low of 20.6 % in 
1974. For Germany the total of research and 
development and procurement as a percentage 
of the defence budget ranged from 26.3 % in 
1970 to 25.2 % in 1976 with a low of 22.4 % in 
1971. In financial year 1977 the United King-
dom spent 12.4 % of its defence budget on 
research and development alone. 
16. Logic therefore has long encouraged indus-
trial co-operation in arms manufacture. Research 
and development costs can be shared and unit 
costs minimised through long production lines 
but the obstacles remain. A number of speakers 
alLuded to them. 
17. Ingenieur General Cauchie warned against 
the alarmingly monopolistic results which a 
de facto specialisation of industries or countries 
in arms manufacture couLd have. He preferred 
the parallel development of several competitive 
systems within Europe with the attendant incen-
tive to innovation and design capability. Like-
wise, Dr. Stefanini reminded the symposium that 
"the improved utilisation of military budgets 
should be conditioned by consideration of its 
collateral negative effects on the European 
industry as a whole". 
18. He pointed out that "in most economic 
sectors European co-operation had been 
implemented in the context of specifically-created 
institutions and according to clearly-defined 
regulations which, in varying measure, take 
account of the possible socio-economic con-
sequences of jointly-reached decisions and which 
1. See speeches by Mr. V an Elslande, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to the Assembly on 5th December 
1974 and on 28th May 1975. 
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provide, where necessary, for corrective action 
or agreement on appropriate compromise". 
19. He feared that the IEPG working exp1ib.ttly 
outside the EEC and also outside NATO "could 
prove to be a body with an outlook concentrated 
on military budgetary interests and relatively 
disinterested in other aspects". These socio--
economic difficulties of joint arms production 
and specialisation described by Dr. Stefanini as 
problems of "human ecology" emphasise the 
importance of the initiative taken by the WEU 
Council in May 1976 when it decided to assign 
a study to the Standing Armaments Committee 1 • 
I. Existing institutions 
A. Independent European programme group 
20. The independent European programme 
group (IEPG) originated from a decision taken 
by Eurogroup Ministem in special session in 
November 1975 to seek to establish a new forum, 
in which France couJd participate, for collabora-
tion in defence procurement and the development 
of a common European position from which to 
begin a dialogue with the United States on 
defence equipment matters. 
21. As a result of this decision, representatives 
of the Eurogroup nations (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Turkey and the United King-
dom) and France assembled in Rome for the 
fim meeting of the IEPG on 2nd February 
1976. They resolved to work, in the spirit of the 
Alliance and without jeopa.rdisi.ng national 
responsibiJities, towards the aims of more 
effective use of funds for research, development 
and procurement, increased standardisation and 
interoperabHity of equipment, the maintenance 
of a healthy European defence industrial and 
technological base and the strengthening of tlie 
European factor in the rel•ationship with the 
United States and Canada. 
22. Since its inception the IEPG has proceeded, 
under Italian chairmanship, in a flexible and 
pragmatic manner without setting up any 
permanent machinery. On 22nd and 23rd Novem-
ber 1976 the second plenary session of the IEPG 
took place once again in Rome. The Italian 
chairmanship of the group was renewed since; 
a:lthough it was felt that the system of annual 
rotation of chairmanship should be retained, it 
was preferable for Italy to continue its work of 
co-ordination and preparation for another year. 
There have been meetings at a number of levels, 
including two at "State Secretary" (Junior 
Minister/Permanent Secretary) level and two at 
national armaments director level. Meetings at 
1. See section C below. 
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officia:l "expert" level have been more frequent. 
Initial progress has been made simultaneously on 
the harmonisation of national equipment pro-
grammes, the examination of possible joint 
projects and the consideration of certain aspects 
of procedures and practices affecting cohlabora-
tive projects. Three panels were established to 
co-ordinate work as follows and their work was 
confirmed and approved by the second plenary 
session: 
(a) Panel I, under United Kingdom 
chairmanship, has compiled and agreed 
a comprehensive schedule of equipment 
in service and rep1aooment intentions. 
This is an essential base for the com-
parison of national needs and the 
formulation of joint plans, and goes 
beyond anything hitherto produced in 
other collaborative fora. The schedule 
will be updated at regular intervals. 
(b) Panel II, chaired by Belgium, co-
ordinates the work of ten equipment 
sub-groups which have been set up to 
examine the opportunities for col-
laboration in specific areas. Six of 
these sub-groups were established as a 
result of comparison of national con-
tributions to the replacement schedule 
prepared by Panel I. 
(c) Panel Ill, the Defence Economics and 
Procedures Panel (DEPP), under 
German chairmanship, has identified 
and set up sub-groups to study five 
general areas : project procedures, 
arms exports, muLti-project compensa-
tion, competition and industrial co-
operation. The panel has been author-
ised to use the results of the study 
assigned by the WEU Council to the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
When the IEPG's equipment sub-groups are 
further advanced in their deliberations, industry 
will of course need to be involved in the result-
ing pre-feaaibHity studies 1• 
23. Until the formation of the IEPG, there 
had been no pureLy European forum for the 
discussion of the production of equipment in co-
operation that was open to all the European 
members of the Alliance and in which France 
participated. France has been unwilling to join 
or be associated with Eurogroup ; while the 
Standing Armaments Committee of Western 
European Union, which has not in any case been 
active as a forum for stimulating co--operation, 
excludes the European fl.ank countries (Denmark, 
Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey). 
1. See paragraphs 85-97. 
24. With the accession of Portugal: in Novem-
ber 1976, the IEPG now includes all the Euro-
pean members of NATO who maintain armed 
forces, and its members have explicitly re-
affirmed their intention that it should continue 
to act as a principal European forum for col-
laboration in the defence equipment field. 
25. Nevertheless, this European context does 
not disregard the Atlantic framework. The 
resolution which established the group linked 
both aspects in a single vision. 
26. As Admiral Mainini 1 reminded the 
symposium, the IEPG has not failed to study 
the question of relations with the Alliance, and 
has seen the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors as the appropriate forum for exchanges 
of views and experience. 
27. Admiral Mainini was insistent that 
a1though the members of the IEPG have been 
preoccupied with their urgent problems of indus-
trial co-operation and of harmonising require-
ment time sooles, they "have not neglected the 
wider consideration of relations with the coun-
tries on the other side of the Atlantic, particu-
larly since the United States is increasingly and 
practicrully disposed to envisage standardisation 
as an aim to be achieved through a more balanced 
exchange between the two components of the 
Alliance". 
28. In its work to date the IEPG has done 
much to reconcile what Julian Critchley 
described as "the twin aims of the Alliance, 
standardisation and the preservation of Euro-
pean defence industries". However, Admiral 
Mainini's speech did not make clear precisely 
how much progress IEPG is making. The Com-
mittee would wish to know what new joint pro-
duction projects are to be embarked on, and 
what institutional arrangements are envisaged 
for joint production. It would .Uke assurances 
that there is no deadlock in any area of the 
IEPG discussions. 
B. Eurogroup 
29. Eurogroup was established in 1968. Its 
members are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom. Created in 
order to further a greater identity of interest in 
defence matters between the European members 
of the Alliance, it soon provided an impetus for 
European co-operation in equipment matters. It 
functions through the armaments experts on the 
national delegations to NATO in Brussels and 
has no secretariat of its own. 
1. Deputy Chief of the Italian Defence Staff, Chairman 
of the independent European programme group at National 
Armaments Director level. 
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30. It has acted as an important ministerial 
forum for the Defence Ministers of the Euro-
pean NATO nations. 
31. Its sub-groups have been engaged for a 
number of years in the field of tactical harmon-
isation, armaments, training and logistic co-
operation 1 • For example, in December 1972 the 
Defence Ministers of Eurogroup passed a 
"Declaration of principles" on equipment col-
laboration and in May 1975 the Eurogroup 
Defence Ministers recommended a much more 
vigorous approach to standardisation through 
military trade between the United States and 
Europe which was endorsed at the NATO 
Defence Ministers' meeting. 
32. Nevertheless, in spite of the progress made 
and real achievements of Eurogroup to date, 
it has suffered from a fatal defect in that France 
did not participate. This has long been recognised 
by the Assembly and by the Committee 1 • Atten-
tion was also drawn to this in Resolution 16 of 
the North Atlantic Assembly (October 1973) 
which noted that "France does not participate in 
the activities of the Eurogroup and that con-
sequently insufficient use is made of the consider-
able technological potential of the French arma-
ments industry and that furthermore this non-
participation will not facilitate a standardisa-
tion of armaments so frequently recommended 
with regard to European defence". 
33. The resolution urged Eurogroup and 
France to seek a solution to this problem. 
C. Standing Armaments Committee 
34. The Standing Armaments Committee was 
established by decision of the Cormcil of Western 
European Union (7th May 1955) but is not 
actually referred to in the Trewty of Brussels 
itself. 
35. "The Standing Armaments Committee shall, 
in close relation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, seek to improve consultation and 
co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a 
view to finding joint solutions which would 
assist governments of member cormtries in meet-
ing their equipment requirements. To that end 
it shall encourage, on a C8ISC by C8ISC basis, agree-
ments or arrangements on such subjects as the 
development, standardisation, production and 
procurement of armaments." 3 
1. Eurotraining - (Training) ; 
Euronad - (Equipment co-operation) ; 
Eurocom - (Battlefield communications) ; 
Eurolog - (Logistics) ; 
Eurolongterm - (Agreement of basic tactics con· 
cepts); 
Euromed - (Medical services). 
2. See e.g. Recommendation 269, 28th May 1975. 
3. Paragraph 10 of the decision. 
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36. Staffed by an international secretariat, 
members of which also attend meetings of the 
NATO Conference of National Armaments 
Directors as observers, the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU meets four times a year in 
Paris. Representatives on the Standing Arma-
ments Committee are drawn from members' 
NATO delegations, usually at colonel or civilian 
official level, except in the case of the French 
and Italian representatives who are generals. 
37. The Standing Armaments Committee also 
maintains a close liaison with the NATO Mili-
tary Agency for Standardisation (MAS) and the 
FINABEL Committee of Principal Military 
Experts. 
38. Despite the hopes placed in it in its earlier 
years, the Standing Armaments Committee has 
not proved to be a framework within which joint 
production projects have been undertaken. But 
as Mr. Nessler rightly pointed out in his open-
ing speech at the sympDSium, the CoWlcil of 
WEU, in May 1976, took an important decision 
in assigning to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee a study of the armaments industries in 
member countries 1 • 
39. This decision, if followed up positively by 
the WEU Council on 26th April 1977, could 
I. Text of the mandate approued by the Council 
of Ministers at ita meeting in Brussels on 31st May 
1916 
1. The Standing Armaments Committee is instructed to 
submit to the Permanent Council, before the end of 1976, 
a detailed outline programme for a study as set out in 
the Annex, and a description of its proposed method of 
work; 
2. The Permanent Council will study carefully the outline 
programme and the proposed method of work submitted 
to them by the SAC, taking account of the determination 
of governments to avoid all duplication and any encroach· 
ment on work in progress elsewhere. The aim of the 
Council's consideration of the SAC's outline programme 
will be to specify the terms and define the scope of the 
study to be assigned to it. They will take account, in 
particular, of the tasks undertaken by the European 
programme group at their meeting in the autumn of 1976; 
3. The Permanent Council are authorised to take deci-
sions on the proposals thus submitted ; 
4. The Permanent Council will follow the development 
of the work and will report to Ministers at their next 
meeting; 
5. The Permanent Council have also been authorised to 
consider at a later stage the possibility of including the 
following points in the study : 
Inventory of capacities 
Here, the aim would be to identify, by main categories, 
the weak and strong points of the European industry, 
together with the sectors where it can compete on favour-
able terms. 
Inventory of relations between indUBtries in different 
European countries 
At industrial level, there is already a network of 
contacts and various forms of occasional or systematic 
co-operation. These experiments should be analysed with 
a view to possible rationalisation on a European scale. 
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restore a useful role to the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU which in the past has been 
overshadowed by other organisations. 
D. FINABEL 
40. The FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee 
was set up in 1953 (i.e. before any other similar 
European body) by agreement of the chiefs of 
staff of the land forces of member countries 
approved by their Ministers of Defence. Its 
permanent secretariat is Jocated in the Belgian 
Ministry of Defence with a French colonel as 
secretary and a Belgian lieutenant-colonel as 
assistant secretary. 
41. It was at first composed of the representa-
tives of France, Italy, Belgium, the NetherLands 
and Luxembourg, but was joined by representa-
tives of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 
and the United Kingdom in 1972 after Great 
Bri-tain's accession to the EEC. 
42. FINABEL is an international association 
whose members are appointed by their respective 
governments. Its proposals are transmitted 
through them, i.e. through the chiefs of staff 
(army) to governments. FINABEL cannot 
negotiate as an entity with a government. 
43. The aim of FINABEL is to encourage 
military co-operation among the NATO member 
States whose defence concerns and requirements 
are comparable particularly in the following 
fields in respect of land armaments : 
- definition of qualitative requirements 
of military equipment and joint defini-
tion of the military characteristics of 
such equipment ; 
- joint testing of equipment and proced-
ure; 
Annex 
The Standing Armaments Committee, acting under 
the authority of the Council, is instructed to make a 
descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments 
industry in member countries. The purpose of this analysis 
is to gain a clearer insight into the industrial and economic 
implications of the standardisation of armaments. It shall 
be directed to formulating a diagnosis. 
(a) Definition of the armaments sector 
The concept of armaments should be defined by 
distinguishing between armaments as such and the pro-
duction of goods and services for national defence. 
(b) Collection of economic data 
One purpose of the study will be to assemble figures 
showing the relative scale of armaments production in 
each of the countries and between them, and covering 
such points as amount of investment, research, sources 
of funds (public and private), manpower and exports 
(divided into the European, Atlantic and other areas). 
(c) Legal status of firms and domestic legislation 
The study should also identify the various legal statuses 
of arms firms. 
- tactical and logistic studies ; 
- exchange of information. 
44. FINABEL's mandate doec;~ not cover the 
joint production of equipment since this is out-
side the responsibilities of chiefs of staff. Never-
theless, the joint positions set out in the agree-
ments on the military characteristics of land 
army equipment have a direct influence on its 
development. 
45. NATO recognises FINABEL as a regional 
group and the NATO Army Armaments Group 
(NAAG) of CNAD frequently uses FIN AB EL's 
work BB a basis for its own studies. 
46. The WEU Standing Armaments Committee 
and FINABEL exchange documents and their 
respective secretariats are in constant contact. 
47. Official liaison procedure has just been 
introduced with Eurolongterm, a Eurogroup 
committee responsible for tactical concepts. 
Eurocom is informed of studies conducted by 
FINABEL and the members of the independent 
European programme group, although having 
no official link with FINABEL, are aware of 
its existence and work. 
E. NATO 
48. As Dr. W alter LaBerge 1 made clear in his 
address, "the established administrative machin-
ery of the Alliance offers general major assets 
which may be of an especial use to the European 
Community in its pro~amme for co-ordinated 
armaments development". 
49. Dr. LaBerge cited three parts of the organ-
isational machinery of the Alliance which can 
be useful for the formulation of a European 
armaments policy. First, there are the staff 
specialists of the allied military commanders. 
Secondly, there are the civilian organisation and 
supporting staff. In this area the best known 
body is the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors which facilitates co-operation by an 
elaborate network of groups for the interchange 
of technical information or formation of projects. 
Thirdly, there exist under the Military Com-
mittee an international staff and certain agencies, 
such as the Military Agency for Standardisation 
(MAS). 
50. The Conference of NationaL Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) is the senior civil body under 
the North Atlantic Council concerned with 
defence equipment, and all NATO countries, 
including France, participate in its work. The 
CNAD has under it five groups of governmental 
representatives. These are the NATO Naval 
Armaments Group, the NATO Army Armaments 
1. NATO Assistant Seoretary.Qeneral for Defence 
Support. 
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Group, the NATO Air Force Armaments Group, 
the Defence Research Group and the Tri-Service 
Group on Air Defence. A sixth group, the Tri-
Service Group on Communications and Electronic 
Equipment, has been approved in principle by 
CNAD, but its exact scope and responsibilities 
have not yet been fuhly agreed. 
51. Under each of the CNAD main groups 
there are numerous specialist panels and sub-
groups. These working groups and panels have 
access to information from the United States and 
Canada. It is primarily through the mechanism 
of the CNAD bodies that this information 
becomes available to the European members. 
The CNAD working groups provide an effective 
two-way street in information between the Euro-
pean and American NATO countries. 
52. Likewise on the military side a body which 
facilitates the exchange of techniool information 
among Alliance nations is the Advisory Group 
for Aerospace Research and Development 
(AGARD). Also under the aegis of the Military 
Committee is the Military Agency for Standard-
isation (MAS) which issues Standardisation 
Agreements (STANAGs) on procedures, doc-
trines and equipment characteristics to provide 
interoperability or compatibility. Most ST ANAGs 
are established through MAS bodies although 
some of the work on equipment STANAGs 
originates in bodies under the CNAD. 
53. These STANAGs can in some cases provide 
a point of departure for the development of 
future armaments to be produced by European 
nations. 
54. As Dr. LaBerge pointed out "any policy for 
European armaments must undoubtedly recognise 
the value of the work of the MAS, and any 
multinational grouping of nations for co-
operative equipment projects must take results 
of its work into account". 
55. Lastly, there is one temporary activity 
which it is important to mention. The ad hoc 
Committeee on Equipment Interoperability was 
established by the NATO Ministers in December 
of 1975 and has now finished one year of opera-
tion. This body of political representatives of 
nations has brought strong pressure to bear for 
the solution of problems of interoperabhlity in 
communications, fuels, tank gun ammunition, 
cross-servicing of aircraft and of the implementa-
tion of standardisation agreements. Furthermore, 
it haB by its actions generated a general· commit-
ment to interoperability which must surely form 
one of the basffi for any European armament.<~ 
policy. Dr. LaBerge's paper cited the following 
weapons projects under NATO CNAD aegis : 
Azores fixed acoustic range (AFAR) 
Mobile acoustic communications study (MACS) 
AN/USD-501 surveillance system 
FH-70 155 mm towed howitzer 
DOCUMENT 738 
Puma, Gazelle and Lynx helicopters 
Jaguar tacticaL and training aircraft 
NATO maritime patrol ·aircraft 
Seasparrow point defence ship missile system 
Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (tracked) 
(VRT) 
MK-20 RH-202 rapid-fire gun and anti-aircraft 
field mount HS-669N 
Mark 44 
Underwater acoustic communication system 
FORACS (fleet ope1.1ational readiness accuracy 
check site) 
SP-70 (155 mm self-propelled howiltzer) 
Milan PHM (NATO hydrofoil fast patroL ship, 
guided missile) 
NATO frigate for the 1970s 
NATO conventionally-powered submarine for 
employment in European waters 
Tornado multi-role combat aircraft 
F-16 air combat fighter 
Sea Gnat 
D. Industrial arrangements 
Industrial aspects of European co-operation in 
weapons producUon 
56. The most striking feature of European 
industrial co-operation in armaments manu-
facture is in Mr. Greenwood's 1 words to the 
symposium "the quite remarkable variety of 
forms which international co-operation has 
taken". 
57. The position was well summarised in the 
action programme for the European aeronautical 
sector of the EEC :"the immense size of develop-
ment expenditure and the need for economies of 
scale in production have prompted the develop-
ment of a series of collaborative European 
projects ... ". 
58. " ... The structures of this colLaboration", the 
EEC Commission report continues, "have evolved 
and been most varied : from the agreement 
between separate companies on the Transall, to 
the 'light' company (SEPECAT) set up to 
develop the Anglo/French Jaguar, to the com-
mon development company to develop and pro-
duce the MRCA". 
59. The advantages and disadvantages of 
industrial co-operation were set out by 
Mr. Kuhlo 2 in his report to the symposium. He 
listed the advantages as : 
1. Chairman, British Aircraft Corporation. 
2. Head of Dynamics Division, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm GmbH. 
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(a) sharing of development cost ; 
(b) sharing of development risk ; 
(c) broadening of background : experience, 
capacity; 
(d) reduction of procurement cost: larger 
quantity and cadence ; 
(e) advantage in logistics and readiness 
to act, 
and the disadvantages as : 
( i) co-ordination of different national 
regulations, standards and procedures ; 
( ii) only partial activation of industrial 
potential. 
60. Mr. Kuhlo cites the cost and complexity 
of modern precision-guided munitions such as 
missiles, rockets, projectiles and bombs together 
with the importance of maximum standardisation 
in their development among inventories of the 
armed forces of the Alliance as arguments for 
co-operation in their development, production 
and use. 
61. Collaboration in this field, once very much 
ad Jwc as between Engins Matra and Hawker 
Siddeley Dynamics over the Martel Missile, is 
now more institutionalised. 
62. The Euromissile organisation and adminis-
trative structure between the German MBB and 
French SNIAS companies created on the founda-
tion of the BPF A and DFPB (respective sponsor-
ing ministries) for the deV'elopment and produc-
tion of the Mi1an, HOT and Roland missile 
systems was given by Mr. Kuhlo as an example 
of the kind of joint industrial/ministerial organ-
isation required in this high technology area. 
(See Diagram 1) 
63. It is noteworthy that in the space field not 
only is there a supranational European Space 
Agency (ESA) but a1so that the satisfactory 
work of the three international consortia MESH, 
COSMOS and STAR has shown, as the General 
Rapporteur Mr. Cristofini exp1ained in his 
summing-up of the symposium, that "the 
extension of bilateral experience to multinational 
co-operation in consortia is not a figment of the 
imagination". Indeed, the General Rapporteur 
considered that "it is relatively easy to pass from 
the Euromissile-type of bilateral organisation to 
a COSMOS-type consortium". 
64. Likewise in the military aerospace sector 
we have had a number of relatively straight-
forward industrial partnerships and collaborative 
arrangements to produce specific projects such as 
the Atlantic, Alpha-Jet, Transall, Puma, Lynx 
and Gazelle helicopters and Jaguar. The 
SEPECAT organisation to manufacture the 
Jaguar (see Diagram 2) is typical of such ad hoc 
arrangements. 
65. The Panavia joint industrial company 
between Aeritalia, BAC and MBB produce the 
multi-role Tornado aircraft with its corresponding 
joint engine company Turbo Union and attendant 
management agencies NAMMA/NAMMO repre-
sents the kind of industrial and official adminis-
trative collaborative evolution which could set the 
pattern for future joint weapon development and 
production in Europe. (See Diagram 3) 
66. It is just the type of successful military 
collaborative consortium which Mr. Greenwood 
warned the symposium should not be broken up 
when its own particular programme is completed. 
He advised the addition of further partners to 
such consortia and the assignment to them of 
additional programmes as they occur. 
67. It is difficult to quantify the cost effects 
of collaboration. However, it seems that by 
doubling the market due to collaboration, a 
saving on the mean unit cost in the order of 
20 % is achieved on a major military aircraft 
programme. On smaller projects, the saving 
might be about 10% per unit. These figures are 
based on estimates for national bilateral program-
mes in which although the total development bill 
in collaboration is one and a half times that of 
the unilateral bill, each sponsoring government 
has to find only two-thirds of the money required 
to do the job on its own. At the same time, a 
5 % increase in manufacturing costs arises from 
the difficulties of geographical distance, language 
difference and so on 1• In its next report the 
Committee will seek to include more recent 
figure$. 
68. Yet as the EEC action programme for 
aerospace pointed out "this healthy evolution 
(towards collaboration) has been marred by 
weakness ; by lack of systematic collaboration on 
procurement at European level ; by lack of pool-
ing of the basic research infrastructure ; by the 
fact that industrial production structures and 
development capabilities have not yet been fully 
rationalised to render them capable of exploiting 
the European dimension; above all perhaps by a 
failure of basic political strategy in the 1960s." 2 
69. The result has been that following the 
withdrawal of France from the Anglo-French 
variable geometry aircraft, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom combined to build the Tor-
nado multi-role combat aircraft, leaving France 
a non-participant in Europe's important military 
project. In the strike/trainer field, the Alpha-Jet 
1. See Sir George Edwards, OM, CBE, FRS, "Partner-
ship in major technological projects", 7th Maurice Lubbock 
Memorial Lecture - 14th May 1970, Oxford University 
Press, pages 23-24. 
2. EEC Commission - Action programme for the 
aeronautical sector, Com. 75 (475), page 9. 
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and Hawk 1 are in direct competition in export 
markets as are the Anglo-French Jaguar and the 
purely French Mirage F-1 although the French 
Dassault-Breguet company is engaged in the 
manufacture of both F-1 and Jaguar. 
70. It is scarcely surprising that such divisions 
of interest and the consequent lack of any 
genuinely European alternative to the United 
States F-16 allowed the replacement order for 
the F-104s of Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Nor-
wegian air forces to go to the General Dynamics 
F-16 fighter rather than to a European aero-
plane. 
71. Nevertheless, there is no reason, given the 
necessary political determination on the part of 
the European members of the Alliance, for them 
not to be able to fulfil most of their requirements 
for defence equipment. 
72. While American military research and 
development expenditure dwarfs that of its 
European NATO partners, the gap, as Richard 
Burt points out '2, is narrowing. Whereas between 
1955 and 1965 the combined military research 
and development spending of Britain, France 
and Germany was 10 % of the American total, 
by 1970-74 this proportion had reached 27 %-
73. Moreover, Richard Burt argues that "the 
research and development gap should not obscure 
the fact in several areas such as anti-tank guided 
weapons (ATGW), low-level surface-to-air guided 
missiles (SAMs), anti-shipping missiles and 
target-acquisition aids - advanced systems are 
undergoing development and deployment by 
Europeans". 
7 4. In listing all the joint European program-
mes in which France alone was involved Inge-
nieur General Cauchie demonstrated the range 
and capability of Europe's armaments industries. 
If to these are added the weapons systems listed 
in Appendix 11 to WEU Document 689 (Report 
of the Committee on European and Atlantic 
co-operation in the field of armaments of 1st 
December 1975), it will be seen how exception-
ally technologically advanced the European 
industries are and how wide-ranging are their 
capabilities. 
75 It is not surprising that in a number of 
areas (V /Stol aircraft, low-level SAMs and ship-
borne guided weapons in particular) European 
weapons outperform those of the United States, 
and in a global context today European equip-
ment accounts according to Ingenieur General 
Cauchie for some 12 % of the market. 
1. A British basic and advanced jet trainer with close 
support capability. 
2. New weapons technologies- debate and directions 
by Richard Burt, TISS Adelphi Paper No. 126, London, 
1976, pages 20-21. 
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m. Institutional aspects of 
European co-operation 
A. Political problems of rationalisation 
76. The principal difficulty in arranging Euro-
pean armaments co-operation has always been 
the reconciliation of the institutional machinery 
for European armaments co-operation with the 
overall strategic necessity to preserve the Atlantic 
partnership. 
77. However, two and a half years after the 
publication for the United States State Depart-
ment of Thomas Callaghan's report on United 
States/European economic co-operation in military 
and civil technology, the "two-way street" it advo-
cated is as far away from realisation as ever. As 
Ingenieur General Cauchie demonstrated, there 
is an imbalance in the United States' favour 
of approximately 10:1 between the United States' 
exports to and imports from Western Europe 
of defence equipment and in the case of France 
the ratio is as high as 40:1. 
78. This imbalance in armament purchases is 
not for a lack of transatlantic dialogue. France, 
for example, although not now involved in the 
integrated military structure of NATO, partici-
pates in the consultations of the North Atlantic 
Council and the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors and at a working level there 
are numerous exchange agreements on research 
and development between France and the United 
States and Canada. 
79. So far the United States has persisted, both 
for strategic reasons and as a result of political 
and industrial pressure, in a policy of near 
autarchy in weapons procurement. The Buy 
American Act in the case of defence equipment 
protects the United States market to the level of 
50 % of domestic costs. In the rare instances in 
which the United States does purchase European 
equipment as in the case of the Roland guided 
weapon and A V8:a Advanced Harrier V /Stol 
aircraft, agreements for manufacture under 
licence in the United States are demanded. 
80. Nevertheless, recent trends in the United 
States towards a policy of standardisation and 
joint production in NATO should be noted: 
(a) Legislation introduced in particular by 
Senators Culver and Nunn in 1975 and 1976 has 
led to legislation declaring it to be "the policy of 
the United States that equipment procured for 
the use of personnel of the armed forces of the 
United States stationed in Europe under the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be 
standardised or at least interoperable with equip-
ment of other members of NATO". The Defence 
Secretary is authorised, for the purpose of the 
Buy American Act, to certify that procurement 
from a domestic source is inconsistent with the 
public interest. Weapon systems developed pri-
marily for the NATO theatre shall conform to 
5 
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a common NATO requirement ; the sense of Con-
gress is stated to be that expanded inter-allied 
procurement would be facilitated by more licen-
sing and eo-production agreements if economies 
of scale are preserved ; finally, it is recognised 
that a two-way street in defence procurement can 
work only if Europe operates collectively, 
"accordingly the Congress encourages the govern-
ments of Europe to accelerate their present 
efforts to achieve European armaments collabora-
tion among all European members of the 
Alliance." 1 
(b) The United States Department of Defence 
Directive No. 2010.6 of 11th March 1977 on 
standardisation and interoperability of weapon 
systems and equipment within NATO lays down 
responsibilities for implementing the policy 
expressed in the legislation quoted above. 
(c) The compensation arrangements made under 
the F-16 programme are more satisfactory than 
those of previous joint production agreements. 
They will bring new technologies into the Euro-
pean factories concerned, and provide the four 
purchasing countries with approximately full 
compensation for the dollar value of the F-16 
contract. Limited production capability in some 
countries has sometimes made it difficult to 
arrange suitable participation in the shared pro-
duction scheme. 
81. However, the problems encountered with 
the proposed new German-United States battle 
tank show still enormous obstacles to be over-
come before a two-way street can be effective. 
The two-way street concept can be criticised, as 
Ingenieur General Cauchie did, but it has to be 
recognised that there is as yet no European basis 
for it, and political and industrial efforts to 
create one have met with little success. The F-16 
deal will perhaps speed up the political efforts. 
82. But transatlantic projects should not be held 
up until the European structures have been built 
and begun to operate satisfactorily. Certain areas 
where two-way co-operation is possible can 
already be defined, and could work, given the 
political will on each side of the Atlantic. But 
a two-way street that satisfies European aspira-
tions is still far off and depends on other factors 
besides the European capacity to build European 
structures that will work. 
83. In an ideal world the best institutional 
machinery in which to concert European efforts 
in the armaments field would be NATO or Euro-
group, since the benefits of interoperability, 
standardisation, collaborative or joint production 
could be achieved on the basis of agreed tactical 
doctrines, but French participation is essential. 
1. United States military procurement authorisation 
bill 1977. Public Law 94-361, sections 802, 803. 
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84. In the view of French spokesmen, progress 
towards co-operation in the field of armaments 
and hence towards a more effective European 
defence effort depends upon an institutional 
basis which, as Mr. Cristofini observed, respects 
"relevant national interests" and whose proceed-
ings can, as Ingenieur General Cauchie remarked, 
be "conducted on pragmatic and flexible lines, 
with no hard and fast structure and no cumber-
some and sterilising mechanisms". 
85. It was against this background that the 
independent European programme group (IEPG) 
was established. To quote Ingenieur General 
Cauchie again : "it means that in the group we 
find ourselves among fellow Europeans untram-
melled by the familiar official structures, whether 
of NATO or WEU". 
86. Hitherto the plethora of institutions have, 
in the field of European armaments procurement 
and co-operation, done scant justice in their 
achievements to the good intentions of their 
founders. In the instance of the IEPG, the pro-
liferation of agencies and institutions must be 
no obstacle to real progress as the IEPG must 
work eclectically taking care to avoid duplicating 
the efforts of other bodies but utilising the results 
of their work where appropriate. 
87. For example, liaison with NATO is auto-
matically assured through the eo-membership of 
NATO of the participants in the IEPG. In this 
way a close relationship between armaments 
projects and military operational needs should 
be even more surely achieved. 
88. Also the lack of industrial participation 
in the IEPG to date can be offset to some extent 
if, as Ingenieur General Cauchie suggests, the 
IEPG follows up the interest of France in 
ensuring that the IEPG utilises the current 
study of the Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU into the present state of the European 
armaments industries. 
89. In this connection, and in view of French 
support for WEU which is after all the only all-
Western European political forum purely devot-
ed to defence questions, the Standing Armaments 
Committee could be given an enhanced role as an 
expert study centre. At present the Standing 
Armaments Committee is responsible to the 
Council of WEU only. Its studies should be 
systematically utilised by the IEPG. To extend 
a degree of parliamentary scrutiny to the IEPG, 
consideration could be given to having the latter 
submit an annual report to the WEU Assembly. 
90. Furthermore, if the Standing Armaments 
Committee had this wider role, it could under-
take studies on behalf of the Assembly in the 
field of weapon procurement and collaboration 
which could not only satisfy current political 
demands but also be of benefit perhaps to the 
IEPG. 
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91. In conclusion, it should also be noted that 
industry is showing increasing interest in the 
IEPG. Your Rapporteur nevertheless agrees 
with the conclusion of the IEPG that a European 
Defence Industry Group or any similar industrial 
body should not participate fully in the work 
of the IEPG. But industrial observers at selected 
sub-group meetings should not be ruled out. 
92. The multiplicity of existing agencies and 
institutions has been a subject of frequent 
adverse comment and long held to be a brake 
upon real progress to European armaments co-
operation. Furthermore, as eventual European 
union edges very gradually nearer to reality, it 
seems in the words of Mr. van der Stoel, Nether-
lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the WEU 
Assembly of June 1976 " ... to be a logical sequel 
... that ultimately defence too should be a matter 
for the union"."~ 
93. "Although", as Mr. Destremau, French 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also 
rightly observed on the same occasion, "in sound 
logic there cannot be a unified European opera-
tional defence without there being a unified 
European political power, there is no reason 
why, to save time, we should not conceptualise 
here and now the conditions for establishing such 
a defence. In this area and until such time as 
the strategic concept takes shape, the setting up 
of a programme group for the standardisation 
of armaments designed and manufactured by 
Europeans might prove the desired trigger for 
developing a European armaments industry. In 
the same prospect may be viewed the Council of 
Ministers' remit to the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU to conduct an in-depth 
survey of our countries' armaments industries. 
This is being done at Belgium's instigation firmly 
backed by ourselves. Moreover it was your 
Assembly which, on a report I had the honour 
to submit to it on 8th November 1972, advocated 
reactivating the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee". 2 
94. In developing a truly European armaments 
industry, there is a marked dichotomy between 
those agencies concerned with the industrial 
aspects and those concerned with the purely 
military. 
95. In view of the success of the IEPG to date, 
the time has surely come for overdue rationalisa-
tion of their functions. In particular, as the 
IEPG is now successfully established and con-
cerns itself primarily with the harmonisation of 
operational requirements, FINABEL's functions 
as regards army equipment and logistics might 
1. Official Report, Sixth Sitting, 17th June 1976, 
page 193. 
2. Official Report, Second Sitting, 15th June 1976, 
page 86. 
come to be assumed by the IEPG which could 
form any extra sub-committees as required. 
96. Both the IEPG and FINABEL are speci-
fically European bodies without any of the 
political disadvantages in French eyes of the 
NATO agencies or even Eurogroup and its sub-
committees 1 • Indeed France is an active parti-
cipant in both the IEPG and FINABEL. 
97. A drawing together of FINABEL and the 
IEPG would have the further advantage that 
FINABEL, unlike the IEPG, maintains close 
liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee 
of WEU. 
B. Interoperability and standardisation 
98. The Eurogroup communique issued at The 
Hague on 5th November 1975 stressed that "in 
order to make better use of the limited defence 
resources available within the North Atlantic 
Alliance, it is of the greatest importance to 
increase the interoperability and standardisation 
of military equipment within the Alliance while 
maintaining an effective and viable European 
defence industry". 
99. There is no doubt of the military need for 
both interoperability and standardisation. In a 
lecture to the Royal United Services Institute 
for Defence Studies in London on 22nd October 
1975, Dr. Gardiner C. Tucker, the Assistant 
Secretary-General of NATO for Defence Sup-
port, cited the example of the ACE Mobile 
Force 2• "There are seven nations who contribute 
units to that force ... it has seven types of combat 
aircraft. It has six different types of recoilless 
rifles ... four different types of wire-guided anti-
tank missiles, three different types of mortars, 
three different rifles and three different 
machine-guns ... seven logistic trains must be 
established." 
100. Even more horrifyingly, Dr. Tucker related 
how, in a recent naval exercise, of over fifty 
NATO aircraft shot down over 50% were credi-
ted to NATO armaments owing to the impos-
sibility of intercommunication with ground or 
ship borne air interception control systems 3 • The 
current lack of harmonisation of equipments is 
indeed fratricidal in not only the economic sense. 
101. The United States on the one hand tends to 
emphasise standardisation. The French on the 
other stress the paramount importance of inter-
operability. lngenieur General Cauchie in his 
paper went so far as to suggest that the ultimate 
logic of standardisation is monopoly and special-
1. Cf. WEU Document 689, European and Atlantic 
co-operation in the field of armaments - minority opinion 
presented by Mr. Riviere, paragraphs 8.3(ii) and 8.3(vi) (a). 
2. See R.U.S.I. Journal - March 1976, page 8. 
3. Op. cit. page 9. 
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isation, probably on a national basis, with all the 
economic and even social disadvantages which 
could ensue. 
102. Certainly Thomas Callaghan is right to 
point out that the military and logistic ineffi-
ciencies of the present situation seriously degrade 
the operational capabilities of the Alliance. "In 
varying degrees", he writes, "neither the land, 
nor the sea nor the air forces of NATO can 
operate effectively together for any significant 
period of time" 1 and he goes on to cite the 
multiplicity of logistic support systems. 
103. "The weakest link", Callaghan continues, 
"in the entire allied defence chain is thus this 
NATO vulnerability to sustained conventional 
attack by Warsaw Pact forces. There should be 
no such vulnerability. There is no lack of 
resources. Over $90 billion per year is spent on 
general purpose forces : over 70 % of the Ameri-
can defence budget ; over 80 % of our European 
allies' defence budget". 
104. In the short term, interoperability is the 
first essential as far as existing weapon systems 
are concerned. For example, at least the Jaguars 
of the Armee de l' Air and RAF should be made 
as genuinely as possible interoperable as should 
the Phantoms of the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAF 
and the Tornados in British, German and Italian 
air force service. These initiatives should be 
extended across the spectrum of army and naval 
armaments as well. 
105. In the longer term Callaghan's European 
defence procurement agency (in fact the IEPG) 
should be tasked with a functional assessment 
of Europe's defence equipment requirements. 
Rationalisation of procurement, and, wherever 
possible, of production to assure standardisation 
would have major industrial and economic reper-
cussions, but : 
(a) we have to contain the explosion of 
defence cost - interoperability can be 
very expensive ; 
(b) from the military operational point of 
view the advantages are great. 
IV. Industrial aspects of European 
defence procure~ent 
106. The General Rapporteur, Mr. Cristofini, 
laid down four guidelines for success in Euro-
pean industrial armaments policy. First, the ins-
titutional framework had to be sound to ensure 
that relevant national interests were preserved 
(to which the Italian contributors to the sympo-
sium so eloquently referred) while working out 
1. See Survival - IISS London - May /June 1975, 
page 130. 
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joint industrial programmes. Secondly, profit-
ability had to be ensured in co-operative projects. 
Mr. Greenwood suggested in this regard that 
"common commercial identity of purpose" was 
necessary. Thirdly, a degree of protection had 
to be introduced at least in the early stages and 
fourthly, resources had to be adequate to bring 
Europe nearer to the level of the major powers 
in this field. 
107. Flexibility would be essential in applying 
these policies. For example, there would have to 
be "weighting" in favour of the smaller nations 
in the allocation of armament work packages. The 
forms of industrial co-operation might vary from 
simple subcontracting in some instances to the 
formation of transnational companies like 
Panavia in others. 
108. Europe should aim to establish itself in a 
position of approximate parity with the United 
States, even in the most modern weapons. A 
degree of pooling of resources for research would 
help in this respect as is occurring through the 
EEC for civil aerospace but overall an element 
of "competition" in research is healthy. 
109. There is no reason why a determined effort 
on the part of the Europeans to build up their 
continent's indigenous capability to provide for 
its own defence equipment should preclude the 
purchase of American armaments. However, the 
establishment of Thomas Callaghan's "Common 
market for Atlantic defence" or former Defence 
Secretary Schlesinger's "two-way street" is a 
longer-term project. 
Conclusions 
110. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation. 
111. The Committee sees no economic or indus-
trial reason why Western Europe should not 
provide for the greater part of its defence equip-
ment within its own resources, provided the poli-
tical willpower exists and adequate finance is 
made available. Technologically Europe is capable 
of manufacturing the latest conventional weapons 
such as precision-guided anti-tank and short- and 
medium-range anti-aircraft missiles. In areas of 
specific weakness the existing facilities for the 
exchange of technical information with the 
United States will continue to be of value. 
112. But to keep abreast of the growing and 
technologically more sophisticated Soviet defence 
production effort, and to compensate for the 
increasing cost of future generations of weapons 
systems, it will be essential for the European 
countries to reap the economic advantages which 
ensue from the longer production runs of jointly-
produced standardised equipment. While the 
Committee is aware that some at least of the 
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military advantages of standardisation may be 
achieved by ensuring that different weapons 
systems are interoperable, it does not believe that 
interoperability alone is a sufficient objective for 
European armaments co-operation. 
113. While stressing the need for standardisa-
tion, the Committee does not overlook the innov-
ative advantages of some competitive research 
and development. Within Europe, however, a 
concerted effort must be made to reduce com-
peting research and development to a maximum 
of two concepts for any weapons system, and to 
ensure that one only is selected for advanced 
development and production before vested indus-
trial interest in conflicting systems can arise. 
114. The Committee welcomes recent indications 
of an increasing desire on the part of the United 
States to seek standardisation of equipment in 
the Alliance. It believes however that first 
priority must be given to ensuring the main-
tenance of a viable European production basis. 
115. The Committee stresses the need for more 
parliamentary control over the whole defence 
procurement process. It is itself fitted by the 
terms of the Brussels Treaty to play such a role 
at the European level until such time as the 
inclusion of statutory defence functions in the 
powers of the European Community makes it 
appropriate for the European Parliament to 
assume that role. 
116. The Committee further recommends that 
the institutional basis of European defence pro-
duction co-operation be streamlined, firstly by 
concentrating on the independent European 
programme group. At the same time, it is essen-
tial that the military characteristics of equipment 
continue to be discussed and determined within 
NA'l'O, as it is within the framework of the 
military command structure of the Alliance that 
weapons would have to be used if a conflict broke 
out. 
117. Lastly, the Committee seeks precise inform-
ation from the Council concerning the terms of 
reference for the study of the European defence 
industry entrusted to the Standing Armaments 
Committee. In a future report the Committee 
hopes to pursue the suggestion that the Standing 
Armaments Committee should be further devel-
oped as an expert study centre for the whole 
defence procurement process. Such an important 
new function for the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee would avoid the problems of duplication 
which, in the past, have inhibited member govern-
ments from making proper use of it. Thus the 
Standing Armaments Committee could be avail-
able to produce studies at the request of the 
IEPG, and, for this purpose, its staff could be 
enlarged through the recruitment of experts, 
including nationals of those IEPG countries 
which are not members of WEU. The Standing 
Armaments Committee could also be available to 
prepare specific studies at the request of the 
Assembly or its bodies - it is pointed out in 
this connection that, unlike the staff of the 
European Parliament, or of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Office 
of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly has no study 
and research staff, apart from its very limited 
committee services. 
Opinion of the minority 
118. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. In 
the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation a minority of the Committee 
would have replaced the words "... makes it 
urgent ... joint production;" with the words 
"makes it necessary for the European countries 
of the Alliance to secure the advantages of 
standardisation through joint production in the 
fields where it is justified from the operational, 
economic and political standpoint" on the 
grounds that standardisation is a difficult, long-
term objective, its advantage being established 
in certain specific sectors only. For the same 
reason paragraph 1 of the operative text would 
have been reworded by deleting "first priority" 
for standardisation in sub-paragraph (a) and 
deleting the whole of sub-paragraph (b). 
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119. In the third paragraph of the preamble the 
minority would have deleted the words "until 
the European Parliament is invested by statute 
with defence functions", claiming that defence 
was a purely national responsibility, not to be 
delegated to supranational authority, and that 
a European defence policy could arise solely 
from concertation between States. 
120. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, 
the minority would have added at the end the 
words "but stressing the need for balanced and 
mutually-advantageous concessions" with a view 
to stressing the need for Europe not to be reduced 
to a role of supplier of low-technology arma-
ments. 
121. Lastly the minority would have replaced 
paragraph 2 of the operative text with the 
words : "Ensure good co-ordination of the work 
of the Standing Armaments Committee with that 
of the independent European programme 
group", because it held that common European 
weapons characteristics should be determined 
outside NATO, and that the Council had assigned 
an important role to the Standing Armaments 
Committee in approving on 26th April the terms 
of reference of a study of the European arma-
ments industry which it is to carry out. 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (1) 
Belgium ..•...............• Million Frs. 
France .................... Million Frs. 
Federal Republic of Germany Million DM 
Italy Million Lire 0 •••• 0 0. 0 •••• 0. 0 •••• 0 
Luxembourg ............... Million Frs. 
Netherlands ............... Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ 
TOTAL WEU 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 
Canada • 0 •••• 0. 0 ••••••• 0 0 0 Million $ 
Denmark .................. Million Kr. 
Greece • • • • • 0 ••••••••••••• Million Drachmas 
Norway Million Kr. 0. 0 •••• 0. 0 •••• 0 0 •• 
Portugal 0 ••••••••••••••••• Million Escudos 
Turkey Million L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
United States ............. Million $ 
TOTAL NON-WEU b .. 
TOTAL NATO b ..••.• 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1972-76 
FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices Defence expenditure (US $ million) a GDP in purchasers' values (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values a 
1972 1973 1974 
(- 5) (-4) (-3) 
44,140 48,941 57,395 
37,992 42,284 47,705 
28,720 31,908 35,644 
2,162 2,392 2,852 
517 601 710 
4,974 5,465 6,254 
3,258 3,512 4,160 
2,238 2,405 2,862 
3,386 3,520 4,439 
17,211 19,866 24,126 
3,239 3,505 3,938 
16,046 16,736 25,108 
9,961 12,192 15,831 
77,639 78,358 85,906 
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1975 1976 f 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 t 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 6 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 e 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 e/ 
--------(-2) (-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
----------
69,936 79,445 1,003 1,258 1,474 1,902 2,058 35,462 45,604 53,409 62,250 67,193 9,711 9,742 9,772 9,801 9,830 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 
55,955 64,100 7,435 9,466 9,908 13,055 13,411 191,998 249,293 265,353 335,721 346,948 51,703 52,130 52,490 52,743 53,218 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 
37,589 38,823 8,912 11,928 13,775 15,267 15,418 258,984 346,983 386,342 424,653 453,377 59,599 59,923 60,021 59,822 59,330 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 
3,104 3,526 3,705 4,106 4,391 4,756 4,237 118,367 140,998 152,780 172,113 164,862 54,411 54,913 55,413 55,812 56,258 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 
836 900 12 15 18 23 23 1,359 1,869 2,184 2,197 2,289 348 353 357 359 363 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
7,246 7,713 1,535 1,954 2,324 2,865 2,917 45,287 60,093 69,536 81,197 88,289 13,329 13,439 13,545 13,654 13,791 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 
5,165 6,188 8,146 8,611 9,736 11,476 11,177 156,923 175,955 190,989 228,785 215,090 55,882 56,021 56,053 56,042 56,154 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.2 
----------
30,748 37,338 41,626 49,344 49,241 808,380 1,020,795 1,120,593 1,306,916 1,338,048 244,983 246,521 247,651 248,233 248,944 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 
----
--
----
3,127 3,595 2,259 2,403 2,926 3,075 3,646 106,434 123,447 149,185 159,681 189,363 21,848 22,125 22,479 22,831 23,128 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 
5,281 5,974 487 582 728 918 988 20,934 27,289 30,220 35,428 38,206 4,992 5,022 5,045 5,060 5,090 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.G 2.6 
43,917 . . 574 670 804 1,363 .. 12,488 16,159 19,173 21,015 24,626 8,889 8,929 8,962 9,046 9,082 4.6 4.1 4.2 6.5 . . 
4,771 5,220 491 602 713 910 957 14,897 19,129 23,344 28,216 30,625 3,933 3,961 3,985 4,007 4,035 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 
19,898 18,500 589 651 985 780 612 8,469 10,907 13,268 14,647 14,575 8,590 8,557 8,890 9,449 10,044 7.0 6.0 7.4 5.3 4.2 
. . .. 718 870 1,140 . . . . 16,509 20,931 29,047 35,511 39,616 37,146 38,094 39,066 40,063 41,105 4.3 4.2 3.9 . . . . 
90,948 99,083 77,639 78,358 85,906 90,948 99,083 1,168,180 1,301,490 1,407,210 1,517,660 1,692,950 208,846 210,410 211,901 213,540 215,462 6.6 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.9 
----------
81,465 82,596 91,258 96,631 105,286 1,318,914 1,482,262 1,623,227 1,755,632 1,965,719 248,209 250,075 252,300 254,887 257,759 6.2 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 
-- ---
----
112,213 119,934 132,884 145,975 154,527 2,127,294 2,503,057 2,743,820 3,062,548 3,363,767 493,192 496,596 499,951 503,120 506,703 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Note a: GDP and defence expendtturea are calculated m natLOnal currency and converted to Umted States $ at the rates shown below. Figures m columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
Previous tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee have used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
For the period 1972-76, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US $ per unit Units per US $ Country Unit US $ per unit Units per US $ 
Belgium & Luxembourg Franc Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1972 0.02272 44.01 - 1972 1.71347 0.58361 
- 1973 0.02571 38.90 - 1973 1.71649 0.58258 
- 1974 0.02567 38.95 - 1974 1.53952 0.64955 
- 1975 0.02719 36.78 - 1975 1.53183 0.65282 
- 1976 0.02590 38.60 - 1976 1.20151 0.83229 
Canada Canadian Dollar Netherlands Guilder 
- 1972 1.00943 0.99066 
- 1972 0.30864 3.24 
- 1973 0.99945 1.00055 
- 1973 0.35746 2.80 
- 1974 1.02248 0.97802 
- 1974 0.37163 2.69 
- 1975 0.98313 1.01716 
- 1975 0.39539 2.53 
- 1976 1.01416 0.98604 
- 1976 0.37822 2.64 
Denmark D. Kroner Norway N. Kroner 
- 1972 0.14390 6.9495 
- 1972 0.15168 6.59 
- 1973 0.16523 6.0522 
- 1973 0.17169 5.82 
- 1974 0.16408 6.0947 
- 1974 0.18106 5.52 
- 1975 0.17392 5.7499 
- 1975 0.19073 5.24 
- 1976 0.16543 6.0450 
- 1976 0.18327 5.46 
France Franc Portugal 
- 1972 0.19570 5.110 
- 1972 
- 1973 0.22387 4.467 
- 1973 
- 1974 0.20770 4.815 
- 1974, 1975 
- 1975 0.23331 4.286 
- 1976 0.20922 4.780 - 1976 
Escudo 
0.03670 27.25 
0.03889 25.71 
0.03922 25.50 
0.03309 30.22 
Fed. Rep. of Germany Deutschmark Turkey 
- 1972 0.31030 3.22 - 1972 
- 1973 0.37383 2.68 - 1973 
- 1974 0.38647 2.59 - 1974 
- 1975 0.40616 2.46 - 1975 
- 1976 0.39714 2.52 - 1976 
T. Lira 
0.07207 13.88 
0.07133 14.02 
0.07199 13.89 
0.06936 14.42 
0.06249 16.00 
Greece Drachma United Kingdom £ 
- 1972 0.03333 30.00 - 1972 2.5000 0.400 
- 1973 0.03373 29.65 - 1973 2.4520 0.408 
- 1974 0.03333 30.00 - 1974 2.3401 0.427 
- 1975 0.03103 32.23 - 1975 2.2219 0.450 
- 1976 0.03017 33.15 - 1976 1.8062 0.554 
Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not available for the most recent years; for purposes of comparison all data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded 
throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M/DPC /2(76)18. 
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Defence expenditure per head a Defence expenditure as % of total WEU (US$) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976e/ 1972 1973 1974 1975 19761 
--------(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
------
103 129 151 194 209 3.26 3.37 3.54 3.86 4.18 
144 182 189 248 252 24.18 25.35 23.80 26.46 27.24 
150 199 230 255 260 28.99 31.95 33.10 30.95 31.31 
68 75 79 85 75 12.05 11.00 10.55 9.64 8.60 
34 42 51 64 63 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
115 145 172 210 212 4.99 5.23 5.58 5.81 5.92 
146 154 174 205 199 26.49 23.06 23.39 23.26 22.70 
------
--
--
126 151 168 199 198 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
----------
103 109 130 135 158 7.35 6.44 7.03 6.23 7.40 
98 116 144 181 194 1.58 1.56 1.75 1.86 2.01 
65 75 90 151 . . 1.87 1.79 1.93 2.76 . . 
125 152 179 227 237 1.60 1.61 1.71 1.84 1.94 
69 76 112 83 61 1.92 1.74 2.37 1.58 1.24 
19 23 29 . . . . 2.34 2.33 2.74 . . . . 
372 372 405 426 460 252.50 209.86 206.38 184.31 201.22 
----------
328 330 362 379 408 . . . . . . . . . . 
----------
228 242 266 290 305 . . . . . . . . . . 
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Introduction 
1. As indicated in the fifteenth report of the 
Committee 1, the present report is divided into 
three parts of very different length, the first 
dealing with members of parliament and defence, 
the second with action taken in the parliaments 
of member countries on texts adopted by the 
WEU Assembly and the third with the activities 
of the Committee. 
I. Members of parliament and defence 
2. Following the preliminary report presented 
at the last session, the Committee agreed to send 
the parliaments of all member countries a ques-
tionnaire on the role of parliamentarians (and 
thus parliaments) in their countries' defence 
policy. 
3. All the parliaments questioned answered in 
full and they should be thanked sincerely for 
this effort. 
4. The questionnaire was divided into four 
main sections : 
- general responsibilities of parliament in 
defence matters ; 
- defence and parliament's legislative 
role; 
- defence and parliament's supervisory 
role; 
- defence and parliament's information 
role. 
5. A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
a study of all the replies to these four questions. 
I. General resporuJibflftfea of parliament in defence 
matters 
6. The first feature common to all the coun-
tries is that specific constitutional provisions 
govern the defence responsibilities of the parlia-
ments. The exception in the case of the United 
Kingdom is more apparent than real since it has 
no formal constitution. However, the principle 
of the supremacy of law emanating from parlia-
ment forms just as valid a basis for the legisla-
tor's power in defence matters as a written con-
stitution. 
7. Second, except in the United Kingdom for 
the abovementioned reason, the responsibility 
I. Document 724, paragraphs 9 and 10. 
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attributed by constitution to parliaments in the 
field in question is ascribed. Parliaments are not 
wholly responsible for all aspects of defence and 
their decision-taking powers are shared to a very 
large extent with the executive. Even in the 
United Kingdom, where parliamentary power 
is almost absolute, practice has limited parlia-
ment's action to specific areas. Such a situation 
is perfectly understandable in view of the special 
nature of defence : secrecy surrounding some 
aspects of defence policy, speed for implementing 
the means, need to concentrate the decision-
taking authority, close and sometimes conflicting 
relationship between defence and individual 
freedom. 
8. In the analysis hereafter of the replies to 
the second question, it will be possible to define 
parliament's exact role, but it should be under-
lined that the constitutional principle of parlia-
mentary action is obviously based on the close 
link between the principles of the people's sover-
eignty and national sovereignty and the very 
principle of defence. Insofar as the latter is 
materialised by the use of force, it is for the 
parliaments to ensure that it is used effectively 
at the same time avoiding it being turned against 
democratic sovereignty. 
9. For these reasons, with few exceptions the 
defence responsibilities of parliaments are not 
set out in specific laws. Admittedly, in Belgium 
laws have extended parliament's prerogatives 
with regard to information in defence matters 
through the compulsory tabling of progress 
reports by certain bodies which depend on the 
Ministry of Defence. The same is true in France. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the law on 
the Bundestag parliamentary commissioner for 
defence grants parliament certain powers in 
defence matters. Finally, in the United Kingdom, 
it is through supervision of delegated legislation 
that parliament finds legal justification for its 
defence prerogatives, and attention should be 
called here to the important role that individual 
parliamentarians can play in implementing this 
supervision. 
10. In all cases, parliamentary rules of proce-
dure add no powers to those held by parliament 
in accordance with the constitution or particular 
laws. They merely organise procedure for imple-
menting such powers. 
11. Their provisions are thus more or less 
extensive depending on the scope of parliament's 
defence responsibilities. In certain cases, the rules 
of procedure merely provide for a defence com-
mittee and specify the extent of its responsibil-
ities. This is so for Italy, for instance. In Belgium 
and the Netherlands, the rules of procedure 
merely state that there shall be a parliamentary 
committee for each ministerial department which 
ipso {®to implies the existence of a defence com-
mittee. 
12. Conversely, because of the wide and specific 
powers of the Bundestag, its rules of procedure 
deal very extensively with procedure for their 
exercise. 
13. In this respect, France and the United 
Kingdom are in an intermediary position. In 
France, the rules of procedure of the National 
Assembly and Senate provide for the existence 
of a committee specialised in defence matters 
and lay down its responsibilities. They also set 
out the procedure in accordance with which a 
state of war or of siege may be declared and 
stipulate that in both cases it can act only on 
a proposal from the government. 
14. In the United Kingdom, although the rules 
of procedure of the House of Lords contain no 
particular provision, those of the House of Com-
mons mention the dates on which defence expen-
diture must be discussed, as for all other sections 
of the budget, moreover. 
15. Parliaments therefore derive their respon-
sibilities and powers in defence matters basically 
from formal constitutional provisions or practice. 
The extent of these responsibilities and powers, 
starting with the legislative field, will now be 
examined. 
ll. Defence and parliament's legislative role 
16. Traditionally, there are three main fields 
of action in defence matters : 
- the declaration of war and the con-
clusion of peace ; 
- providing the State with the necessary 
human means for protecting the nation ; 
- granting the government financial 
means for applying defence policy. 
1. Declaration of war and conclusion of peace 
17. The principle of the compulsory prior 
authorisation of parliament for declaring war or 
concluding paece is not general. However, most 
constitutions make direct or indirect provision 
for parliament to veto the engagement of hostil-
ities decided on by the government on its own 
authority. These remarks are also valid for the 
return to peace. Consideration should also be 
given to parliamentary powers in situations mid-
way between a state of peace and a state of war. 
s• 
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A. States in which prior parliamentary 
authorisation is necessary for a declaration of 
war or a return to peace 
(a) Declaration of war 
18. Four States grant parliament the power 
to give prior authorisation for declaration of 
war, i.e. France, the Netherlands, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Although appa-
rently identical in scope and implementation, 
this power has particular characteristics in each 
country. 
(i) Common characteristics 
19. In the countries concerned, the govern-
ment's power to declare war has three charac-
teristics in common. 
The initial step 
20. First, who submits the proposed declara-
tion of war to parliament 7 In this respect, have 
parliamentarians the same power of initiative as 
in other legislative matters Y 
21. As is logical, the answer is no. 
22. Article 115a-1 of the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany specifically lays 
down that parliament declares the country in a 
state of defence (or of war) at the request of 
the Federal Government. 
23. In France, the constitutional provision is 
set out in the rules of procedure of the two 
chambers, where it is underlined that a proposal 
to declare war must emanate from the govern-
ment (Article 35 of the 1958 constitution, Article 
131 of the rules of procedure of the National 
Assembly, Article 49 of the rules of procedure of 
the Senate). 
24. Government initiative seems implicit in the 
Italian constitution since the chambers "discuss 
the state of war and confer on the government 
the necessary powers" and the President of the 
Republic then declares war. 
25. The same applies in the Netherlands under 
Article 59 of the constitution. 
Competence 
26. It should be pointed out that in the four 
States which have a two-chamber parliamentary 
system, the two chambers have equal powers in 
the decision to declare war. In the Netherlands, 
the two chambers even discuss the matter at 
a joint sitting. Consideration will be given later 
to the special case and existence in the Federal 
Republic of a constitutional body, the Joint 
Committee, which may take the place of the two 
chambers, and the application of Article 16 of 
the French constitution. 
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27. In Italy, France and the Netherlands, the 
decision to declare war is subject to no specific 
conditions. It is therefore taken in the same way 
as other legislative decisions. Conversely, the 
constitution of the Federal Republic requires a 
qualified majority in the Bundestag of two-thirds 
of the votes cast and not less than a majority of 
the members of the Bundestag. 
Scope of the declaration of war 
28. In France, the Netherlands and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the vote on the declaration 
of war automatically brings into force constitu-
tional or legislative provisions governing such 
circumstances. In the main, these provisions 
increase the government's powers in matters 
relating in particular to personal property and 
freedom and transfer of certain powers from 
the civil to the military authorities. 
29. It should be noted that in the Federal 
Republic the powers of the Federal parliament 
are increased by the transfer to it of some of the 
legislative responsibilities of the Lander. 
30. The Italian constitution makes no provision 
for automatic consequences resulting from a state 
of war. On the contrary, it appears that at the 
same time as authorisation is given by members, 
the government must be granted the necessary 
powers to conduct hostilities. 
31. Regarding the consequences of declaring 
war, the extent of the relevant constitutional 
provisions in the Federal Republic should be 
underlined. This juridical situation is probably 
due to the federal nature of the German State. 
It may also be due to a desire to limit increases 
in the powers of certain political authorities to 
what is strictly necessary. The apparent unity 
of texts governing the declaration of war in fact 
conceals actual differences over the reality, 
practical effect and content of the declaration. 
(ii) Differences 
32. Differences mainly concern the real extent 
of parliamentary power, the implementing bodies 
and the role of parliaments after war has been 
declared. 
The real extent of parliamentary power 
Notion of war and parliamentary power 
33. The real extent of parliamentary power 
depends on what is meant by war. 
34. On this point, the constitution and laws 
of application are silent in Italy and France. It 
is apparently the government which has every 
right to consider a military operation as war 
and therefore aBk parliament for authorisation 
to declare war. Thus the executive is able to 
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engage armed forces in armed actions or civil 
protection tasks on its own authority. This has 
been done in France several times and each 
time the decision has been questioned. 
35. In France, the army may also be engaged 
in keeping internal order but this is governed 
by legal procedure which sets strict limits on 
such operations. 
36. In the Netherlands too the notion of war 
seems to be based on an assessment which is left 
to the executive, although Article 202 of the 
constitution assigns parliament a role in defining 
this state of affairs. 
37. On the other hand, the German constitution 
specifically defines the cases in which armed 
forces may be used directly by the government 
when a state of war has not been declared. These 
are mainly civil defence operations in the event 
of natural catastrophes or serious accidents 
(Article 35 of the constitution) or a question of 
maintaining order in the event of threats to 
freedom (Article 87 of the constitution). In the 
latter case, operations must be halted if one of 
the two chambers of the Federal parliament so 
requires. 
The restrictive nature of the notion of war 
38. In the preamble to the French constitution 
which dates back to 1946 and was taken up again 
in 1958, war is repudiated as a means of political 
action. Nevertheless, articles relating to the 
declaration of war make no mention of the 
offensive or defensive nature of such a declara-
tion. Parliament might therefore be asked to 
authorise a war of aggression. The situation is 
identical in the Netherlands, but not the same 
in the constitution of the Federal Republic, 
Article 115-a of which does not refer to declara-
tion of war but to "noting a state of defence" by 
parliament when "Federal territory is the object 
of an armed attack or such an attack is im-
minent". A contrario, it must be concluded that 
parliament is not empowered to authorise taking 
the offensive. 
Bodies authorised to declare war 
39. In this connection, mention has to be made 
here of an original institution under the constitu-
tion of the Federal Republic. 
40. In peacetime, a Joint Committee is set up 
(Article 53-a of the constitution) two-thirds of 
whose members are members of the Bundestag 
and one-third members of the Bundesrat. This 
Committee has a single role : defence matters. 
It has no powers in peacetime and does not 
encroach on the attributions of parliament but 
is kept informed of Federal defence plans. 
41. In the event of an emergency, if it is impos-
sible to convene the Bundestag, the committee 
may note the existence of a state of war in place 
of the chamber by a majority of two-thirds of 
the votes cast and not less than a majority of its 
members (Article 115-a). 
42. If by the same majority the committee 
notes that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat can-
not be convened, it assumes the exercise of legis-
lative power in their stead. This power and the 
ensuing acts cease and are abrogated if the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat together decide. 
43. The concern of the constitution of the 
Federal Republic to maintain a nucleus of parlia-
mentary power, even if in a limited form, may 
be compared with the solution adopted by France 
in the 1958 constitution. When the operation of 
constitutional public authority is interrupted, 
Article 16 of the constitution allows the tempo-
rary transmission of all powers to the President 
of the Republic. An early return to normal 
operation of the institutions is guaranteed by 
parliament meeting with full rights and the 
impossibility of dissolving the National .Assembly. 
However this may be, there is nothing to prevent 
the President of the Republic declaring war 
without the authorisation of parliament in the 
event of a serious and sudden emergency threaten-
ing the nation. 
44. Similarly, Article 59 of the Netherlands 
constitution allows the Queen to declare war 
without the prior approval of parliament if the 
latter cannot be consulted. 
Role of parliaments after the declaration of war 
45. In France, the Netherlands and Italy, a 
declaration of war does not change the powers 
of parliament, which remain those of common law 
laid down by the constitution. 
46. Conversely, the constitution of the Federal 
Republic defines a full constitutional status for 
the Federal parliament in wartime. It first settles 
the respective relations between the Federal 
parliament and the Joint Committee. 
47. Secondly, it forbids the dissolution of the 
Bundestag for the duration of the state of 
defence and extends its period of office should 
it be due to expire during the state of defence. 
48. It also makes specific provision for the 
possibility of the Federal parliament abrogating 
measures taken by the Joint Committee at any 
time. 
49. Finally, the Bundestag, with the agreement 
or at the request of the Bundesrat, may at any 
time terminate the state of defence. This decision 
is binding on the Federal President. The decision 
must be taken immediately the reasons for the 
state of defence no longer exist. This procedure 
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should be mentioned insofar as it defines the 
rights of parliament in maintaining the state of 
war, which is not the case in France, Italy or the 
Netherlands. 
(b) Return to peace 
(i) End of hostilities 
50. As just shown, only the German constitu-
tion makes specific provision for parliament 
to terminate the state of war at any time. 
51. In France and Italy, in the absence of 
specific constitutional provisions the initiative of 
ending hostilities appears to be the prerogative 
of the executive, generally the government. It 
should be specified that the question here is 
only that of ending military operations and not 
one of returning to peace in the legal sense. In 
other words, the parliament of the Federal 
Republic may note that there is no longer a state 
of war and the French and Italian Governments 
may terminate hostilities. This does not mean a 
return to a situation of peace, which is a new 
legal situation in international law for the State, 
drawing consequences from the result of military 
operations. 
(ii) Peace 
52. In general, therefore, peace results from a 
treaty concluded between the former belligerants 
defining new rules in international law applicable 
to the status of the States and their relations. 
53. The constitutions of France, Italy and the 
Federal Republic make the ratification of peace 
treaties subject to parliamentary authorisation. 
In France, this is covered by Article 53 of the 
constitution and in Germany by Article 115-1 of 
the fundamental law ; it is implicit in Article 80 
of the Italian constitution. 
B. States in which prior parliamentary 
authorisation is not necessary to declare war 
or note a retur1~ to peace 
(a) Declaration of war 
54. ln two WEU member States, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, parliamentary authorisa-
tion is not legally necessary before war is 
declared, but parliament in fact exercises a very 
strict right of control. 
( i) Who declares war ? 
55. In Belgium, as in the United Kingdom, it 
is the sovereign as head of the armed forces who 
declares war. This is a purely formal power. 
Since they are both parliamentary monarchies, 
this power is in practice exercised by the govern-
ment. 
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56. Article 68 of the Belgian constitution 
merely requires the King to inform parliament 
as soon as possible. 
(ii) Parliament's power of control 
57. Parliamentary power of control over a 
declaration of war is exercised in accordance 
with the principle of the government's respons-
ibility to parliament. It is therefore an a poste-
riori control. 
58. In the United Kingdom, this responsibility 
can be engaged only in the House of Commons. 
According to the reply to the questionnaire, it 
is essentially through votes on laws granting 
special powers to the government that the House 
of Commons can exercise control and what even 
amounts to a veto over the engagement of 
hostilities. 
59. In Belgium, constitutional practice has 
established that the King's military powers cannot 
be separated from political problems. Conse-
quently, the ministerial responsibility established 
in Articles 63 and 64 of the constitution may 
come into play when the King exercises the duties 
(particularly that of declaring war) attributed 
to him in Article 68. Such responsibility is to 
both chambers of parliament. 
(iii) Consequences of the situation 
60. The consequences of this situation are not 
fundamentally different from those already con-
sidered in the case of States in which parliament 
plays an effective prior role in the declaration 
of war but others are peculiar to the two coun-
tries under consideration. 
61. The first consequence is that in the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, as in France, the Nether-
lands and Italy, the notion of war is by law left 
to the executive power. Military operations may 
be undertaken by the government without it 
declaring a state of war. 
62. There is one exception. In Belgium, the 
King may allow foreign troops to be stationed in 
the country or cross it only in accordance with 
a law (procedure used when NATO was installed 
in Belgium). A declaration of war may be offen-
sive or defensive. 
63. A government decision to go to war may 
be accompanied by the application of special 
legislation already existing in peacetime - as is 
the case in Belgium - or necessitate the vote of 
special powers by parliament - as is the case 
in the United Kingdom. It is evident that in the 
latter case parliament's a posteriori powers of 
control will be strengthened. 
64. The role and status of the Belgian and 
United Kingdom parliaments are not changed 
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by a declaration of war. They stay the same as 
in peacetime. 
65. However, certain legislative powers may be 
transferred to the executive either by wartime 
legislation or by specific laws. Such transfers 
are always limited to the period of hostilities. 
(b) Return to peace 
66. In both the United Kingdom and Belgium, 
the sovereign is empowered to halt hostilities and 
make peace by negotiating the necessary treaties 
(Article 68 of the Belgian constitution, for inst-
ance). This power is obviously exercised by the 
government. 
67. Parliament exercises a posteriori control 
over such action either because government 
responsibility is involved or when a peace treaty 
comes up for approval which, in certain cases 
in Belgium, is a prior condition to ratification 
(cession of territory). 
2. Parliament and the population's military 
liability 
68. On the population's liability to defend the 
nation, three main facts emerged from the ans-
wers to the questionnaire : here there is real 
legislative power, it is exercised with full parlia-
mentary rights and is more or less extensive 
depending on the country. 
(a) Real legislative power 
69. In most WEU countries, the fixing of the 
defence liability of the population is a parlia-
mentary responsibility embodied in the constitu-
tion. The only exception is the United Kingdom, 
which has no formal constitution. In France, 
Article 34 of the constitution makes subject to 
law the fixing of rules concerning "the obliga-
tions imposed on the persons and property of 
citizens by national defence". 
70. In Italy, Article 52 of the constitution 
stipulates that : "Military service shall be 
compulsory within the limits and according to 
the methods laid down by the law." 
71. In the Netherlands, Article 195 of the 
constitution provides that "the law shall govern 
compulsory military service. It shall also govern 
the liability for the defence of the country of 
those who are not in the army". Furthermore, 
Article 196 specifies that "the law shall determine 
the conditions in which exemption from military 
service may be granted for serious conscientious 
reasons". 
72. In the Federal Republic, Articles 4 and 
12-a of the constitution determine the conditions 
in which the law governs the fulfilment of 
military service. 
73. In Belgium, Articles 118 and 119 of the 
constitution state that "the method of recruiting 
the army shall be determined by the law" and 
that "the army call-up shall be decided annually. 
The law fixing it shall remain in force for only 
one year." 
74. Although the United Kingdom has no 
formal constitution, the overriding supremacy of 
the law means that parliament necessarily has 
to decide on military liability and the method 
of recruitment. 
(b) A fully-exercised power 
75. It is understandable that . the military 
liability of the population should be governed 
by law insofar as it is closely linked with indiv-
idual freedom. This is why, when the laws on 
liability are debated and voted, parliaments and 
their members may exercise their full powers, 
particularly through amendments. Answers to 
the questionnaire show no limits to this right of 
amendment. 
76. Conversely, it seems unlikely that parlia-
mentary initiative in the form of a motion for 
a bill can be exercised in this field, although 
there is nothing to prevent it. In this connection, 
some answers mention the technical difficulties 
involved in preparing bills which leave the 
government the initiative or the application of 
general rules limiting the initiative of members 
of parliament (as in the United Kingdom). 
77. Nevertheless, in certain countries parlia-
mentary initiative in the form of motions for 
bills is used to mark either a desire for change 
or opposition to certain existing measures. Its 
aim is to prompt a government response. 
(c) The extent of parliamentary power 
78. In general, the very extensive responsibi-
lities of parliaments in legislation on liability to 
military service must be stressed. 
79. There are differences from country to coun-
try however. 
80. In Belgium, for instance, the annual intake 
is decided by the law, whereas in other States 
such as France it is decided by the government 
authorities. 
81. In the Netherlands, mobilisation decreed by 
the sovereig.n has to be confirmed by the law 
fixing the duration of its validity. 
82. However, it is in the Federal Republic that 
parliament has the widest responsibilities, which 
are exercised mainly for the protection of the 
rights of those who are called up. 
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3. Parliament and the status of regular 
servicemen 
83. What has been said about the general 
military liability of the population is valid for 
the status of regular servicemen. 
(a) Legislative responsibility 
84. The general status, rights and duties of 
regular servicemen are laid down by law in all 
the WEU countries. 
85. However, in the Netherlands the pay system 
is the sole responsibility of the government. 
(b) Full legislative responsibility 
86. The responsibility of parliaments being 
very extensive, it is exercised in all the usual 
forms : right to make proposals and right to 
atmend. 
87. Here too government initiative, because of 
the complexity of the problem, tends to exclude 
parliamentary initiative which can nevertheless 
be expressed through amendments. 
(c) Extent of legislative power 
88. Here mention should be made of the special 
power of the United Kingdom parliament, which 
votes a five-yearly law on the armed forces 
submitted for annual review in the form of a 
white paper which is debated, voted and possibly 
amended by both houses of parliament. 
4. Parliament's powers in respect 
of defence budgets 
89. Where the debate and vote on military 
budgets are concerned, WEU member States may 
be divided into three groups : those where par-
liamentarians have the same sovereign powers 
in respect of the military budget as for other 
budgets ; those where parliamentarians have the 
same limited powers as for other expenditure ; 
and finally the Federal Republic, where the 
military budget is the subject of a special study. 
(a) The widest powers in common law 
90. It is in the Federal Republic, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Italy that parliamentarians 
have the widest powers in the debate and vote 
on budgets. Amendments may increase or reduce 
expenditure. 
91. This ability is applied to both military 
and other budgets. The Netherlands reply to the 
questionnaire emphasises that it is used fre-
quently. 
92. In Belgium, the parliamentary rules of 
proeedure provide merely that proposed increases 
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in the defence budget must be communicated 
to the President of the Chamber before they are 
debated. 
(b) Limited powers in common law 
93. In France and the United Kingdom, par-
liamentarians have the same powers in respect 
of military and other expenditure. However, 
amendments may not seek to increase expen-
diture further to constitutional or legislative 
provisions which place a general limit on the 
powers of parliamentarians to take budgetary 
initiatives (Article 40 of the French constitution, 
for instance). In the United Kingdom, the House 
of Lords has had no budgetary powers since 
1911. 
(c) General limits on the financial rights of 
parliaments 
94. All in all, the answers to the questionnaire 
underline that the parliaments' ability to modify 
military expenditure through budgetary pro-
cedure is relatively theoretical. 
95. In fact, the vote on the military budget 
cannot be isolated from adhesion to a policy 
which dominates the debate. In the circum-
stances, governments are not inclined to accept 
changes in military expenditure and par-
liamentarians, particularly those who support 
the government, hesitate to table amendments 
which might fundamentally affect the defence 
system. Moreover, military financial commit-
ments are fairly inflexible because of their size 
(pay) or continuing nature (equipment). It is 
therefore difficult to change government pro-
posals, except in very minor respects. 
Ill. Defence and parliament's supervisory r8le 
96. Three questions were put in the ques-
tionnaire : what was the procedure for general 
supervision and for more technical supel'Vlsion 
and how were certain forms of supervision 
exercised. 
1. General supervision of defence policy 
97. Two means seem to be used in the par-
liaments of the six countries to supervise defence 
policy : the means afforded by common law 
applicable in every sector of government policy 
and procedure specific to defence matters. 
(a) General means 
98. General means cover all those by which 
parliamentarians may question the government 
on its policy and action. 
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99. They consist mainly of debates on the 
government programme, interpellations, written 
and oral questions and budget debates. 
100. While all the means exist, parliamentarians 
do not have the same latitude in every country 
to exercise them, and their supervision does not 
have the same political value. 
101. In France, for instance, the right of inter-
pellation was dropped from the 1958 constitu-
tion. Parliament's ability to initiate a debate 
is thus limited and can be exercised only in 
agreement with the government. 
102. In France as in the United Kingdom, this 
agreement is particularly evident in the particip-
ation of the executive in preparing the par-
liamentary agenda. This is also the case in the 
Federal Republic. 
103. There seems to be a greater guarantee of 
parliamentary initiative in three other countries, 
i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. 
104. The extent of the general supervisory 
ability of parliamentarians is not enough to 
define it and its scope must also be assessed. 
105. Certain procedure is more a question of 
information than real supervision ; this applies 
mainly to questions and it is normal for replies 
not to be endorsed politically. 
106. Conversely, the debate on the govern-
ment's general policy or votes on laws (on the 
budget for instance) receives political endorse-
ment in approval of the government statement 
or proposed text. 
107. The question is whether there can be other 
means of giving the executive political endorse-
ment, particularly in defence policy. 
108. Here parliamentary rights vary consider-
ably from one country to another. 
109. In France they have been strictly limited 
since 1958. Only the government may call for 
a vote after a debate on its defence policy. It 
has been shown that it is very difficult for 
deputies or senators to initiate such a debate. It 
can be endorsed by a vote of approval only in the 
National Assembly and on the initiative of the 
government. Only by invoking government 
responsibility through a motion of censure can 
deputies recover their full right of initiative. 
110. In the United Kingdom, an interpellation 
must be included in the agenda and it is accepted 
that it may be concluded by a motion expressing 
parliament's feelings in a vote. The same is the 
case in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the 
Federal Republic. 
111. What may be the consequence of such a 
vote Y In all countries where it is possible, it 
seems accepted that it is not a vote of confidence 
and that a majority against certain aspects of 
government policy would not automatically lead 
to the resignation of the government. 
112. It may be said that these votes are rather 
guidelines which provide the executive with 
valuable indications as to the opinion of the 
representatives of the people and nation. 
(b) Specific means 
113. Specific means imply particular procedure 
allowing parliament as a whole to exercise spe-
cific supervision of military policy. 
114. Some of these means are a matter of 
practice. In France, if, apart from the budget, 
no law has been passed on defence allowing a 
debate on military policy, it is customary to 
organise a debate on military policy during the 
first session of the year (April-July). There is 
generally a government statement followed by 
a debate but not endorsed by a vote. 
115. Other debates are more organised. They 
are generally held when the government tables 
one of its more or less regular white papers 
on defence, which is then considered by par-
liament and may or may not be endorsed by a 
vote. As has already been said, this is an annual 
practice in the United Kingdom where the white 
paper is the annual up-dating of the five-year 
defence policy. 
116. In the Netherlands, most governments sub-
mit a memorandum to the two chambers on 
long-term defence policy leading to a debate in 
the upper chamber. 
117. The white paper practice is also used in 
the Federal Republic. 
118. It should be noted that in France the 
explanatory memorandum to the last financial 
programme-law (1976) relating to the armed 
forces included a definition of long-term military 
policy and thus came close to the white paper 
system. 
2. Procedure for more technical supervision 
119. The answers to the questionnaire show that 
most of the more technical supervision, generally 
in preparation for a political debate in plenary 
sitting, is exercised by the committees. 
120. Although in France, for instance, par-
liamentary rules of procedure may authorise the 
hearing of a senior official by the whole par-
liament, this procedure does not seem to be 
general. It is therefore important to consider 
what powers the committees have and what they 
can do. 
121. There are fairly wide differences between 
the WEU parliaments in these two respects. 
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(a) The powers of committees 
122. Committees responsible for defence matters 
do not have the same legal powers in all coun-
tries. In some they have very wide powers at 
all times ; in others only exceptionally ; in yet 
others they have ordinary powers only, and 
other bodies may be entrusted with wider tasks 
on specific matters. 
(i) Committees with wide powers 
123. In two countries, committees have wide 
supervisory powers in accordance with the con-
stitution or constitutional practice. 
124. In the Federal Republic, the Bundestag 
Defence Committee enjoys a special position 
under Article 45 of the constitution. First, it 
continues to exercise its duties between two 
legislatures. Second, it has the powers of a com-
mittee of enquiry on a continuing basis, i.e. 
almost jurisdictional powers, at least for con-
ducting investigations. Finally, an enquiry 
becomes compulsory if a quarter of the members 
of the committee so request. 
125. Furthermore, under Article 43 of the con-
stitution and the rules of procedure of the Bun-
destag, the committee exercises the powers of 
committees in common law. It examines texts, 
may ask the government for information and has 
the right to hear members of the executive or 
officials as representatives of the government or 
as experts on a specific subject. 
126. Although there is no real permanent 
defence committee in the United Kingdom, the 
House of Commons empowers the committee or 
sub-committee which may be made responsible 
for defence matters to hear persons and be 
given any document it requires. It may therefore 
hold the necessary hearings and be given all 
the written information it needs. In particular, 
it may question officials. These powers may be 
assimilated to those of a committee of enquiry. 
They reflect the principle of the primacy of 
legislative power in the United Kingdom. On 
the other hand, this is why the House of Lords 
has no similar powers, nor does it set up spe-
cialised committees. 
(ii) Committees with possible exceptional 
powers 
127. In Italy, the standing committees of both 
chambers have the full range of powers in com-
mon law to which committees are entitled in 
parliamentary systems. They may put questions, 
ask the government for information or enlighten-
ment and obtain all the elements of information 
needed for examining bills. They may hear 
members of the government and their repre-
sentatives, which appears to imply the pos-
sibility of hearing senior officials. The Italian 
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committees also seem to have the power to ini-
tiate consideration of certain matters and to set 
out their conclusions in motions or resolutions 
tabled in the chamber to which they belong, 
which may be debated. 
128. However, the most interesting power of 
the committees is undeniably to sit as com-
mittees of enquiry on any matter within their 
terms of reference. The two chambers may even 
decide that their respective committees acting 
as committees of enquiry may work together. 
(iii) Committees without exceptional powers 
129. In France, the Netherlands and Belgium, 
the powers of defence committees are no dif-
ferent to those of other committees. 
130. Although important, their powers are sub-
ject to limitations. 
131. In general, committees may obtain full 
information about bills submitted to them for 
consideration. They may hear ministers and 
senior officials. In France, the latter possibility 
is in practice limited by the prior authorisation 
of the minister. 
132. Committees have wide powers of informa-
tion : study missions, which may lead to the 
tabling of a report and conclusions. Such reports 
and conclusions are not debated or voted on in 
parliament. 
133. This does not mean that parliaments in 
these countries have no right to enquire into 
certain facts or situations. This right is in fact 
separate from the existence of specialised com-
mittees. It is a general right exercised by special 
committees of enquiry set up to consider specific 
matters and they are disbanded once a report 
has been tabled. 
134. The extent of the power of enquiry there-
fore depends on the power granted to parliament 
in this field. It seems fairly wide in Belgium 
and the Netherlands and is strictly regulated 
in France by the constitution. 
(b) How committees exercise their powers 
135. Apart from the collective powers of 
enquiry of certain committees, is there in some 
parliaments other specific investigatory pro-
cedure for exercising parliamentary supervision 7 
Answers to the questionnaire indicate four means 
in France, the Federal Republic, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium. 
136. In France, it should first be noted that 
the defence committees of the two chambers, 
as well as being able to call upon parliamentary 
officials, may also have the permanent technical 
assistance of senior ranking military experts. 
These experts may not conduct supervisory or 
investigatory tasks on behalf of the committee 
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but they may provide the latter with technical 
assistance when it studies specific matters. 
137. Second, deputies and senators have indivi-
dual powers under the procedure for studying 
and debating the French budget. Parliamenta-
rians in both chambers responsible for preparing 
the budgetary debate - the rapporteurs - may 
by law "exercise documentary and on-the-spot 
verification of the budget of the ministerial 
department for which they are responsible". In 
this capacity, they may visit administrations, 
receive accounting and departmental documents 
and question the appropriate officials. The result 
of this verification is set out in the report which 
they table first in committee and subsequently 
in parliament. 
138. In the Federal Republic, Article 45-b of the 
constitution established a defence commissioner, 
appointed by the Bundestag, with the task of 
"safeguarding fundamental rights and assisting 
the Bundestag in the exercise of parliamentary 
supervision". The commissioner works on the 
basis of indications from the Bundestag and the 
Defence Committee. He may also act on his 
own initiative. He tables a report in parliament 
and speaks in support of it. This is an original 
institution which has added to the determination 
of the legislative power to exercise permanent 
supervision over the implementation of military 
defence means. 
139. In the United Kingdom, committees may 
appoint experts to advise them on matters which 
they wish to study and this also applies to defence 
matters. 
140. In Belgium, parliamentarians who are mem-
bers of the Defence Committee of the Chamber 
or Senate are authorised to visit military head-
quarters and other military installations without 
the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Defence, 
provided there are at least three of them, each 
with a special permit issued by the Ministry of 
Defence for the duration of the legislature. 
141. In conclusion, it may be noted that the 
supervisory powers of parliaments are sometimes 
greater in the military sphere than in other 
sectors. They are however not as extensive as 
those of the United States Congress which not 
only exercises very wide powers but also has a 
real administration to implement them. This 
difference sterns from the European concept of 
people's sovereignty which allows only the 
elected member to entrust its exercise to a non-
elected representative. 
IV. Defence and parliament's information rdle 
142. Finally, parliaments are a source of reci-
procal information for both population and 
government on the consequences of defence 
policy at national and European leveL 
(a) Parliament as a source of information for 
the public 
143. Two questions were put about the role of 
parliament and parliamentarians as a source of 
i~formati?n f,or the public : the impact of par-
l~amentarians . personal contacts with the popula-
tiOn and the Importance of audio-visual means. 
It is striking to note a lack of harmony in the 
replies to these two questions. 
(i) Parliamentarians' personal contacts 
with the population 
144. All the answers show the interest of the 
population in defence matters. Parliamentarians 
are frequently questioned on the subject and the 
political parties have to give them prominence 
in their electoral undertakings. Here, the Bun-
destag reply is the most explicit : "Public 
interest in defence matters is relatively great. 
Parliamentarians not specialised in these ques-
tions therefore have to inform themselves about 
such matters in order to answer their electorate 
for instance about conscientious objection, equip~ 
ment supply problems, stationing of troops, etc." 
(ii) Reports on defence debates by news 
media 
145. .Although the population shows interest in 
defence matters, the news media do not appear 
to attach particular importance to these questions. 
146. In countries where radio and television 
broadcasting of parliamentary debates is author-
ised, no particular place is reserved for defence 
matters. 
147. General policy matters are sometimes con-
sidered more interesting for the public, which 
indicates that there is a degree of demagogy in 
this respect. 
148. In this connection, it is noted that in the 
United Kingdom the broadcasting of parliament-
ary debates has not been authorised so far but 
will soon be allowed in both houses. 
149. The written press also reports on defence 
policy debates at the discretion of press bodies 
and account being taken of their independence. 
Here too answers to the questionnaire indicate 
that defence policy is not the one that interests 
the information media the most. This attitude 
is perhaps due to reticence in face of the techni-
cal nature of the subject and probably also 
to the desire to place defence over and above 
short-term political controversies. 
(b) Parliament as a source of information for 
the government 
150. It is abundantly clear that through their 
legislative and supervisory work the parliaments 
of the various countries provide the govern-
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ments with valuable information on the repercus-
sions of their defence policy. However, in certain 
countries there are additional means of associating 
parliamentarians more closely with government 
action. 
151. The most significant example is in the 
Netherlands, where the Defence Council attached 
to the government includes representatives of 
both chambers. In the long run, it is no longer 
a matter of information but the true association 
of parliament with the overall preparation of 
defence policy. 
152. In France and Italy, parliamentarians may 
take part in various technical bodies attached 
to the government. In France, these bodies are 
limited in number : committee on the cost price 
of armaments production, permanent council on 
military service. In Italy, such participation 
seems to depend more on circumstances and is 
effected in government bodies set up to study 
specific matters. All these bodies are essentially 
technical. 
153. Apart from these exceptions, it would 
appear that the planning of defence policy is 
the prerogative of the executive and even of the 
government (president of the republic or sove-
reign) assisted by committees of experts. 
154. This raises a fundamental question. Does 
not the nature of modern warfare, unannounced, 
short and total, make the parliamentary powers 
considered above illusory 7 
155. To safeguard a real consensus of national 
representation in the defence effort, is it not 
essential for parliaments (majority and oppo-
sition) to be associated with the definition of 
defence policy Y The example of the Netherlands 
is certainly worthy of consideration. 
156. For France, where the President of the 
Republic is wholly responsible for preparing and 
implementing a nuclear deterrent, the question 
is particularly acute. The socialist opposition in 
particular wishes parliament to be associated 
with decisions at this level. 
(c) Parliament and information on European 
defence 
157. Answers to the questionnaire show that 
the resolutions and reports of Western European 
Union are made available to national parliaments 
in very varying conditions which in reality do 
not allow parliaments to question governments 
about the way they are taken into consideration. 
158. There are three main courses for trans-
mitting these texts to the parliaments: 
- directly to all parliamentarians by the 
secretariat of the WEU Assembly (in 
the case of the Netherlands) ; 
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- through the delegations which inform 
either all members or the committees 
(France, Federal Republic, United 
Kingdom); 
- through the presidents of parliaments 
who may announce them in public sit-
ting and refer them to committees for 
study (Belgium, Italy). 
159. The diversity of the methods of transmis-
sion has an unfortunate consequence. WEU 
Assembly recommendations are not examined 
systematically by parliaments nor are they dis-
cussed with governments. In fact, everything is 
left to the initiative of individual parliamenta-
rians or of the committees, but with no obliga-
tion. 
160. In France, where the delegation to WEU 
reviews the activities of the Assembly in an 
annual information report, there is in practice 
no debate on this text, whose only value is that 
it merely constitutes a reference document. 
161. If the present study were to be limited to 
practical conclusions, the proposal would be to 
adopt a unified procedure for transmitting WEU 
Assembly recommendations to national parlia-
ments, to have them discussed systematically 
and to send the reports of the three main .Com-
mittees to the corresponding committees in the 
national parliaments. 
Conclusion 
162. Consideration of the role of parliaments in 
defence policy allows three main conclusions to 
be drawn: 
163. The first is that in spite of differences 
between countries parliaments have important 
legislative and supervisory powers. As already 
said, this is quite normal in democracies where 
defence requirements have to be reconciled with 
individual freedoms which paradoxically in some 
circumstances have to be limited in order to 
afford them better protection. The intervention 
of parliaments is thus a sign of a national con-
sensus regarding the defence effort and a gua-
rantee that this consensus will not be diverted 
from its goal. 
164. The second conclusion is that certain par-
liamentary powers seem to have become a dead 
letter and are now only nominal. Has the solemn 
declaration of war any meaning in an era of 
nuclear and subversive warfare Y Would it not 
be desirable for the people's sovereignty to be 
associated more closely with the preparation of 
defence policy Y Otherwise it may have no 
alternative but to approve without a real discus-
sion a policy whose complexity allows the govern-
ment to impose its options without too much 
difficulty, although such options may be the 
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wr~ng ones, an example being France's military 
policy between the two wars. The creation of a 
national defence council attached to the executive 
including both technical experts and parlia-
mentarians would allow the legislature to be 
associated with defence planning from the out-
set. By including representatives from the par-
liamentary opposition, a national consensus 
would also be maintained without which there 
can be no real military policy. 
165. The third conclusion is that the effort of 
organisation, reflection and co-ordination which 
has developed at European level is not very 
well known at national level. Without question-
ing the fundamental principle of State indepen-
dence in defence policy, it should again be 
emphasised that if such independence is not 
channelled into an orderly European policy 
Western Europe, like the Curiatti, State by 
State in face of a united and determined enemy, 
might lose the freedom which is its most precious 
asset. 
U. Action taken on texts adopted 
166. The Committee selected the following 
recommendations for transmission to parliaments 
of member countries at the close of the second 
part of the twenty-second ordinary session of 
the Assembly : 
- 293 on European union and WEU ; 
- 295 on safeguarding Europe's energy 
supplies - new sources of energy ; 
- 296 on Western Europe's policy towards 
Mediterranean problems. 
167. In the five-month period (December 1976 to 
April 1977) between the adoption of these texts 
and the preparation of this report, your Rap-
porteur has been able to record only twelve 
questions and replies which is a meagre sum but 
others will follow during the year. ' 
168. In his report in reply to the political 
activities of the WEU Council 1, Mr. Treu, Rap-
porteur of the General Mfairs Committee, men-
tions replies given in Belgium and France which 
in fact amount to refusals to answer written 
questions on recommendations adopted by the 
Assembly. 
169. The number of interventions haB returned 
to a normal level, the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly having recorded thirty-six between 
1st December 1976 and 30th April1977, making 
a total of ninety for texts adopted in 1976 2• 
1. Chapter IT (b): National parliamentary procedure. 
2. See Appendix I. 
170. Furthermore, the number of interventions 
on WEU in general has increased considerably 
in recent years: 
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total 3 3 I 28 32 
171. This again shows that WEU is more than 
ever mentioned in debates in our parliaments. 
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ID. Activities of the Committee 
172. On 9th and lOth May 1977, the Committee 
visited the Italian parliament. 
173. It met the Senate Committee for European 
Affairs and the Parliamentary Committee for 
Regional Affairs. The corresponding texts are 
given at Appendix III. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action In the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each aeaion) 
Member countries 
.s 
Recommendations :g~ ~ ~ adopted in 9 G) ~~ ~ ! 3 .8 ·so i Gl 1~ 1-1 I I:Q j!O ~ 
"" 
I956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
I957 4 0 I 0 0 5 
I958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
I959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
I960 3 I2 2 8 0 3 
I961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
I962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 I3 22 I 2 
I964 4 I4 9 ll I 5 
I965 0 ll I2 24 0 5 
I966 2 I2 I2 49 I 4 
I967 I4 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 I4 20 22 I I6 
I969 1I I5 17 8 0 4 
I970 3 I5 15 7 2 3 
I97I 0 4 19 9 0 6 
I972 0 6 2 1 0 I 
1973 0 4 2 6 I 0 
I974 0 I 3 13 2 0 
I975 IO 28 8 I9 3 ll 
I976 I6 40 I2 9 2 3 
I977 0 I 2 0 0 0 
Total 77 I92 I90 246 I8 87 
Annual average 3.67 9.05 9.05 ll.57 0.86 4.I3 
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~ 
! Total 
~ p 
0 3 
2 I2 
3 I2 
0 9 
I 29 
0 ll 
IO 3I 
3 4I 
2 46 
28 80 
I8 98 
I6 98 
47 I26 
36 9I 
IO 55 
IO 48 
0 IO 
0 I3 
0 I9 
3 82 
8 90 
0 3 
I97 I,007 
9.38 6.83 
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APPENDix 11 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted aince June 1915 
s:l 
.s.! :8 ~ .!a ..c: 
-:5 iJ r ] % ~·I J 1 ]~ l 8 l ] ~ ~ 1~ ~ 1 1S .El "; l-a 1-4 ! ~ ~~ IXl IZt ~ ~Cl. ~ ~ ~ IZt 
-
260 
-
261 
-
262 2 2 4 8 
263 2 2 
264 2 2 
265 
-
June 266 X 4 2 6 28 
1975 267 
-
268 2 2 
269 X 2 2 4 
270 X 2 2 
271 
-
272 X 2 2 
273 X 2 1 3 6 
274 X 2 2 1 5 
275 4 4 
276 X 2 1 3 
277 
-
278 
-
Dec. 279 
-
1975 280 
-281 
-
54 
282 
-283 
-
Res. 55 2 1 3 2 8 
Res. 56 
-
Res. 57 
-
Res. 58 
-
Other action 2 17 4 1 1 2 1 28 
Res. 59 2 4 2 8 
284 
-
285 X 2 5 2 1 10 
June 286 
-1976 287 2 2 1 1 2 8 46 
288 X 
-
289 X 4 5 2 2 13 
290 X 4 2 1 7 
--
--- ---
291 
-
292 
-
Nov. 293 X 2 2 1 5 
1976 294 -
295 X 1 1 2 4 44 
296 2 1 3 
Res. 60 
-
Other action 5 15 5 1 6 32 
1977 
Other action I 1 2 3 3 
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APPENDIX Ill 
(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th ~arch 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25t~ February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd ~ay 1973 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
15th-18th October 1973 Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28t.h Oot.ober 1975 
11th-12th ~ay 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-10th ~ay 1977 
Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
(b) Statements on regionaU.ation in Italy 
Committee for European Affairs (Giunta) 
(Rules on the constitution, functioning and powers 
of the Giunta based on the new regulations of the 
Senate, 1971) 
1. Constitution 
The Giunta shall comprise 22 senators 
designated by the President of the Senate follow-
ing nominations proposed by the parliamentary 
groups under the proportional representation 
system (Article 23, paragraph 1). 
2. Powers 
The provisions concerning the powers and 
activities of the standing committees at sessions 
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other than deliberative or drafting, i.e. the pro-
visions concerning referral sessions, shall by 
analogy be applicable to the Giunta. The sole 
exception shall be non-applicability of Article 50, 
paragraph 2, concerning the voting of resolutions 
following the examination of matters submitted 
by the appropriate committees. Therefore the 
Giunta is not able to pass any resolutions (Article 
23, paragraph 2, and Article 50, paragraph 2). 
(a) Power of referral 
The Giunta shall examine the annual report 
by the government (?tlinistry for Foreign 
Affairs) on the activities of the European Com-
munities, presented as a rule towards the end 
of December, and shall draft its own report to 
the Assembly (Article 142, paragraph 3). The 
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opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee may 
be appended to the Giunta's report. In carrying 
out its referral function, the Giunta shall eo-opt 
any members of the Italian Delegation to the 
European Parliament not members of the Giunta 
itself. Such senators shall not have deliberative 
voting powers (Article 142, paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4). 
The Giunta shall be able to place before the 
Assembly, on its own initiative, reports and pro-
posals concerning matters within its competence 
(Article 50, paragraph 1). 
(b) Consultative power 
(i) The Giunta shall express its views on draft 
legislation concerning implementation of the 
agreements relating to the European Com-
munities (Article 23, paragraph 1). 
(ii) The Giunta may express, in the event of a 
request by the committee competent in the mat-
ter, through the intermediary of the President of 
the Senate, its views on resolutions passed by 
the European Parliament, formally transmitted 
for communication to the Senate and forwarded 
by the President, after announcement in the 
House, to the competent committees that may 
decide to call for a debate (Article 143, para-
graphs 1 and 2). 
(iii) The Giunta may express, by the same pro-
cedure as that set out in the preceding sub-
paragraph, its views on resolutions passed by 
international assemblies in which Italian par-
liamentary delegations take part (Article 143, 
paragraphs 1 and 2). This refers to resolutions 
adopted by the Council of Europe and WEU. 
(iv) The Giunta may request, or be requested, 
to express its own view on statutory enactments 
emanating from the Council of Ministers and 
Commission of the European Communities, 
published in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities. Such enactments may be 
examined by the committees competent in the 
matter, with the purpose of conveying in a 
document their own view on the advisability of 
any initiatives by the parliament or government 
(Article 144, paragraph 1). The document drafted 
by the competent committee, presumed to convey 
also the Giunta's opinion, shall be announced 
by the President of the Senate in the house and 
forwarded to the President of the Council of 
Ministers, and for information to the Speaker 
of the Chamber of Deputies (Article 144, para-
graph 2). 
(c) Power to call a debate, with intervention 
by the minister concerned 
At the request of the government, 8 senators 
or one-fifth of the senators members of the Ita-
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lian Delegation to the European Parliament, 
the Giunta may call a debate, with intervention 
by the appropriate minister (Article 142, para-
graph 1), in the following cases: 
(i) Concerning proposals by the Commission of 
the EEC, published in the Official Journal of 
the Communities, with a view to their being 
placed on the agenda for the Council of Ministers 
of the Communities (Article 142, paragraph 1). 
The members of the Italian Delegation to the 
European Parliament who are not also members 
of the Giunta shall attend this meeting, without 
deliberative voting powers (Article 142, para-
graph 2); 
(ii) In the case of given topics on the agenda 
of the Council of Ministers of the Communities 
(Article 142, paragraph 1). 
The members of the Italian Delegation to 
the European Parliament who are not also mem-
bers of the Giunta shall attend its meeting 
without deliberative voting powers (Article 142, 
paragraph 2) ; 
(iii) In respect of matters pertaining to agree-
ments of the Communities (the wording of the 
regulations is broad, and enables all matters 
envisaged in the treaties to be discussed) (Article 
142, paragraph 1). 
The members of the Italian Delegation to 
the European Parliament who are not also mem-
bers of the Giunta shall attend its meeting 
without deliberative voting powers (Article 142, 
paragraph 2). 
(d) Powers to hold hearings and enquiries for 
taking cognizance 
These are governed by Article 23, para-
graph 2, on the basis of which the provisions 
concerning the powers and activities of the stand-
ing committees at sessions other than deliberative 
or drafting shall, so far as possible, apply to the 
Giunta. 
Hence it seems possible to apply to the 
Giunta Article 46, paragraph 1, on fresh inform-
ation and clarifications requested of the govern-
ment by the committees on questions, including 
political questions, relating to the matter for 
which they are competent. 
It is also possible, and a precedent has 
already been created by the Fifth Legislature, 
to hold hearings for taking cognizance on the 
strength of Article 47 of the regulations which 
recognises, in respect of parliamentary bills and 
in general matters within their competence, the 
committees' right to request the ministers to 
arrange for fresh information and the requisite 
administrative or technical elements for com-
pleting their information on the issues under 
discussion, to be supplied by the respective 
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administrations and corporations subject to their 
control, including personal attendance at sessions 
of individual officials and administrators. 
For fuller elucidation of given problems, the 
Giunta may also hold, on the basis of Article 48, 
enquiries for taking cognizance, with the agree-
ment of the President of the Senate, for the 
purpose of acquiring facts, information and 
documentation. For conducting these enquiries 
the committees may hold sittings to which may be 
summoned the relevant ministers, departmental 
officials and administrators of public corpora-
tions. Representatives of territorial bodies, private 
concerns, professional associations and other per-
sons expert in the matters under examination 
(Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 5) may also be 
requested to attend. For the enquiries for taking 
cognizance, joint proceedings with the other 
house may also be arranged. 
Meeting of the office of the Chairman of the 
Committee for Regional Affairs with the WEU 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
As is known, regional law in Italy is laid 
down in the republican constitution of 1947, 
which devoted a whole chapter (about twenty 
articles) to the division of the Republic into 
regions, provinces and communes. There are two 
kinds of regional autonomy, special and ordinary. 
The first kind is enjoyed by Sicily, Sardinia, 
Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 
Val d'Aosta, which have been given wider legis-
lative powers to be exercised on the basis of 
statutes adopted by means of constitutional laws 
rather than approved by ordinary. laws as in 
the case of the other fifteen regions. In the 
regions of special autonomy the region's legis-
lative power in specific matters is merely 
required to observe constitutional principles and 
the general principles of the legal system. The 
regions of ordinary status, in contrast, have 
legislative powers exercised within the limits of 
the fundamental principles laid down by the 
State in appropriate laws, topic by topic, or even 
if not enacted ad hoc, able to be at any rate 
deduced from the mass of legislation on a given 
issue. 
Then there is a third legislative power, 
that of issuing rules for implementing State 
laws; it is a power which, besides being consti-
tutionally a matter for the region, may be attri-
buted at discretion to the region by the State 
parliament. The State may also delegate by law 
other administrative functions to the region in 
matters in which it has no legislative power of 
its own and can assume none by virtue of the 
delegation which, we repeat, solely concerns 
administrative functions. This task may be noted 
as usefully applicable for supplementing vis-a-vis 
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the region an organic sector of actions which 
otherwise, on the basis of division of responsi-
bilities, would not devolve upon the region. Still 
on the plane of administrative functions, we 
note the close interconnection made under the 
constitution between the positions occupied by 
the region and the lesser local authorities 
(communes and provinces), involving a configur-
ation of the region as rather a planning body 
than one of detailed administration. It is pro 
vided in consequence that the region "normally" 
exercises its administrative functions by delegat-
ing them to the provinces, communes and other 
local entities or by making use of their instru-
mentality. Moreover, the State directly assigns to 
these latter functions "of solely local interest". 
In this way the region tends to be seen as a 
body "for necessary indirect administration", ie. 
not acting through an organisation of its own, 
which would end by promoting a new regional 
centralisation of both local government and 
planning. This has affected the system o-~' 
financial relations whereby, besides liquid funds 
assigned to the regions as their share of tax 
revenue, much more substantial resources are 
distributed among the regions themselves out of 
a fund for financing regional development pro-
grammes. However, the implementation of this 
plan is running into a series of difficulties both 
of a political nature, stemming from the fact 
that there is at regional level a certain reluctance 
to divest itself of its own specific functions, 
and especially of a technical nature, arising 
from the serious organisational and financial 
difficulties with which the communes and pro-
vinces are having to contend. For the latter in 
particular there arises precisely the problem of 
justifying their own existence inasmuch as their 
dimensions are considered artificial and ill-suited 
for having organic powers delegated to them. 
There is talk therefore of new bodies, chiefly 
termed "development areas", to take their place 
by combining more communes, based on a more 
suitable size of territory for planning purposes, 
both town-planning and economic. As for the 
powers delegated to the regions to date, it has 
been endeavoured to use them as an instrument 
for inducing a process of organic re-ordering of 
functions at local level, e.g. by making the grant 
of finance or even the actual attribution of 
functions conditional on their being administered 
by the communes in a structured and co-ope-
rative manner. 
As regards supervision of regional laws, if 
there is no opposition from the government they 
are reviewed by a government inspector within 
thirty days of their notification ; should the 
government consider, however, that a regional 
law goes beyond the region's writ or clashes with 
national interests or those of other regions, it 
sends it back to the regional council, and if the 
latter again approves it by an absolute majority 
it may appeal against it on grounds of legitimaey 
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in the constitutional court or, on the merits as 
a conflict of interests, before both chambers of 
parliament. This last hypothesis has not yet 
materialised, in that the government has prefer-
red to subsume aspects on points of substance 
under questions of constitutional legitimacy. On 
the other hand grounds of legitimacy are fairly 
often invoked even if it has to be said that the 
regions, which might in their turn challenge 
State laws they hold to be encroachments on 
their jurisdiction, seem more and more dis-
inclined to wield this instrument because they 
think the constitutional court more sensitive to 
the arguments of the central government, and 
anyhow prefer to try and get laws unfavourable 
to themselves altered by way of political "horse 
trading". 
Administrative control of enactments is 
exercised (by the State over the regions and by 
the regions over smaller local authorities) on 
grounds of legitimacy, with the possibility of 
having them voided, and of expediency with a 
view to collaboration and in a form respectful 
of the autonomy of the body concerned, desig-
nated "request for review" ; the supervisory 
authority draws attention to the matter, but if 
the party subject to supervision again approves 
the enactment, it becomes enforceable without 
further ado. 
Moreover, the relation between State and 
the regions has in recent years undergone a 
rather interesting process of maturing whose 
chief effect has been to give precedence to the 
political and substantive issue instead of the 
formal question of the precise division of powers. 
And so, even if by changes of direction, whereby 
some cabinets have been more meticulous in 
their supervision while others have shown greater 
leniency, there has gradually grown up a con-
cept of the region being allowed to operate as 
a genuine territorial government unit, and as a 
consequence the powers relating to it are inter-
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preted evolutionally and extensively so as to 
enable an organic performance of its functions. 
This requirement has been given tangible 
form by an act (Law No. 382 of 1975) under 
which, to supplement the legal structure of the 
region by incorporating the transfers of func-
tions already effected in 1972 and now regarded 
as insufficient, the government has been charged 
with issuing rules for transferring and delegating 
functions in order to arrive at the exercise of 
regional powers in organic sectors. At present 
the text prepared by the government, which 
should be promulgated by 25th July, is being 
examined by the appropriate parliamentary com-
mittee for regional matters which I have the 
honour to preside over, and which is to express 
an opinion on the text also on the basis of com-
ments by the regions. This phase is a particularly 
delicate one because the government's proposed 
bill has been judged inadequate for supplement-
ing the regions' legal structure in the way 
intended, and the government will therefore 
certainly be invited by the Committee as well 
to make a great many essential additions. For 
the Committee this is one of the most important 
opportunities for action afforded to it under 
ordinary laws, whereas the constitution provides 
(Article 126) that it give an opinion only in the 
hopefully unlikely case of dissolution of a regional 
council (incidentally the case has never arisen 
yet) and parliamentary rules ordain consultative 
action by the Committee in the event (also not 
yet arisen, for the reasons stated) of a substan-
tive conflict between government and the regions. 
Nevertheless, these indications help to give some 
idea of the ·Committee's role of mediation between 
government and regions, and of initiating proper 
and fruitful relations in the perspective of a 
system which, while it should remain unitary 
(the Republic is, as Article 5 of the constitution 
has it, one and indivisible), ought still to be 
functionally unshackled in the harmonious inter-
play of all its component elements, obviating 
breaches of trust at the centre, and dislocations at 
the periphery. 
Document 740 9th May 1977 
Motion for a resolution on the designation of 
Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Mr. Piket, Rapporteur 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Piket, Rapporteur) 
1. During the last session, MM. Burckel, 
Radius, Treu, V alleix, Amrehn, Tanghe, Lewis, 
McNamara, Schwencke and Mende tabled a 
motion for a resolution with a request for urgent 
procedure on inviting the Greek and Turkish 
parliaments to be represented at each session of 
the WEU Assembly by their delegations to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, whose members would have observer 
status. 
In a vote the same day, the Assembly decided 
not to adopt urgent procedure and the motion 
for a resolution was referred to the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
The responsibility of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure is not to consider the political aspect 
of the problem but merely to analyse the proposed 
procedure and determine its possible repercus-
sions. 
2. The motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. 
Burckel would make the participation of Greek 
and Turkish observers in the work of the Assem-
bly permanent. They would be convened to each 
session, even if the agenda did not include ques-
tions connected with the Eastern Mediterranean. 
It should be noted, however, that Greek and 
Turkish observers have never yet asked to take 
part in debates which did not concern their coun-
tries and it is therefore not certain whether their 
parliaments would wish to be represented at 
every session. 
3. If the motion for a resolution were adopted, 
there would not be the same number of Greek 
and Turkish observers because of the weighting 
system governing the attribution of seats under 
Article 25 of the Statute of the Council of 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Membera of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Acting Chair-
man) ; Mr. Abens (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Borghi (Alter-
nate : Pecoraro), Burckel (Alternate : Peridier), Cerneau, 
Oraigen, Duvieusart, Mrs. Faccio (Alternate: Treu), MM. 
Giust, Hulpiau (Alternate: Leynen), Jeaael, Konen, du 
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Europe: the Greek Delegation would have five 
representatives and five substitutes and the Tur-
kish Delegation ten representatives and ten 
substitutes. 
These delegations would obviously never 
attend in full. There is even a danger that 
absenteeism would be even more rife in the 
delegations of observers than in the delegations 
of countries which signed the Paris Agreements 
and whose members are entitled to vote, in which 
case the prestige of the Assembly might suffer 
from what would appear to be a sign of indif-
ference. 
Moreover, since observers have no voting 
rights, it would seem illogical to allow Turkey 
twice as many representatives as Greece. A 
weighting system based on the size of the popula-
tion is significant only if the delegations may 
vote, but it is not justified for merely giving a 
national point of view during a debate. 
In fact, to obtain the views of the parliament 
of a country which is not a signatory of the 
treaty, it should be enough to invite two of its 
members. 
4. Finally, if the motion for a resolution were 
adopted, the problem of other countries being 
given the right to delegate parliamentary obser-
vers to the WEU Assembly would inevitably 
arise. For instance, Denmark is a member of 
the European Community and will take part in 
the European union. The fact that it is not repre-
sented by permanent observers would not pass 
unnoticed. If this situation were due to the 
Danish parliament turning down an invitation, 
the Assembly would find itself in a delicate 
position. 
Luart, Marquardt (Alternate : Schefller), Dr. Phipps (Alter-
nate: Oordle), MM. Pignion, Schmidhuber, Scholten (Alter-
nate: Piket), Sgherri, Voogd, Zebisch (Alternate: Lenzer). 
N. B. The namea of thoae taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
The range of parliaments invited to be 
represented by a permanent delegation might be 
extended even further. Portugal, and probably 
soon Spain, are also among the countries which 
might be interested in having permanent parlia-
mentary observers associated with the work of 
the Assembly. Finally, it might similarly be felt 
that the WEU Assembly, as the European assem-
bly with defence responsibilities, should also wel-
come permanent observers from member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance such as the United 
States and Canada, which are often invited to 
be represented in the Assembly and which make 
a leading contribution to European security. 
However, since the latter are not European 
countries, a delegation of permanent observers 
would have to be formed on an ad hoc basis. 
In short, there would be a risk of the WEU 
Assembly being submerged by observers and its 
work being slowed down considerably. 
5. In conclusion, it would appear that the aim 
of those who tabled the motion for a resolution, 
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i.e. to associate representatives of the Greek and 
Turkish parliaments closely with the work of the 
Assembly, would be better attained by maintain-
ing present practice. 
In general, a flexible pragm&~tic approach 
to the question of parliamentary observers allows 
parliaments of non-signatory countries wishing 
to be represented in the Assembly's debates to be 
satisfied without wearing some of them down 
by invitations which the Assembly, bound by a 
new provision in its Rules of Procedure, would 
have to renew time and again. It is therefore 
considered preferable to abide by this approach 
and leave the Assembly full and unrestricted 
responsibility for its policy of invitations. 
Consequently, the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges proposes that the 
Assembly not adopt the motion for a resolution 
tabled by Mr. Burckel and others on the designa-
tion of Greek and Turkish parliamentary obser-
vers to the WEU Assembly. 
Document 7 41 17th Jnne 1977 
RepUes of the Council to Recommendations 291 to 296 
RECOMMENDATION 291 1 
on detente and security in Europe 2 
The Assembly, 
Affirming that true East-West detente can be achieved only through substantia.] mutual, balanced 
and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ; 
Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union 
and its allies in Central and Northern Europe; 
Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final 
act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ; 
Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ; 
Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advanfiage of crises outside Europe to strengthen 
its political position by direct or indirect military means; · 
Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic 
Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ; 
Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of detente, 
a.s this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe 
has occurred vis-a-vis the Soviet military threat ; 
Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions 
in 1975; 
Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement 
of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for detente ; 
Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some 
members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by externa.) 
military intervention ; 
Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies a.nd intervention provided a. 
pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ; 
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE : 
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a. continuing adequate 
balance to ensure peace with security ; 
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising 
outside Europe in order : 
(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a. pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or 
its allies ; 
(b) to deter any further Soviet interference ; 
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, 
economic and military balance in Europe and the world ; 
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied 
should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session (7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee (Document 703). 
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1. The Council, fully aware of the importance of giving full effect to the results of the CSCE and of 
assuring, among the signatory States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results, 
will continue to examine the consequences of the final act of Helsinki as they have done in the past. 
2. The Council are, furth.ermore, paying due regai:d to ~he implementation of the provisions of the 
final act by the signatory States and will keep the Assembly informed about developments, bearing in mind 
that the signatory States of the final act will have a thorough exchange of views both on the implemen-
tation of the provisions of the final act and on the tasks defined by the CSCE at the follow-up conference 
in Belgrade in 1977. 
3. In the Declaration of Ottawa, the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed their obli-
gation "to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces and that each should undertake, according 
to the rl'lle that it has assumed in the structure of the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of main-
taining the security of all". They consult each other in the North Atlantic Council and the other institutions 
of the Alliance on the contributions which each of them makes towards the common defence, making allow-
ances in that process for all developments that affect their security. Accordingly, the final communique 
issued after the ministeriahession of the North Atlantic Council on 9th-10th December 1976 reads: "Faced 
with this persistent growth in military might (of the Warsaw Pact), Ministers reiterated their determination 
to take the measures necessary to maintain and improve their own defensive military forces, in order to 
ensure credible deterrence and to safeguard their countries from any risk of military aggression or political 
pressure." 
4. In the Declaration of Ottawa, the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance stressed their firm 
resolve "to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appro-
priate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these 
interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world". The possible repercussions on collective 
security of crisis-laden developments outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty assume 
increasing importance in the permanent practice of allied consultations. In the final communique issued 
after the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 9th and lOth December 1976, Ministers stressed 
that "if detente is to progress, with the necessary public support, and not to falter, there must be real 
improvements across the entire range of international relations. It should not be assumed that heightened 
tensions in one area. of relations would not have repercussions on other areas". 
5. The Council are aware of the Assembly's interest in all international developments influencing the 
strategic equilibrium in Europe and in the world. They will therefore continue to provide the Assembly 
with all necessary information. 
6. A strong Atlantic Alliance is the surest guarantee that no member country will fall victim to direct 
or indirect military intervention from outside. Thanks to the security policy of th{) Alliance, such a danger 
is at present hypothetical. With regard to the modified Brussels Treaty, it can be said that the automatic 
mutual assistance clause in Article V in particular is an important contractual element of relations between 
member countries on matters concerning their security. But in order that this danger may remain hypo-
thetical, all members of the Atlantic Alliance will have to sustain their efforts in the political and military 
spheres. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 292 1 
on the r6le of the Atlantic AlUance in the world today 2 
The Assembly, 
Recalling the decisive role constantly pla.yed by the United States (and Canada) in ensuring 
security and peace in Western Europe ; 
Considering the maintenance and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance to be the only military guarantee 
of lasting peace in Europe ; 
Considering that its maintenance and cohesion require continuous and frank consultations in many 
fields between the European and American members of the Alliance ; 
Considering that it is the duty of the European and American members to help each other effectively 
avoiding any policy or undertaking contrary to the principles of democracy; 
Considering that since the second world war member States of the Atlantic Alliance have not 
always managed to fulfil the obligations to adhere to such principles ; 
Recalling, finally, that next to the alliance for the necessary military defence a. genuinely com-
prehensive policy for security and peace should consist of relevant and fully adequate components in the 
field of social-economic solidarity between the rich and the poor parts of the world population, as well 
as in the field of elimination of all discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Encourage its members to initiate or consistently afford their support in the appropriate frameworks 
to the following policies which are essential components of a. comprehensive security policy : 
- necessary military defence and mutual, balanced and controlled disarmament ; 
- defence and the promotion of parliamentary democracy ; 
- respect for the equivalence of men and peoples ; 
- recognition of the fact that all men are entitled to a. fair share of this earth's wealth and its 
possibilities of well-being; 
2. Constantly remind its partners in the Atla.ntic Alliance and elsewhere (notably in the OECD) of 
these guidelines ; 
3. Ensure that NATO, like the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Communities, groups 
only countries with democratic regimes ; 
4. Give the Assembly a. fair assessment of relevant difficulties and dangers facing the Atla.ntic Alliance 
as such or individual member countries and, if possible, the means for meeting them. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session (7th Sitting). 
2. Explana.tory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committe 
(Document 711). 
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l. The Council are alive to the concern expressed by the Assembly in the preamble to Recommen-
dation 292. This is in fact not unconnected with the action taken and the results obtained by the allies 
in various fields as evidenced in particular by the Ottawa declaration and the communiques issued after 
ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council. 
As regards disarmament and arms control, WEU member countries represented in the competent 
international bodies have played and are continuing to play an active role, with a view to the adoption 
of multilateral measures subject to adequate control. This action has been combined, as and when required, 
with consultations, both as part of European political co-operation and in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Such contacts take place at frequent intervals. 
2. The importance of defence and of the promotion of parliamentary democracy has frequently been 
reflected in the emphasis laid on these subjects during contacts between the representatives of the member 
countries and those of other members of the international community. In this context, the member 
countries of WEU have been specially attentive to their relations with the new parliamentary demo-
cracies which have recently come into being in Southern Europe. There is a growing likelihood that these 
democracies will take an increasing part in the process of European integration. 
3. The terms of the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular, respect for funda-
mental human rights, for the dignity and worth of the human person and for the other ideals proclaimed 
in the Charter of the United Nations have been a constant inspiration and guide to member countries of 
WEU since the Council was first formed. This was the spirit in which they made their contribution to 
the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. 
Member governments have stated repeatedly that they regard the Helsinki document as a major 
contribution to detente and mutual understanding in Europe and have stressed the importance of this 
text in the matter of respect for human rights. 
Thus, they have kept in contact with each other over the period leading up to the forthcoming 
meeting in Belgrade, in order to determine how far the provisions of the final act have been implemented 
and, possibly, to seek improvements which may be both desirable and expedient. 
4. The Council recognise the disturbing nature of the elements of instability and uncertainty hanging 
over Europe and detente as a result of the continuing growth in the strength of offensive capabilities of 
the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries particularly in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
including the Mediterranean. 
The Council therefore consider that the greatest vigilance must be exercised in order to ensure 
stability in the area and that an effective common defence must be maintained as in the past in spite of 
the effects of the persistent economic crisis. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th June 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 293 1 
on European union and WEU 2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision taken by the European Council to elect the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffra.ge as from 1978; 
Regretting the European Council's slowness in considering and implementing the Tindemans report ; 
Recalling its Resolution 59 ; 
Considering that the decision taken by the WEU Council on 31st Ma.y 1976 can help to develop 
the activities of the future European union in the "field of armaments industries ; 
Noting that this undertaking requires close co-operation between WEU and the European programme 
group; 
Considering that the co-ordination of European armaments industries can produce satisfactory 
results for the European economy and for the common defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance 
only if started without delay, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study at an early date the outline programme which is to be submitted to it by the Standing 
Armaments Committee in order to be able to determine that body's new tasks as soon a.s possible and at 
the latest at its ministerial meeting in 1977; 
2. Pay close attention to co-ordinating this undertaking with the work of the European programme 
group and have the latter's decisions communicated to it or be kept informed, through the international 
secretariat of the SAC, of the activities of that body in matters affecting the mandate of the SAC ; 
3. Report to the Assembly in the appropriate manner on the results of the studies conducted by the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the decisions it takes in pursuit thereof ; 
4. Invite the signatory countries of the North Atlantic Treaty who are members of the EEC or 
associated with it under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty to take part in the study to be undertaken by the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session (7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 720). 
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1. The Council are now studying the outline programme prepared at their request by the Standing 
Armaments Committee. In this context, governments of member States will ensure that the SAC's activities 
do not duplicate the work undertaken by the independent European programme group. The Assembly 
will be duly informed of their conclusions. 
2. As stated in Article 10 of the Council decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or 
arrangements drawn up within the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee remain open to 
participation by other allied countries. The Council have noted the statements made on this subject during 
the last session of the WEU Assembly. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 4th April 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 294 1 
on European oceanographic activities 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting the Council's reply to Recommendation 275 that no European oceanographic authority 
should be set up, even in the framework of an existing European organisation ; 
Noting also the total absence of a common overall European policy with respect to mining seabed 
minerals, prospecting for and exploitation of other marine resources, marine pollution and scientific 
oceanographic research ; 
Expressing satisfaction however with European co-operation during the negotiations of the Law 
of the Sea Conference in New York ; 
Aware of the existence of numerous oceanographic organisations and ad hoc bodies in worldwide, 
Atlantic, Western European and smaller regional frameworks ; 
Aware of the defence aspects of many oceanographic activities, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To define their own national maritime policies ; 
2. To try to work out a. general European strategy while at the same time proceeding with co-operation 
in practical and specific oceanographic subjects and to consider setting up a standing steering committee 
of national authorities for this purpose ; 
3. To study possible means of co-operation in a regional framework, such as the North Sea area, 
between all countries interested in : 
(a) the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which 
come within that area but which are outside territorial waters ; 
(b) the establishment of a common programme and strategy for policing the 200-mile economic zone; 
(c) reaching agreement on the joint implementation of all conventions on pollution; 
(d) collaboration on basic maritime research and development. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
(9th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospao3 Questions (Document 722). 
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I. The Council endorse the Assembly's satisfaction with European co-operation during the negotiations 
of the law of the sea conference in New York. 
2. The Council confirm the desire of member States to pursue possibilities for co-operation where defined 
national policies indicate the benefits of such co-operation. 
3. The Council believe that considerable progress has been made in European co-operation in oceano-
graphy, but consider that a balance must be maintained between co-operation within Europe and that 
which is more broadly based. They consider that the proposal to set up a standing steering committee of 
national authorities merits further consideration. It would be important to ensure that the work of such 
a committee did not overlap with the functions of existing bodies. 
4. There is close contact between North Sea States (particularly in the forum of the regional conference 
on the peacetime protection of offshore installations in the North Sea) on the problems of protecting oil 
rigs and other installations in the North Sea in peacetime against malicious or accidental damage. In time 
of war, members of the Atlantic Alliance would rely on that organisation as a whole to defend them. 
5. Not all member States have established an economic zone: most have extended or plan to extend 
their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. The arrangements for policing these extended limits are the res-
ponsibility of coastal States though the EEC Council recognises the importance and value of co-operation 
between coastal States on policing. 
6. The decision whether to sign and ratify a convention on pollution must be for individual States. 
It is premature to discuss joint implementation of all the pollution conventions relating to the North Sea. 
The Paris convention on land-based sources of pollution is not yet in force and the work of the regulatory 
body, the Interim Paris Commission, is likely to affect the implementation of this convention. There are 
however regular consultations which take place both in this body and the regional convention for the North 
Atlantic, and this makes for increased co-operation and co-ordination between European and other coun-
tries in the field of pollution control. Furthermore, steps are being taken to activate the Bonn agreement 
on co-operation in dealing with oil pollution of the North Sea. 
7. The Council confirm the intention of member States to study further possibilities for regional colla-
boration on maritime research and development, for which arrangements and bodies such as CREST and 
COST already exist, as well as on a broader basis through bodies such as the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea, the World Meteorological Organisation, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research 
and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1977. 
163 
DOCUMENT 741 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 295 1 
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies 
- new sources of energy 2 
Considering that there is a close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies ; 
Aware that even so the Western European governments are unwilling to establish a. common 
energy supply policy within a. European framework ; 
Considering that no nuclear programme on a. large scale is acceptable without a. solution being 
found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate 
these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ; 
Acknowledging the need to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently 
and thereby lessening the need to resort to nuclear power ; 
Convinced that alternative sources of energy, especially solar energy, could be used more widely 
instead of nuclear means, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
To promote a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources, equal consideration 
.eing given to the interests of the developing and developed countries ; 
2. To establish a common strategy here and now since oil prices will increa11e· by 10 or 15 % by the 
end of this year ; 
3. To accept joint planning for the improved use of energy resources, increase investments, particularly 
in coal production including the gasification process, and promote action by industry by guaranteeing 
long-term security for the development of coal power; 
4. To accord greater attention and financial means to research and development of alternative sour\:es 
of energy in general, and to solar energy in particular, at both national and European Community levels; 
5. To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European 
level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a 
democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ; 
6. To hold a wide-ranging conference with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of 
the EEC covering all aspects of energy-saving through oil conservation programmes, invitations also being 
extended to parliamentarians and representatives of employers' and employees' organisations and other 
civic groups such as consumers' and women's organisations in order to elaborate a common energy-
saving strategy. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty.Second Ordinary Session 
(11th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Comelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 721). 
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The 1973-74 oil embargo and the increases in the price of oil since 1973 have highlighted 
Europe's dependence on imported energy sources, especially oil. This dependence is not only of great 
significance from the point of view of the security of W astern European countries but, because of 
the high price of oil, it also has important consequences for their economic and social development. 
Furthermore, there has been an increasing awareness that supplies of hydrocarbon fuels are 
limited and are rapidly being exhausted. It is therefore necessary that the world community and 
particularly the countries of the western world as the largest consumers of oil should gradually reduce 
the proportion of hydrocarbon fuels in their total energy supplies. To accomplish this, existing sour-
ces of energy need to be used in a more economical and efficient way and alternative sources of 
energy must be developed vigorously. 
An additional consideration is the fact that the initial expectation that a solution to the prob-
lem of a future energy shortage could be found in the more rapid development of coal power or 
nuclear power or both has declined somewhat because of the problem of safety and environmental 
and infrastructural difficulties. In other words, Western Europe will continue to depend on imported 
oil for a very large part of its energy requirements for the foreseeable future. 
1. It is debatable whether a worldwide convention on energy resources is feasible in the near 
future. 
The Conference on International Economic Co-operation is discussing the possibility of institu-
ting regular consultations on energy problems in which oil-producing countries, non-oil-producing 
developing countries and industrialised oil-importing countries could participate. 
2. It would seem best not to anticipate any future decisions the OPEC countries may take on 
oil plices in terms of actual figures. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that on 17th December 1974 the EEC Council of Min-
isters adopted a resolution setting out a number of common objectives with regard to energy pol-
icy. 
3. An EEC recommendation concerning the economical use of energy already exists but further 
efforts for joint planning in relation to the better use of energy resources should be made. 
The EEC Council of Ministers will shortly consider possible ways of promoting the use of coal 
in electricity power stations. 
4. Considerable attention and increased efforts must be directed to encouraging the saving of 
energy and to developing alternative sources of energy. The research this requires must be vigorously 
undertaken, both nationally and internationally. In addition to the efforts which are being made 
within the EEC, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is also active in these fields. 
5. Member governments continue to attach great importance to safety regulations for nuclear 
energy production, harmonised at Western European level. 
6. Although this paragraph put forward an interesting suggestion it is doubtful whether the proposed 
conference could make any significant contribution to solving the energy problem as outlined. The 
question is of such complexity and has such far-reaching consequences in socio-economic terms that 
it will be extremely difficult to work out a consistent national or international energy conservation 
policy. This is confirmed by the limited progress of international consultations on the subject. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd May 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 296 1 
on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ; 
Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters ; 
WelCfming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC; 
Recalling that the agreement of a.ssociation between Turkey and the EEC provides for the 
accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation ; 
Considering it essential to associate Greece and Turkey here and now with examination of matters 
affecting the security and the building of Europe ; 
Recalling that paragraph 10 of the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 setting up a. 
Standing Armaments Committee provided that the undertakings of that Committee "would remain open 
to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"; 
Gratified that the three member countries represented in the Security Council have acted jointly 
to encourage Greece and Turkey to seek together a solution to the points at issue between them ; 
Deploring the wait-and-see policy pursued by the United Nations towards the Lebanese tragedy 
and the increasingly systematic deviation of world-wide organisations from their miginal tasks, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Draw up a programme forthwith to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern 
Mediterranean; 
2. Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries ; 
3. Make every effort for Greece and Turkey to be associated ever more closely with the building 
of Europe; 
4. Continue its work towards settling issues between Greece and Turkey ; 
5. Co-ordinate the efforts of member countries with a view to finding a fair solution to the Lebanese 
conflict; 
6. Invite member States in the United Nations and other world-wide organisations to adhere firmly 
to the commitments they entered into on joining, particularly as regards the Middle East conflict and the 
situation in the Mediterranean. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session (11th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Repcrt tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 719). 
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1. The Council share the Assembly's concern regarding the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and its possible consequences for European security. 
However, they feel that it would be inappropriate for them to "draw up a programme to strengthen 
Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean", since the defence of that region is at 
present ensured by the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. Like the Assembly, the Council welcome the fact that Greece and Turkey wish to be more closely 
associated with the construction of Europe. In this connection, the Council would like to remind the 
Assembly that their reply to its Recommendation 256 included a passage stating that the member countries 
of WEU intended to encourage the increasing development of relations between the EEC on the one hand 
and Greece and Turkey on the other. They would recall, however, that this is a. matter for the Council of the 
Communities. 
The Council have noted with interest the desire expressed by the Greek and Turkish authorities for 
closer links with Western European Union and in particular with its Assembly. They feel, however, that 
it is too soon to consider the possibility of associating the Greek and Turkish Governments with the work 
of the Standing Armaments Committee. At the same time, they wish to point out that under paragraph 
10 of the decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or arrangements concluded within the 
framework of the SAC remain open to participation by other allied countries. 
3. The Council, who are concerned at the dispute between Greece and Turkey, remind the Assembly 
of the action taken by the WEU member States individually, within the Community or within the Atlantic 
Alliance, to encourage the two countries to resolve the issues between them peacefully, by direct negotiation. 
4. The Council are convinced that a continuation of the Lebanese conflict would have had serious con-
sequences for security in the Eastern Mediterranean and welcome the fact that the fighting has been stopped 
and that a settlement is being worked out. 
In this context, they would draw attention to the efforts made by the WEU member States both 
individually and within the Community to further the settlement of a conflict which must be resolved 
primarily by the parties involved. 
5. Finally, the Council, who are anxious that machinery for settling the Middle East conflict should 
be rapidly set in motion, note with satisfaction a number of favourable signs suggesting that the peace 
conference may be convened in the near future. They are however aware that the obstacles preventing 
the parties concerned from ending the conflict in such a way that the legitimate rights of each of them are 
respected have not yet all been removed. 
1. Communicated to the .Assembly on 4th April 1977. 
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Draft Opinion 
oft the budget of the mim.terial orgtm11 of WEU 
for the financial year 1911 
The Assembly, 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
2. Member8 of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); 
Lord SelBdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Alber (Alternate : 
Reddemann), Antoni, Bonalumi, de Bruyne (Alternate: 
AdriaenBenB), Del Duca, Depietri, Evers, Hengel (Alternate : 
Margue), Kauftins.nn, van Kleef, de Koster, Lemp (Alter-
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nate : Schwencke), Lewis (Alternate : Lord Beaumont of 
Whitley), McNamara, Orsini, Page (Alternate: Sir John 
RodgerB), Schleiter (Alternate : Schmitt, Vice-Chairman), 
Vadepied, Vohrer. 
Also pr88ent : Lord Peddie. 
N. B. The namu of those taking part in the t10te are 
printed in italice. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Rec:ommendation 
on the atata of WEU ataff 
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Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pen-
sion scheme ; 
Deploring nevertheleBB that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up 
a joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ; 
Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a. reversionary pension to 
be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ; 
Noting the slowneBB in reforming the procedure for co-ordination, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
I. The early establishment of a. joint body to manage the pension scheme ; 
2. The granting of a. reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as 
for widows of male staff ; 
3. The creation of a voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommo-
dation; 
4. The estab1ishment as soon as pOBBible of a. committee of senior experts to plan and promote a. 
personnel policy ; 
n. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on condi-
tions for seconding national officials. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Selsdon,. Rapporteur) 
I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
(i) Approval 
1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1977 and 
have, for the time being, no comment to make 
thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft 
opinion and draft recommendation to the Com-
mittee for its approval. 
(ii) The budget 
2. The total budget of WEU for 1977 as com-
pared to 1976 is as follows : 
1976 Budget 1977 Budget 
£ F £ F 
Secretariat-General ............. 483,280 569,840 
Standing Armaments Committee .. 3,881,750 4,243,320 
Agency for the Control 
of Armaments ................ 8,329,550 9,089,060 
Office ofthe Clerk .............. 6,559,000 7,236,000 
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU .......... 483,280 18,770,300 569,840 20,568,380 
(iii) WEU establishment 
3. The total establishment of WEU for 1977 
is as follows : 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Standing Armaments Committee . . . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 52 
128 
Office of the Clerk .............. .'. 28 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1977 156 
D. Pension scheme 
4. The Assembly welcomes the fact after long 
negotiations the councils of the co-ordinated 
organisations have finally approved the setting 
up of a pension scheme as from 1st July 1974. 
The Council of WEU decided that the option 
period of one year allowed to members of the 
staff should commence on 1st March 1977. Never-
theless, the Council should give urgent considera-
tion to widowers of female staff of the co-ordi-
nated organisations being granted a reversionary 
pension in the same conditions as widows of male 
staff. 
5. In the ensuing paragraphs your Rapporteur 
would like to outline his suggestions for setting 
up a pension unit and joint management fund 
for pensions for the staff of the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
6. In its Recommendations 240, 250, 265 and 
287 on improving the status of WEU staff, the 
Assembly recommended the "setting up of a joint 
management fund for pensions for the staff of 
the co-ordinated organisations". 
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7. The importance of setting up such a fund 
cannot be sufficiently stressed, particularly to 
guard against the possibility of a government or 
governments withdrawing from one or more of 
the co-ordinated organisations, or the winding 
up of an organisation. 
8. A pension fund is a continuing process and 
it is for this reason that we must seek to set up 
an organisation which will be in existence for 
many years to come. As an example, an official 
recruited this year at the age of 25 would be 
drawing his pension at the latest in 40 years' 
time ; assuming a life expectancy of 85 years, 
the fund would have needed to be in existence 
for 60 years (more in the case of a surviving 
widow) in order to pay the official's pension. 
9. It can safely be said that many of the co-
ordinated organisations will undergo transforma-
tions in the next decade but the continuity of a 
pension fund, unharmed by political upheavals, 
must be ensured. 
10. On the assumption that the councils of all 
the co-ordinated organisations are in agreement, 
it will take several years before this goal can be 
achieved. Two phases might be envisaged to this 
end. 
First phase - pension unit 
11. One of the larger organisations, with a com-
puter at its disposal, should be responsible for 
setting up a small unit to deal with pensions. The 
OECD should be considered for this purpose 
since it is by far the best equipped to deal with 
this administrative problem and already has an 
"Inter-Organisation Study Section on Salaries 
and Prices". A small staff would naturally have 
to be recruited or seconded from other orgooisa-
tions to handle the work of the unit but if each 
organisation had to deal with the pensions of its 
respective staff members, the staff requirement 
would be even greater. 
12. The administrations of the co-ordinated 
organisations would be required to set up a 
standard "pension file" for all staff having opted 
for the pension scheme and for all staff recruited 
since July 1974. This file, with its contents 
would be identical for the staff of all the eo: 
ordinated organisations. On retirement of a staff 
member having opted for the pension scheme the 
administration of the organisation to which he 
or she belonged would be required to send his 
or her pension file to the pension unit. The latter 
would assess the basis on which the official's pen-
sion should be calculated and the file would 
thereafter remain with the unit. The unit would 
in turn, inform the organisation concerned of th~ 
amount of the monthly pension to be paid and 
keep it advised of any modifications to be made 
to this amount as a result of increases in cost-
of-living and standard-of-living allowances. Con-
versely, the organisation would inform the pen-
sion unit of any elements liable to modify the 
pension, i.e. death of the pensioner, conversion 
into a widow's pension, change in the number of 
children's allowances or place of residence, etc. 
13. The pension unit would inform all the co-
ordinated organisations of the estimates to be 
included in their respective budgets for the pay-
ment of pensions to those already retired or due 
for retirement in a given financial year. 
14. An important aspect is that of taxation and 
this also would be calculated by the pension unit. 
15. Should a pensioner have recourse to arbitra-
tion, this would have to be dealt with by the 
organisation to which he had belonged, pending 
the creation of a joint appeals board for all the 
co-ordinated organisations. 
16. In order to assess the number of staff 
required for the pension unit, an approximate 
estimate would have to be made of the number 
of officials due for retirement (or already retired) 
in the co-ordinated organisations over the next 
three years. Such figures would of necessity be 
approximate since it is only after the option 
period of one year following the date of the 
decision of the councils to set up such a unit 
that the exact number of pensioners would be 
known. 
17. The cost of running the pension unit should 
be in proportion to the number of pensioners in 
each of the co-ordinated organisations. 
18. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the setting up 
of a pension unit, the long-term objective of a 
joint management fund within the next three 
years must be urgently pursued. 
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Second phase - joint management fund 
19. The fund should be an entirely independent 
body, set up by governments who are members 
of the co-ordinated organisations. This would 
require the ratification of protocols by all the 
governments concerned. It would thereafter fol-
low that this organisation would have its own 
budget, with its own independent staff ; its head 
should have both financial and legal experience. 
20. A joint arbitration committee should be set 
up to deal with all litigation. The organisation 
should, if possible, be housed in the OECD in 
order that contact with the "Inter-Organisation 
Study Section on Salaries and Prices" might be 
maintained and access facilitated to the OECD 
computer. 
21. The joint management fund should be 
governed by a board comprising one or two senior 
officials from each of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions. 
22. Once the organisation had been set up, it 
would follow that all the pensions previously 
paid by the co-ordinated organisations would be 
paid by the joint management fund. The new 
organisation would take over all administration 
in respect of pensioners, including the problem 
of taxation. 
23. The budget of the joint management fund 
would make provision for all retired staff. The 
budget would also include the normal running 
expenses of the organisation. Contributions to 
this budget would be levied from all present and 
former member governments of the co-ordinated 
organisations, who have an implied debt to the 
pensioners of these organisations. It should be 
stressed that the setting up of the joint manage-
ment fund would not entail a staff establishment 
very much larger than that of the pension unit. 
24. The creation of a reserve fund should also 
be envisaged since the organisation would have 
only the aforementioned contributions at its 
disposal and it would appear essential for some 
funds to be available for emergencies, i.e. late 
payment of contributions, a government or 
governments withdrawing from an organisation, 
etc. It would be for member governments to 
calculate the amount to be held in such a reserve 
fund. 
Ill. Conditions of employment and remunera-
tion of staff of the co-ordinated organisations 
25. On several occasions the Assembly's atten-
tion has been drawn to the shortcomings of 
co-operation procedure 1 • 
1. Documents 584 and 701. 
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26. Nothing has happened in the past year to 
change the views expressed in this respect. 
Admittedly, a pension scheme for staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations has been introduced 
after more than three years of negotiations, but it 
is accompanied by such a complex taxation system 
that even the experts who worked it out doubt 
whether it can be applied. The abnormally long 
time taken to reach agreement has been one of 
trial for retired officials who have often had 
to manage on a very small income pending pay-
ment of the promised pension. In addition, the 
delay has also caused tremendous administrative 
complications. 
27. For salary adjustments, the new procedure 
approved by the councils of the co-ordinated 
organisations now involves a long and difficult 
exercise starting on 1st July each year, demand-
ing the collection of a mass of information which 
may be interpreted in many different ways. This 
calls for three comments : 
28. First, almost a year has passed since 1st 
July 1976 and salary levels operative on that 
date have not yet been fixed. The secretaries-
general were therefore compelled to ask for a 
provisional salary increase as from 1st January 
1977 to take account of the rise in the cost of 
living during the second half of 1976 although 
the scales for calculating this increase were not 
yet known. 
29. Second, the new procedure which no longer 
makes any distinction between increases for the 
cost of living and increases for a possible 
improvement in the standard of living is not in 
conformity with the procedure for adjusting pen-
sions as set out in Article 36 of the pension 
scheme regulations which is based on such a 
distinction. The result is that in less than a year 
the Co-ordinating Committee has submitted to 
the councils two texts on this important matter 
which, if not contradictory, are, to say the least, 
difficult to reconcile without resorting to subtle 
interpretations, which are always debatable and 
subject to appeal. 
30. Third, without going into the actual level of 
salaries applicable in the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, there is no escaping the fact that during 
the period of reference for assessing the change in 
the cost of living the purchasing power of staff 
progressively diminishes, and in addition several 
months elapse after the end of this reference 
period before compensation is granted, with the 
result that staff are always at least nine months 
behind in a vain attempt to adjust salaries to 
prices. 
31. It is urgent to judge the situation as a whole 
and this judgment can but be severe. Whatever 
its past record, the procedure for co-ordination 
now seems irremediably paralysed. It is becoming 
increasingly bogged down in futilities, sterile 
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technical complications and ineffectiveness ; the 
representatives of the secretaries-general and the 
government experts no longer speak the same 
language and their discussions are hampered 
by growing mutual distrust ; senior administra-
tive staff from the organisations have to devote 
more and more time to discussions which are 
generally of no practical effect. The time of 
the secretaries-general themselves is increasingly 
taken up by the need to examine and solve these 
problems and they also have to protect them-
selves against the continual infringement of their 
duties by experts with no real responsibilities. 
Only too often councils have to settle technical 
problems which could not be solved by those 
appointed to find solutions. Finally, staff feel 
that their views are not being heard and there 
is growing unrest ; strike movements, virtually 
unknown before in international organisations, 
are now developing. 
32. The situation now seems so disturbing that 
perhaps a solution might be found by seeking an 
outside opinion which might be more enlightene'd, 
impartial and acceptable to all concerned. 
33. There is a precedent for this: in 1957, the 
OEEC Council proposed to the WEU and NATO 
Councils and the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe that they appoint a committee 
of five wise men to report to them on the harmo-
nisation of conditions of remuneration in these 
organisations 1• After six months' work, this com-
mittee made recommendations which led to the 
present system of co-ordination. 
34. The time now seems ripe to renew this 
worthwhile experience and re-examine the prob-
1. Extracts from the terms of reference of the Serres 
Committee: 
I. A committee of experts, comprising not more 
than five members, will be set up to examine all aspects 
of the problems relating to the emoluments of the staff 
of the OEEC, of NATO (international 'staff and civilian 
employees of military headquarters located in France), 
of WEU and of the Council of Europe ... 
These experts will be selected jointly by the four 
organisations from a list of experts submitted by the mem-
ber governments of any of the organisations. 
The experts will act in a personal capacity and, with 
respect to the tasks assigned to them, will be independent 
of the organisations and of governments. They will appoint 
their chairman and establish the committee's rules of pro-
cedure. In the event of the committee being unable to 
reach unanimous conclusions, it shall submit minority 
views. 
2. .. . The report of the experts, which shall contain 
an analysis of its budgetary implications, will be submitted 
to each of the councils or committee of ministers of the 
organisations through their respective secretaries-general. 
It should give precise and detailed proposals, supported 
by explanatory statements and such documentary mate-
rial as the experts consider to be essential to the under-
standing of their report. 
lems raised by the conditions of employment and 
remuneration of staff. 
35. But the 1957 terms of reference should be 
broadened since they were then limited to prob-
lems relating to staff remuneration. (This was 
how the Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts came into being.) 
36. Experience has proved, however - and the 
WEU Assembly's recommendations testify to this 
- that, while the budgetary aspect of the prob-
lems was essential, it was not the only aspect ; in 
fact, there has never been, at the level of each 
organisation nor at co-ordinated level, any effec-
tive body with responsibility for working out and 
promoting an overall staff policy in the widest 
sense, and this lack has proved, and is still today, 
detrimental to the efficient operation of the 
organisations, the justified interests of their staff 
and, in the long run, the interests of the govern-
ments themselves. 
37. Now therefo~he time to give meaningful 
and detailed consideration to the whole system 
of remuneration, recruitment, conditions of 
employment, career possibilities and every other 
facet of international civil service in order to 
determine the rightful place of these officials in 
society and in the overall framework of interna-
tional organisations. 
IV. Loans for the purchase of accommodation 
38. The introduction of the pension scheme will 
raise a special problem in connection with the 
facilities previously available to staff for drawing 
on their individual accounts with the provident 
fund in order to purchase accommodation 1 • 
Members of the staff who opt for the pension 
scheme and decide to validate past service will, 
depending on their length of service, be using 
much or virtually all of their provident fund 
balances for this purpose. In addition, provident 
fund arrangements no longer apply to staff 
joining the co-ordinated organisations after 1st 
July 1974, since they are compulsorily affiliated 
to the pension scheme. Finally, a large part of 
the interest-bearing housing loans granted to 
staff has been secured by the provident fund 
accounts, a guarantee that will no longer exist 
with the pension scheme. 
39. It is important to offer assistance to staff 
for accommodation, and alternative schemes for 
offering housing loans at an acceptable rate of 
interest should be examined as a matter of 
urgency. One practical scheme which would 
provide an acceptable alternative would appear 
to be a staff savings and loan service. 
1. Documents 666 and 701. 
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40. Under such a scheme, which operates in the 
United Nations and has been working well in 
UNESCO for nearly twenty years, loans are 
financed from a staff savings fund. The organi-
sation would intervene only in the investment of 
the fund and the practical arrangements for 
deductions from staff salaries. 
41. A co-ordinated scheme for all the organisa-
tions would obviously be the best solution since 
such a scheme requires large numbers of staff in 
order to make it viable. Your Rapporteur is 
aware that the OECD has been studying this 
problem and would urge the secretaries-general 
of the co-ordinated organisations to give this 
matter urgent consideration. 
V. Seconded national officials 
42. In its Recommendation 200 adopted on 19th 
November 1970, the Assembly recommended that 
the Council : 
"4. Instruct its Public Administration Com-
mittee to study the harmonisation of condi-
tions for seconding national officials to the 
co-ordinated organisations with a view to 
submitting recommendations to the member 
governments." 
43. On 18th May 1971, the Council replied as 
follows: 
"4. The Council have noted with interest 
the Assembly's suggestion that the harmon-
isation of conditions for seconding national 
officials be studied. They propose to create 
a special working group for this purpose 
which would study the question on the basis 
of research into national practices which has 
already begun." 
44. Over the years, the Assembly has continued 
to press, in its recommendations, for this study 
to be completed and in its reply to Recommenda-
tion 287 the 'Council stated : 
"II. The survey carried out by the Public 
Administration Committee at the Council's 
request, on the implementation in member 
countries of the principles recommended by 
the Council for the secondment of national 
officials to international organisations, has 
now been completed. The relevant documents 
have been transmitted by the Secretariat-
General to the Clerk of the Assembly." 
45. The information to which the Council refers 
can be found in its annual report to the Assembly, 
Chapter V (D), which reads as follows : 
"The Public Administration Committee con-
cluded the study called for by the Council 
on the implementation in member countries 
of the principles recommended by the Coun-
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ell for the secondment of national officials 
to international organisations. The Council 
were thus able, during 1976, to study the 
documentation collected and to decide what 
further measures should be adopted regard-
ing the study of this question. 
Replies to the questionnaire submitted to the 
member countries contained gaps in some 
cases, and the Council requested those dele-
gations which had been unable to collect 
some part of the information (particularly in 
the statistical field) to take the necessary 
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steps to make the required information avail-
able in future. 
Secondly, the Council agreed that a further 
survey should be undertaken to review the 
situation after an interval of five years. 
The Council will not fail to keep the Assem-
bly informed of all further developments." 
46. The Assembly feels that, after a period of 
six years, the foregoing information cannot be 
considered sufficient and requests that more 
details be submitted to it. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1977 
Proposed expenditure and income 
A* B* c• TOTALB + C 
£ Francs Francs Francs 
Salaries and allowances ............. 709,165 5,814,370 12,677,220 18,491,590 
Travel ................••........... 19,645 86,000 335,300 421,300 
Other operating costs ............... 80,865 370,500 449,800 820,300 
Purchase of furniture ....... ,, ....... 3,395 10,500 19,400 29,900 
Buildings .......................... 
- - - -
Total expenditure ................... 813,070 6,281,370 13,481,720 19,763,090 
WEU tax .......................... 237,430 2,006,850 4,337.700 6,344,550 
Other receipts ...................... 5,800 31,200 54,960 86,160 
Total income ......................• 243,230 2,038,050 4,392,660 6,430,710 
NET TOTAL ..................•...... 569,840 4,243,320 9,089,060 13,332,380 
National contributions 
A* "B* c• Office of the Clerk 
600ths 
£ 
Belgium .................... 59 56,034.27 
France ..................... 120 113,968.00 
Federal Republic of Germany . 120 113,968.00 
Italy ...................... 120 113,968.00 
Luxembourg ................ 2 1,899.46 
Netherlands .............•.. 59 56,034.27 
United Kingdom ...........• 120 113,968.00 
600 569,840.00 
Total WEU budget 
• A • Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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Francs Francs 
1,311,017.37 711,540 
2,666,476.00 1,447,200 
2,666,476.00 1,447,200 
2,666,476.00 1,447,200 
44,441.26 24,120 
1,311,017.37 711,540 
2,666,476.00 1,447,200 
13,332,380.00 7,236,000 
£569,840 
Francs 20,568,380 
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AI 
Secretary-General 1 
Deputy Secretary-General 1 
Director of the Agency 
-
Assistant Secretary-General 1 
A7 
-
A6 1 
A5 2 
A4 
-
A3 3 
A2 2 
L5 1 
L4 1 
L3 1 
L2 1 
B6 -
B5 
-
B4 8 
B3 7 
B2 5 
B1 2 
C6 
-
05 -
C4 1 
C3 8 
C2 2 
48 
I. A • Secretariat-General. 
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Table of establishment 
WBSTBB.N EUROPJIAN UNION 
Bl Cl Total A, B, C 
- -
1 
- -
1 
-
1 1 
1 
-
2 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
-
1 4 
-
2 4 
- -
1 
1 
-
2 
3 2 6 
- -
1 
- - -
- - -
4 8 20 
7 8 22 
-
2 7 
- -
2 
- -
-
- 1 1 
4 
-
5 
3 9 20 
- -
2 
28 52 128 
B • International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C • Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations /Publications. 
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Office of the Clerk 
Clerk 1 
-
-
Clerk Assistant 1 
-
-
5 
21 
1 
31 
-
1 
-
4 
7 
-
-
1 
-
-
2 
-
28 
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RECOMMENDATION 287 1 
on improving the status of WEU stalf 1 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ; 
Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ; 
Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before 
introducing new procedure ; 
Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations. 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
I. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions 
being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of 
pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973; -
2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based inter alia on joint management 
for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 
and 265; 
3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break 
in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ; 
4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ; 
5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ; 
6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communi-
ties and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to 
their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ; 
7. Make provision for a reinstallation allowance for officials terminating their service and who were 
granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment. as is the case in the European Communities ; 
11. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study 
on conditions for seconding national officials. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
A.ft'airs and Administration (Document 701). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 287 
I.I. The Council a.re in a. position to inform the Assembly tha.t, at their meeting of 23rd November 1976, 
they approved the 127th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts which 
contained a.t annex the rules implementing the pension scheme set up in the 94th report. This scheme, 
which for WEU staff is now in force, takes effect from 1st July 1974. 
2. The Council believe that guarantees a.re provided by Article 40, paragraphs 2, 3 a.nd 4 of the draft 
pension scheme rules. The question of a joint management is currently under study in the Co-ordinating 
Committee. 
3. Neither the WEU nor Assembly Staff Rules stipulate that payment of a staff member's salary 
should terminate on the day of his death. In practice, these emoluments have been paid by the Secretariat-
General up to the end of the month in which the official died. 
4. A procedure for salary reviews broadly comparable to that followed in the European Communities 
is at present under study by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations. It is expected tha.t the new 
procedure will be approved by Councils before the end of this yea.r. 
5. Consideration is a.t present being given to the reform of co-ordinating procedures. However, the 
Assembly will be aware of the difficulties in achieving this when in addition to the seven members of 
WEU, the interests of some eighteen other governments are involved within the co-ordinated framework 
6.-7. The present system of indemnities for loss of job ha.s been in force since 1972. At that time, it 
represented a substantial improvement on the previous system. No proposals for improving the indemnities 
for loss of job, or for introducing a. reinstallation allowance have, at the moment, been submitted to the 
governments of member countries. 
II. The survey carried out by the Public Administration Committee a.t the Council's request, on the 
implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment 
of national officials to international organisations, has now been completed. The relevant documents have 
been transmitted by the Secretariat-General to the Clerk of the Assembly. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th November 1976. 
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Breakdown of staff in the co-ordinated organisations on 1st January 1976 
NATO 
OECD Council of Total ESA WEU Grand total Europe Secretariat NATO- SHAPE 
Agencies SHAPE 
Military Committee 
> to > > to ~ > to ~ > to ~ > to ~ > to ~ > to ~ > to ~ t-< t-< 0 to t-< 0 to t-< 0 t-< 0 t-< 0 to t-< 0 t-< 0 to t-< 0 a a a a a a a a 
-- ---- -- --
---------- -----------------------------
624 1016 1640 267 457 724 909 2062 2971 475 886 1361 1384 2948 4332 939 608 1547 55 94 149 3269 5123 8392 
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APPENDIX V 
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Organisation 
Member country Council 
OECD of NATO ESA WEU 
Europe 
EUROPE 
Austria X X 
Belgium X X X X X 
Cyprus X 
Denmark X X X X 
Finland X 
France X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X 
Greece X X X 
Iceland X X X 
Ireland X X 
Italy X X X X X 
Luxembourg X X X X 
Malta X 
Netherlands X X X X X 
Norway X X X 
Portugal X X X 
Spain X X 
Sweden X X X 
Switzerland X X X 
Turkey X X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X 
AMERICA 
Canada X X 
United States X X 
AsiA 
Japan X 
AUSTRALASIA 
Australia X 
New Zealand X 
TOTAL 24 19 15 10 7 
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Amendment No. 1 
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs 
of Western European Union for the financial year 1911 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Piket 
21st June 1977 
1. Replace the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following text : 
"Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the inaccepta.ble delay in 
applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,''. 
2. Mter Part I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following: 
"II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living 
which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;". 
The present Part II will become Part Ill. 
Signed : Pi/eel 
1. See 4th Sitting, 22nd June 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
181 
Document 7 43 1st June 1977 
Anti-submarine warfare 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur 
Revised Draft Recommendation 
on anti-submarine warfare 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the large numbers of modern attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose 
a serious threat to allied communications, both across the Atlantic and between the different parts of 
Western Europe ; 
Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines; 
Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability 
from their limited resources, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
1. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, with particular reference 
to communications, and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ; 
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evalu-
ation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to shallow waters and 
the use of maritime patrol aircraft ; 
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La. Spezia 
through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend 
time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur) 
1. The Committee's original report on anti-
submarine warfare (Document 725) was adopted 
in Committee by 14 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions 
on 29th November 1976. The debate on the report 
in the Assembly at the second part of the twenty-
second ordinary session was taken at the end of 
the week, when few representatives were present. 
At the request of the Chairman it was referred 
back to the Committee. 
2. The Committee takes this opportunity of 
submitting a revised draft recommendation -
revised only in operative paragraph 1 where 
the words "with particular reference to communi-
cations" have been inserted, and in operative 
paragraph 2 which now calls for particular refer-
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with I 
abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Oritchley (Chairman); 
Mr. Dankert (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrena, Beauguitte 
(Alternate : Delorme), Bizet (Alternate : La Oombe), 
Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, FoBBon, Grant (Alternate : 
Banks), Handlos, Hardy (Alternate : Lord Peddie), Konen, 
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ence to "shallow" rather than "coastal" waters. 
Since the original report was prepared the Com-
mittee has in fact been briefed on anti-submarine 
warfare at NATO Headquarters by Vice-Admiral 
L.R. Bell-Davies, R.N., SACLANT's Represent-
ative in Europe. The Committee is aware of 
SACLANT's need to rely upon NATO European 
navies and maritime air forces both for shallow-
water operations and for some escort duties across 
the Atlantic. 
3. The Committee therefore makes the foregoing 
changes of emphasis in its original draft recom-
mendation. Otherwise it re-endorses its original 
report. 
de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, Menard, Pawelczyk 
(Alternate : Lemp), Pecchioli, Riviere, Roberti, Raper, 
Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Schugens (Alternate : 
Dequae), Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate: Watkinaon). 
N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Document 743 
Amendment No. 1 
Anti-submarine warfare 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Farr 
22nd June 1977 
In paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "with particular reference 
to shallow waters". · 
I. See 4th Sitting, 22nd Jrme 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
1sa 
Signed: Fa" 
Document 743 
Ameatlment No. 2 
Anti-submarine warfare 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
22nd June 1977 
1. At the beginning of the revised draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council" 
insert "and its Standing Armaments Committee" ; leave out "urge member governments". 
2. In paragraph 1 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular reference" 
to the end of the paragraph and insert "to allow joint production for these forces wherever appropriate ;". 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"2. In liaison with the independent European programme group, evaluate European ASW require-
ments and capabilities in every field ;". 
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"3. Establish the necessary liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at 
La. Spezia, maintaining close links with national centres, and examine the possibilities of starting 
joint research into anti-submarine warfare.". 
Si(/'IU?4 : Riviere 
l. See 4th Sitting, 22nd June 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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European security and East-West relations 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on European security and East-West relations 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUlf 
submitted by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
Preamble 
Operative text 
APPENDIX 
1st June 1977 
Draft recommendation on European security and East-West relations adopted 
by the Committee on 29th November 1976 and Amendments 1 to 5 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 2 with 1 
abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Chairman); 
Mr. Dankert (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Beauguitte 
(Alternate: Delorme), Bizet (Alternate : La Combe), 
Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Fosson (Alternate: Del Duca), 
Grant (Alternate: Banks), Handlos, Hardy, Konen, 
7* 
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de Koater, Lemmrich, Maggioni, Menard, Pawelczyk 
(Alternate: Lemp), Pecchioli, Riviere, Roberti, Raper, 
Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate : Piket), Schugens 
(Alternate : Duvieusart), Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate : 
Lord Peddie). 
N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Revised Draft Recommendation 
on European security and East- West relations 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as defence 
expenditure in real terms steadily rises, as considerable improvements in Soviet technology enhance the 
effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic 
nuclear missiles are prepared which could threaten Western Europe; 
(ii) Believing that a policy of detente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close 
consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence 
effort ; and welcoming therefore the new resolve of all the Atlantic allies "to strengthen their mutual 
support efforts and co-operation"; 
(iii) Welcoming the intention of the new United States Administration to secure significant reductions 
in the numbers of Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, provided always that the essential 
basis of mutual deterrence and the security of the Alliance is not jeopardised ; 
(iv) Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw 
Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting detente, and in the progress of other ongoing 
negotiations ; 
(v) Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well 
as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observance by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in 
which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries; 
(vi) Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of detente can bring advantages to both 
East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both sides, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council continues its careful preparation for the meeting 
of representatives of Ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act: 
(a) by continuing to compile, on the basis of reports from member States, the record of the 
implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention 
to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security 
and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-opera-
tion in other fields ; 
(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance with respect to the Belgrade meeting 
shall be: 
(i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting now being held that the meeting at the level of 
representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ; 
( ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance 
policy; 
(iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far; 
(iv) to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures 
and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions ; 
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until 
the Soviet Union is prepared to bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO positions; 
3. To seek to secure a moratorium on the further development by all countries of cruise missiles and 
strategic bombers, pending the outcome of the bilateral SALT negotiations; 
4. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on 
Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate 
East-West arms control forum. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Koater, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee prepared a report on Euro-
pean security and East-West relations for sub-
mission to the second part of the twenty-second 
ordinary session. The report (Document 726) was 
adopted on 29th November 1976 by 12 votes to 2 
with 5 abstentions. The debate on this report in 
the Assembly took place at the end of the week 
when few representatives were present ; five 
amendments to the draft recommendation in the 
report were tabled. At the end of the debate, 
at the request of the Chairman, the report was 
referred back to the Committee without a vote. 
The texts of the original draft recommendation 
and the five amendments are reproduced at 
appendix. 
2. The Committee has taken this opportunity 
of preparing a revised draft recommendation 
which takes account of events since the first 
report was adopted. The new Carter administra-
tion has taken office in Washington, and adopted 
a significantly different line to the strategic 
arms limitations talks (SALT) ; the North 
Atlantic Council has met in London at the levels 
of Heads of State and of Government and been 
followed by the usual meeting of Defence Minis-
ters in Brussels ; lastly the postponement of the 
debate on the report to the first part of the 
twenty-third session of the Assembly means that 
the Assembly will be called upon to vote upon 
the new draft recommendation during the week 
beginning 20th June - i.e. actually during the 
course of the meeting in Belgrade of officials 
who will be preparing the subsequent meeting 
of representatives of Ministers who are to exa-
mine the workings of the final act of the Hel-
sinki conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE). 
3. Reference should still be made to the explan-
atory memorandum of the original report (Docu-
ment 726) as far as the original text of the 
recommendation is concerned. The comments 
below are designed to explain the modifications 
which the Committee has now made to the ori-
ginal text. 
Preamble 
4. The briefing given by the Chairman of the 
Military Committee to the Chiefs of State and 
Defence Ministers of the NATO countries in 
Brussels on 16th and 17th May drew attention 
to the financial basis of the Soviet defence effort 
estimated to be increasing at more than 4 % 
per annum in real terms, and to account at 
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present for at least 11 to 13 % of the Soviet 
gross national product. The ministerial guidance 
adopted by the Defence Ministers at that meeting 
estimates the annual increase of defence spending 
at 5 % in real terms. The Committee has drawn 
attention to this assessment by inserting in the 
first paragraph of the original preamble the 
words "as defence expenditure in real terms 
steadily rises". 
5. The same briefing by the Chairman of the 
Military Committee states that the size of the 
Soviet IRBM/MRBM force remains the same, 
but that it is thought that the deployment of a 
new, and possibly mobile, mirved IRBM is 
"imminent". It is for this reason that the Com-
mittee has re-worded the last line of the first 
paragraph of the preamble to read "and as new 
strategic nuclear missiles are prepared which 
could threaten Westem Europe", instead of 
referring to missiles which are deployed. 
6. In the second paragraph of the preamble 
the Committee has added at the end the quotation 
from the communique issued on 11th May after 
the meeting in London of the fifteen Heads of 
State and Government of the NATO countries 
(pa:ragraph 3). The Committee welcomes the 
subsequent decision of the NATO Defence Minis-
ters meeting in Brussels to undertake a long-term 
defence programme aiming at an annual increase 
in defence spending of 3 % in real terms in the 
years 1979-84. 
7. Paragraph (iii) of the preamble is new, 
it reflects President Carter's approach to SALT 
which goes beyond the Vladivostok agreement 
described in paragraph 17 of Document 726. 
At his press conference on 30th March President 
Carter described his preferred approach as fol-
lows: 
"It was to have substantial -reductions in 
the level of deployment of missile launchers 
and the MIRV missiles below the 2,400 level 
and the 1,320 level that were established 
under the Vladivostok agreement. Secondly, 
to stop the development and deployment 
of any new weapons systems. A third point 
was to freeze at the present level about 550 
intercontinental ballistic missiles - our 
Minuteman and their missiles known as the 
SS-17, 18 and 19. Another was to ban the 
·deployment of all mobile missiles - their 
SS-16 and others or ours, that is, under the 
development stage the MX. Another is to 
have a strict limit on the deployment of the 
Backfire bomber and a strict limit of the 
range that would be permitted on cruise mis-
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siles. Another element of the proposal was 
to limit the number of test firings of mis-
siles to six firings per year of the inter-
continental range and also of the medium-
range missiles and to ask the Soviet Union 
to give us some assured mechanism by which 
we could distinguish between their inter-
continental mobile missile the SS-16 and 
their limited-range mobile missile the SS-
20." 
8. President Carter described his proposal as 
" much more far-reaching, and has profound 
consequences that are beneficial, I think, to our 
own nation and to the rest of the world". Para-
graph 7 of the North Atlantic Council communi-
que of 11th May, referred 1;o above, states "The 
allies warmly welcome the efforts of the United 
States to negotiate with the Soviet Union an 
agreement to limit and reduce strategic arms 
which takes into account allied interests". Para-
graph {iii) of the preamble has been drafted 
accordingly. 
Operative text 
9. Paragraph 1 of the operative text of the 
draft recommendation has been slightly re-worded 
to put it in the present tense, on the assumption 
that the Assembly will be voting on it during 
the meeting in Belgrade of the officials who are 
to prepare the meeting of representatives of 
Ministers to be held in Belgrade later in pur-
suance of the CSCE final act. 
10. The Committee originally called for "a full 
record" of the implementation of the CSCE final 
act to be drawn up, with particular attention to 
confidence-building measures. The allied countries 
are in fact now busily engaged in compiling just 
such a record, and your Rapporteur has accepted 
Mr. Scholten's amendment (No. 4) to delete the 
word "full", so paragraph 1 (a) now reads "by 
continuing to compile ... the record". Paragraphs 
42 to 57 of Document 726 describe in some detail 
action taken by NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries under the headings "Prior notification of 
major military manoeuvres" (mandatory) ; "Prior 
ootification of other military manoeuvres" (op-
tional) ; "Exchange of observers" (voluntary and 
bilateral) ; "Prior notification of major military 
movements" (optional) and "Other items" -
which includes exchange visits of military per-
sonnel and delegations. That information in Docu-
ment 726 was up to date to about September 1976. 
11. The Committee presents the following sum-
mary information concerning action by NATO, 
Warsaw Pact and non-aligned countries up to 
the present time. It may be anticipated that more 
scope may arise for reporting military man-
oeuvres by the Warsaw Pact countries, if indeed 
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they are coming round to the view that such 
notification is not detrimental to their interests, 
in the fa1l of 1977 which is the traditional time 
for land army manoeuvres. 
Prior notification of major military manoeuvres 
(over 25,000 troops) 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1975 
neutral and non-aligned 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1976 
neutral and non-aligned 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1977 
neutral and non-aligned 
3 
nil 
1 
3 
3 
nil 
nil 
1 
nil 
Prior notification of smaller-scale and other 
manoeuvres 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1975 
neutral and non-aligned 
1976 
3 
nil 
1 
NATO 4 
Warsaw Pact 2 
(the notification for ·these manoeuvres 
was given at very short notice) 
neutral ·and non-aligned 2 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1977 
neutral and non-aligned 
Invitation of observers to manoeuvres 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1975 
neutral and non-aligned 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1976 
neutral and non-aligned 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
1977 
neutral and non-aligned 
1 
nil 
1 
1 
nil 
1 
4 
3 
1 
nil 
nil 
1 
Prior notification of major military movements 
Since the Helsinki summit of the CSCE there 
have been no notifications of such movements. 
Other items 
Since the Helsinki summit of the CSCE 
there have been a number of bilateral exchanges 
of military delegations and naval ship visits 
between members of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. 
12. The Committee now places more emphasis on 
the need "to strengthen and extend" the confi-
dence-building measures, as explained in para-
graph 57 of Document 726. Accordingly, the 
original phrase in the recommendation has been 
made a separate sub-paragraph 1 (b) (iv). 
Paragraph 1 of the operative text is otherwise 
unchanged. The status of the MBFR negotiations, 
explained in paragraphs 30 to 41 of Document 
726 remains unchanged ; they are not expected 
to progress until after some agreement is reached 
on SALT II. In December 1976 the NATO coun-
tries tabled in Vienna fresh figures put forward 
by the Warsaw Pact countries for the first time 
in June 1976. Your Rapporteur has accepted 
Mr. Scholten's amendment (No. 4) with one 
change - the end of paragraph 2 now reads 
"bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO 
positions", instead of "proposals" in the amend-
ment. 
13. Paragraph 3 of the operative text is new, 
but is already foreshadowed by the Committee's 
comments in paragraph 18 of the explanatory 
memorandum of Document 726, the last two sen-
tences of which read : "An agreement in SALT 
II to ban the further development by either party 
[of cruise missiles] will not jeopardise western 
security. Experience shows that the only possible 
alternative in the longer run would be the full 
deployment of cruise missiles by both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, with greatly 
increased uncertainties in the nuclear equation ... " 
14. The publication "Aviation Week and Space 
Technology" on 23rd May, published after the 
three-day talks in Washington between the 
United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, 
and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, 
claimed that "US a:nd Soviet strategie: arms 
negotiators, meeting last week in Genev~, based 
their discussion on the proposed moratoriUm for 
cruise missile development for an interim period 
in exchange for possible restrictions by the Soviet 
Union on its Tupolev Backfire bomber and some 
reductions in the total number of strategic deli-
very vehicles". It was understood that the cruise 
missile moratorium would remain in effect until 
a third SALT agreement could be concluded, if 
SALT II was to be agreed in the relatively near 
future, and hence be limited to less far-reaching 
objectives. 
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15. The Committee is aware that a strategic 
cruise missile may prove an attractively inexpen-
sive and effective replacement for the present 
generation of British and French submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. .At the same time it 
recognises that with arms control agreements 
relying solely on "national means of verification", 
verification of such missiles is possible only 
during the development stage when test flights 
can be observed by means external to the coun-
tries in which they are conducted. Once develop-
ment is completed, it will not be possible to 
negotiate a verifiable agreement to restrict the 
numbers deployed or to ban them completely, 
because unlike strategic missiles in silos, cruise 
missiles cannot be observed by satellites or other 
external means. Thus the choice facing East and 
West alike at the present time is either to ban 
strategic cruise missiles completely, or to accept 
their ultimate deployment by both sides even 
though Soviet deployment might lag behind that 
of the West by five or more years . .A moratorium 
on testing now would give time to assess the 
advantages or disadvantages to the western allies 
of full-scale deployment by both the allies and 
the Soviet Union. 
16. In an unusually frank interview with Mr. 
William Beacher, reporter of the "Boston Globe" 
published on lOth May, two senior members of the 
Soviet "Institute for the Study of the United 
States" spoke of the type of SALT II agree-
ment which might conceivably be possible from 
a Soviet point of view ; it would include : 
- a 10 % reduction in the Vladivostok ceil-
ing of 2,400 long-range missiles and 
bombers; 
- "some limitation" on Soviet deployment 
of the Backfire bomber ; 
- a ban on cruise missiles on attack sub-
marines, surface ships and land laun-
chers; 
- and possible limitation on the numbers of 
tests of IOBMs. 
17. The re-numbered paragraph 4 of the draft 
recommendation remains unchanged. The Com-
mittee's proposals for a suitable forum for East-
West negotiations on Eurostrategic missiles 
r'Euro-SALT") are described in paragraphs 28 
and 29 of Document 726. 
Minority opinion 
18. .A minority of the Committee would have 
deleted paragraph 3 of the revised draft recom-
mendation for·the reasons stated in the minority 
opinion given at the end of Document 726. 
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APPENDIX 
Draft Recommendation on European security and East-West relations 
adopted by the Committee on 29th November 1916 1 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX 
Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continua.lly increasing, as vast improve-
ments in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower 
and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are deployed which threaten Western Europe; 
Believing that a policy of detente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close 
consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence 
effort; 
Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw 
Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting detente, and in the progress of other ongoing 
negotiations ; 
Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well 
as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observation by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in 
which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries; 
Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of detente can bring advantages to both 
East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
I. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation for the meeting to be 
held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act: 
(a) by compiling, on the basis of reports from member States, a full record of the implementation 
by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents 
on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation 
in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ; 
(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance at the meeting shall be: 
(i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting to be held on 15th June that the meeting at the 
level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ; 
(ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance 
policy; 
(iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far, to seek to streng-
then and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, and to report 
on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions ; 
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until 
the Soviet Union is prepared to make acceptable concessions to the NATO position; 
3. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on 
Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in a.n appropriate 
East-West arms control forum. 
I. Document 726. 
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AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
DOCUMENT 744 
1. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Atlantic Alliance" 
insert "Western European Union and the European Economic Community,". 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Alliance" and insert "WEU". 
In paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Alliance" and insert "jointly-
defined". 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
* * 
* 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
Signed : Riviere 
1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: 
"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated," 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: 
"and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions ;" 
3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
* * 
* 
AMENDMENT No. 3 l 
tabled by Mr. La Combe 
Signed : Riviere 
In the draft recommendation proper, after the words "RECOMMENDS TO THE CouNcn." leave out 
"that it urge member governments : 1. To ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful prepara-
tion" and insert "I. To make careful preparation". 
Signed : La Oombe 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Scholten 
1. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "full". 
Al'PENDIX 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "make acceptable concessions to 
the NATO position" and insert "bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO proposals". 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back t<> the Committee). 
* * 
* 
AMENDMENT No. 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Dankert 
Signed : SchoUen 
1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: 
"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated," 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: 
"and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions ;" 
Signed : Dankert 
I. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Amendment No. 1 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 11 
tabled by Mr. Roberti 
21st June 1977 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "until the Soviet Union is prepared 
to bridge the gap" and insert "until the gap is bridged". 
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed : Roberti 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Part 1 agreed to.; part 2 withdrawn). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Congratulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommendations when 
these emanate from the Council itself or from delegations ; 
Thanking the Council for the welcome it gave the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments at the conversations on 31st May 1976 ; 
Noting certain shortcomings in the application of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty con-
cerning the control of armaments ; 
Gratified that the Council has given the Standing Armaments Committee a mandate whose 
scope extends well beyond the field of activities hitherto conferred on that body, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Ensure that replies to Assembly recommendations furnished by other international organisa-
tions are no less precise than those prepared by the Council ; 
2. Indicate in future annual reports : 
(a) the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe; 
(b) the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accord!Lnce with the commitment 
contained in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
3. Ensure a fuller application of the provisions of the treaty concerning the control of arma-
ments, with particular regard to biological and chemical weapons ; 
4. (a) Ensure a continuing exchange of information between the independent European pro-
gramme group and the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
(b) Ensure that the number, status, qualifications and level of the representatives of the 
member countries on the Standing Armaments Committee are high enough to guarantee the effec-
tiveness of the work undertaken ; 
(c) Encourage national authorities to provide the Standing Armaments Committee with all the 
information it requires ; 
(d) Ensure that the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee is extended to 
the field of research in order to ensure European co-operation in this sector ; 
(e) Keep the Assembly regularly informed about the tasks entrusted to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee, the time-table and successive stages and the results obtained. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee welcomes the determination 
to promote European co-operation in defence 
matters recently expressed by the Council of 
Ministers. Indeed, on 31st May 1976, the latter 
decided to instruct the Standing Armaments 
Committee to submit to it a detailed outline study 
of the armaments industries in the member coun-
tries. Once this had been done, the Council 
adopted it in a form which unfortunately has 
not been described to the Assembly, and this is 
regrettable. Today therefore WEU is in a position 
to develop considerably its work in co-ordinating 
and strengthening the armaments industries of 
the member States. 
2. The urgency of such an undertaking aimed 
at rationalising and putting in order Europe's 
armaments production potential is keenly felit 
everywhere. There are three main reasons for 
this need for co-operation : the necessity for the 
European industries to have wider and better 
guaranteed outlets and resources, the need for 
joint protection against American competition 
and above all the productivity requirement to 
which the armaments industries are subjected 
in order to maintain the cost of new equipment 
at the lowest possible level The symposium 
organised by the Assembly on 3rd and 4th March 
lilst bears witness to these concerns. It was then 
noted that co-operation in armaments is the basis 
on which it will be possible to define the role 
of the future European union in defence matters. 
To this end, the work of the WEU CoThllCil and 
of its Standing Armaments Committee warrant 
the greatest attention. Their work may help to 
build an effective coherent industrial framework 
in the military production sector and pave the 
way for a convergence of defence policies and 
security in Europe. 
3. As before, the Committee welcomes the 
Council's promptness in communicating the 
annual report, i.e. by 11th March. The chapter 
numbers in the present report correspond to those 
in the Council's report. 
CHAPTER I 
Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
4. With regard to the Council's replies to 
Assemb1y recommendations, the annual report 
points out that : 
"the Council are not the only international 
body empowered to deal with the questions 
covered by Article VIII of the modified 
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Brussels Treaty. The member States of WEU 
are also members of the European Com-
munity, the North Atlantic Council and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, which also have authority to 
discuss some of these problems. The Council 
continued to take account of the work in 
hand in those organisations when arranging 
their own activities." 
5. When the Council transmits an Assembly 
recommendation to another organisation for a 
rep1y, however, the Committee would appreciate 
it if such replies were not less substantial than 
those prepared by the Council itself. With the 
assistance of the delegations of the seven countries 
to the other organisation in question, it should 
be possible to give satisfaction in these particular 
cases. 
6. The ·Committee thanks the Council for having 
received it in Brussels on 31st May 1976 for an 
informal exchange of views under the chairman-
ship of Mr. Destremau, French Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and by a happy 
coincidence a former Chairman of the Committee. 
This meeting was held in the best conditions ; 
representatives of several OOUllltries spoke, as did 
members of the Committee, which hopes it will 
be possible to renew the experience next year. 
CHAPTER 11 
Activities of the Council 
7. Prominent among the activities of the 
Council was the new life injected into the work 
of the Standing Armaments Committee. This new 
development in the work of the Council is exam-
ined in Chapter IV. 
(a) Level of British forces on the mainland of 
Europe 
8. Under Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to 
maintain on the mainland of Europe, "assigned 
to SACEUR", a number of troops which the 
Council has now fixed at 55,000 men plus the 
Second Tactical Air Force. This duty to fix the 
level of the British commitment is undeniabLy 
the most important part of the Council's present 
activities. 
9. In its reply to Recommendation 213 1, the 
Council stated that the United Kingdom under-
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971 
on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato. 
took to state in the annual report each year the 
current level of British forces on the continent. 
The Committee notes that the level duly reported 
at 30th November 1976 amounted to 60,985 men 
plus the Second Tactical Air Force. But in its 
reply to Written Question 170 1 and Recommen-
dation 284 '2, the Council recognised that "the 
United Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI 
of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels 
Treaty) to maintain a certain level of forces on 
the mainland of Europe relates not to the total 
level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland 
(which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibral-
tar), but only to those which are assigned to 
SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment 
the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 
men plus the Second Tactical Air Force" and 
that "the figure of 60,066 men on the continent 
of Europe is, as stated in the twenty-first annual 
report, the total level of ground forces manpower. 
It therefore includes personnel in Berlin and 
GibraLtar, which are not reckoned in the commit-
ment to maintain 55,000 men 'assigned to 
SACEUR'." 
10. The Committee recommends that future 
annual reports indicate not only the total troop 
strengths of British land forces on the mainland 
but also the level of British land forces included 
in the definition of the commitment: "The figure 
of 55,000 includes not only BAOR but those 
United Kingdom personnel in the various allied 
headquarters and command organisations such as 
HQ NORTHAG and HQ AFCENT who may 
properly be reckoned as being 'assigned to 
SACEUR'." 
11. The present annual report adds : "The 
continued need for the presence of troops in 
Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of 
the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed 
for short tours of duty there. At 30th November 
1976 there were some 4,419 men from BAOR in 
Northern IreLand. As has been previously stated, 
these units could be speedily returned to their 
duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO." 
The Committee notes that the corresponding 
figure for last year was only 3,700. 
(b) Amendments to tke list of prohibited weapons 
12. On some twelve occasions since the conclu-
sion of rthe modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the 
Council has amended the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill which specifies the weapons 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture on its territory. No 
amendments to this list have been reported by 
1. Put by Mr. Haase on 15th April 1976. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 on 
the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 700, Rapporteur Mr. Haase. 
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the Council during 1976, the year covered by the 
annual report. 
13. The last amendment to this list, made by 
the Council on 26th September 1973, raised the 
tonnage of submarines which Germany is autho-
rised to manufacture on its territory from 450 
to 1,800 tons. Under the previous limit, Germany 
had also been authorised to manufacture up to 
six submarines not exceeding 1,000 tons and this 
quota of six submarines had subsequently been 
exported - four to Greece and two to Turkey -
as the Committee has previously reported. 1 
CHAPTER Ill 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
14. The Committee has always stressed the inade-
quate application of the provisions of the Brussels 
Treaty, and particularly Protocols Nos. Ill and 
IV, on the control of armaments. It is surprising 
to read in the Council's report that : 
"On various occasions during the year under 
review, the Council re-stated to the .Assembly 
the importance which they attach to the 
modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. 2 
Moreover, the determination of each of the 
WEU partners to fulfil the obligations 
entered into was reaffirmed in the speeches 
made by several ministers of the member 
governments to the Assembly. 
The Council continued to pay close attention 
to the implementation of the treaty and its 
protocols. 2 The various related probLems 
were regular items on their agenda. Thus, 
the different aspects and stages of imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreements appeared 
on the agenda for their meetings thirty-four 
times." 
whereas the same report mentions fields where 
the Agency does not exercise these activities : 
"The situation described in previous annual 
reports regarding certain armaments, 
remained unchanged in 1976. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons 
or, in one member State, to what that State 
calls "strategic forces". 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 
638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe. 
2. Rapporteur's italics. 
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The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
catagories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, onLy non-
prodUJCtion controls take place ; no quanti-
tative controls are made in this field since 
none of the member States concerned has 
declared possessing such armaments." 
15. The annual report subsequently adds : 
"(c) As the Convention for the due process 
of law 1 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the Agency 
at private concerns had, in 1976, as in 
previous years, to take the form of 'agreed 
control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency must give some six 
weeks' notice. This agreement has never been 
withheld." 2 
16. Agreement had always been given up to 1976, 
the year covered by the Council's report. 
17. It is nevertheless necessary to underline the 
basic weakness of controls on chemical weapons 
to which the Council itself has drawn attention 
in earlier reports: "in the absence of a due 
process of law, it cannot be claimed that the 
Agency's methods, particularly in the case of 
chemical weapons, have reached a fully satis-
factory state of development" 3 • A solution should 
therefore be found to allow satisfactory control 
of chemical and biological weapons. The govern-
ments concerned should ensure that the firms 
show greater willingness to accept the verifica-
tions undertaken by the Agency. The situation is 
more complicated where nuclear weapons are 
concerned. It is not very realistic to think that 
the French Government could be the only one 
to accept controls on its deterrent when this is 
not so for the United Kingdom or the United 
States. In fact, the juridica:l order instituted by 
the Brussels Treaty no longer corresponds in full 
to the new situation created by the formation of 
the French nuclear deterrent force. This is no 
doubt the reason why France has not thought 
fit to authorise the control by the Agency of the 
forces that France styles "strategic". The Council 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member States of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to 
carry out its control effectively and making provision 
for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. 
IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols 
signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris 
on 14th December 1957). [Ratified by six States only : 
Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom.] 
2. Rapporteur's italics. 
3. Eighteenth annual report of the Council (for 1972), 
Document 598. 
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has taken note of the statement of the French 
representatives on this subject. It should however 
be appreciated that with the exception of these 
forces, the Agency, while not applying controls to 
nuclear weapons, because it has never :received 
the Council's authorisation to do so, does apply 
controls to the other delivery vehicles (missiles, 
aircraft, guns, etc.), whether fitted with conr 
ventional or nuclear warheads. 
18. In any event, according to the annual report : 
"The Agency's basic assumption in this 
respect, which is supported by the observa-
tions of previous years, is that the under-
takings and declarations of member countries 
are being honoured. Clearly, if any doubt 
existed on this point, control measures would 
have to be increased ... " 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments 
19. Although the political reticence of govern-
ments, or of some of them, limits the Agency's 
scope, it is active and efficient in the fields open 
to it and deserves the Committee's praise. It 
may be said that controls are applied in respect 
of conventional weapons on the mainland of 
Europe (including aircraft) and various missile 
systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and 
warheads - although, of course, the warheads 
concerned remain in United States custody and 
are not subject to control by the Agency. The 
Council confirmed the situation in reply to 
Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 
27th May 1976. 
20. The number of inspections carried out each 
year by the Agency shows no reduction in its 
activities. 
CHAPTER IV 
Standing Armaments Committee 
(a) General 
21. It is evident that an important factor in the 
activities of WEU in 1976 was the adoption by 
the Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels 
on 31st May of a mandate for the Standing Arma-
ments Committee. The Committee was instructed 
to submit to the Permanent Council, before the 
end of 1976, a detailed outline programme for a 
descriptive analysis of the situation of the arma-
ments industry in member countries. The purpose 
of this analysis was to define the various cate-
gories of equipment coming under the heading 
of "armaments", collect economic data on arma-
ments industries and describe the various legal 
statuses of armaments firms in these countries. 
22. The text of the mandate was transmitted by 
the CounciL to the Assembly on 25th October 
1976. It may be wondered why it took the Council 
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Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
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---
1961 29 15 12 66 7 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 60 
--
6 * * * * * 78 7 * * * * * 70 8 * * * * * 79 9 * * * * * 77 
--
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * 82 72 1 * * * * * * * * * * 82 72 2 * * * * * 66 3 * * * * * 66 
4 * * * * * 71 5 * * * * * 72 1976 * * * * * 71 
Note a, b: from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary 
table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition 
depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects 
no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets 
of figures (old and new style - a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
Sources: Figures for 1961-65 are derived from the published annual reports of the Council. 
Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 
to 1976 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommen-
dation 213 of the Assembly, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor dis-
crepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance. 
* Confidential information not for publication. 
five months to communicate a text of this nature 
which, if read, is seen to contain nothing which 
cannot be revealed to the public. It is learnt from 
Chapter II.B.3 of the annual report of the 
Council that the outline programme was submit-
ted to the Council on 9th February 1977. More-
over, the Counci1's reply to Recommendation 293 
indicates that "the Assembly will be duly 
informed of their conclusions". 
23. Fin.alJ.y, your Rapporteur conc1udes from the 
information gleaned in the course of the dinner 
given by the Council for members of the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly on 26th April 
1977 and at the press conference held on the same 
day by Mr. Taittinger, French Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of 
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the Council, that the Counci1 actually adopted the 
outline programme at its ministerial meeting on 
26th April. He has not ascertained whether it 
was adopted in the form prepared by the SAC 
or whether the Council amended it. 
24. It should in fact be underlined that so far 
the Council has given the Assembly no specific 
information on what has happened about the SAC 
mandate since 31st May 1976. It is essential that 
the Council let the Assembly know as soon as 
possible how it intends to inform the Assembly 
on the one hand of the substance of the outline 
programme submitted by the SAC at the begin~ 
ning of 1977 and, on the other, what kind of 
decision it has taken on it : has the Council 
merely decided to apply it or has it been amended, 
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cut down or added to ? Had the Council supplied 
this information earlier, your Rapporteur would 
probably not have had to tackle certain matters 
which may already have been settled to his 
satisfaction. In any event, it would have allowed 
him to be more specific in his suggestions on the 
mandate given to the SAC. 
25. In its published form there is no explanatory 
memorandum to the SAC mandate. However, 
addresses to the .Aasembly by a number of min-
isters clarify to some e~tent the motivations of at 
least some members of the Council, particularly 
the address by Mr. Van Elsiande, Minister for 
Foreign Mfairs and Development Co-operation 
of Belgium on 5th December 1976. Mr. Van 
Elslande stressed that the European Community 
was feeling it increasingly necessary to develop 
its responsibilities in defence matters in order to 
meet the ever greater economic and financial 
difficulties now being encountered by European 
armaments-producing firms. According to the 
Belgian Minister, it is therefore a matter of 
urgency to promote a pooling of each member 
country's efforts in this sector of the economy. 
26. Mr. Taittinger, French Secretary of State 
for Foreign Mfairs, speaking at the November 
1976 session, defined the aims of the French 
Government as follows : 
"We are awaiting the SAC's proposals with 
al'l the more interest since our governments 
must have at their disposal the fullest pos-
sible information before deciding on a real 
policy of co-operation. Such co-operation, as 
your Assembly knows, means something quite 
precise to the French Government : its pur-
pose is that the States of Europe should 
jointly produce equipment that will meet 
their common needs ; and it must evoke a 
real wilJ to act as Europeans in a field 
where each of us has a major interest in 
safeguarding his own technological and 
industrial capacity." 
27. Thus in slightly different terms, the two 
ministers gave what were on the whole very 
similar indications about what they expected of 
the task given to the SAC. Although perhaps 
less explicit on these points, Mr. Thorn and 
Mr. W!schnewski expressed themselves in the 
same sense during the November session. 
28. Moreover, all the ministers specified that 
the new task of the SAC should in no event 
duplicate ,the work of the independent European 
programme group for promoting co-operation on 
armaments matters between the European mem-
bers of NATO from a military angle. Answering 
a question by Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Taittinger 
defined the aims of the independent European 
programme group as follows : 
"The basic aim of the independent European 
programme group is to study specific co-oper-
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ation programmes. It was with this in mind 
that the independent European programme 
group set out to collect and analyse inform-
ation relating to national armaments plans, 
which has enabled a number of areas for 
technological co-operation to be identified. 
In each of the fields deemed to be promising 
a group of experts has been set up to deter-
mine the real chances of working out joint 
projects involving several partners." 
And he added : 
"Even if the fields to be explored in the 
framework of the independent European 
programme group present some analogies 
with those which the SAC wi11. be called 
upon to study, duplication will be avoided 
by co-ordinating the work. It has been agreed 
that the group would, in its own studies, 
take into account those being carried out 
by the WEU Standing Armaments Commit-
,tee. As a matter of fact, I believe it may 
be affirmed that overlapping should be all 
the easier to avoid because, as you noted 
in your report on European union and 
WEU, the work of these two bodies is not 
conducted on the same plane. The study 
which the SAC has been asked to carry out 
is more of an economic and legal nature 
than a military one, and differs from that 
of the European programme group, which is 
directed towards the implementation of con-
crete projects for equipping the armed 
forces." 1 
(b) Co-ordinating the work of the SAC and the 
lE PG 
29. When the problem is put in this way, one 
of the points on which the WEU Council must 
take a clear decision emerges, i.e. how to co-ordin-
ate the work of the SAC and of the independent 
European programme group. It implies, to say 
the least, that there must be mUJtual information, 
essentially on the one hand to avoid duplication 
and on the other to ensure th8!t the basic defini-
tions of the two bodies' work are the same. How-
ever, for reasons which escape your Rapporteur, 
it would appear that the governments did not 
wish to set up an organic system of co-operation 
between the SAC and the independent European 
programme group. 
30. But such exchange of information is essen-
tial. It can obviously be done by extremely 
flexible means involving no institutional mea-
sures. However, a consensus of all the parti-
cipants is essential if any kind of procedure is 
to function satisfactorily. Naturalzy, it might 
be possible to manage with exchanges of inform-
ation between the two delegations from each 
country, the delegations to the IEPG informing 
the delegation to the SAC and vice yersa of 
1. Rapporteur's italics. 
what each body is doing. But such a procedure 
8eems both unhealthy and fragile because should 
for any reason information not be transmitted 
with equal satisfaction in all countries, useless 
divergencies might arise between the interpret-
ations of the various delegations. Only inform-
ation given by one voice can produce satisfactory 
resuLts. 
31. On the other hand, two forms of co-operation 
appear both possible and desirable, particularly 
since one does not preclude the other. The first 
would be for the "pilot country" for each of the 
IEPG's activities to be made responsible for 
providing the international secretariat of the 
SAC with information on the work for which 
that country has responsibility. This procedure 
would have the advantage of avoiding duplication 
at every stage of work. It might present certain 
difficulties if countries which are not members 
of WEU were "pilot countries" in the IEPG, 
but this does not appear to be the case at present. 
Should the case arise, another country might be 
made responsible for informing the SAC. 
32. The second solution would be to ask the 
chairman of the IEPG to keep the SAC informed. 
This would probably be a more cumbersome and 
less efficient procedure, but it in no way pre-
cludes the first solution. In any event, it is 
essential for the Council to indicate how it 
intends to avoid duplication which it says it 
wishes to avoid at all costs. 
(c) Means necessary for the SAG to operate 
33. Your Rapporteur's second remark is that, 
according to the documents transmitted to mem-
bers of the Assembly, there is no indication that 
the Standing Armaments Committee will be 
granted additional credits for pursuing its man-
date. This means that it cannot carry out major 
research work itself and will have to rely on 
the data SUJpplied by member countries. This 
means that the value of its work will depend 
very largely on the good wiU of the member 
governments, since only they will be responsible 
for deciding how much information should be 
released to the SAC, what definitions they will 
use and the classification to be accorded to such 
information. Each government wiH thus retain 
the ability to minimise the work of the SAC, 
which will consequently depend soleLy on the 
degree to which governments and their staff 
wish to co-operate. Should any of them have the 
slightest thought of reducing the scope of the 
study, it would be hard to see how the SAC 
could win. 
34. It is to be hoped that this is not and will not 
be the case in the future, but it is a point on 
which the Assembly must be particularLy vigi-
lant. The good will of the governments will 
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obviously be demonstrated in the level, status, 
number and ability of the persons representing 
them in the various activities of the SAC and the 
regularity of their participation in its work. For 
instance, the study undertaken by the SAC 
might be adopted at a meeting within that body 
of the Ministers of Defence who have never yet 
met in the framework of WEU. But before reach-
ing this stage, the governments must show a 
necessary degree of flexibility and wish for con-
tinuity by having senior-ranking officials or 
officers take part in the work of the S.A:C, and 
also by ensuring that their representatives are 
particularly competent in each of the matters 
studied, particularly from the economic and legal 
points of view. 
35. Nor should armaments research be neglected 
since it occupies an increasingly large place in 
the investment budgets of most European coun-
tries. The .SAC's work would fall short of one 
of its essential aims if it failed to include con-
sideration of the structure and financing of 
research with a view to achieving very close 
co-oper111tion in this field. It would obviously 
further the cause of co-operation to draw up 
statutes for a European research body and pre-
pare the way for a multinational financing 
system, which is essential if research is to be 
carried out on truly European lines. 
36. Last but certain1y not least, at every stage 
of the SAC's work its aims must remain clear 
to all participants. What counts is obviously not 
so much the study itself as the fact that it must 
lel!id to effective measures for protecting and 
strengthening Europe's economic and military 
defence capability. 
37. The fact that the independent European 
programme group has no secretariat whereas the 
SAC has an international secretariat should allow 
the latter, while remaining a WEU body, to have 
a certain degree of independence of action in 
order to form a wider and more independent 
entity in the service of this cause. This is a 
prospect which has always been advocated by 
the WEU Assembly, particularly in adopting 
Recommendation 291, in which it stated that in 
the light of present mutual undertakings and 
institutions it considered WEU to be the nucleus 
of the future European union in defence mat-
ters. 
38. There is no need to emphasise that in your 
Rapporteur's opinion there can be no question 
of envisaging this future European union in 
isolation from a defence policy defined and 
exercised by the Atlantic Alliance. The purpose 
is to strengthen the means avaiLable to the 
Alliance by consolidating its European pilJ.ar, 
which from every point of view conforms to the 
constantly-expressed wishes of the North Atlantic 
Council over the years. 
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Conclusions 
39. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set out in the draft recommendation. 
Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendatio-n 
40. The problems of replies to Assembly recom-
mendations is mentioned in paragraph 5 of this 
explanatory memorandum. 
Paragraph 2 
41. The problem of statistics on British force 
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commitments on the mainland of Europe is 
described in paragraphs 8 to 10. 
Paragraph 3 
42. The problem of controls is explained in para-
graphs 14 to 18. 
Paragraph 4 
43. The Committee's recommendations on the 
Standing Armaments Committee are baBed on the 
conclusions of Chapter IV and in particular 
paragraphs 29 to 35. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Critchley 
20th June 1977 
I. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Noting that the more important arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty have never been 
applied and that those that are have become unnecessary;". 
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"3. Abrogate the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty when the mutual defence 
obligations of that treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling 
all its external defence and foreign policy ;". 
Signed : Oritckley 
1. See 2nd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the ffDenty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert : 
20th June 1977 
"Continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of British land forces stationed on 
the mainland of Europe and consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the govern-
ments concerned it can indicate the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with 
the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty;". 
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed : Roper 
I. See 2nd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Part 1 agreed to; part 2 negatived). 
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Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems -
the Western Mediterranean 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 1 
to the report prepared by Mr. Mendelson, Rapporteur, 
and adopted on 9th May 1977 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 1 
by Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur 
Draft Recommendation 
20th June 1977 
on Western Europe's policy toUHJrcls Mediterranean problems - the Western Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
Having surveyed the present political situation in Spain ; 
Gratified that the elections on 15th June 1977 testified to the Spanish people's free choice in 
favour of a democratic parliamentary regime ; 
Recognising the important constitutional and political changes which have occurred in Spain 
during the last sixteen months ; 
Welcoming the moves towards a more liberal system of government which have taken place since 
1975, in particular the legalisation of political parties and of free and independent trade unions; 
Recognising the important advances made in the new preliminary constitution of Spain, and 
expressing the hope that Spain will proceed on its way towards a full system of parliamentary democracy ; 
Expressing the wish that Spain will soon be able to take its place in the process of building Europe ; 
Noting that Spain is in fact already associated with western defence policy in Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Examine closely the evolution of the Spanish political regime, the application of universal suffrage 
and guarantees of public freedom ; 
2. Insofar as there are valid guarantees regarding the establishment of democracy, promote the early 
participation of Spain in Western Europe's economic and political activities; 
3. Study the poBBibility of close co-operation between Spain and the WEU member countries. 
I. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 2 with 3 
abstentions. 
2. Membera of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodgera, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Abens, Amrehn (Alternate: Reddemann), Ariosto 
(Alternate : Maggioni), Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Faulds, Geaaner, Mrs. Godinache-
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Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate: Pecoraro), Grangier, 
von HaBBel, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci (Alternate: Treu), 
Neaaler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Peridier, Portheine, Segre, 
Urwin, Van Hoeylandt (Alternate: Hulpiau). 
N. B. The namea of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italicB. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur) 
Since the General Affairs Committee adopted 
the report submitted by Mr. Mendelson, three 
events have led the Committee to amend the text 
it adopted on 9th May 1977. 
1. Since Mr. Mendelson is no longer a member 
of the Assembly, another Rapporteur had to be 
asked to submit the General Affairs Committee's 
report. 
2. In its reply to Recommendation 292 received 
by the Assembly on 17th June, the WEU Council 
defined its position towards the new parliamen-
tary democracies which have recently come into 
being in Southern Europe as follows: 
"The importance of defence and of the pro-
motion of parliamentary democracy has 
frequently been reflected in the emphasis 
laid on these subjects during contacts 
between the representatives of the member 
oountries and those of other members of the 
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international community. In this context, the 
member countries of WEU have been 
specially attentive to their relations with the 
new parliamentary democracies which have 
recently come into being in Southern Europe. 
There is a growing likelihood that these 
democracies will take an increasing part in 
the process of European integration." 
3. The Spanish elections on 15th June 1977 
confirmed that since 1975 a very large majority 
of the Spanish people chose to follow a liberal, 
parliamentary course. The results of the elections, 
as published in the press on 18th June, are given 
at appendix. 
In view of these three events, the Committee 
felt it could express more detailed views on 20th 
June than it could on 9th May, and it has there-
fore decided to submit to the Assembly the draft 
recommendation herewith. 
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 746 
APPENDIX 
Spanish general elections on 15th June 1911 - Results for 95 % of the votes cast 1 
Beats Votes % 
Democratic Centre Union I65 6,020,993 47.I4 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party II9 4,998,827 33.7I 
Spanish Communist Party 20 I,582,022 5.7I 
Popular Alliance I7 I,449,09I 4.85 
Catalan Democratic Pact 9 436,564 
Basque Nationalist Party 8 274,52I 
Socialist Union 6 76I,625 I.6I 
Centre Independents 2 9I,094 
Democratic Centre - Catalan Christian Democracy 2 I60,966 
Catalan Esquerra I I33,803 
Left-Wing Basque I 59,335 
Left-Wing Democratic Front 254,872 
Christian Democrat Federation 243,566 
Democratic Socialist Alliance I26,305 
Other 939,5II 1.9 
1. Source: Diaro 16, 18th June 1977. 
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